Land of the Free (Part I) The Fundamental Fault that Underlies Tisha Ba'av

(ed: This was posted in Hebrew {with one citation from the Mei'am Lo'eiz in Ladino} pursuant to Chazal's dictate "...תנו רבנן ששה דברים נאמרו ב... ואין מגלין להן סוד...." {Pesachim 49b} If you read this, I think you will agree that this circumspection is appropriate.)

ידועים דברי חז"ל על סיבת חורבן בית שני : אבל בית שני שאנו בקיאים בו שהיו עוסקים בתורה ובמצות וגמילות חסדים מפני מה חרב מפני שהיתה בה שנאת חינם ללמדך ששקולה שנאת חנם כנגד שלש עבירות וכו' (יומא ט: עם הג' הב"ח) ואולם ענין זה מובא בשינוי ממשי בירושלמי (יומא א' א' ד:) וז"ל ...אלא שהיו אוהבין את הממון ושונאין אלו לאלו שנאת חנם וכו' וכעין זה בתוספתא. שילהי מנחות. וצ"ב אם יש כאן פלוגתא ואם שני הסיבות בירושלמי הם סיבות נפרדות או שאחד גרם לשני.

ומהמשך הירושלמי "וקשה היא שנאת חינם שהיא שקולה..." משמע שאהבת הממון גרם לשנאת חינם ואז שינאת חינם הביא לחורבן בהמ"ק. וכן כתב הנצי"ב הרחב דבר דברים ד' י"ד "...כך חורבן בית שני שהגיע ע"י שנאת חנם, ועיקרו היה אהבת ממון יותר מדי ... ומזה הגיעו לשפיכת דמים בהיתר ... היו ג"כ עיקר המחטיאים את הרבים ת"ח גדולי תורה ..." וע"ע בהרח"ד במדבר ל"ו ל"ד ובהעמק דבר דברים ל"ב ו' ודבריו הכואבים בהקדמה לספר בראשית. ומבהיל על הרעיון ש"אהבת ממון יותר מדי" הביא לידי שנאת חנם שהביא לידי קנאות כזאת שהת"ח וגדולי תורה הרגו אנשים ע"פ "דעת תורה" שבאמת לא היו חייבים מיתה: ובלשון הנצי"ב "רציחה בהיתר." כדאי לשים לב שהנצי"ב מעמיס ענין זה על "ת"ח גדולי תורה" של דורות התנאים

ואולם קשה ממסקנת הגמ' סוטה (כ"א . ) דתורה בעידן דעסיק בה מגנא ומצלא, וא"כ איך לא הגין תורתם של גדולי התורה עליהם, דהא יש לתאר שהיו מקיימים בעצמם והגית בם יומם ולילה. ואולי י"ל דהיות והיה להם אהבת ממון יותר מדי היו עוסקים בפרנסתם יותר מדי ואז לא היתה נחשבת עסק זה כהכשר מצוה דת"ת ונפלו אז לחטאים נוראים

אבל כד נדייק נראה שיש דרך אחרת בזה, בהנחה שסיבת מיתת תלמידי ר"ע היה קשור לסיבת החורבן. וידוע מש"כ ביבמות ס"ב: שמתו על שלא נהגו כבוד זה לזה. ובבראשית רבא (ס"א ג') הובא בסגנון אחר: למה, שהיתה עניהם צרה אלו באלו...אמר להם [ר"ע לתלמידים שהקים תחתיהם] בני , הראשונים לא מתו אלא שהיתה עניהם צרה [בתורה] אלו לאלו. תנו דעתכם שלא תעשו כמעשיהם. עמדו ומלאו כל הארץ תורה. ויש לדייק - וכן משמע בקהלת רבא פרק י"א פסוק ו' - שזה שמלאו כל הארץ תורה היתה ההיפך ממעשה תלמידי ר"ע הראשונים. וכן הובא במעם לועז (בראשית כ"ט כ"ז) בשם היפת תואר, שאינו תחת ידי כעת, שחטא התלמידים היתה שלא רצו ללמד תורה זה לזה ובעיקר לא ללמד חידושי תורה שלהם לתלמידים אחרים

ואיך יתכן שתלמידי ר"ע לא רצו ללמד תורה זה לזה ולא אחרים? המשך אי"ה יבוא מחר

(Here is the link to Part II)

Va'eschanan, Devarim 6:7. Ve'shinantam Le'vanecha.

The mitzva of Limud Hatorah is derived from here and from Vehaya Im Shamo’a’s ‘Velimadetem’ below in Devarim 11:19.

Reb Akiva Eiger in the teshuvos (starting at #29) discusses whether kesiva is ke'dibbur, whether writing has the same halachic status as speech, regarding Oaths, Counting the Omer, and other things. Reb Akiva Eiger holds that it is not ke’dibbur, and that you do not fulfill the mitzva of Talmud Torah by thinking the words of Torah.

He brings a contrary opinion from Teshuvos Shev Yakov, who holds that it is ke’dibbur. The Shev Yaakov brings proof to his opinion from the halacha that one who thinks in learning does not have to make a Birchas Hatorah, but one who writes Torah does have to make a bracha. The difference must be that thinking is not the same as speech, but writing is, and therefore requires birkas hatorah. But Reb Akiva Eiger shlogs op the raya. He explains that we learn the Mitzva of Talmud Torah from the words veshinantam and velimadetem; both of these words mean both to study and to teach. This is why we exclude thinking, hirhur, because you can’t teach anyone Torah by being meharher in learning. On the other hand, when you write, you certainly can teach others through your writing, and therefore it is included in the mitzvah of talmud Torah. Thus, the Shev Yakov’s raya is not good; The Shev Yaakov held that the Mitzva is dibbur, and the difference between thinking and writing is that thinking is not like dibbur, while writing is like dibbur. Reb Akiva Eiger explains that by Torah, there is no din of dibbur at all. The only din is that it has to be a limud which could be used to teach others. This is the only reason that we are mema’eit hirhur. But in the case of other dinim, like sefira or sh'vua, which do require dibbur, ke'siva would not be enough.

We see from here a very interesting thought; that limud hatorah has to have in it the ability to teach others. Limud which is not spread, or a lomeid who does not make an effort to teach others, is missing the ikkar of talmud Torah. If a person learns Torah, and has no influence on the people around him, there is something wrong with his Torah. If your children are not at least as great as you- relative to their capacity and the circumstances-- then it’s a raya that your own limud hatorah was flawed

☞Note, also, that R’ Akiva Eiger wrote the tshuva on the day he got married, as he says in the beginning of the tshuva

Rabbi Moshe Kletenick of Seattle once spoke at his nephew's bris, and said that he heard once that the Rambam in the Yad somewhere says that one brings his child to Hakhel “leiro’os bo,” to be seen with his child. He said over that this means that the parent brings the child to demonstrate that he is a shomer Torah, and he shows that by bringing a child that is being properly raised to do mitzvos.

Sanhedrin 99a: “kol halomeid Torah ve’eino melamda harei zeh bichlal ki dvar Hashem bazah.” One who learns Torah, and does not teach it to others, he is included in the phrase "the word of God he has disgraced."

So whenever we learn, we need to remember that we can't pat ourselves on the back and say that we're good boys, we've been mekayeim the mitzva of Talmud Torah. The Mitzva of Talmud Torah is far deeper and broader than learning alone. It includes learning, incorporating the mitzva so that it is a part of our mind and our emotions, bringing what we've learned to our real life, and teaching others what we've learned. We say this every day in Birchos Kri'as Shma: Lilmod, le'lameid, lishmor ve'la'asos.

In a guest post, Rabbi Doctor Psychrolutes marcidus brought an Reb Yosef Ber Soloveitchik's amazing diyuk that the Rambam is meramez exactly this thought in 1 Talmud Torah:1-4. See http://havolim.blogspot.com/2009/07/land-of-free-part-ii.html


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Devarim. From Lo ish devarim to Sefer Devarim; A Guest Post by Rabbi Joshua Hoffman. (annotated)

Rabbi Hoffman kindly contributed this Dvar Torah, which addresses the evolution of Moshe Rabbeinu from "Lo ish devarim anochi" to "ve'eileh hadevarim asher diber Moshe." Whence this uncharacteristic eloquence? (See Medrash Rabba here and Shem MiShmuel.)

The simple answer, of course, is that Hashem cured Moshe Rabbeinu of his impediment either before yetzias Mitzrayim, or along with all the other physical flaws that were cured at Mattan Torah. The simplest answer, as usual, is not the correct answer. For one thing, Moshe Rabbeinu was not a ba'al mum (see Sotah 12b and Bechoros 45a). Secondly, we find that Hashem agreed with Moshe and sent Aharon to represent the Jews before Pharaoh, which indicates that whatever flaw Moshe Rabbeinu perceived in himself, there was no divine intention to reverse it by fiat. Rabbi Hoffman here presents an entirely new perspective on what, exactly, Moshe's difficulty was, and what changed between Mitzrayim and Arvos Mo'av.

Thank you, Rabbi Hoffman, for your contribution to our blog.

(Rabbi Hoffman was untimely niftar in May, 2017. Here is a link to the hespeidim at his levaya. Yehi zichro baruch.)

The book of Devarim consists of orations given by Moshe to the Jewish people shortly before his death as they prepared to enter the Holy Land. Some of these orations rebuke to the people for their past deeds, some instruct them on the performance of various mitzvos, and some are blessings and curses that will come to the nation in the future depending on the loyalty it demonstrates to these mitzvos and to God's covenant with them.

What stands out in all of these orations is Moshe's adeptness of speech. Lest one think that everything he said was simply a repetition of what was placed in his mouth by God to say, as was the case in regard to the first four books of the Torah, the Talmud tells us that Moshe said the section of blessings and curses in the book of Devarim on his own. The commentators explain that God later told him to write down in the Torah what he had said. Thus, the integrity of the divine nature of the Torah is still maintained. Some commentators take this Talmudic statement in a broader sense, and understand it to mean that the entire book of Devarim was said by Moshe on his own, and was later said over to him by God to be written in the Torah.

Whether we understand this Talmudic statement in a strict, limited sense, or in a broader sense, it certainly tells us that Moshe did not suffer from a lack of communication skills. This seems to be in conflict with what Moshe himself told God when He first asked him to speak to the Jewish people, as recorded in parshas Shemos and again in parshas Vaeira. There, Moshe told God "I am not a man of words… I am heavy of mouth and heavy and speech" (Shemos 4:10). How can we reconcile these contradictory messages?

Rabbi Boruch Epstein author of the Torah Temimah, discusses this issue in his work Tosefes Beracha, which originally appeared as a series of newspaper columns on the weekly Torah reading, He writes that when Moshe expressed reluctance to serve as God's messenger to Pharaoh, it wasn't because of a total inability to speak, but because of his unfamiliarity with royal protocol.

As an illustration, he mentions a story he heard from his father in the name of Rabbi Ya'akov Berlin, who was the father of Rabbi Epstein's illustrious uncle, the Netziv. Rabbi Berlin related that Rabbi Eliezer Fleckles, illustrious author of responsa Teshuvah MiAhavah and a student of the famed Rabbi Yechezkel Landau, chief rabbi of Prague, witnessed the scene of the audience that Rabbi Landau's son and successor, R. Shmuel, had with the Austrian monarch, Joseph I, who had been a great admirer of his father's. When Joseph asked R .Shmuel if he was as wise as his father, he answered 'much less.' The monarch was not pleased with this answer, because it implied that R. Yechezkel was deficient in knowledge and R. Shmuel was even more deficient. The correct thing for R.Shmuel to have said was 'my father was much wiser than I am.'

It was knowledge of this kind of scrupulously ceremonious protocol that Moshe felt he was lacking. Even though he had grown up in Pharaoh's house, it had been many decades since he left, and, therefore he was unfamiliar with the workings of the royal court. However, when it came to speaking to his own people, Moshe was certainly able to convey the message properly, as we see throughout the book of Devorim.

Actually, Rabbi Epstein's explanation is somewhat similar to that of the Rashbam in his commentary to parshas Shemos (4:10). He writes that Moshe was not able to pronounce Egyptian, which was the royal language, properly. It is inconceivable, continues the Rashbam, to say that Moshe, through whom the Torah was given, had a speech impediment and could not speak properly in any language at all. Rashbam then goes on to say that we should not pay attention to outside books. The Rashbam is probably referring to the medieval midrashic-style compilation, Divrei HaYamim D'Moshe, which does include a story according to which Moshe did have a physical speech impediment.

(It is interesting to note, however, that Rashbam does accept, in his commentary to parshas Beha'aloscha, the account - also included in that compilation - that Moshe was married to the queen of Kush, and it was about that marriage which Miriam and Aharon were complaining when they spoke of Moshe's wife, the Kushite woman. Rabbi Avrohom Ibn Ezra, however, in parshas Shemos (2:22) writes that the Kushite woman mentioned in parshas Beha'aloscha is Tzipporah, daughter of Yisro, mentioned in parshas Shemos, and adds that one should not pay attention to what is written in Divrei Hayomim D'Moshe.)

In regard to Moshe's argument that he was heavy of mouth and of speech, Ibn Ezra explains, similarly to Rashbam, that he had trouble pronouncing the Egyptian language. According to Ibn Ezra, then as well, Moshe's reason for not wanting to speak to Pharaoh had no relevance to his ability to speak to his own people.

Rav Ya'akov Moshe Charlop, in his Mei Marom to parshas Devarim, offers a completely different approach to the phenomenon of Moshe's great oratorical skills, as demonstrated in the book of Devarim, in contrast to his earlier reluctance to speak, as advanced in the book of Shemos. Moshe, writes Rav Charlop, believed, in his humility, that all of the abilities he had, including his ability to speak, came through the merit of the Jewish nation. Because of this, he did not want to use his special talent of speech until it was fully relevant to them. Rav Charlop explains that the exile in Egypt was really an exile of the power of speech. Although Moshe did use his power of speech to some extent once the Torah was given, since redemption had come to a certain culmination at that point, the complete redemption would not come until the people were ready to enter Eretz Yisroel. This is so, he continues, because the purpose of the Jewish nation is act as God's witnesses in this world, to speak of God's wonders, as the prophet Yeshaya says, " You are my witnesses, the word of God " (Yeshaya 43:12) and, again, in a later verse, "this nation which I have fashioned for Myself, that they might declare My praises" (Yeshaya, 43,:21). Because the optimum location for the fulfillment of Israel's task of relating God's praises is Eretz Yisroel, their complete redemption could not take place until they entered the land, at which time the power of speech could be used to its maximum effect. It was, therefore, only in connection with that step of the conclusion of their redemption from Egypt that Moshe believed he would have the ability to fully exercise his power of speech, which he derived from the nation.

We may add that this explanation is particularly meaningful according to the Ramban, who writes in his introduction to devarim that the entire book is geared toward the life of the nation in Eretz Yisroel. Moreover, it is the Ramban who says that the the entire book of Devarim was said by Moshe, and later repeated to him by God.

The notion that the exile in Egypt was an exile of speech is actually found in the Zohar (Raya Mehemna, Vaeira), and is elaborated upon by Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik zt"l in his essay " Redemption, Prayer and Talmud Torah," (Tradition, Spring 1978, pps. 55-72).The Zohar, cited by R. Soloveitchik, says that although God told Moshe that He would be with him when he went to Pharaoh, Moshe countered that he was on the level of 'voice,' but his utterance was in bondage to Pharaoh. R.Soloveitchik explained that before Moshe appeared, the Jewish people had no voice at all, and were unable to express even their fundamental human needs. All they could do was give out a shriek, much like an animal in pain. When Moshe appeared on the scene, he gave voice to their suffering, and defended them. However, they were still unable to bring out the meaning behind their existence, their teleological destiny. This could not happen until they received the Torah at Sinai. Only through study and prayer, writes Rabbi Soloveitchik, can the nation express and realize its true, ultimate needs. "A history-making people," he writes, "is one that leads a speaking, story-telling, communing, free existence" (page 55).

Rav Soloveitchik's approach to the exile and redemption of speech, as presented in the Zohar, provides us with an insight into Moshe's contention that he was not able to speak to Pharaoh, but it does not explain why Moshe waited to exhibit his great oratorical skills until the end of the nation's sojourn in the wilderness. Rav Charlop's approach introduces the added elements of Moshe's belief that his individual talents drew their source from the nation and should be used only in connection with their national purpose, and the importance of Eretz Yisroel as providing the stage for the fulfillment of Yisroel's national purpose of declaring the praises of God. By bringing these two elements into the equation, Rav Charlop shows that it was only in connection with the nation's development as a dynamic gestalt entity in Eretz Yisroel that speech would be used for its ultimate purpose, and true redemption would finally be achieved. Therefore, Moshe waited until the nation was about to enter the land that until he demonstrated his oratorical skills, in service of the nation from which he drew those skills. Although Rav Charlop does not say this, perhaps we can add that it is because of the crucial role that speech plays in the destiny of the nation, that it was the misuse of speech in the incident of the spies, as recalled by Moshe in parshas Devarim, that prevented them from entering the land for forty years until a new generation, untainted by that sin, arose. Perhaps, too, this is why we read of this sin on the Shabbos before Tisha B'Av, the day on which we mourn the destruction of the Temple, the focal point of our connection to God and our destiny as a nation created to declare His praises. May it be speedily rebuilt in our days.

(editor's note: There's a difference between "don't really know" and "really don't know."
I really don't know what Rav Yosef Ber means, and I don't really know why Rav Charlop says that Yetzias Mitzrayim was not an optimal opportunity for Moshe Rabbeinu to use his Ko'ach Hadibbur.
Even so, I think I can try to elaborate on the idea that Moshe Rabbeinu's power of speech stemmed from his relationship with Klal Yisrael:
In the parsha of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven, R' Berel Povarsky (in his Bod Kodesh Bamidbar 32:1) brings the Medrash (Bamidbar 22:7) to the effect that there are three matonos in the world; wisdom, might, and wealth. One who has any one of these has everything. But that is only so when they are gifts from Hashem and come “b’ko’ach haTorah.” But “g’vuraso v’ashro shel basar vadam eino klum.” The Medrash gives as an example two chachamim who were utterly lost, because their matanah was not from Hashem, but rather “chotfin osoh lahem.”

He says that we see a chidush that there are two kinds of chochmah, one a gift from Hashem and miko’ach haTorah, and one of "chatifah."  He uses this to explain a Medrash in Vayishlach, Medrash Breishis 81:2, that someone was sent to be a poseik in a town, and they made him a big platform with a seat on top, and he totally lost his chachmas haTorah. When he went back, he explained to his Rebbi that the kavod caused him to become haughty and he forgot his Torah. Also, he brings Psachim 66b “kol hamisyaheir...chachmaso mistalekes mimenu.” He says that this is only true on Torah and Chachma that are a matas Hashem and come miko’ach haTorah. But the other type is less sensitive and will not necessarily be affected by gaivoh.

This is an insight which suggests several interesting things.

1. Not all great accomplishment is a matanah from Hashem. One can snatch these things.

2. The idea that certain bad behavior or middos deleteriously affects chachma might only apply to the chachma that stems from kedusha and tahara. But the other type of chochma is not necessarily affected by these things.

3. Just as Shimshon's strength was completely unrelated to his physical traits, Moshe Rabbeinu's talents were gifts from Hashem; when he became angry, the flow of wisdom became occluded and his wisdom departed. And, hanogei'ah le'inyaneinu, when he felt that his ko'ach hadibbur was not pivotal to an imminent geula of Klal Yisrael and to their greatest benefit, he became mute.

B'nos Midyan and Banos in General: A Guest Post (annotated)

While we are waiting for the "certain extravagantly talented scholar" to show up, perhaps I (editor's note: the writer, from whom I solicited this post while I try to regain my balance, is in fact that "extravagantly talented scholar") can contribute some random thoughts (editor's note: our guest writer is being modest, as will soon become evident.)

While I had originally wanted to focus on the complex issue of precisely why the בנות מדין were executed, regardless of whether they had actually participated in illicit relations, I decided that perhaps this is not a topic appropriate for internet exposure at this time. For those who are curious, or perhaps are involved in a situation where it is נוגע להלכה , some sources are רמב"ם פי"ב אסו"ב ה"י, כלי יקר and the חתם סופר on the פרשה/ There is also an extensive discussion in אג"מ אבה"ע חלק א' סי' ל"ח.

Actually, and again I don't propose to discuss this on the internet, the חקירה in the אג"מ (also mentioned in several places in the מנ"ח) may be the reason the פקודי החיל were unsure as to where, how, and whom to execute. This would be an answer to the question in the משך חכמה as to precisely what their (mis)calculation was.

However, there is one aspect of this episode which has practical ramifications in many of our lives.

At the end of או"ח רכ"ה is the הלכה

הרואה אילנות טובות ובריות נאות אפילו עכו"ם...אומר בא"י אמ"ה שככה לו בעולמו

One who sees beautiful trees and beautiful creatures-- even an idol worshiper-- says the following blessing: Blessed art Thou God, King of the Universe, "She'kacha Lo be'olamo," Who has such in His world.

Now בריות נאות immediately, and unfortunately, brings to [my] mind not images of a graceful gazelle, nor of a beautiful flower, but rather, of members of the opposite gender. (editor's note: obviously, this natural preference proves that aesthetic pleasure is not just an appreciation of symmetry or perfect health and functionality, because those traits are equally evident in a good horse or a good car.) In fact, between the מ"ב and the ביאור הלכה, it seems clear that the חפץ חיים has this in mind, albeit with great reservations.

On the other hand, the ערוך השולחן is clear:

ואף שאין להסתכל באשה וכו' זהו דרך הסתכלות הרבה אבל ראייה בעלמא הא בעל כרחה רואה ולית לן בה

This is based on the מעשים of רבן גמליאל and רבי עקיבא in עבודה זרה כ. Although there a ברכה in not mentioned explicitly, the (same/similar) episode is mentioned in the ירושלמי הרואה הלכה א' and there the נוסך is ובירך עליה. This is probably why the דברי חמודות , ברכות הרואה סי' י"ב ס"ק ל"ד , brings the ירושלמי rather than the בבלי.

(editor's note: I recently mentioned this bracha to my shiur. The following day, two members of the shiur independently came over and told me that they had no trouble getting to Mei'ah brachos the day before.)

However, in contradistinction to the ערוך השולחן, the מ"ב in the שער הציון quotes the

חיי אדם (ס"ג א') as saying the the minhag today is not to make most ברכות הראייה/ The מ"ב suggests that this is because the ברכה requires "...נאות ביותר...ומי יכול לדקדק..."

אני הקטן

respectfully disagree, and claim to able to be מדקדק sufficiently and with great dedication and deliberation. However, this is where the problem truly begins, and where the aforementioned reservations of the מ"ב may stem from.

Regarding the קרבן of the פקודי החיל, רש"י refers to שבת ס"ד. , where the פקודי החיל tell משה רבינו, אם מידי עבירה יצאנו מידי הרהור לא יצאנו"." If seeing the בריאה נאה of the human female persuasion engenders הרהור, then we come to the issue of אין זה מברך אלא מנאץ. And if not, then perhaps there is indeed a lack of נאות ביותר. I am certain that the members of this audience include great פרושים who have numbed themselves to the blandishments of this יצר הרע , but then they are lacking the factor explicit in the לבוש

כמו שהוא העניין בבריות טובות שיש לו הנאה לרואה ומברך על הנאתו...".

"...just as the idea is with beautiful creatures, that the observer has pleasure in seeing them and he makes a blessing on his enjoyment."

How does one safely skate the line between הנאה and הרהור? Even in a situation of אונס, such as which the גמרא states occured with רבן גמליאל and רבי עקיבא, it seems that הרהור is a problem. (editor's note: The Gemara there says that RSBG and RA, upon seeing beautiful women, made this bracha. The Gemara asks "But it is forbidden to gaze upon women because it generates within a man lustful thoughts, and lustful thoughts- regarding a women with whom you are not married- is forbidden! The Gemara answers that they only looked at these women when they, or the women, turned a corner, and so their gaze inadvertantly rested upon these women for a moment.) Similarly, the מלחמת מדין certainly qualified as an אונס and nevertheless a כפרה was required.

In the שעור דעת "קרבנות" (חלק ב' צ'), the מהרי"ל בלאך deals with this episode and this point. He notes the greatness of רבן גמליאל and רבי עקיבא who didn't eradicate the admiration of the beauty, but rather, instead of focusing on the object, immediately redirected their emotions to Hashem, the creator of this beauty. Indeed, on a separate point, this is the only way to avoid the problem of לא תחנם, which according to many poskim is a דאורייתא. This is explicit in both the ירושלמי and the Bavli, . ואכמ"ל.

It seems, לעניות דעתי, that anyone who cannot meet this criterion should probably follow the חיי אדם and משנה ברורה: don't make the ברכה.

Incidentally, this is also an explanation of why יעקב was saying קריאת שמע when he was reunited with יוסף: he took the overwhelming emotion of joy he was feeling and refocused it into his relationship with the Ribbono Shel Olam.

בדרך צחות, there is another problem. In several places, חז"ל mention that one of the consequences of the חורבנות is that Jewish women are no longer as attractive as their counterparts outside of the religion. For example, in איכא רבתי , the מדרש relates that one זונה forgave her coworker every insult except that she said she looked Jewish. [פרק א' פסוק י"א].

This would probably result in שככה לו בעולמו being recited primarily upon seeing non-Jewish women, which would be an insult to Jewish women. Note that the two episodes in the גמרא focus on encounters of the non-Jewish kind. If the point was just that the ברכה applied to non-Jews and women, a single case would have been sufficient, as is found in the ירושלמי.

And lest you think this is not a serious problem halachically, consider the מהרש"א עבודה זרה נ"ה. ח"א ד"ה כלום He posits that the קנאה of פנחס was both for the issue of בעל פעור, and for the fact that the בני ישראל were being מזנה with בנות מואב הפחותים"/" I.e., he killed זמרי because he insulted Jewish femininity by shacking up with a non-Jewish lowlife (rather than with a nice Jewish woman????!). This is what הבועל ארמית קנאים פוגעים בו s about!

This is not just aggadic דרוש. In the אגרות משה mentioned above, ר' משה invokes this פשט in his analysis of why קנאים פוגעים בו does not continue after the זנות is terminated.

If so, one must be very leery of doing anything that insults Jewish women, both from a halachic and from an actuarial perspective. As long as the expression "שיין וי א שיקסע" has currency, it would be appropriate to refrain from reciting the ברכה of שככה לו בעולמו .

Then of course there is the story that everybody claims is absolutely true and happened in his Yeshiva when he was there. It seems that a bochur noticed an attractive young lady at a חתונה and went over to her with the line, "When I saw you, I immediately made the ברכה of שככה לו בעולמו." She looked him up and down with total disdain and responded, "And when I saw you, I made ברוך משנה הבריות."

In any case, de gustibus non est disputandum, or על קול מראה וריח אין להתווכח בלע"ז .

The following picture was from an article on creatures that "nature" blessed with an extra measure of ugly, and yet I find the subject rather touching. This is a blobfish, found in deep waters near Australia and New Zealand. For some reason, I look at it and think of an alter Yid. That nose! Fish don't have noses!!! It MUST be a גלגול.

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/galleries/the_worlds_ugliest_animals_/the_worlds_ugliest_animals_.html#ph3

This entry is a hack: the owner of the site is not responsible for its contents; the poster is generally not responsible.



(editor's notes:

1. There is a machlokes whether one makes "shekacha lo be'olamo on something that was created contrary to Halacha, such as a mamzer or a hybrid. The She'eilos Ya'avetz 1:63 says you do, just as you would make a birkas haneh'enin if you eat a fruit from a kila'ei ilanos tree, but others argue. See Halacha Ravachas 265:2.



2. A book was published in In 2007called “Only a Promise of Happiness”, by Alexander Nehamas, professor of philosophy at Princeton. He talks about the evolution of the philosophical approach to beauty, beginning with Plato, who, in Phaedrus, describes how the sight of a beautiful (girl) could arouse a state of emotional exaltation and rapture, causing the viewer to forsake all else. Over time, Plato argued, the desire to posses a particular beautiful individual could lead to a “love of all the beauty of the world” and ultimately to a “longing for goodness and truth.”



As Michael J. Lewis said in his review in the Wall Street Journal on April 14-15, 07, “Plato’s association of beauty with both carnal experience and moral enlightenment is alien to modern sensibilities. These days we can imagine beauty leading to ungovernable rapture but not moral goodness. The modern aesthetic encounter, as Mr. Nehamas describes it, is a morally neutral affair, divested of ethical content.”



Chazal, however, were more 'evolved' than either Plato or Professor Nehamas. Chazal teach us that the examined life requires that aesthetic encounters be invested with spiritual content.)



3. Thank you, guest poster, for three things. For your interesting analysis of the bracha on human beauty; for providing an example of something you would make Meshaneh Habriyos on; and for not providing an example for She'kacha lo be'olamo. Although I would have suggested this naughty example of feminine pulchritude:

)

T'nai Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven

In Parshas Mattos, we learn about the deal Moshe Rabbeinu made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven, where they were given the just-conquered transjordan but only on condition that they don't go home until the rest of the land of Israel was conquered.

From the form of the condition we learn many laws of T'na'im. One of them is "Hein kodem le'lahv," that the condition has to state the positive before the negative. That is, Moshe said "If you join your brethren in their war of conquest, then you will keep this land. If you don't, this land will be taken away and divided equally among all the people of Israel. Yes before no, Positive before negative, "if you join" before "if you don't".

The Taz and the Shach are the two great commentators on Yoreh Dei'ah. Often, they disagree. The Taz wrote an introduction to his work, and in middle of the introduction, he remarks that he has an interesting dvar torah about the laws of T'na'im, which he then writes.

The Shach, in his Nekudos Hakesef, argues on the Taz's introduction. And the Shach's son also argues on the Taz, but for different reasons. And the Gilyon Hamahrsha suggests a far-out-in-left-field answer in response to the Taz.

There are plenty of musmachim that know Yoreh Dei'ah very well that are unaware of this interesting viku'ach; the Shach and the Taz couldn't wait to start arguing, and the Gilyon Maharsha couldn't wait to start making tzushtells.

The Taz:
Brings Tosfos' (Kiddushin 62) kashe: why, by Sotah, does the Kohen say "Im lo shachav" (if you were not unfaithful, then you will be unharmed) first, when there's a rule of hein kodem le'lav? Tosfos answers that Hein, the positive, does not mean active as opposed to passive. It means positive in the sense of desired. Since we would rather that she was innocent, lo shachav is called hein, positive.
The Taz says this cannot be, because the Gemara (Gittin 75), talking about a conditional Get given in anticipation of death (to avoid Yibum problems) asks "how can the condition be stated "if I do not die, it will not be a get, but if I die, it will be a get," since the positive needs to be first? The Gemara answers that a person doesn't begin with puranusa, fearful events, and so he should not begin with "If I die...." But, the Gemara asks, what about the rule of positive/negative? The Gemara answers that the tnai should be stated thus: "If I don't die, then no get, if I die, then yes get, if I don't die, then no get."
So the Taz argues with Tosfos and says that Tosfos' assumption is faulty, and in truth, by Sotah, the real order is "im shachav...im lo shachav". The Taz says that the idea of not beginning with puranus doesn't apply here, because unlike get, where the puranus is a possible future event that we don't want to happen, by sotah we're talking about a possible past event, so beginning with puranus is not a problem. Usually, the Taz does not straight out argue with Tosfos, but here he says that he's sorry to say so, but the truth will out, and he's right.

So the Shach jumps on the Taz and says that the kashe from Get to Sotah is not a kashe. By Sotah and Bnei Gad and Reuven, the purpose of the tnai is to modify the event that is taking place. By BG&BR, the event was the allotment of the land. We modify it by saying that this allotment will take place if you do join your brethren in their war. By Sotah, the event is the trial by Sotah Water, which can have beneficial or deleterious effect, and we modify it by saying that the beneficial effect, that of improving the woman's health, is conditional on her innocence. But by get, there is only one event that is taking place, and that is the giving of a get. The purpose of giving a get is so that the get should be a get. There is no alternative meaning to the act of giving the get. Therefore, one has no choice but to begin with 'If I die." Before even discussing the idea of yes before no and that sort of thing, the fundamental idea of a tnai is the effectuation of the act that is taking place. Here, there is no alternative other than beginning with the circumstances that will effectuate and give meaning to the get-- if I die. So the Gemara says that one should do a triple tnai-- if I don't die, if I die, if I don't die.

The Shach's son, in his Hagahos, says another answer. He says that "Positive" can be either, as Tosfos says, the desired result stated in the positive, or an active instead of passive event. By Sotah, hinaki is a positive/desired. So even though hinaki is if lo shachav, it's still called hein because hinaki, be innocent, is stated in the positive. But by Get, "if I don't die" and "then it will not be a get" are both stated in the negative, and so it cannot be used to begin the tnai.

The Gilyon Mahrsha answers the Taz's question by quoting the Ran in Nedarim 50. The Ran there says that there are times, r'l, when a person, and his friends, should pray that he die instead of live. So, he says, the Taz's assumption that according to Tosfos' rule that hein means desired result "if I die" is an unalloyed negative, is not true. Sometimes, "If I die" is the desired result. The GhM, I think, didn't mean this as a serious teretz; it's just a nice tzushtell.

Gone Fishing

Sorry for the failure to post. I'm too stressed out; one guy's suing me for housing discrimination because I didn't renew his lease (i.e., I raised the renewal fifteen dollars more than for other tenants), and he claims this is because he has a medically necessary dog; (his one o'clock in the morning howling, he says, was not the reason I was being mean to him, of course); tenants at another building are yelling about refunds on rent because we had a fire (no injuries, b'h,) that inconvenienced them; and we learned Tagrei Lud yesterday in the shiur. Sometimes I think I would prefer Tagrei Lewd. So instead of posting something trivial, like why the word Chalatz can mean armed, or released, or graced, or a shirt, I'll just wait until things calm down around here.

I solicited a certain extravagantly talented scholar to write here while I go to ground, but so far, no cigar.

Spitting on Reporters

Recently, this article was in the news. In brief: ABC's Middle East Correspondent Anne Barker finds herself amidst rioting Yerushalmis; to her disgust, humiliation and anger, they shower her with spit.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/06/2617502.htm?section=world

You and I have no idea whether the story is true or a complete fabrication, or (my guess) a broad exaggeration of a tiny bit of truth. The allegations have not one drop of supporting evidence, nor one other witness. Has this reporter earned our trust in the past? Has this reporter done anything more than broadcast simple, destructive, Lashon Hara? Is there any basis or logic to trust this reporter's claims? (These are rhetorical questions. The answers are: No; No; and, No.) Since a claim that the fascist blackshirts (not an error) had destroyed her recording devices would strain credulity, she says that her tape and video recorder mysteriously didn't work.... You don't have to be a Freudian to see the subtext of sexual assault in her description of a group of aggressive, bearded men violating a woman by drenching her with spit, and it's truly hard to parse the hysteria from the objective reportage. But "the truth" is not relevant to the effect of newspaper reports. Once the article is printed, the effect is irreversible. So, arguendo, let's assume that the events described in the article actually happened.

Assuming that some truth lies at the bottom of the article, this was a terrible disgrace, a chillul hashem. The article scathingly presents these Yerushalmis as an ugly gang of backward and filthy religious zealots. The reporter was understandably disgusted, and she reacted by using all her journalistic skills to portray her anger and disdain, from descriptions of primitive religious fanaticism, to her fear of physical injury, to malodorous mouths. Well, anyone who is spat upon is entitled to respond in kind, and that, essentially, is what she does in her article- she spits back.

Someone pointed out to me that if she had found herself in a similarly inflamed mob in Gaza, it would have been stones, and in Saudi Arabia it would have been rods and whips. And the reaction would have been "well, it was only stones...."

These Yerushalmis were, as I said, a mob inflamed by the heat of the protest. They live a cloistered life that has gone unchanged for hundreds of years, a life of complete immersion in their traditional behavior and morality, and they know very well that just a few miles south, in Tel Aviv, is a population that hates what they stand for and that ardently desires to inflict a hedonistic, amoral, and anti-religious lifestyle on them. Unlike Pennsylvania, where the Amish are left alone to live in their traditional way, in Israel no one has learned the lesson of "live and let live." Anyone who has lived there will tell you that people can't rest without acting out their animosity to those who have beliefs that are different than theirs. A traditionally garbed Yerushalmi would elicit sneers and shoves if he were to go to certain malls in Tel Aviv or Eilat, and indeed they stay away from places where they are not welcome. On the other hand, it is a predictable and never failing certainty that irreligious people will intentionally drive as close as possible to the chareidi neighborhoods in Yerushalayim on Shabbos, and stroll wearing clothing diametrically antithetic to modesty, with the specific intent of upsetting and demeaning "those adukim," those zealots.

If they were great lowland apes in a wildlife preserve in Rwanda, harassed and traumatized by jeering, leering tourists, they would get far more media sympathy than these people get

Once again; it was a terrible chillul hashem and counterproductive to boot. But it would have been nice if one iota of sympathy or empathy had been evidenced by the media. Now, let's see, what would a level headed, even handed article look like....

Long demonized by virulent antipathy of the mainstream media for their traditional lifestyle and beliefs, this was, for them, the last straw. A new mayor had been elected, who, it was hoped, would maintain Jerusalem's delicate detente between the anti-religious left and the ancient non-Zionist Ultra-Orthodox community. But when the mayor opened a city parking lot on the Sabbath, it became clear to the traditional Jerusalemites that their community was in the cross-hairs. Tel Aviv, the anything-goes seaside city famous for its nightlife and unabashed exhibitionism, was on the march, and would not rest until all of Jerusalem was "liberated." Anger simmered, protests were organized, and, with all the ingredients primed for an explosion, events were brought to a head when violent confrontation broke out between the truncheon swinging riot police and the unarmed protesters.

This reporter had the misfortune to fall afoul of a small group of protesters, who, in the manner of adrenaline-stoked activists since time immemorial, vented their anger on the interloper. In retrospect, I think their choice of weapon was, in a sense, quaint. Having dodged half-tracks and bullets and clubs, I can report that being spat upon left me feeling soiled and humiliated, but it also left me shaking my head at the innocence of these Davids facing down mounted riot police looking for heads to split. All things considered, I prefer spitting to splitting.