I once read Anthony Hecht’s translation of the Chorus of Oedipus at Colonos:
What is unwisdom but the lusting after
Longevity: to be old and full of days!
For the vast and unremitting tide of years
Casts up to view more sorrowful things than joyful.
It has been pointed out that Avraham's life would seem to be an example of this sorrowful poem. How hard Avraham’s life was, even though he was the Yedid Hashem, the Av Hamon Goyim! Among the ten nisyonos mentioned in Avos 5:3 (according to Rabbeinu Yonah, while according the Rambam this is not separate from the Akeidah itself) is that he came back from the Akeidah joyously and found that Sara died alone while he and his children were away from home. Then, despite having been promised the whole land, when Sara died, and while she waited in an Aron, Avraham had to start bargaining to get a place to bury her. So anyone who thinks that being beloved by Hashem means having an easy life had better think again.
And even so, when it comes to our Tzadikim, Sophocles is wrong. We find that Avraham died “zakein ve’savei’ah.” Despite all his trials, he felt that he lived a full and satisfying life, because he knew that whatever happened he tried to do his best, and whatever he experienced was right and good for him. The basic difference is whether you live as an eved Hashem, trying to emulate the 13 Middos by doing what you can for Hashem and for other people, or you live for what you can enjoy and accumulate for yourself.
The image that I have is of an airplane; Dinner has just been served, and the pilot's voice comes over the intercom, and he says, I'm sorry to inform you that we've lost both engines: we're going to try to glide to a soft landing on the water, but I have to tell you that we're in a pretty desperate situation. Good luck and goodbye. Some people will react by trying to finish their meal as fast as they can. People whose existence is so self centered focus exclusively on what they can ingest and accumulate, and ultimately are not really living a true life at all.
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Chayei Sara, Breishis 23:10. Efron Sat Among His People: The Median can be the Cardinal Point
23:10. Efron sat “be’soch bnei Chais” Rashi says that this day he had been appointed as a ‘sar’ of his people. Rabbi David Zupnick Z'l told me that Heidenheim, in his pirush on Rashi, asks what made Rashi say this, and he answers that in all of Tanach this expression of ‘besoch’ of a people means being a master, and that in Melachim II 3:14, this is what the Isha Hashunamis meant when she told Eliahu that there was nothing she needed because she was "besoch ami'.
I later realized that the same idea is evident in the Gemara in Bava Kamma 88a, where the Gemara darshens the passuk “mikerev achecha” to mean that only “muvchar she'bi’achecha” can be a king, and not an eved meshuchrar or even a geir. Kerev and toch not only mean the same thing but also carry the same connotation.
Why? Why does a word that means common also connote uncommon? Wy does 'undistinguished' or median also connote greatness? This Zohar about the Shunamite woman is interesting, and has some potential to explain the Gemara in Bava Kamma, but it does nothing to explain Efron:
יג וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ אֱמָרנָא אֵלֶיהָ הִנֵּה חָרַדְתְּ אֵלֵינוּ אֶת כָּל הַחֲרָדָה הַזֹּאת מֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת לָךְ הֲיֵשׁ לְדַבֶּר לָךְ אֶל הַמֶּלֶךְ אוֹ אֶל שַׂר הַצָּבָא; וַתֹּאמֶר בְּתוֹךְ עַמִּי אָנֹכִי יֹשָׁבֶת.
she did not need his help in any material things.I later realized that the same idea is evident in the Gemara in Bava Kamma 88a, where the Gemara darshens the passuk “mikerev achecha” to mean that only “muvchar she'bi’achecha” can be a king, and not an eved meshuchrar or even a geir. Kerev and toch not only mean the same thing but also carry the same connotation.
Why? Why does a word that means common also connote uncommon? Wy does 'undistinguished' or median also connote greatness? This Zohar about the Shunamite woman is interesting, and has some potential to explain the Gemara in Bava Kamma, but it does nothing to explain Efron:
ועל דא תנינן דלא איצטריך ליה לבר נש לאיתפרשא מכללא דסגיאין בגין דלא יתרשים איהו בלחודוי
ולא יקטרגון עליה לעילא דכתיב בשונמית ותאמר בתוך עמי אנוכי יושבת לא בעינא לאפקי גרמי
מכללא דסגיאין בתוך עמי יתיבנא עד יומא דאובתוך עמי בכללא חדא.
ולא יקטרגון עליה לעילא דכתיב בשונמית ותאמר בתוך עמי אנוכי יושבת לא בעינא לאפקי גרמי
מכללא דסגיאין בתוך עמי יתיבנא עד יומא דאובתוך עמי בכללא חדא.
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Breaking the Plate at the Tna'im. A Trivial Discussion of a Little Minhag
I'm writing this little bagatelle because it came up in conversation recently, and I thought that if my friend had to deal with certain mechutan issues involving this minhag, a little overview might be helpful to other people as well. This kind of post is not going to become a habit.
We Ashkenazim have a minhag that the mothers of the Chasan and Kallah break an earthenware plate after the Tna'im is read. (I am not talking about the glass under the Chupah. That minhag stems from Brachos 31b, as Tosfos says there.
All our minhagim are holy and meaningful, but among those holy and meaningful minhagim, this one does not stand on the highest rung. But it's worth bearing in mind that, as I've said before, the meaning of our minhagim is fluid and dynamic; they ebb and flow. What a minhag means to one generation, to one group, might be very different than what it means to another. See, e.g., our discussion of the Kittel here, where we showed that wearing the kittel could symbolize diametrically opposed ideas, and that with time, one idea has become dominant, and our discussion of masks on Purim here. The symbol's meaning is what you understand it to be, and even minor minhagim can come to assume greater significance. The same is true regarding the breaking of the plate. Here's a list of the various interpretations that have attributed to it by our mefarshim. I'm listing all the time honored classics; I'M NOT IMPLYING ANY PARITY HERE! Some are stranger than others, several are similar but have differences in tone. Pick the one you like. They're all kosher.
The first written mention of this minhag is in the Sefer Ma'adanei Yomtov, written around 1600 by Reb Yomtov Lippman Heller, the author of the Tosfos Yomtov. He was a talmid of the Maharal. And he is the Ketzos' grandfather.
1. To temper the celebration Zeicher Le'Mikdash. Ma'adanei Yomtov (cited by Eliahu Rabba, which is cited by Pri Megadim in OC 560 Mishbetzos SK 7, and cited by Mishna Berura there SK 9, but I found it here) says the purpose is to shock the onlookers, in order to temper excessive joy that is inconsistent with mourning for the Churban Beis Hamikdash.
2. To show that the Te'na'im is irreversible, and whoever breaks it can never be made whole. The Pri Megadim brings the Maharit, which he understands to mean that although we break glass under the Chupa, we should break earthenware at the Tna'im, because glass can be melted and remade, but earthenware, once broken, can never be repaired. This is also said in the name of the Gaon in the She'iltos on the Ma'aseh Rav in numbers 133 and 134, here.
3. As a re-enactment of Mattan Torah, the breaking of the Luchos, and our ultimate redemption. The Pri Megadim himself says the following: Mattan Torah was Kidushin, and it ought to have been followed by Nesu'in. The sin of the Egel, followed by the breaking of the luchos, and ultimately the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash, left us almost bereft of the Hashra'as Hashechina that should have been ours as the beloved of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. But the day will come that Hashem will betroth us again, and that kidushin will be followed by a nisu'in and a permanent union. So we break earthenware at the Tna'im, to symbolize the breaking of the luchos and the impermanence of Klal Yisrael's first kiddushin, but we break glass at the chupa, because glass can always be repaired; in a sense, it can never be permanently or irreparably broken.
4. To show that breaking a tna'im is worse than getting divorced. The Gaon is quoted here as having said that it is worse to break a Tna'im than to get married and divorced. Or, that it is better to get married even if you know you're going to get divorced than to break a tna'im. So we use irreparable earthenware at the Tna'im, and glass at the Chuppah.
5. To show that the only one way to break a tna'im: by dying. The Baal Shem Tov is quoted in Taamei Haminhagim (page 411) as having explained this Maharit as meaning that a tna'im cannot be broken for any reason at all, but a marriage can be dissolved via a get.
6. To remind the chasan that even if his wife turns out to be a shrew, he should be grateful, because suffering through a miserable marriage will earn him a ticket straight to Olam Haba. (Hopefully, without her.) The Ta'amei Haminhagim also brings from the Likutei Maharan the following reason: you break an earthenware vessel at the Tna'im to remind the Chasan that there is a Gehinnom, and that he better not be mindlessly driven by his bodily desires. Also, he says, even if (Chas veshalom!) the answer to the question is "motzei," and it turns out that his wife is no good, he should still not "traitorously" divorce her, because his lifetime of suffering will save him from Gehinnom.
7. To prevent excessive frivolity so that we don't forget our Yiras Shamayim. See above from Brachos 31, Rav Hamnuna Zuti, who, when asked to sing at a wedding, sang "Woe to us, we all will die....." and the rule of Rav Yochanan/Rav Shimon bar Yochai,
8. Why do the mothers do this? Well, it seems that in some places, this was not done by the mothers. In this drawing from 1724, a man is doing it (the fellow bottom center with the jug raised above his head).
and here's another drawing of men breaking stuff at a Tna'im:
While I haven't found anyone who explains the change, I would guess that it indicates that the Kallah, by sending her female representatives, is aware of and agrees to what is happening. There was a time when we would just give them away, but that's not how it's done now, and it's not much of a 'commitment to get married' if the kallah has no idea of what's happening. Also, see the first comment for Rebbitzen Divrei Chaim's note.
And, here's the bonus video. It's from a Sardinian wedding, and they're not Jews. There were Jews in Sardinia from before the destruction of the second Beis Hamikdash until the expulsion that accompanied the Inquisition in the late fifteenth century. If you want to believe they got the minhag from us, go ahead and believe it. I think people, Jews and Gentiles, do it because it's just fun to break stuff.
Now, you are all experts on this minhag. I hope this has cheered you up.
We Ashkenazim have a minhag that the mothers of the Chasan and Kallah break an earthenware plate after the Tna'im is read. (I am not talking about the glass under the Chupah. That minhag stems from Brachos 31b, as Tosfos says there.
רב בריה דרבינא עבד הלולא לבריה חזנהו לרבנן דהוו קבדחי טובא אייתי כסא דמוקרא בת ארבע מאה זוזי ותבר קמייהו ואעציבו רב אשי עבד הלולא לבריה חזנהו לרבנן דהוו קא בדחי טובא אייתי כסא דזוגיתא חיורתא ותבר קמייהו ואעציבו אמרו ליה רבנן לרב המנונא זוטי בהלולא דמר בריה דרבינא לישרי לן מר אמר להו ווי לן דמיתנן ווי לן דמיתנן
I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about breaking the plate at the Te'na'im.) All our minhagim are holy and meaningful, but among those holy and meaningful minhagim, this one does not stand on the highest rung. But it's worth bearing in mind that, as I've said before, the meaning of our minhagim is fluid and dynamic; they ebb and flow. What a minhag means to one generation, to one group, might be very different than what it means to another. See, e.g., our discussion of the Kittel here, where we showed that wearing the kittel could symbolize diametrically opposed ideas, and that with time, one idea has become dominant, and our discussion of masks on Purim here. The symbol's meaning is what you understand it to be, and even minor minhagim can come to assume greater significance. The same is true regarding the breaking of the plate. Here's a list of the various interpretations that have attributed to it by our mefarshim. I'm listing all the time honored classics; I'M NOT IMPLYING ANY PARITY HERE! Some are stranger than others, several are similar but have differences in tone. Pick the one you like. They're all kosher.
The first written mention of this minhag is in the Sefer Ma'adanei Yomtov, written around 1600 by Reb Yomtov Lippman Heller, the author of the Tosfos Yomtov. He was a talmid of the Maharal. And he is the Ketzos' grandfather.
1. To temper the celebration Zeicher Le'Mikdash. Ma'adanei Yomtov (cited by Eliahu Rabba, which is cited by Pri Megadim in OC 560 Mishbetzos SK 7, and cited by Mishna Berura there SK 9, but I found it here) says the purpose is to shock the onlookers, in order to temper excessive joy that is inconsistent with mourning for the Churban Beis Hamikdash.
2. To show that the Te'na'im is irreversible, and whoever breaks it can never be made whole. The Pri Megadim brings the Maharit, which he understands to mean that although we break glass under the Chupa, we should break earthenware at the Tna'im, because glass can be melted and remade, but earthenware, once broken, can never be repaired. This is also said in the name of the Gaon in the She'iltos on the Ma'aseh Rav in numbers 133 and 134, here.
3. As a re-enactment of Mattan Torah, the breaking of the Luchos, and our ultimate redemption. The Pri Megadim himself says the following: Mattan Torah was Kidushin, and it ought to have been followed by Nesu'in. The sin of the Egel, followed by the breaking of the luchos, and ultimately the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash, left us almost bereft of the Hashra'as Hashechina that should have been ours as the beloved of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. But the day will come that Hashem will betroth us again, and that kidushin will be followed by a nisu'in and a permanent union. So we break earthenware at the Tna'im, to symbolize the breaking of the luchos and the impermanence of Klal Yisrael's first kiddushin, but we break glass at the chupa, because glass can always be repaired; in a sense, it can never be permanently or irreparably broken.
4. To show that breaking a tna'im is worse than getting divorced. The Gaon is quoted here as having said that it is worse to break a Tna'im than to get married and divorced. Or, that it is better to get married even if you know you're going to get divorced than to break a tna'im. So we use irreparable earthenware at the Tna'im, and glass at the Chuppah.
5. To show that the only one way to break a tna'im: by dying. The Baal Shem Tov is quoted in Taamei Haminhagim (page 411) as having explained this Maharit as meaning that a tna'im cannot be broken for any reason at all, but a marriage can be dissolved via a get.
6. To remind the chasan that even if his wife turns out to be a shrew, he should be grateful, because suffering through a miserable marriage will earn him a ticket straight to Olam Haba. (Hopefully, without her.) The Ta'amei Haminhagim also brings from the Likutei Maharan the following reason: you break an earthenware vessel at the Tna'im to remind the Chasan that there is a Gehinnom, and that he better not be mindlessly driven by his bodily desires. Also, he says, even if (Chas veshalom!) the answer to the question is "motzei," and it turns out that his wife is no good, he should still not "traitorously" divorce her, because his lifetime of suffering will save him from Gehinnom.
7. To prevent excessive frivolity so that we don't forget our Yiras Shamayim. See above from Brachos 31, Rav Hamnuna Zuti, who, when asked to sing at a wedding, sang "Woe to us, we all will die....." and the rule of Rav Yochanan/Rav Shimon bar Yochai,
א"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י אסור לאדם שימלא שחוק פיו בעולם הזה
that one may not "fill his mouth with joy in this world." Some learn that this 'reigning in of levity' is so that we should remember the Churban, that we should elevate Yerushalayim over our joys, as indicated in the Ramban in Toras Ha'adam. This approach is seen in the Tosfos Yomtov's pshat, #1 on this list, and that's why this halacha is discussed in Hilchos Tisha Ba'av. HOWEVER: Rabbeinu Yonah in Brachos there says that this rule applied even when the Beis Hamikdash stands, because immoderate levity is incompatible with Yir'as Shamayim. The same reasoning would apply to our discussion-- that the breaking of the plate at the Tna'im is more in line with Rav Hamnuna Zuti's dirge than it is with Zeicher Le'Mikdash.8. Why do the mothers do this? Well, it seems that in some places, this was not done by the mothers. In this drawing from 1724, a man is doing it (the fellow bottom center with the jug raised above his head).
And, here's the bonus video. It's from a Sardinian wedding, and they're not Jews. There were Jews in Sardinia from before the destruction of the second Beis Hamikdash until the expulsion that accompanied the Inquisition in the late fifteenth century. If you want to believe they got the minhag from us, go ahead and believe it. I think people, Jews and Gentiles, do it because it's just fun to break stuff.
Now, you are all experts on this minhag. I hope this has cheered you up.
Vayeira. Guest Post by Harav Eli: The Expulsion of Hagar and ....
Following the birth of Yitzhak, the Torah tells about Avraham expelling his son from Hagar. A simple reading of the Psukim gives the impression that expulsion was of a young child:
1. He is called הילד or הנער. While נער could be used for a wide range of ages (from the 3-months old Moshe to ומשרתו יהושע בן נון נער), the term ילד typically refers to a young child (even though 17-years-old Yosef is also referred to as הילד איננו)
2. At the end of the Parsha the Mal'ach tells Hagar to carry her son. Well, maybe he was dried out and sick. But, it seems Hagar carries the boy even at the beginning of the journey - ויתן אל הגר שם על שכמה ואת הילד וישלחה [although some Meforshim explain this to mean she carried only the bread and water].
3. It says Hagar throws him under the bush, meaning that he wasn't too heavy. [Again, some of the Meforshim say this is not to be taken literally].
4. The end of the parsha - ויהי א' את הנער ויגדל also sounds like he was young at the time
However, the consensus of Chazal and all Meforshim I remember, is that this boy is in fact Yishma'el, although he is not mentioned by his name. At the time of the events Yishmael was at least 16 years old.
Luley Divreihem (in the style of the Ibn Ezra), we might suggest that the boy mentioned here could be a younger (second ?) son of Avraham and Hagar. If it is not Yishmael, that's why the Torah presents this nameless boy, never mentioned before, in such a lengthy description of בן הגר המצרית אשר ילדה לאברהם. This boy might be of similar age to Yitzchak, or a bit older.
This explains also why Hashem comforts Avraham by saying וגם את בן האמה לגוי אשימנו. If we're talking about Yishmael, this would have been redundant as Yishmael was already promised a much bigger future: הנה ברכתי אותו והפריתי אותו והרביתי אותו במאוד מאוד שנים עשר נשיאים יוליד ונתתיו לגוי גדול
Furthermore, in next week's parsha we find that Avraham sends away בני הפילגשים plural. Who are they? One Pilegesh we know of is Ktura. The other is Hagar (assuming they are not the same person). But, Yishmael was not sent away - he buried his father together with Yitzchak. So, it seems Hagar had more sons that were sent away.
Yet, as far as I know this (seemingly obvious) Pshat was not picked up by any Medrash or any of the Meforshim. Why?
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Lech Lecha, Bereishis 14:24. Military Logistical Support
(There was a previous version of this post that was much more interesting and one hundred percent wrong. This boring correction will have to do for the moment.)
During the war of the Four Kings against the Five, Avram's nephew, Lot, was taken captive. Avram gathered an army and went to war with his nephew's captors. Ultimately, he vanquished the Four Kings and freed Lot, and, tangentially, saved Bera, the king of Sdom, who had fallen into a pit while fleeing the Four Kings. After the battle was over, Bera offered Avram the spoils of war, which were obviously Avram's by right of conquest. Avram declined his share, but noted that his refusal to be enriched by the spoils of war did not speak for the men who had joined his army:
Rashi says that the Ne'arim and the Anashim fought in the battle, but Aneir, Eshkol, and Mamrei did not actually bear arms for Avram. They only "guarded the possessions" of the combatants. Even so, Rashi explains, the passuk indicates parity among all their chalakim; Aneir and his friends were entitled to a share equal to that of the actual combatants. Rashi brings that this lesson was applied by David Hamelech in Shmuel I 30:23-4.
This also teaches us how we should appraise the relative status of those who enable others to learn by supporting and encouraging them, the yosheiv ahl hakeilim. As John Milton said, "They also serve who only stand and wait."
While I understand this as applied to Reb Akiva's Rachel, I find it difficult to understand in the context of an army. I would have thought that the persons who exposed themselves to immediate mortal danger and who exerted all possible human effort should be entitled to more. War in those days was not fought with rifles and computers- it was done hand to hand, with extremely heavy swords and spears, wielded by antagonists who were fighting for their lives. Yes, analysts and strategists have ten thousand times the effect of individual soldiers. But I think that the warriors deserve more recognition and reward than cooks and laundrymen and blacksmiths and the ישב על הכלים.
The Rambam paskens like this, more or less, in 4 Melachim 9:
In Mattos, Bamidbar 31, the Torah describes the war with Midian. Each Shevet sent out one thousand warriors, a total of 12,000, one fiftieth of the population. Obviously, besides these twelve thousand there were many more who supported them. No army in history could fight a war without support-- food, weapons, clothing, horses, people to guard the camp while the army is fighting, and more. I don't know what the ratio is in modern armies, but as an uneducated guess, I would say that for every actual combatant, there would have to be at least two people behind the lines focused exclusively on vital support services. It is not correct to answer that the war against Midian was a matter of an afternoon's work, that it required no infrastructure, because the Tanchuma says there were three thousand from each shevet-- (31:4) "Elef lamateh elef lamateh" means one thousand warriors, one thousand support and supply (like Reb Yishmael in the Sifri as brought in the Baal Haturim), and one thousand for tefilla. According to Reb Akiva that elef means one thousand, the repetition elef/elef means that shevet Levi also sent one thousand. But even though Reb Akiva holds that they were not mentioned, he will have to agree that the thousand had support of a yosheiv ahl hakeilim group.
After the war was won, Moshe Rabbeinu told the people that the spoils were to be divided, with half going to the "tofsei hamilchama", those that "held the battle", and half to the rest of the people. Who are the tofsei milchama? We will have to say that this includes the support as well as the soldiers. According to the shittah that elef lamateh was only one thousand, then the phrase tofsei milchama is not the same as chalutzei tzava, because tofsei has to include many more who were yosheiv ahl hakeilim. Or, possibly, the phrase elef lamateh of chalutzei tzava included the yosheiv ahl hakeilim group and there were only a couple hundred armed warriors from each shevet. According to Reb Yishmael, Chalutzei Tzava itself includes all the support group, a total of three thousand per shevet.
During the war of the Four Kings against the Five, Avram's nephew, Lot, was taken captive. Avram gathered an army and went to war with his nephew's captors. Ultimately, he vanquished the Four Kings and freed Lot, and, tangentially, saved Bera, the king of Sdom, who had fallen into a pit while fleeing the Four Kings. After the battle was over, Bera offered Avram the spoils of war, which were obviously Avram's by right of conquest. Avram declined his share, but noted that his refusal to be enriched by the spoils of war did not speak for the men who had joined his army:
הַנְּעָרִים, וְחֵלֶק הָאֲנָשִׁים, אֲשֶׁר הָלְכוּ אִתִּי: עָנֵר אֶשְׁכֹּל וּמַמְרֵא, הֵם יִקְחוּ חֶלְקָם
the Ne'arim, the Anashim, and 'Aneir, Eshkol, and Mamrei' and that they were entitled to take their share. Rashi says that the Ne'arim and the Anashim fought in the battle, but Aneir, Eshkol, and Mamrei did not actually bear arms for Avram. They only "guarded the possessions" of the combatants. Even so, Rashi explains, the passuk indicates parity among all their chalakim; Aneir and his friends were entitled to a share equal to that of the actual combatants. Rashi brings that this lesson was applied by David Hamelech in Shmuel I 30:23-4.
כג ויאמר דוד לא תעשו כן אחי: את אשר נתן ה' לנו וישמר אתנו ויתן את הגדוד הבא עלינו בידנו. כד ומי ישמע לכם לדבר הזה כי כחלק הירד במלחמה וכחלק הישב על הכלים יחדו יחלקו.
This also teaches us how we should appraise the relative status of those who enable others to learn by supporting and encouraging them, the yosheiv ahl hakeilim. As John Milton said, "They also serve who only stand and wait."
While I understand this as applied to Reb Akiva's Rachel, I find it difficult to understand in the context of an army. I would have thought that the persons who exposed themselves to immediate mortal danger and who exerted all possible human effort should be entitled to more. War in those days was not fought with rifles and computers- it was done hand to hand, with extremely heavy swords and spears, wielded by antagonists who were fighting for their lives. Yes, analysts and strategists have ten thousand times the effect of individual soldiers. But I think that the warriors deserve more recognition and reward than cooks and laundrymen and blacksmiths and the ישב על הכלים.
The Rambam paskens like this, more or less, in 4 Melachim 9:
כָּל הֲרוּגֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ, מָמוֹנָן לַמֶּלֶךְ; וְכָל הַמַּמְלָכוֹת שֶׁכּוֹבֵשׁ, הֲרֵי אוֹצְרוֹת הַמְּלָכִים לַמֶּלֶךְ. וּשְׁאָר הַבִּזָּה שֶׁבּוֹזְזִין--בּוֹזְזִין וְנוֹתְנִין לְפָנָיו, וְהוּא נוֹטֵל מַחֲצִית בָּרֹאשׁ; וּמַחֲצִית הַבִּזָּה, חוֹלְקִין אוֹתָהּ. כָּל אַנְשֵׁי הַצָּבָא בְּיַחַד עִם הָעָם הַיּוֹשְׁבִין עַל הַכֵּלִים בַּמַּחֲנֶה לְשָׁמְרָהּ, חוֹלְקִין בְּשׁוֹוֶה--שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר "כִּי כְּחֵלֶק הַיֹּרֵד בַּמִּלְחָמָה, וּכְחֵלֶק הַיֹּשֵׁב עַל-הַכֵּלִים--יַחְדָּו יַחֲלֹקוּ"
In Mattos, Bamidbar 31, the Torah describes the war with Midian. Each Shevet sent out one thousand warriors, a total of 12,000, one fiftieth of the population. Obviously, besides these twelve thousand there were many more who supported them. No army in history could fight a war without support-- food, weapons, clothing, horses, people to guard the camp while the army is fighting, and more. I don't know what the ratio is in modern armies, but as an uneducated guess, I would say that for every actual combatant, there would have to be at least two people behind the lines focused exclusively on vital support services. It is not correct to answer that the war against Midian was a matter of an afternoon's work, that it required no infrastructure, because the Tanchuma says there were three thousand from each shevet-- (31:4) "Elef lamateh elef lamateh" means one thousand warriors, one thousand support and supply (like Reb Yishmael in the Sifri as brought in the Baal Haturim), and one thousand for tefilla. According to Reb Akiva that elef means one thousand, the repetition elef/elef means that shevet Levi also sent one thousand. But even though Reb Akiva holds that they were not mentioned, he will have to agree that the thousand had support of a yosheiv ahl hakeilim group.
After the war was won, Moshe Rabbeinu told the people that the spoils were to be divided, with half going to the "tofsei hamilchama", those that "held the battle", and half to the rest of the people. Who are the tofsei milchama? We will have to say that this includes the support as well as the soldiers. According to the shittah that elef lamateh was only one thousand, then the phrase tofsei milchama is not the same as chalutzei tzava, because tofsei has to include many more who were yosheiv ahl hakeilim. Or, possibly, the phrase elef lamateh of chalutzei tzava included the yosheiv ahl hakeilim group and there were only a couple hundred armed warriors from each shevet. According to Reb Yishmael, Chalutzei Tzava itself includes all the support group, a total of three thousand per shevet.
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Noach: Interbreeding and Genetic Manipulation
I'm not finished with the last post. But its time for Parshas Noach, and there is something I've been meaning to write about. Earlier Posts on Parshas Noach:
Luxury at a Price
The Two Reasons We Were Zocheh to Tzitzis
The Victim of Victimless Crime
One of the behaviors of the generation of the Mabul, as Rashi says (6:12), was spontaneous inter-specific mating of animals.
וַיַּרְא אֱ--לֹהִים אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְהִנֵּה נִשְׁחָתָה כִּי הִשְׁחִית כָּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ עַל הָאָרֶץ:
And God saw the earth, and behold it had become corrupted, for all flesh had corrupted its way on the earth.
Rashi:
כי השחית כל בשר: אפילו בהמה חיה ועוף נזקקין לשאינן מינן:
Even cattle, beasts, and fowl would mate with those that were not of their own species.
This is made clear in the Medrash here, 28:8, in the name of Rav Azariah.
This Rashi might be understood as referring to the animal behavior as a symptom or a reflection of human degradation (see Beis Halevi), but not as inherently iniquitous or repugnant.
But later (8:1), Rashi says that when Hashem remembered the animals in the Ark and looked upon them with favor, this was because Hashem knew that these individual animals had not engaged in inter-specific sexual congress. This does indicate that such behavior is inherently iniquitous or repugnant. Furthermore, the Gemara in Sanhedrin 108a states that mankind was guilty of intentional cross species animal husbandry. According to the Mizrachi, (also mentioned by the Maharsha there) this is an alternative to the Medrash of Rav Azariah; according to the Maharal, this is consistent with the Medrash (and see Rav Povarsky's Bahd Kodesh here). But in any case, whether the interbreeding was spontaneous or forced, it is clear that it ultimately generated chaos, a suspension of the laws of nature-- androlomusia (Medrash 26:5).
In Vayikra 19:19, the Torah prohibits us from intentional mating of animals of different species:
אֶת חֻקֹּתַי, תִּשְׁמֹרוּ בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם וּבֶגֶד כִּלְאַיִם שַׁעַטְנֵז לֹא יַעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ.
The Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya there say that interbreeding of species for the purpose of creating an animal that is not part of the natural world expresses a denial of the perfection of the world as created (see, e.g., Chulin 127), it is an act of rebellion against God's will, and it is Makchish- it weakens- God's act of creation. I would say that this 'Makchish,' weakening, is derived from the term androlomusia, a breach in the laws of nature, resulting in chaos. It is as if natural law- physics, mathematics, biology- is a treaty between Man and God; if Mankind breaches the treaty, all natural law is subject to abrogation by God, as occurred at the time of the Mabul..
Now, here is a paragraph from an editorial in Nature, published June 2007.
Many a technology has at some time or another been deemed an affront to God, but perhaps none invites the accusation as directly as synthetic biology. Only a deity predisposed to cut-and-paste would suffer any serious challenge from genetic engineering as it has been practised in the past. But the efforts to design living organisms from scratch — either with a wholly artificial genome made by DNA synthesis technology or, more ambitiously, by using non-natural, bespoke molecular machinery — really might seem to justify the suggestion, made recently by the ETC Group, an environmental pressure group based in Ottawa, Canada, that "for the first time, God has competition".
I suppose it's nice to see that these people were mechavein to, and so eloquently stated, the essential thesis of the Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya. And, of course, the Ramban issue does not apply only to synthetic biology, but even to gene splicing, which is now so common as to often be done in high school science projects.
The natural halachic reaction to this Rashi is that the fact remains that after Matan Torah, we have 365 prohibitions, no more, no less, and if no specific prohibition covers an act, there is no reason to avoid it other than the vague mussar of "kedoshim tihyu". After all, the issur of Kilayim in Vayikra 19:19 is called a "chok." If it is a chok, perhaps the issur is limited to the specific cases that were prohibited and not meant to be extrapolated, and we have no right to establish a binyan av. Perhaps, then, the manipulation of genetic material in a laboratory, which does not involve the unnatural act of mating dissimilar animals, is not prohibited.
Continuing the train of thought, here's a piece of Torah from Reb Elchonon Wasserman. Every single line in this piece is a fascinating chiddush. Items 1 and 2 will appear irrelevant to our discussion, but you will see that they lead back to this topic. Unfortunately, I can't find a full text copy of the Kovetz Shiurim online, and I'm not getting paid enough to type it, so I'll just give you the mareh makom and a synopsis. Kesuvos 60, # 203 in my copy.
1. Citing Rabbeinu Chananel in Chagiga 16- a child conceived through artificial insemination, and certainly in vitro, does not generate tumas leida for the mother. (Ed: Of course there would be the standard "ein pesichas hakever belo dahm." But neither the chumra of tumas leidah, nor the kula of dahm tohar, would apply to a child of AI, and certainly not to in vitro fertilization.)
2. This would only be true where AI and IV are rare. If they were to become common, their halacha would be the same as natural conception. (Ed: in the previous piece he says like Reb Moshe and the Avnei Nezer, that bishul be'chama is only different than bishul in fire so long as it is rare. Once it becomes common, there would be a din of bishul basar be'chalav, the issur of bishul korban pesach, and a de'oraysa of bishul on Shabbos, even in bishul bechama. See, e.g., this.)
3. Now that cross-pollination is common, cross-pollination is prohibited between any trees for which grafting would be assur. (Ed: the Chazon Ish (Zeraim, Kilayim 3) leaves undecided the question of whether grafting among dissimilar citrus trees is prohibited. According to many poskim, the issur of harkava is the reason that we avoid grafted Esrogim, though the Chazon Ish prohibits grafted Esrogim even if the the issur of harkava does not apply. According to Reb Elchonon, then, the act of intentional cross-pollination between dissimilar citrus trees would be a safek de'oraysa. If so, it would seem that the fruit of any naturally cross-pollinated esrog would be passul. If so, there hasn't been a kosher esrog in the world since the time of Adam Harishon, because cross-pollination with other similar citruses occurs whenever the wind blows. In fact, I believe that the only reason we can use them on Sukkos, even though they inevitably contain a certain percentage of lemon genes from cross pollination, is that yichus goes after the mother (the ovary/stigma), not the father (the pollen/stamen.))
Some aspects of this issue have been addressed by certain rabbinical figures, some of whom propose that the prohibition of harkava only applies to living entities. Genetic material, on the other hand, is not alive, and, they say, may be manipulated at will. This might come as a surprise to the Ramban, to Reb Elchanan, and to the editors of Nature. It is similar to an argument that ma'aseh Onan is muttar for anyone that was already mekayeim pirya ve'riya.
Regarding Cloning, there are those who do not discourage it. Rabbi J. David Bleich, in Tradition, Spring 1998, argues that cloning is muttar because
He then cites Reb Elchanan in Kovetz He'aros 8:33 who broadly applies the rule of the Mishna in Bechoros.The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 116:1) has also been cited as support for the approach.
On the other hand, Rav Eliashiv has been quoted (see Torah U’madda Journal 9:195 and 216) as stating that cloning violates the spirit of the Torah, as it is similar to Kilayim. Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 15:45:4) emphatically objects to cloning.
But there is a fundamental distinction between that discussion, which focuses on the product of cloning, and Rashi and the Ramban's statements, which address the process of hybridization. In fact, the Chazon Ish in YD 168:1 is arguably a strong source for the prohibition of interspecific gene splicing.
In any case, it could be argued that the Torah is warning us that the creation of new life forms, either by conflation or synthesis, endangers all life on earth. One doesn't have to be a Luddite or a fundamentalist to recognize that if the black plague, which involved a natural life form which co-existed with humanity for millennia, reduced the population of Europe by sixty percent, the escape of a carelessly or maliciously engineered organism could do at least as well. I don't mean to rehash the trope of endless science fiction novels and thrillers. The idea here is that besides the natural danger, a more important factor might be the breach of the natural treaty between man and G-d. True, Hashem promised that the wholesale abrogation of the laws of nature will never happen again. But this does not exhaust the list of alternative horrors. There are many who consider themselves Orthodox Jews who have a hard time believing the literal truth of the story of the Mabul and Noach. Here's hoping that the thesis I presented here is incorrect, so that we don't have to witness conclusive proof of the literal truth of the story of the Mabul.
Luxury at a Price
The Two Reasons We Were Zocheh to Tzitzis
The Victim of Victimless Crime
One of the behaviors of the generation of the Mabul, as Rashi says (6:12), was spontaneous inter-specific mating of animals.
וַיַּרְא אֱ--לֹהִים אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְהִנֵּה נִשְׁחָתָה כִּי הִשְׁחִית כָּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ עַל הָאָרֶץ:
And God saw the earth, and behold it had become corrupted, for all flesh had corrupted its way on the earth.
Rashi:
כי השחית כל בשר: אפילו בהמה חיה ועוף נזקקין לשאינן מינן:
Even cattle, beasts, and fowl would mate with those that were not of their own species.
This is made clear in the Medrash here, 28:8, in the name of Rav Azariah.
This Rashi might be understood as referring to the animal behavior as a symptom or a reflection of human degradation (see Beis Halevi), but not as inherently iniquitous or repugnant.
But later (8:1), Rashi says that when Hashem remembered the animals in the Ark and looked upon them with favor, this was because Hashem knew that these individual animals had not engaged in inter-specific sexual congress. This does indicate that such behavior is inherently iniquitous or repugnant. Furthermore, the Gemara in Sanhedrin 108a states that mankind was guilty of intentional cross species animal husbandry. According to the Mizrachi, (also mentioned by the Maharsha there) this is an alternative to the Medrash of Rav Azariah; according to the Maharal, this is consistent with the Medrash (and see Rav Povarsky's Bahd Kodesh here). But in any case, whether the interbreeding was spontaneous or forced, it is clear that it ultimately generated chaos, a suspension of the laws of nature-- androlomusia (Medrash 26:5).
In Vayikra 19:19, the Torah prohibits us from intentional mating of animals of different species:
אֶת חֻקֹּתַי, תִּשְׁמֹרוּ בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם וּבֶגֶד כִּלְאַיִם שַׁעַטְנֵז לֹא יַעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ.
The Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya there say that interbreeding of species for the purpose of creating an animal that is not part of the natural world expresses a denial of the perfection of the world as created (see, e.g., Chulin 127), it is an act of rebellion against God's will, and it is Makchish- it weakens- God's act of creation. I would say that this 'Makchish,' weakening, is derived from the term androlomusia, a breach in the laws of nature, resulting in chaos. It is as if natural law- physics, mathematics, biology- is a treaty between Man and God; if Mankind breaches the treaty, all natural law is subject to abrogation by God, as occurred at the time of the Mabul..
Now, here is a paragraph from an editorial in Nature, published June 2007.
Many a technology has at some time or another been deemed an affront to God, but perhaps none invites the accusation as directly as synthetic biology. Only a deity predisposed to cut-and-paste would suffer any serious challenge from genetic engineering as it has been practised in the past. But the efforts to design living organisms from scratch — either with a wholly artificial genome made by DNA synthesis technology or, more ambitiously, by using non-natural, bespoke molecular machinery — really might seem to justify the suggestion, made recently by the ETC Group, an environmental pressure group based in Ottawa, Canada, that "for the first time, God has competition".
I suppose it's nice to see that these people were mechavein to, and so eloquently stated, the essential thesis of the Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya. And, of course, the Ramban issue does not apply only to synthetic biology, but even to gene splicing, which is now so common as to often be done in high school science projects.
The natural halachic reaction to this Rashi is that the fact remains that after Matan Torah, we have 365 prohibitions, no more, no less, and if no specific prohibition covers an act, there is no reason to avoid it other than the vague mussar of "kedoshim tihyu". After all, the issur of Kilayim in Vayikra 19:19 is called a "chok." If it is a chok, perhaps the issur is limited to the specific cases that were prohibited and not meant to be extrapolated, and we have no right to establish a binyan av. Perhaps, then, the manipulation of genetic material in a laboratory, which does not involve the unnatural act of mating dissimilar animals, is not prohibited.
Continuing the train of thought, here's a piece of Torah from Reb Elchonon Wasserman. Every single line in this piece is a fascinating chiddush. Items 1 and 2 will appear irrelevant to our discussion, but you will see that they lead back to this topic. Unfortunately, I can't find a full text copy of the Kovetz Shiurim online, and I'm not getting paid enough to type it, so I'll just give you the mareh makom and a synopsis. Kesuvos 60, # 203 in my copy.
1. Citing Rabbeinu Chananel in Chagiga 16- a child conceived through artificial insemination, and certainly in vitro, does not generate tumas leida for the mother. (Ed: Of course there would be the standard "ein pesichas hakever belo dahm." But neither the chumra of tumas leidah, nor the kula of dahm tohar, would apply to a child of AI, and certainly not to in vitro fertilization.)
2. This would only be true where AI and IV are rare. If they were to become common, their halacha would be the same as natural conception. (Ed: in the previous piece he says like Reb Moshe and the Avnei Nezer, that bishul be'chama is only different than bishul in fire so long as it is rare. Once it becomes common, there would be a din of bishul basar be'chalav, the issur of bishul korban pesach, and a de'oraysa of bishul on Shabbos, even in bishul bechama. See, e.g., this.)
3. Now that cross-pollination is common, cross-pollination is prohibited between any trees for which grafting would be assur. (Ed: the Chazon Ish (Zeraim, Kilayim 3) leaves undecided the question of whether grafting among dissimilar citrus trees is prohibited. According to many poskim, the issur of harkava is the reason that we avoid grafted Esrogim, though the Chazon Ish prohibits grafted Esrogim even if the the issur of harkava does not apply. According to Reb Elchonon, then, the act of intentional cross-pollination between dissimilar citrus trees would be a safek de'oraysa. If so, it would seem that the fruit of any naturally cross-pollinated esrog would be passul. If so, there hasn't been a kosher esrog in the world since the time of Adam Harishon, because cross-pollination with other similar citruses occurs whenever the wind blows. In fact, I believe that the only reason we can use them on Sukkos, even though they inevitably contain a certain percentage of lemon genes from cross pollination, is that yichus goes after the mother (the ovary/stigma), not the father (the pollen/stamen.))
Some aspects of this issue have been addressed by certain rabbinical figures, some of whom propose that the prohibition of harkava only applies to living entities. Genetic material, on the other hand, is not alive, and, they say, may be manipulated at will. This might come as a surprise to the Ramban, to Reb Elchanan, and to the editors of Nature. It is similar to an argument that ma'aseh Onan is muttar for anyone that was already mekayeim pirya ve'riya.
Regarding Cloning, there are those who do not discourage it. Rabbi J. David Bleich, in Tradition, Spring 1998, argues that cloning is muttar because
| "The matter of identification as a member of a species is best summed up in a pithy comment attributed to Rav Chaim Soloveitchik. It is reported that Rav Chaim explained a certain Halachic concept by posing the following query: Why is a horse a horse? The answer is that a horse is a horse because its mother was of that species. For that reason the Mishna, Bechorot 5b, declares that the offspring of a kosher animal is kosher even if it has the appearance and physical attributes of a non-kosher animal and, conversely, the offspring of a non-kosher animal is non-kosher even if it has the appearance and physical attributes of a kosher animal. Thus, identity as a member of a particular species is determined not by distinguishing characteristics, but by birth." |
On the other hand, Rav Eliashiv has been quoted (see Torah U’madda Journal 9:195 and 216) as stating that cloning violates the spirit of the Torah, as it is similar to Kilayim. Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 15:45:4) emphatically objects to cloning.
But there is a fundamental distinction between that discussion, which focuses on the product of cloning, and Rashi and the Ramban's statements, which address the process of hybridization. In fact, the Chazon Ish in YD 168:1 is arguably a strong source for the prohibition of interspecific gene splicing.
In any case, it could be argued that the Torah is warning us that the creation of new life forms, either by conflation or synthesis, endangers all life on earth. One doesn't have to be a Luddite or a fundamentalist to recognize that if the black plague, which involved a natural life form which co-existed with humanity for millennia, reduced the population of Europe by sixty percent, the escape of a carelessly or maliciously engineered organism could do at least as well. I don't mean to rehash the trope of endless science fiction novels and thrillers. The idea here is that besides the natural danger, a more important factor might be the breach of the natural treaty between man and G-d. True, Hashem promised that the wholesale abrogation of the laws of nature will never happen again. But this does not exhaust the list of alternative horrors. There are many who consider themselves Orthodox Jews who have a hard time believing the literal truth of the story of the Mabul and Noach. Here's hoping that the thesis I presented here is incorrect, so that we don't have to witness conclusive proof of the literal truth of the story of the Mabul.
___{|____
~~~~~~~~~~~\_____/~~~~~~~~~~~
Monday, October 12, 2009
Breishis: Shabbos Faxes and Phone Calls
Earlier Posts on Beresishis:
Spiritual/Emotional Divine Communion and Contemplating the Beauty of Nature
Beautification of Mitzvos and Conspicuous Virtue
The Nachash was First in a Series of Four
Parshas Bereishis includes the concept of Shabbos. The onset and conclusion of Shabbos are local, and sweep across the globe from east to west along with the setting of the Sun on Friday and Saturday. Similarly, the dates being different on the two sides of the international dateline means that if there were a north-south street in Anchorage, Alaska, when it would be Friday morning on the east side of the street, it would be Shabbos morning on the west side. (Anchorage, and a mid-continental dateline, are cited here only for purpose of illustration, not as an assertion of normative halacha.)
One of my great Shabbos pleasures is hearing from my children in Israel. Sometimes we are lucky enough to be eating our seuda at the table, and sometimes I am preparing my shiur in the dining room, and the phone rings, the answering machine turns on, and we hear the voices of our beloved children in Yerushalayim, saying something like this: "Good Shabbos, Mommy and Daddy! I hope you're able to hear me. Shabbos was beautiful here, I spoke at the meal in the Yeshiva, I walked to the Kosel and didn't get arrested, we had a great Chumash shiur at Shalosh Seudos, and we're looking forward to hearing from you soon."
Obviously, my kids are calling from Yerushalayim long after their Shabbos is over, and we are hearing them while it is still Shabbos for us in America. Part of our oneg shabbos is watching the consternation on the faces of our guests, who begin to wonder that if this is how we keep Shabbos, who knows if the food in our house is kosher. So I let them wonder for a while, and then I explain why I hold this is muttar. But is it muttar? Are we allowed to hear the message on Shabbos? Are my kids allowed to call us when it's after Shabbos for them but still Shabbos in America?
Basically, these are the issues: (Remember what I said about relying on anonymous halacha opinions you find on the Internet: see my profile in "About Me".)
1. Even though we do not require Shvisas Keilim, and so we are allowed to begin a melacha process before Shabbos that continues automatically on Shabbos, we are not allowed to do so in the case of Avsha Milsa, where the melacha creates a noise that is heard on Shabbos (OC 252:5, Rama). Would this not prohibit us from leaving the answering machine on where the entire purpose of leaving it on is so that calls will generate noise on Shabbos? Or may we do so because we are merely leaving the machines on; but it is not us who will be generating that noise-- it is no different than allowing a non-Jew to come on to my property and to use my keilim on Shabbos.
2. Obviously, the telephone call is for our benefit. If so, does this fall into the category of "Akum she'asa melacha bishvil Yisrael," in which case it is prohibited, (under the rubric of "amira le'akum," either because of שליחות or דבר דבר) to benefit from the melacha until after Shabbos is over and bichdei she'ya'aseh (unless it was done by the akum for his own benefit and our benefit is secondary)? Or is amira le'akum limited to cases where someone or something is doing the melacha during Shabbos. Here, nobody is doing anything on Shabbos.
3. Is is muttar for a person for whom Shabbos is over to directly cause a melacha to be done in a part of the world where it is still Shabbos? Perhaps this is real chillul Shabbos, because he is actually doing melacha where it is still Shabbos-- he is being מחלל the אות of Shabbos, he is profaning the sign of Shabbos where the melacha is being done? Or is the idea of Shabbos a matter of personal conduct, and limited to the individual for whom it is Shabbos where he is?
This question can be much more serious than phone calls and faxes; what about the 'Shain Machine'?
The Shain Machine was invented by Rabbi Yehuda Shain to avoid Bishul Akum problems in factories. This is a mechanism which allows a mashgiach to call the factory and enter a code on the telephone which will ignite a fire at the factory, such that the fire cannot be turned on by anyone but the mashgiach, although workers at the factory can turn it off.
So, can a mashgiach, for whom it is Friday morning, turn on a fire in a factory in China when it is Shabbos in China? Can an Israeli, for whom it is long after Shabbat, turn on a fire in a (non-Jewish-owned) factory in Los Angeles, where they are holding by Mizmor Shir Leyom Hashabbos in pesukei dezimra?
The question also arises regarding sending email. But it's hard to believe that rearranging a few electrons in the local server really raises any real chilul Shabbos issues. אש שחורה על גבי אש לבנה on the screen may be kesiva, but not in the server.
There are exactly three approaches among the poskim.
1. It is absolutely 100% muttar lechatchila. (Rabbi Hershel Shachter, for all practical purposes, and Rabbi Yisroel Belsky- who says that Reb Akiva Eiger's teshuva 159 is irrelevant, and he's right- in Daf Kashrus volume 13 no. 9, June 2005, Rav Neuwirth in שמירת שבת כהלכתו 31:26 from Rav Scheinberg, and Me)
2. It is most likely assur Mi'Deoraysa. (I can't say until I verify his opinion and get his permission to quote him UPDATE OCTOBER 2011: I had heard this in the name of Reb Dovid Feinstein. I asked him last week, and he said that he holds it is muttar, period. The person that quoted him to me was diametrically wrong.)
3. It is assur Mi'Derabanan, but only where the recipient is a Jew, based on Issue #2. (Rav Meir Bransdorfer of the Eida Chareidis in מבקשי תורה תשרי תשנ'ד כרך ב who brings the Radvaz in 1:76 to be mattir Issue #3 but assers on the basis of Issue #2 where the recipient is a Jew, citing the שו'ע הרב רס'ג בקונטרס אחרון אות ח. Lefi aniyus da'ati, the Radvaz is a very weak comparison, and the connection to the Shulchan Aruch Harav is very debatable.)
Now, this is not the only case where the opinions are diametrically opposed. (Another example is where you want to re-hang a picture that fell down on Shabbos, which the Mishna Berura is mattir, and the Chazon Ish holds it's assur mi'deoraysa. Also, the Tefilla Lishlom HaMedinah.) But here, the basic philosophy of Shabbos comes into play, which, to me, makes it more interesting. Furthermore, it is very hard to come up with a strong tzushtell in Shas, so the question is, in many cases, left to "יראה לי."
Another halacha that might involve some of the same issues:
What about Chametz in the US when you are in Israel, or vice versa? If you have Chametz in Israel, can you sell it when it's Pesach in Israel but not in the US where you are? What if you're in Israel: can you buy it back from the goy when it's after Pesach in Israel but still Pesach where the Chametz is? (I actually once had a shayla like this: someone from New York called erev Pesach and said he had forgotten to sell his chametz, and it was after noon already, when you can no longer sell the chametz. We told him he was up the creek, and he would have to pour all his expensive schnapps down the drain. He, being a Manhattan lawyer with a keen eye for a loophole, then asked whether he could still call a rov in Los Angeles, where it was still early morning, to sell his chametz. We (meaning me as interlocutor for Reb Dovid Feinstein) told him no. But that's not exactly what we're discussing here.)
If my use of the word might didn't make it clear, I know that it would be easy to propose possible distinctions between the issues of Chametz and Shabbos: if it's called issura bala before Pesach, if shelcha is a mi'ut, etc. But without rayos, it's just speculation.
An interesting thing on this question is the tentativeness of the poskim: among the respectable authorities, almost nobody takes a firm stand on the issue of chametz. See, e.g., Teshuvos Igros Moshe OC IV 95, last paragraph, where he says that you have to be machmir both ways-- mei'ikar hadin. And see Oneg Yomtov 36, who brings "קצת ראיה" that the loaction of the Chametz is all that matters. As Great Unknown points out in the comments, the Oneg Yomtov's raya is based on an assumption that Chazal would have mentioned the case of different time zones if it would yield any interesting halachic ramifications. Rav Shternbuch, in his Mo'adim Uzemanim at the beginning of Mechiras Chametz, disagrees with the Oneg Yomtov, and holds that all that matters is the location of the owner. As for the Oneg Yomtov's proof, he says that Chazal would not have proposed such a pshat as a legitimate interpretation of the intent of the author of the Mishnah, and so they ignored it, just as Great Unknown suggested.
Similar questions:
1. Shevisas Be'hemto. What if you and your animal are in different time zones-- it is Shabbos for you, but not where your animal is, or vice versa?
2. Oso ve'es Beno. What if the two are shechted on the same day from your perspective, but they were in different days where they were shechted? Reb Meir Simcha in Parshas Emor 22:28 says that your perspective doesn't matter. If the mother was shechted where it was day, but it is already night where you are, you can shecht the offspring now, even though it is still the same day, from your perspective, as the shechitas ha'eim. Then he says a most remarkable chiddush-- that in that case, since it is muttar to shecht the offspring that is in a different calendar day, one may even shecht another offspring that shares the calendar day with the mother.
3. Chadash. After the Churban Beis Hamikdash, it is not the offering of the Minchas Ha'omer that is mattir Chadash, it is the break of dawn on the sixteenth of Nissan that is mattir Chadash. So, here's the question: After Hei'ir Pnei Mizrach in Yerushalayim, which is mattir Chadash locally, what is the status of Chadash over in Los Angeles? In some places, it's not even the sixteenth of Nissan yet, to say nothing of dawn on the sixteenth. So is Chadash muttar or assur there? Rav Tzvi Kaplan, Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivas Kodshim in Yerushalayim, and son in law of Harav Michel Feinstein ztzl, says he asked this question to Reb Chaim Kanievsky. Reb Chaim Kanievsky told him that as soon as it is Hei'ir Pnei Mizrach in Yerushalyim, all Chadash in the world becomes muttar. Reb Tzvi was so shocked by this that he forgot the other questions he had prepared. The reason he was shocked is because the Brisker Rov says that even Hakravas Ha'omer is not mattir Chadash in places where it's not daytime of the sixteenth yet, because hakravas ha'omer is only mattir on the day of the sixteenth. This is diametrically opposed to what Reb Chaim Kanievsky said.
4. Keilim that are koneh sh'visa. Here's the case: we pasken (OC 397:8) that objects are limited to the techum of their owner. If the owner of an object is outside the techum, you can't move the object daled amos, even in the house. For example: My son is in Israel, I'm in the U.S., it's Shabbos, I can't borrow and wear his tie or sweater. This is the factual Halacha. But perhaps that is only true if it's Shabbos where the owner is. If it's after Shabbos in Israel, maybe there's no din that his keilim are limited to any particular techum.
(to be continued. If you have an informed opinion or a makor, send it now.)
Spiritual/Emotional Divine Communion and Contemplating the Beauty of Nature
Beautification of Mitzvos and Conspicuous Virtue
The Nachash was First in a Series of Four
Parshas Bereishis includes the concept of Shabbos. The onset and conclusion of Shabbos are local, and sweep across the globe from east to west along with the setting of the Sun on Friday and Saturday. Similarly, the dates being different on the two sides of the international dateline means that if there were a north-south street in Anchorage, Alaska, when it would be Friday morning on the east side of the street, it would be Shabbos morning on the west side. (Anchorage, and a mid-continental dateline, are cited here only for purpose of illustration, not as an assertion of normative halacha.)
One of my great Shabbos pleasures is hearing from my children in Israel. Sometimes we are lucky enough to be eating our seuda at the table, and sometimes I am preparing my shiur in the dining room, and the phone rings, the answering machine turns on, and we hear the voices of our beloved children in Yerushalayim, saying something like this: "Good Shabbos, Mommy and Daddy! I hope you're able to hear me. Shabbos was beautiful here, I spoke at the meal in the Yeshiva, I walked to the Kosel and didn't get arrested, we had a great Chumash shiur at Shalosh Seudos, and we're looking forward to hearing from you soon."
Obviously, my kids are calling from Yerushalayim long after their Shabbos is over, and we are hearing them while it is still Shabbos for us in America. Part of our oneg shabbos is watching the consternation on the faces of our guests, who begin to wonder that if this is how we keep Shabbos, who knows if the food in our house is kosher. So I let them wonder for a while, and then I explain why I hold this is muttar. But is it muttar? Are we allowed to hear the message on Shabbos? Are my kids allowed to call us when it's after Shabbos for them but still Shabbos in America?
Basically, these are the issues: (Remember what I said about relying on anonymous halacha opinions you find on the Internet: see my profile in "About Me".)
1. Even though we do not require Shvisas Keilim, and so we are allowed to begin a melacha process before Shabbos that continues automatically on Shabbos, we are not allowed to do so in the case of Avsha Milsa, where the melacha creates a noise that is heard on Shabbos (OC 252:5, Rama). Would this not prohibit us from leaving the answering machine on where the entire purpose of leaving it on is so that calls will generate noise on Shabbos? Or may we do so because we are merely leaving the machines on; but it is not us who will be generating that noise-- it is no different than allowing a non-Jew to come on to my property and to use my keilim on Shabbos.
2. Obviously, the telephone call is for our benefit. If so, does this fall into the category of "Akum she'asa melacha bishvil Yisrael," in which case it is prohibited, (under the rubric of "amira le'akum," either because of שליחות or דבר דבר) to benefit from the melacha until after Shabbos is over and bichdei she'ya'aseh (unless it was done by the akum for his own benefit and our benefit is secondary)? Or is amira le'akum limited to cases where someone or something is doing the melacha during Shabbos. Here, nobody is doing anything on Shabbos.
3. Is is muttar for a person for whom Shabbos is over to directly cause a melacha to be done in a part of the world where it is still Shabbos? Perhaps this is real chillul Shabbos, because he is actually doing melacha where it is still Shabbos-- he is being מחלל the אות of Shabbos, he is profaning the sign of Shabbos where the melacha is being done? Or is the idea of Shabbos a matter of personal conduct, and limited to the individual for whom it is Shabbos where he is?
This question can be much more serious than phone calls and faxes; what about the 'Shain Machine'?
The Shain Machine was invented by Rabbi Yehuda Shain to avoid Bishul Akum problems in factories. This is a mechanism which allows a mashgiach to call the factory and enter a code on the telephone which will ignite a fire at the factory, such that the fire cannot be turned on by anyone but the mashgiach, although workers at the factory can turn it off.
So, can a mashgiach, for whom it is Friday morning, turn on a fire in a factory in China when it is Shabbos in China? Can an Israeli, for whom it is long after Shabbat, turn on a fire in a (non-Jewish-owned) factory in Los Angeles, where they are holding by Mizmor Shir Leyom Hashabbos in pesukei dezimra?
The question also arises regarding sending email. But it's hard to believe that rearranging a few electrons in the local server really raises any real chilul Shabbos issues. אש שחורה על גבי אש לבנה on the screen may be kesiva, but not in the server.
There are exactly three approaches among the poskim.
1. It is absolutely 100% muttar lechatchila. (Rabbi Hershel Shachter, for all practical purposes, and Rabbi Yisroel Belsky- who says that Reb Akiva Eiger's teshuva 159 is irrelevant, and he's right- in Daf Kashrus volume 13 no. 9, June 2005, Rav Neuwirth in שמירת שבת כהלכתו 31:26 from Rav Scheinberg, and Me)
2. It is most likely assur Mi'Deoraysa. (I can't say until I verify his opinion and get his permission to quote him UPDATE OCTOBER 2011: I had heard this in the name of Reb Dovid Feinstein. I asked him last week, and he said that he holds it is muttar, period. The person that quoted him to me was diametrically wrong.)
3. It is assur Mi'Derabanan, but only where the recipient is a Jew, based on Issue #2. (Rav Meir Bransdorfer of the Eida Chareidis in מבקשי תורה תשרי תשנ'ד כרך ב who brings the Radvaz in 1:76 to be mattir Issue #3 but assers on the basis of Issue #2 where the recipient is a Jew, citing the שו'ע הרב רס'ג בקונטרס אחרון אות ח. Lefi aniyus da'ati, the Radvaz is a very weak comparison, and the connection to the Shulchan Aruch Harav is very debatable.)
Now, this is not the only case where the opinions are diametrically opposed. (Another example is where you want to re-hang a picture that fell down on Shabbos, which the Mishna Berura is mattir, and the Chazon Ish holds it's assur mi'deoraysa. Also, the Tefilla Lishlom HaMedinah.) But here, the basic philosophy of Shabbos comes into play, which, to me, makes it more interesting. Furthermore, it is very hard to come up with a strong tzushtell in Shas, so the question is, in many cases, left to "יראה לי."
Another halacha that might involve some of the same issues:
What about Chametz in the US when you are in Israel, or vice versa? If you have Chametz in Israel, can you sell it when it's Pesach in Israel but not in the US where you are? What if you're in Israel: can you buy it back from the goy when it's after Pesach in Israel but still Pesach where the Chametz is? (I actually once had a shayla like this: someone from New York called erev Pesach and said he had forgotten to sell his chametz, and it was after noon already, when you can no longer sell the chametz. We told him he was up the creek, and he would have to pour all his expensive schnapps down the drain. He, being a Manhattan lawyer with a keen eye for a loophole, then asked whether he could still call a rov in Los Angeles, where it was still early morning, to sell his chametz. We (meaning me as interlocutor for Reb Dovid Feinstein) told him no. But that's not exactly what we're discussing here.)
If my use of the word might didn't make it clear, I know that it would be easy to propose possible distinctions between the issues of Chametz and Shabbos: if it's called issura bala before Pesach, if shelcha is a mi'ut, etc. But without rayos, it's just speculation.
An interesting thing on this question is the tentativeness of the poskim: among the respectable authorities, almost nobody takes a firm stand on the issue of chametz. See, e.g., Teshuvos Igros Moshe OC IV 95, last paragraph, where he says that you have to be machmir both ways-- mei'ikar hadin. And see Oneg Yomtov 36, who brings "קצת ראיה" that the loaction of the Chametz is all that matters. As Great Unknown points out in the comments, the Oneg Yomtov's raya is based on an assumption that Chazal would have mentioned the case of different time zones if it would yield any interesting halachic ramifications. Rav Shternbuch, in his Mo'adim Uzemanim at the beginning of Mechiras Chametz, disagrees with the Oneg Yomtov, and holds that all that matters is the location of the owner. As for the Oneg Yomtov's proof, he says that Chazal would not have proposed such a pshat as a legitimate interpretation of the intent of the author of the Mishnah, and so they ignored it, just as Great Unknown suggested.
Similar questions:
1. Shevisas Be'hemto. What if you and your animal are in different time zones-- it is Shabbos for you, but not where your animal is, or vice versa?
2. Oso ve'es Beno. What if the two are shechted on the same day from your perspective, but they were in different days where they were shechted? Reb Meir Simcha in Parshas Emor 22:28 says that your perspective doesn't matter. If the mother was shechted where it was day, but it is already night where you are, you can shecht the offspring now, even though it is still the same day, from your perspective, as the shechitas ha'eim. Then he says a most remarkable chiddush-- that in that case, since it is muttar to shecht the offspring that is in a different calendar day, one may even shecht another offspring that shares the calendar day with the mother.
3. Chadash. After the Churban Beis Hamikdash, it is not the offering of the Minchas Ha'omer that is mattir Chadash, it is the break of dawn on the sixteenth of Nissan that is mattir Chadash. So, here's the question: After Hei'ir Pnei Mizrach in Yerushalayim, which is mattir Chadash locally, what is the status of Chadash over in Los Angeles? In some places, it's not even the sixteenth of Nissan yet, to say nothing of dawn on the sixteenth. So is Chadash muttar or assur there? Rav Tzvi Kaplan, Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivas Kodshim in Yerushalayim, and son in law of Harav Michel Feinstein ztzl, says he asked this question to Reb Chaim Kanievsky. Reb Chaim Kanievsky told him that as soon as it is Hei'ir Pnei Mizrach in Yerushalyim, all Chadash in the world becomes muttar. Reb Tzvi was so shocked by this that he forgot the other questions he had prepared. The reason he was shocked is because the Brisker Rov says that even Hakravas Ha'omer is not mattir Chadash in places where it's not daytime of the sixteenth yet, because hakravas ha'omer is only mattir on the day of the sixteenth. This is diametrically opposed to what Reb Chaim Kanievsky said.
4. Keilim that are koneh sh'visa. Here's the case: we pasken (OC 397:8) that objects are limited to the techum of their owner. If the owner of an object is outside the techum, you can't move the object daled amos, even in the house. For example: My son is in Israel, I'm in the U.S., it's Shabbos, I can't borrow and wear his tie or sweater. This is the factual Halacha. But perhaps that is only true if it's Shabbos where the owner is. If it's after Shabbos in Israel, maybe there's no din that his keilim are limited to any particular techum.
(to be continued. If you have an informed opinion or a makor, send it now.)
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