Be'haaloscha, Bamidbar 11:10, Bocheh L'Mishpechosav. Geirus

Synopsis:
The Jewish People underwent Geirus at Har Sinai.
There is a rule that גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי , conversion erases all previous familial relationships and renders relatives unrelated and able to marry each other.
It appears that this rule did not apply to the Jews at Har Sinai.
Why?
Answer: Because at Sinai, two things happened, but the Geirus only had one step.
One: the actual Geirus- we were granted a quantitative (613) and qualitative (servants of Hashem) increase of mitzvos and kedusha, and
Two: this endowment was declared to be exclusive to members of Klal Yisrael.
At every Geirus after Sinai, two things happen, but they are different, because they are both parts of the Geirus. (Neither of these two elements can exist independently, but they are conceptually and effectively distinct.)   
One: the person erases his past and joins Am Yisrael, and
Two: he accepts the kedusha of Avdus to Hashem and Taryag Mitzvos.
It is element One, the negation of his prior identity, that results in the annulment of familial relationships.
Element One was not present at Mattan Torah, nor was there any need for it, nor would it make any sense at all.
Therefore, at Sinai there was no negation of their prior relationships.

However, there is an contrary opinion that holds that the rule of K'katan did apply at Sinai.
I explain the basis of the two opinions.
I discuss problems with this minority opinion.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Our passuk, 11:10,  says וַיִּשְׁמַע מֹשֶׁה אֶת הָעָם בֹּכֶה לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָיו אִישׁ לְפֶתַח אָהֳלוֹ.  Chazal (Shabbos 130a) explain that the people were upset about the Arayos restrictions they were taught at Mattan Torah.  As the Gemara says, כל מצוה שקבלו עליהם בקטטה כגון עריות דכתיב וישמע משה את העם בוכה למשפחותיו על עסקי משפחותיו עדיין עושין אותה בקטטה דליכא כתובה דלא רמו בה תיגרא.    Mitzvos they accepted with contentiousness, they are still fussing about.  (I don't know if this is a siman or a sibba.  Both make perfect sense.)  For example, it says they cried about marital relations, and this initial resentment still echoes among us, as we see that wedding negotiations always involve some argument. 

What so upset us that we came to tears?  Rashi there in Shabbos says שנאסר להם קרובות, that certain relatives that are allowed to a Ben Noach are prohibited to Jews, and they were crying for the loss of those relatives.  But there is an important disagreement between the Maharal and Reb Meir Simcha as to exactly what the problem was.

The Maharal (and Rabboseinu Ba'alei Hatosfos on our passuk) understands the Gemara to mean that many married couples realized that they would have to separate, because under the new rules their marriage was illegal. 

Reb Meir Simcha (Devarim 5:26) understands that the marriages of the people that received the Torah at Sinai were not affected: with the giving of the Torah, we all became Geirim (Yevamos 46a), and converts are viewed as newly born.  גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.  (Yevamos 97b)  The familial history of all the people living then, who were all geirim, was erased.  All their relatives from their past life were no longer legally related to them.  Therefore, there could be no problem with marriages among those people, and so Hashem told them to go home, no matter to whom they were married, שׁוּבוּ לָכֶם לְאָהֳלֵיכֶם, which means to their marital relations (Moed Kattan 7b).  The reason they cried here in Be'ha'aloscha was because they were thinking about the future, when the children they would have in the future would not be allowed to marry the childrens' relatives.

The Maharal (Breishis 46:10 and in Yisro) says that the rule of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי did not apply to that generation, because it was a forced conversion; Hashem had them over a barrel, so to speak.  They couldn't refuse the conversion.  A forced conversion does not yield the result of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.  So, many married couples were forced to separate.  (Side note- The Shmaitsa in the Hakdama says that it wasn't a literal case of duress.  Instead, the fact that the world could not exist without Torah was so obvious to the Jews at that point, that in a manner of speaking, they had no choice.  Similarly, the Prashas Drachim I discuss in a different post says that even then, there was a din of the Rambam's Kofin making Ratzon.)

Ironically, the Chasam Sofer in his pirush to Avodah Zara 63b says that he never could find a convincing source for Chazal's rule of Geir Shenisgayer K'Katan Shenolad Dami.  Reb Meir Simcha says that the passuk in Devarim 5 שׁוּבוּ לָכֶם לְאָהֳלֵיכֶם that allowed them to go home to their spouses is the source for the rule- that they could go back to their spouse even if the spouse was a relative, because any potential problem was solved by the chidush of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.   The Maharal looks at the same event and says that on the contrary, the couples that were related to each other were  prohibited to go home, and that's why they cried.  According to Reb Meir Simcha, it is the source for the rule.  According to the Maharal, it is the one and only exception to the rule.

Most Achronim assume the Maharal's pshat, that they were crying for the spouses they lost.  However, they offer several alternatives to the Maharal's explanation for this anomalous absence of the general rule that a Ger is no longer related to his erstwhile relatives.  As we said, the Maharal's explanation is that Mattan Torah was to some extent a forced conversion, and a forced conversion is not called a rebirth.  The explanations offered by other Achronim are as follows:

Many achronim (including Rav Shternbuch in his Moadim Uzmanim on Shvuos #238) say that Geir Shnisgayer is only Ke'Kattan when he is coming from a different nation.  But we already were descendants of the Avos, we already were Klal Yisrael.  For example, the Ramban at the end of Emor says that after Avraham's Bris Milah, his children acquired the yichus of "Zera Avraham," and the Brisker Rov in Parshas Bo says that the din of Kol ben neichar by Korban Pesach proves that there was already a legal distinction between Zera Avraham and a Ben Neichar in Mitzrayim.  So the Geirus at Mattan Torah was simply geirus to add kedusha.  Such a Geirus is not ke'katan she'nolad.

Reb Yosef Ber (YU) as brought by Rabbi Shurkin in his Harrerei Kedem brings the Rambam that Geirus requires three things, Milah, Tevilah, and Ritzui of the Dahm of a Korban.  From the words the Rambam uses (13 Issurei Bi'ah 1 and 3, and see similar in 1 Teshuva 2), it appears that he sees the Korban at Mattan Torah as essentially distinct from the normal korban of a geir: it was a korban tzibbur.  Therefore, he says, the geirus too was a geirus of a tzibbur.  We only say Ke'kattan when an individual becomes a geir, because he leaves behind all his relatives.  But where a group all becomes geirim together, their relationships survive the geirus.  I'm sure Reb YB said it slightly differently, because the way it's written it's very speculative.  What I think he said was that there is a difference between the geirus of a yachid and the geirus of a tzibbur.  Even if a bunch of geirim are misgayeir at once, they are still not related, because the nature of their geirus was Geirus Yachid.  But here, it wasn't geirus of a yachid.  It was Geirus of a Tzibbur.  A Geirus tzibbur brings along its members' relationships.


I am not a Googelamden, who just digs up a bunch of pshatim and adds nothing.  I don't write unless I can offer something new.


What I have to offer is this: 
When Rus insisted on becoming a Giyores, she told Na'ami  עמך עמי, ואלקיך אלקי.  Your nation is my nation, and your G-d is my G-d.  Geirus involves two elements, two dinim: joining Klal Yisrael and kabbalas Mitzvos Hashem.  What is this Ameich Ami business?  Why does the Ger need to join Klal Yisrael?  Apparently, it's only shayach to be chayav in Mitzvos when you're a member of Klal Yisrael: that special yachas to the Ribono shel Olam requires being a member of Am Yisrael.  Now, these two elements have different characteristics.  Establishing the special relationship through the mitzvos is a a matter of acquiring something totally new.  Before, you weren't chayav in mitzvos, and now you are.  Joining Klal Yisrael is more than a matter of entering, it requires leaving as well.  One can be a Amoni, or a Ashuri, or whatever, and that's fine, but in order to become a Yisrael, you have to abandon your earlier national identity.  Kedusha- a positive act, be'poeil.  Klal Yisrael- both a negative and a positive, shlilis and be'poeil. You have to erase your past in order to enter your future.  (Maybe this is a part of the Geirus, maybe it's only a machshir for kabbalas mitzvos.  That's a question for another day.)  This is the basis of Geir Shenisgayer: not the addition of kedusha, but rather the abandonment of the previous identity that was necessary in order to become a Yisrael.

So nowהסכת ושמע :

What is the source of this dual requirement, of joining Klal Yisrael plus kabalas mitzvos?  Why isn't Kabalas Mitzvos alone good enough?  Because at Mattan Torah, at the the bris of Chorev, two events occurred:

• One, that we were endowed with and we accepted the Chiyuv mitzvos, the special relationship with the Ribono shel Olam.  
• Two, that the Ribono shel Olam was meyacheid this chalos davka to Klal Yisrael.  

This was a geirus, certainly, but at that time the actual Geirus only had one element- chalos mitzvos and avdus to Hashem.  It so happens that there was also a special yichud of this chalos to members of Klal Yisrael.  Why was this higher kedusha made exclusive to Klal Yisrael?  I don't know.  Maybe because of Avraham's being the first to recognize with tifkeit what the Ribono shel Olam wants and to fulfill it, maybe because of the perfection of Yaakov, maybe because of the gevura of Yitzchak.  I don't know, and it doesn't matter to me.  The fact remains that this special yachas through an endowment of kedusha is specific and exclusive to members of Klal Yisrael, and this exclusivity was established at the time of Mattan Torah.  And while we were the kallah, we were also the Chosen.

After Mattan Torah, only after the limitation of chiyuv mitzvos to Klal Yisrael, the process of Geirus itself required two steps. The two steps now are:

• First that the Geir becomes a member of Klal Yisrael and 
• Second that he accepts the kedusha of mitzvos and avdus to Hashem.  

So the kashe of the Maharal disappears, poof.  Geirus is only ke'katan shenolad when the process involves two elements, identity change and kedusha.  This is true after the Bris with Klal Yisrael at Sinai, when the Ribono shel Olam was meyacheid His name and kedusha upon us.  But at Sinai, no identity change was necessary.

I think this pshat is gold, and makes everything else unnecessary.  True, Reb Meir Simcha holds that Geir shenisgayeir is ke'katan because of a Gzeiras Hakasuv and it applied to the Geirus of Sinai.  But for all the rishonim and achronim that say not like Reb Meir Simcha, what I'm saying could be, as my father zatza'l used to say, karov l'emes. 

I ask, too, that you realize that this goes FAR, FAR, BEYOND the teretz from the achronim that Rav Shternbuch brings.  What they say is dry as dust, with no explanation, no lomdus, a take it or leave it teretz.  What I'm saying brings a completely different perspective that breathes life into the teretz.

One more thing:
Let's talk for a moment about the basic machlokes whether Geirus Sinai had a din of K'katan she'nolad or not.  What's the yesod of the machlokes?

We already explained that the shita that Sinai did not cause כקטן שנולד holds that nolad comes from the change of identity, from Nochri to Yisrael.  What does the other shitta, Reb Meir Simcha, hold?  Reb Meir Simcha holds that כקטן שנולד comes from the Chalos din of becoming an Eved Hashem.  This applied 100% at Har Sinai, so there was a din of כקטן שנולד there too.

In fact, if  you want to say this with a little smile, you might say pshat in the machlokes about what causes the din of katan she'nolad - is it the שינוי השם  from Nochri to Yisrael or the שינוי רשות from owning himself (or, perhaps,  הפקרות,) to being a kinyan of the Ribono shel Olam, an Eved Hashem.



Please note that even if you don't accept the essential difference between Mattan Torah and later Geirus, the idea that Geirus involves two elements still is very useful, as follows:

Would this din apply where they were already members of Klal Yisrael?  Of course not.  They weren't abandoning their past. 
Would this din apply where it was the geirus of a tzibbur?  No it would not.  Since Hashem allowed the tzibur to convert as a whole, it appears that their din tzibbur was allowed to remain.  If not, then they couldn't have a GEIRUS TZIBUR.  If they remained a tzibur, then there was not din of katan shenolad.
And finally; would this din apply if the geirus was forced?  No, it would not. A chalos can be chall ba'al korcho.  But a bittul chalos cannot be chall ba'al korchos.  You can be mechayeiv someone in more mitzvos against his will, you can impose kedusha on him, but a person's identity is inherently personal- you can't make a person not be what he is.  That can only happen if the person changes himself.


UPDATE:
Tal Benschar wrote a comment noting that it is clear in Chazal that the generation of Sinai did inherit from their parents.  The Gemara in Bava Kamma 109a says that under certain circumstances, repayment of theft may be made to the heir of the victim.  That person is called the Go'eil.  The Torah says there may be a victim who has no heir.  The Gemara asks, but every Jew is related to every other Jew!  The Gemara says that the only person without an heir is a Ger who had no children after the conversion.  According to Reb Meir Simcha, the entire generation of Sinai were considered reborn without relatives, so why would every Jew be related to every other Jew?  There were 600,000 unrelated individuals created on that day.
I attempted to defend Reb Meir Simcha by saying that the din of Go'eil may survive the Geirus of Sinai, though the din of yerusha did not, just as Amoni or Mitzri does.  I supported this with the opinion of Reb Yochanan, that a convert (whose children later convert, according to the Rambam's reading of Reb Yochanan) is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of Piryah ve'Rivya.  I deflected the fact that rishonim seem to equate Go'eil with Yoresh by arguing that the laws of yerusha might be a siman of who is the go'eil, not the sibah, and would therefore apply even through geirus.

I later admitted that this argument was untenable, because there is not a shred of support for this concept in the Braisos or Gemaros or Rishonim.  

It was also noted that it is impossible to contend that there was no din yerusha in the midbar, because the way the Gemara in Bava Basra understands the story of the Bnos Tzlafchad assumes all the dinim of yerusha were in full force.

The only defense of Reb Meir Simcha I could think of is that although they were K'katan regarding Arayos, they were not K'katan  regarding Yerusha.  The problem with this is that Reb Meir Simcha says that the entire source for the rule of K'katan  is Sinai, and if it didn't apply to yerusha, on what basis does it apply in cases of later geirus?

One might respond that it is obvious to Chazal that if kurva regarding Arayos is annulled, then  kurva regarding yerusha must be annulled as well.  If so, one must deal with the contradiction evident between Tzlafchad and Shuvu L'ahaleichem.  One can say that the retention of yerusha was a singular exception to the rule which was necessitated by the overriding need to bequeath Israel to the descendants of Avraham, either to fulfill the vow to Avraham, or because we, as individuals, were not worthy of Eretz Yisrael.  Our only claim was through Avraham Avinu.  This is why Geirus did not annul kurva regarding Geirus Sinai.   But for all subsequent Geirus, just as kurva regarding Arayos is annulled, kurva regarding yerusha is annulled too.

In any case, I noted that with or without a defense of Reb Meir Simcha, we can assume that he had a way to resolve the questions, and so his opinion that K'Katan applied to Sinai remains on the roster of Shittos.

Naso, Bamidbar 6:23. Birkas Kohanim ברכת כהנים

Synopsis:
I
Machlokes whether a non-kohen may place both hands on the head of someone he is bentching.
This Machlokes follows from the opinions of Rashi and the Ramban in Parshas Shemini regarding the first time Aharon blessed the people, whether he used the language of Birkas Kohanim in Naso or some other nusach.

II
Whether Birkas Kohanim is De'oraysa or Derabanan in our time.
Why Birkas Kohanim is after Modim and why we say Ve'se'erav.

III
The concept of Birkas Kohanim following Avodas Korbanos and the extent to which tefilla is like a korban.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I

There is a widespread minhag to bless children Friday night.  This minhag is brought in the siddur of Reb Yaakov Emden and in the siddur of the Gr'a.  In Rav Emden's siddur (section on ליל שבת), he says that one should place both hands on the child during the Bracha.  He says that those who believe that one should use only one hand are incorrect.  Or, as he puts it, ולא כחסירי דעת שחושבין שיש קפידא לברך דוקא ביד אחת.  (If you've ever read his Mor Uketzi'ah, you know that in matters of Halacha and Hashkafa, Rav Emden was not a model of tranquility, and "חסירי דעת" is, by his standards, mild.)  This opinion is also stated in the Pachad Yitzchak (Reb Yitzchak Lampronti, section on Brachos, page 54, who says that although some only use one hand, he uses both.  (He doesn't say that they are חסירי דעת.)

On the other hand, the Siddur Hagr'a (section on ליל שבת) says that the Gaon is quoted as having said that it is assur for anyone other than a Kohen to give a bracha with both hands.

The Torah Temima here also quotes the Gaon to this effect, and says that when the Vilner Posek Rav Landau got married, he got a bracha from the Gaon, who put one hand on him.  He asked the Gaon why one hand, and the Gaon said that we do not find a two handed bracha other than kohanim in the Mikdash.  Irrespective of your opinion on Rabbi Epstein's reliability, this particular story has been said by others with a significant difference.  There is a book of stories of gedolim called Ma'asei Ilfas by a man named Ilfas, published in Jerusalem in תש"א.  The book was published when the author was an elderly man, and he says (page 9) that he personally met the Vilner Dayan (who died in תרל"א  at 91), and he himself told him the story.  When he was a Chassan, he came in to the Gaon's house while the Gaon was eating kugel at the day meal of Shabbos, and the Gaon put out his hands to give him a bracha.  I am not making this up. The young rabbi Landau moved back, because he was afraid the Gaon would make his new Shtreimel greasy.  So the Gaon ended up putting only one hand on him and giving him the bracha.  Rabbi Landau said that his whole life he regretted the childish preference for a clean shtreimel over the Gaon's hand.

The stories in the Torah Temima and the Ma'aseh Ilfas cancel each other out.  But we do have the Siddur Hagr'a that validates the story of the Gaon's k'peida to use only one hand, and Reb Moshe once told me that the authors and editors of the Siddur Hagr'a were talmidei chachamim who took their work very seriously and can be trusted as to factual matters.

The basis for the Gaon's k'peida, one assumes, is the Gemara (Ksuvos 24b) that a non-Kohen that lifts his hands and says birkas Kohanim transgresses the mitzva of our parsha, namely, דַּבֵּר אֶל אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל בָּנָיו לֵאמֹר כֹּה תְבָרְכוּ אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל .  The passuk is telling us that only Aharon and his children can use this protocol of Bracha.

Exactly when the issur applies is well discussed: the Magen Avraham (beginning of OC 128) says it's only a problem when using the Sheim Hashem, either in a bracha of Levarech or in the words of the psukim of Birkas Kohanim (see Noda BeYehuda OC I:5).  The Ksav Sofer says the issur is only when intending to fulfill the Mitzva of Koh Sevarchu.  The Bach there says the issur is only when one raises his hands, which is consistent with the Gaon. 

I would say that the issue of whether you can use both hands when duchenning depends on Rashi/Ramban in Shmini, and the Mishneh Le'Melech.

In Parshas Shemini (Vayikra 9:22) it says that after inaugurating the Mizbei'ach, Aharon raised his hands and blessed the people-וַיִּשָּׂא אַהֲרֹן אֶת יָדָו אֶל הָעָם וַיְבָרְכֵם.  Rashi there says that (even though the parsha of Birkas Kohanim had not yet been taught) Aharon was inspired in his choice of words and he gave the blessing exactly as it was later taught in our parsha- Yevarech'echa Hashem Veyishme'recha....  The Ramban disagrees and says that Aharon's bracha was just a bracha, and we have no idea what the words of the bracha were, just as Shlomo Hamelech gave the people a bracha when the Beis Hamikdash was finished.  He says that the Bracha in our parsha was created only when Hashem taught it to Moshe.

The Mishneh Le'Melech brings this machlokes in Hilchos Tefilla (14:9).  He explains that although we learn many dinim of Birkas Kohanim from Parshas Shmini, this doesn't prove like Rashi.  The limudim are only because of a Gzeira Shava, and don't prove that the two brachos are identical.  The Ramban, therefore, learns that the bracha of Shmini was entirely different, and the Gzeira Shava only imports the circumstances of Shmini and applies them to the new parsha of Birkas Kohanim.  Rashi, on the other hand, holds that the two brachos are the same, and that we would know many dinim without a Gzeira Shava, because Shmini is also Birkas Kohanim.  According to Rashi, we only need the Gzeira Shava to teach us that you don't need to match the Bracha of Shmini exactly, that it doesn't have to be the Kohen Gadol on Rosh Chodesh. 

So: according to Rashi, Shemini's Vayisa Kapav is specifically and exclusively associated with Birkas Kohanim, and a non-kohen that uses both hands is doing something that is intended to be unique to Duchening.  According to the Ramban, on the other hand, the raised hands of Shemini are not a unique characteristic of duchenning, because Aharon wasn't duchenning when he raised his hands.  That action is appropriate to brachos in general.  When you give someone a bracha, you reach out to him, you want contact.  If so, there is no reason to think that "אֶל אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל בָּנָיו לֵאמֹר כֹּה  תְבָרְכוּ" precludes others from using both hands when they give a bracha.  Only those things that are uniquely associated with duchenning are prohibited to non-Kohanim.


II

The Gemara (Sotah 38a) uses the passuk in Shmini to tell us that Birkas Kohanim can only be done when the Kohen finishes an Avoda of Korbanos Tzibur.

Because of this, Reb Yaakov Emden (same place as above, and also in his Mor Uketziah 128) says that Birkas Kohanim in our time is Miderabanan.  Mid'oraysa, no Avodah means no Duchenning.   The Mishna Berura (Shaar Tziyun in 128) strongly disagrees and holds it is De'oraysa even now, but he does not address the question of Avoda.  Similarly, the Keren Ora there in Sota (D'H Ve'od) raises the question of avoda, and says that he would like to think that Birkas Kohanim is De'Rabanan now for lack of Avoda, but admits that it is clear that the Rambam and others hold it is De'Oraysa, as his brother, Reb Yaakov Karliner says in Teshuvos Mishkenos Yaakov OC 84.  So what do you do with Reb Yaakov Emden and the Keren Orah's question?

Although the Mishkenos Yaakov/Keren Ora brothers tie the issue of whether Birkas Kohanim is De’oraysa to the issue of whether Tefilla is De’oraysa, I don’t see that there is necessarily any correlation.  It would be more appropriate to relate this to the idea (Brachos 26b) that our tefilla is like Avodas Korbanos.  If so, then the Tefilla of the Chazan in Chazaras Hatefilla is Avodas Tzibur.  This might satisfy the prerequisite of Avodas Tzibur for Birkas Kohanim De'oraysa.  

With this we understand the nusach we use to introduce Birkas Kohanim on Yomtov- ותערב עליך עתירתינו כעולה וכקרבן.  The Gemara in Sotah says that the Kohanim must begin moving toward the platform during Re'tzei, because Re'tzei is the Bracha of Avodah, and Duchenning must follow Avodah.  (We delay the bracha until in middle of Hoda'ah, the Gemara says, because Avodah and Hoda'ah are essentially twins.)  The reason we says Ve'Seiareiv is to emphasize this connection:  We are asking that Hashem accept our tefilla as if it were a real Korban.  Now that we have brought our Korban Tzibur, we are allowed to proceed to the Duchenning.

I have to mention, though, that the Mishna Berura very strongly asserts that Duchening is d'oraysa bizman hazeh.  See the Shaar Tziun in 128, and also see Igros Moshe OC 5:20:23.


III

So the question remains, and this is where we were headed the whole time:
It seems that there is a machlokes here whether the rule of "tefilla=korbanos" satisfies Birkas Kohanim's prerequisite of avoda.  What is the basis of the machlokes?  What is the yesod of the machlokes?  I think that to answer this question we need to know WHY the prerequisite exists, and what it means, what it says about Birkas Kohanim and what it says about the Kohanim who are saying Birkas Kohanim.  And let's not forget the Mishneh Le'Melech.

TBC, maybe.  You really have everything you need to work out your own mehalach. 

*

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Bamidbar 4:49. Pidyon Haben with a Shaliach

פדיון הבן על ידי שליח

Synopsis:
Argument among poskim whether the mitzva of Pidyon Haben can be done through an agent, or has to be done personally.
Our parsha seems to state that it could be done through a shaliach, in that Moshe brought it to Aharon on behalf of the Bechors.
Answers that distinguish our parsha from general pidyon:
Our parsha was a mere delivery of money, which everyone allows through a shliach as long as the father personally says the nusach of pidyon; or
Moshe had the status of a Kohen at that time, and he was the podeh; or
everyone would agree that a kohen can receive on behalf of another kohen; or
the pidyon of the Midbar was singular and had different rules than the pidyon we do now.

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The Rama (YD 305:10) brings a Rivash that one cannot do Pidyon Haben via an agent.  The Rivash is in the Teshuvos (131), but he does not say this explicitly.  He brings the Rambam that says that the form of Bracha when a father redeems his son is "Ahl pidyon" but when a person redeems himself it is "Lifdos".  The Rivash explains that as far as the father is concerned, the mitzva could be done by another person, namely the son himself when he grows up, and for a mitzva that could be done by another person the proper bracha is "ahl."  `When the father was not podeh the son, and the son grew up and is podeh himself, that pidyon can not be done by anyone else at all, and in such cases, the language of the bracha is "li..", not "ahl."   We see that the Rivash holds that Pidyon cannot be done by a third party, a shliach.

Everyone argues with the Rama/Rivash.  As the Aruch Hashulchan (sk 5) says, וכל גדולי עולם דחו דבריו and that all the poskim say that one does not have to be concerned about the Rama's shitta here at all. The Gaon there says that the whole thing is an error and that it's not even in the Rivash.  (I don't know why he says that.  Look at the link.  It looks like it's there.  Either he had a different Rivash or he holds that's not how to learn the Rivash.)

If  you know the Aruch Hashulchan, you know that with that kind of setup, he usually takes the side of the chiddush.  Indeed, the Aruch Hashulchan does say that there is a strong basis for saying that Pidyon cannot be done by a shliach, and that one should very much avoid doing so.

The Aruch Hashulchan also says that some people say pshat that even the Rama agrees that you can send the money via shliach, and he only meant that the father himself needs to say the nusach of pidyon.  "Some people" happens to be, among others, Reb Akiva Eiger there in Shulchan Aruch.  But the Aruch Hashulchan disagrees with that pshat in the Rama, and holds that the Rama prohibits using a Shliach even for the giving of the pidyon money to the Kohen. 

So just like the shittas haRosh (Chulin 6:8) about Bris Millah, we have a serious argument about shlichus by Pidyon.  The issue of what is called a mitzva she'b'gufo, starting with the Tosfos HaRid brought in the Ketzos in 382 and onward, is endless.  But what is interesting is that in the first case of Pidyon, in our parsha, did the people deliver the money to the kohanim themselves?  No.  They did not. Bamidbar 4:49-51

וַיִּקַּח מֹשֶׁה אֵת כֶּסֶף הַפִּדְיוֹם מֵאֵת הָעֹדְפִים עַל פְּדוּיֵי הַלְוִיִּם מֵאֵת בְּכוֹר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לָקַח אֶת הַכָּסֶף חֲמִשָּׁה וְשִׁשִּׁים וּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת וָאֶלֶף בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ  וַיִּתֵּן מֹשֶׁה אֶת כֶּסֶף הַפְּדֻיִם לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו עַל פִּי ה' כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה' אֶת מֹשֶׁה.

 Moshe Rabbeinu took the money and gave it to Aharon and sons.  It seems clear from these psukim that Shlichus works by pidyon haben.  I found that the Baal HaHafla'ah in Kesuvos 74 and in his Panim Yafos on the Chumash points this out as well, as does the Malbim here.

Is this a kashe on the Rivash?  According to Reb Akiva Eiger that I mentioned above, and the Hafla'ah, it is not shver on the Rivash, because they hold that even the Rivash allows mere delivery of money via shliach, so long as the father says the nusach of pidyon.  But the Aruch Hashulchan has some explaining to do, because he holds that even the delivery of the money has to be done by the father and not a shliach.

We can defend the Aruch Hashulchan by using the pshat which the Hafla'ah proposes but immediately rejects: that Shlichus does not work, and Moshe Rabbeinu took the money not as a shliach, but rather in his position as Kohen Gadol (as he is described in Zevachim 101b.)  The Hafla'a rejected this because of the simple reading of the psukim in Chumash, which he understands to mean that Aharon's receipt was the pidyon, not Moshe's, and that Moshe served as a shliach, not as a podeh. 

But even if the Hafla'ah is right, and Moshe acted as a shliach, I would still say that there is no kashe on the Aruch Hashulchan from here.  Even if Shlichus doesn't work, that's only when it's not beyado, or in a case of  מיגו דזכי לנפשיה.  Since Moshe could have taken it, but instead chose to give it to Aharon and family, shlichus does work here.

(Note: migo and beyado, which I am using to explain why shlichus worked here although it doesn't usually work by pidyon, is debatable.  Our problem is not shlichus of the kohen to take the money, it is with shlichus of the father to give the money.  So one might argue that migo and beyado wouldn't help.  The only migo and beyado would be if someone was beyado to be the father, not to be the Kohen.  But I can live with this kashe.)

In fact, although the Hafla'ah rejects this option, others, including Reb Dovid Soloveichik (as brought in the Shai Latorah,) say that the pidyon was effected as soon as Moshe Rabbeinu took the money.  This would answer the kashe on the Aruch Hashulchan. 

But we have to examine this solution, that Moshe took the pidyon as Kohen Gadol.  I don't know whether the din of pidyon by giving money to a Kohen is a din in Aharon and sons, the family that took over the avodah, which would exclude Moshe Rabbeinu, or a din in Kehuna, in actual ability to do avodah, which would include him. This probably is related to the Macholkes Rishonim whether a woman Kohenes can take the five Selaim to be podeh a child.  (Rambam 1 Bikkurim 10- No, / Rashi Kiddushin 8a and Tosfos Pesachim 49b- Yes.)


Rabbi Dr. NJS, wrote to inform me that the Netziv in passuk 50 says that the fact that they gave all the money to Moshe and he gave it as a sum to the Kohanim, which eliminated tovas hana'a, shows that it was a hora'as sha'ah and so no proof can be derived ledoros.  Reb Nachum also expressed his consternation that the Aruch Hashulchan quoted neither his brother in law (the Netziv during his first marriage to Rabbi Epstein's sister) nor his son in law (the Netziv during his second marriage to Rabbi Epstein's daughter) on this matter.  But everything balances out in the end.  The Aruch Hashulchan's own son, the Torah Temimah, never quotes his father.

He then suggested that instead of  saying "hora'as sha'a," one might suggest an explanation for the difference between this and the regular pidyon.  It was a demographic exchange.  Yes, of course they had a lottery, and those who did not have a corresponding Levi had to take money out of  their pockets and pay, but this was still primarily a threshold event which exchanged one group for another, and not primarily an individual obligation, as it became afterwards.  Therefore, the money was davka given as a sum and it was given davka through a shliach.  I was not willing to take achrayus for his pshat, but he showed me that in the Ramban (Shemos 13:11), the fundamental difference between Pidyon Midbar and Pidyon Doros is inescapable, to wit:

ועל דרך הפשט קדש לי כל בכור, כל הנמצאים בישראל היום, כי בעבור שפדאם ממות בהכותו בארץ מצרים ציוה שיהיו קדושים לו לעבוד את עבודת ה' לכל אשר יצווה בהם, ולא ציוה להם עתה פדיון עד שהחליפם בלווים וציוה בפדיון העודפים (במדבר ג מו), אבל המצווה בנולדים לא נהגה במדבר, וציוה כי כאשר יבאו אל הארץ תנהג באדם ובבהמה ובפטר חמור וציוה בפדיונם לדורות:

It is clear that the Ramban holds that pidyon of those that were in Mitzrayim did not go into effect until the exchange for the Leviim, whereas the pidyon of those that were notT in Mitzrayim was slated to go into effect when they came to Eretz Yisrael, irrespective of the exchange for the Leviim.  There are no two ways to read it.

I found that the Ibn Ezra (3:45) also says like the Netziv, that the Pidyon in the Midbar was a singular event with halachos that are different than Pidyon Le'Doros.

Both the Netziv and the Ibn Ezra seem to be inconsistent with the Medrash Rabba here (only male Kohanim) and the Gemara in Menachos 37a-b (two-headed child), which use the Pidyon Midbar as a source for dinim of Pidyon Doros.

Briefly,

• Rivash- no shlichus on Pidyon Haben.
• Shver from Pidyon in Midbar via Moshe Rabbeinu.
• Some answer that this was mere delivery of money, which even Rivash allows, as long as father personally says nusach of Pidyon.
• Others say Rivash would not allow this either, so kashe remains.

Three possible answers:

•  That Moshe took pidyon not as shliach, but he was the Podeh as Kohen Gadol (which raises interesting lomdishe questions, and might be related to issue of a Bas Kohen taking pidyon money).
• That even if Moshe didn't take as Kohen Gadol, and Aharon was the Podeh, but since Moshe could have been the Podeh as Kohen Gadol, even the Rivash would agree he can be a shliach (which also raises interesting lomdishe questions about migo and b'yado).
• Or, that Pidyon Midbar was different than Pidyon leDoros (which is not like the pashtus of the Medrash and the Gemara in Menachos).

~

Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:31. Reiach Nichoach

No, this is NOT about Rav Yechiel of Paris or the Aruch Laner and Rav Kalisher and the Chasam Sofer and Reb Akiva Eiger or the Netziv about Korban Pesach.

וַהֲשִׁמּוֹתִי אֶת מִקְדְּשֵׁיכֶם וְלֹא אָרִיחַ בְּרֵיחַ נִיחֹחֲכֶם

In the Tochecha, the passuk says that there will be/was destruction of the Mikdash, and I will not smell the fragrance of your korbanos.

Reb Meir Simcha in the Meshech Chochma here says that this passuk is well understood according to the Shitta of the Baal Tosfos Rabbeinu Chaim (who was famously a talmid of Rabbeinu Tam) in Megilla 10b.   There is a machlokes whether the Kedusha of the Beis Hamikdash remained after its destruction.  Most people read the Gemara to mean that if the kedusha remains, then private altars, Bamos, are prohibited.  If the kedusha disappears, then Bamos are muttar.  Rav Chaim holds that this is incorrect.  He says that everyone agrees that once the Beis Hamikdash was built, never again are Bamos muttar.  The machlokes is only whether the kedusha of the mikdash remains so that one could bring korbanos on the place of the Mizbei'ach.

Reb Meir Simcha explains that the first half of the pasuk, וַהֲשִׁמּוֹתִי אֶת מִקְדְּשֵׁיכֶם, means there will be no mikdash, that the kedusha of the mizbeiach will be gone so you won't be able to bring korbanos on the place of the mizbei'ach as mizbei'ach korbanos.  And if you think that this will release you to bring korbanos on Bamos, the passuk says no:  וְלֹא אָרִיחַ בְּרֵיחַ נִיחֹחֲכֶם .  You won't even be allowed to bring korbanos on a Bama.

The great problem with this vort is that one of the prominent characteristics of a Bama is that there is no din of Rieach Nichoach on korbanos that are brought on a Bama.  So how could Reb Meir Simcha say that the end of the passuk that says וְלֹא אָרִיחַ בְּרֵיחַ נִיחֹחֲכֶם is referring to Bamos?  You can't possibly exclude Bamos with the words "I will not smell your Reiach Nichoach"!

The answer is that Reb Meir Simcha in several places brings a medrash that says that although there is no Reiach Nichoach on a bama, but if you build a bama on the place of the mizbeiach, then there IS Reiach Nichoach.  It depends on the PLACE of the mizbei'ach, irrespective of Bama/Mizbei'ach, and irrespective of whether the place has Kedushas Mizbeiach.  So the passuk means that not only won't you be able to be makriv on the place of the Mizbei'ach because lo kidsha le'asid lavo, but if you  think you will be able to be makriv wherever you want with a Bama or ON THE PLACE OF THE MIZBEIACH WITH A BAMA, you're wrong, because there won't be a hetter bamos: no kedusha of the Mizbeiach to allow Mizbeiach-korbanos, and no hetter bamos which would allow a Bama on the place of the Mizbei'ach.

Rabbi Kupperman asks this question on Reb Meir Simcha here and he says he does not know any answer.  I sent him my answer, and he responded with a non-committal post card thanking me for my comment.  I thank you for that nice post card picture of the Michlala, Rabbi Kupperman, but it wasn't a comment.  It is the pshat in Reb Meir Simcha.  It's obvious that you have to do some fiddling with the words there, but either you'll accept some leeway in his words to accommodate my pshat, or you'll remain with your tzarich iyun gadol. 

 Derech Agav, using Reb Chaim Hakohen to deny the option of being makriv on the mekom hamizbei'ach with a mema nafshach of either mizbei'ach or bama can also be found in the Tzitz Eliezer here and here (volume 10 end of siman 13 and beginning of siman 5.)

Bechukosai. Meta-Mitzvos.

Synopsis:
Although generally we are told what we must and what we must not do, there are some concepts and attitudes that the Torah expects us to know without being told.  These are so fundamental that that in their absence, the mitzvos we do are essentially crippled.

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In Greek, the word Meta means after or beyond.  In English, it can be used to mean a fundamental truth beyond the self-evident, an abstraction that transcends and informs the reality with which it is associated.  It is both transcendent and fundamental.

Our 613 Mitzvos are defined clearly enough for us to know exactly whether we have or have not fulfilled them.  But there are meta-Mitzvos.  By this I mean an underlying attitude or a manner beyond the legal definition of any particular Mitzva.  Even if one fulfills a mitzva, he may have failed in the Meta-Mitzva.  Sometimes, failing the Meta is worse than not doing the Mitzva at all.

Here's an illustration: Reb Chaim's pshat in Kavanas Hatefilla.  Reb Chaim says that more fundamental than the Kavana of "what the words mean" is the Kavana of "standing before the King."  Even if you could get away with mouthing words and not thinking about what they mean, you cannot be said to be davening at all unless you are aware that you are standing before Hashem.  That, to me, is Meta-Kavana.

Three examples of Meta-Mitzvos come to mind.

1.  The Yerushalmi (Brachos 2:5) says that a laborer who eats during his work day cannot say the usual long form of Bentching, but instead says the first bracha and a shortened version of the rest.  The Yerushalmi says that even though we all are able to work while we bentch, this is prohibited.  Because it is assur to work while you Bentch, the only option is to truncate Bentching,
The Taz (OC 191:1) says that this is true by all tefillos and by all mitzvos:

ודאי בכל המצוות לא יעשה אותם ועוסק בד"א כי הוא מורה על עשייתו המצוה בלי כוונה אלא דרך עראי ומקרא וזה נכלל במאמר תורתינו ואם תלכו עמי בקרי שפירושו אף שתלכו עמי דהיינו עשיית המצוה מ"מ הוא בדרך מקרה ועראי

He says that this behavior falls under the heading of walking with Hashem with indifference, the passuk in our parsha, Bechukosai  (Bamidbar 26:21), וְאִם תֵּלְכוּ עִמִּי קֶרִי וְלֹא תֹאבוּ לִשְׁמֹעַ לִי, if you walk with Me with indifference and do not desire to listen to Me.  Even if a person does all the mitzvos, if he does them with a casual attitude, an attitude of indifference, he has failed the Meta-Mitzva.  We should keep this in mind when, during bentching, we distractedly begin brushing off the crumbs and stacking the plates.  Or patchkeh'ing with your phone when it buzzes during Shmoneh Esrei.  (The Magen Avraham there says it applies even to easy melachos.)


2.  What is worse, occasionally being Mechallel Shabbos, or scrupulously keeping Shabbos but not believing that Shvisa is a mitzva from the Ribono shel Olam?
In Devarim (27:26) it says אָרוּר אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתָם
Cursed is he who does not uphold the words of this Torah to do them.  The Ramban explains this to pertain to a Jew who does all the mitzvos, but does not believe in his heart that the mitzvos are divine obligations, that Hashem rewards their observance, that Hashem punishes their desecration.  The Ramban says that if a person does the mitzvos but doesn't believe they are min hashamayim, then he is subject to the curse.  If, on the other hand, a person simply violates commandments, that is, a person who eats chazir or does not keep the mitzva of Sukkah or lulav, but still believes they are true and that ultimately there is reward and punishment, that person is not subject to the curse in the parsha.  In other words, it is worse to do mitzvos but not believe they are from Sinai than to not do them but know that you are being a sheigitz.  (See the words of the Ramban below.)
This, by the way, should give pause to those that believe that Judaism is a religion of actions, Orthopraxy, and that belief, Orthodoxy, is not so important.  Unless, of course, they disagree ("He's a Rabbi, and I'm a Rabbi") with the Ramban. 


3.  Devarim 28:47, תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר לֹא עָבַדְתָּ אֶת יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּשִׂמְחָה וּבְטוּב לֵבָב.  A person does all that is expected from him; but he does it grudgingly and resentfully, feeling that Mitzvos are an imposition he would prefer to be without.  This is a sin that can chas ve'shalom tip the balance to the tochecha.  Imagine that!  The attitude makes such an enormous difference!   I remember hearing Reb Shalom Shvadron speak about this on the psukim in Malachi 3:13-14.  חָזְקוּ עָלַי דִּבְרֵיכֶם אָמַר יְהוָה. וַאֲמַרְתֶּם מַה נִּדְבַּרְנוּ עָלֶיךָ. אֲמַרְתֶּם .שָׁוְא עֲבֹד אֱלֹקְים וּמַה בֶּצַע כִּי שָׁמַרְנוּ מִשְׁמַרְתּוֹ וְכִי הָלַכְנוּ קְדֹרַנִּית -  The people said "It is futile to serve God, and what profit do we get for keeping His charge and for going about in anxious worry ( because of Hashem's commandments)."  Rav Shvadron asked, how can the people say "what did we say that was wrong?"   And the Gemara says that not only the people were clueless, even the Malachim didn't understand why Hashem was upset.  If they said shav avod Elokim, if they said ma betza, if they said halachnu kedoranis, it should have been obvious that there was a problem.  The answer is that they did every mitzvah, they did everything with hiddur, but they did it with sour faces and an attitude that the mitzvos were a burden.  They didn't chas veshalom say a negative word about the mitzvos, but their faces and slumped shoulders screamed out their dislike of the mitzvos.

Summing up, I say that there are three Meta-Mitzvos: Reverence, Awareness, and Joy.

1.  Respect and reverence that focuses your attention exclusively on the Mitzva while you do it.

2.  Awareness that this Mitzva is Hashem's will as He taught us in His torah min hashamayim, and that we do the mitzvos because we are obligated to do as Hashem commands us.

3.  Joy that we have the opportunity to serve Hashem in a way that makes us into great and holy people.

Slightly off topic:  We find a similar idea in the context of Kibbud av.  Devarim 27:16, אָרוּר, מַקְלֶה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ.  Cursed is he who belittles his parents.  Reb Meir Simcha in his Meshech Chochma- explains that this is a person who belittles his parents because he knows they will be mochel.  Mechila might help; this person has not transgressed the mitzva of Kibbud.  He's not even like the Ma'achil petumos veyoreish Gehinom, because here, the parent is mochel.  But that doesn't help him.  His disparaging attitude is as great a sin as actual bitul asei.


Comments about the Ramban made it clear that I ought to quote it verbatim.

"אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת". 'כאן כלל את כל התורה כולה וקבלוה עליהם באלה ובשבועה' - זה לשון רש"י.  "ולפי דעתי, כי הקבלה הזאת, שיודה במצות בלבו ויהיו בעיניו אמת ויאמין שהעושה אותן יהיה לו שכר וטובה והעובר עליהן ייענש ואם יכפור באחת מהן או תהיה בעיניו בטלה לעולם, הנה הוא ארור! אבל אם עבר על אחת מהן, כגון שאכל החזיר והשקץ לתאוותו, או שלא עשה סוכה ולולב לעצלה, איננו בחרם הזה, כי לא אמר הכתוב 'אשר לא יעשה את דברי התורה הזאת', אלא אמר: "אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת..", כטעם: "קִיְּמוּ וְקִבְּלוּ הַיְּהוּדִים" (אסתר ט, כ"ז) והנה הוא חרם המורדים והכופרים'.

Also, please note that we're not quoting a Gemara or a Medrash.  This is a Taz, a Ramban in his pirush al hatorah, and a diyuk in a passuk.

(On the topic of Kavana, see the Chayei Adam on the Sefer Chareidim, discussed here.)

Behar, Vayikra 25:3. Shmittah, Shabbos, and Working for a Living.

The Torah says that we will plant and harvest for six years, and then in the seventh year, we will let the land rest.  שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים תִּזְרַע שָׂדֶךָ וְשֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים תִּזְמֹר כַּרְמֶךָ וְאָסַפְתָּ, אֶת תְּבוּאָתָהּ.  וּבַשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת שַׁבַּת שַׁבָּתוֹן יִהְיֶה לָאָרֶץ.  The Lubavitcher in his first Likutei Sichos asks, why say that you will work for the six years?  Just say that the seventh year is assur!  Same thing by Shabbos Breishis, Saturday— work six days, and on Shabbos don’t work.  All that is necessary is to teach us the special laws pertaining to the seventh year and to the seventh day!  

 He answers that there are two avodos man has;  one is to be mevareir the gashmius, that is, to suffuse gashmius with ruchnius through kiyum hamitzvos in this world, and that is the avodah of the weekdays and of the six years.  The other is to draw one's self close to Hashem in a way of lema’ala miderech hateva.  The weekday work is called Avodas Elokim, because ‘Elokim ‘ is gematria ‘hateva.’  The avodah of Shabbos is Avodah of (Yud Kei Vov Kei) Hashem, which is lema’ala miderech hateva.  He says that each avodah depends on the other.  Only a person that is mekadeish gashmius a whole week can come to Shabbos and rise above the teva, and only a person who is elevated by the kedushas Shabbos can be mekadeish the gashmius.

R’ Moshe in his original Dorash (the first Hebrew one and not the one I translated that was later printed in Hebrew) says that the lesson is that in the six years you cannot be someich ahl haneis, you can't rely on miracles, but instead you must plan and work.  In the seventh year, you are obligated to rely on miracles, you must be someich ahl haneis, as the Torah tells us “v’nasati es birkasi.”  This is a mussar haskeil that a person should not say that if he davens properly and is kovei’a ittim it will eat into his parnassah; the Torah teaches us that we should be kovei’a itim and the Torah says we should daven.  In the time you should be working, you must work, but in the time you should be learning and davenning, you must be someich on the Ribbono shel Olam that the ultimate yield will be at least as great as it would be if you skipped the mitzvos.

Note that ‘ultimate yield’ can mean many things; it can mean equal income, or fewer sudden losses or illnesses, or being satisfied with less, and so on.  As I've discussed elsewhere,  the the Gemara in Eiruvin 18  brings the pasuk in Parshas Noach, Breishis 8:11,  that says “omro yona...”  Let my food be bitter as olives from the hand of Hashem, rather than sweet as honey from the hands of man.  I explained that although hashgachas Hashem predetermines whether a person will have enough to eat, it does not necessarily guarantee that the quality, or the quantity, or the pleasantness of the food will be the same as it otherwise would be.  The Yonah said “I realize that by choosing to subsist directly from the yad Hashem I might have to settle for food that is as bitter as olives, while if I shnorr from Noach I would get food that is as sweet as honey, but I prefer the yad Hashem.”  This is also clear in the Gemora in Sahnedrin 20a that says that in the generation of R’ Yehuda B’reb Ila’i that was characterized by universal limud hatorah, “hoyu sisha miskasim betallis echad.”  The point is that what we think of as the bottom line is not the bottom line.  There are many lines under it!  The raw number that indicates ‘income’ is not absolute or interchangeable with other similar numbers!  A person might have a high income but high tzaros, or be audited, or have tremendous personal expenses for unexpected needs or even meshugasen.  Here, Hashem promises that the bottom line will not suffer because of the person’s keeping the mitzvos.

This lesson reinforces something we've discussed in the past.  The Chasam Sofer says that  the reason the Bris Milah is on the eighth day is to ensure that the child experience the beginning of a Shabbos and the end of a Shabbos.  We explained that every Jewish child needs to learn that there is a Shabbos and there is a Motzei Shabbos.  Just as the kedusha of Shabbos is essential, so, too, the work week, the mundane activities we undertake, must be imbued with the kedusha of Shabbos.