Rosh Hashanna 5773 and the Maharil

May Hashem grant you a year of great joy and success in Ruchnius and Gashmius

בינך להקדוש ברוך הוא, בינך לחברך, ובינך לעצמך  

and a quick dvar halacha:

The Maharil says that one should not begin Yomtov earlier than necessary on the first night of Rosh Hashanna, and should, therefore, only make kiddush after Tzeis.  Because Rosh Hashanna is a day of judgment, it is inappropriate- even counter productive- to offer one's self for judgment before being summoned.  It expresses audacity and overconfidence, or indifference.  In any case, it is unwise to begin Rosh Hashanna before necessary.  He specifies Kiddush, suggesting that kiddush is a more serious matter than davening, because kiddush is deoraysa.

Reb Moshe, in an early teshuva (OC I 170, page 292), written in Lyuban, paskens that if, on the first night of Rosh Hashanna, one davenned the correct shmoneh esrei for Rosh Hashanna, but said האל הקדוש instead of המלך הקדוש, he does not have to repeat shmoneh esrei.

This was first proposed by a Yesh Omrim in the Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona in Brachos, but rejected.  It next appears in the Chayei Adam, who brings this from the gaon Rabbi Avraham Abbale Pasveller (b. Pasval, 1764, d. Vilna, 1836, for a time contemporary with the Vilner Gaon, who lived from 1720 to 1797,) head of the Beis Din of Vilna.  The Mishna Berura rejects this opinion, and even the Chayei Adam calls it "a big chiddush."

Reb Moshe is surprised that the Gaon Reb Abbeli didn't mention the Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona's earlier rejection of this shitta.  So Reb Moshe says that the Talmidei R"Y are talking about someone who says the entire weekday Shmoneh Esrei.  Reb Abbeli is talking about someone who davenned the correct Rosh Hashanna shmoneh esrei and the only error was saying Keil instead of Melech.  Although there is issur melacha at night, and all the laws of yomtov apply, the judgment of Rosh Hashanna does not begin until morning.  The concept that saying המלך הקדוש is essential, and that without it you haven't properly davenned shmone esrei, only pertains when Hashem is exercising Malchus through judgment, and judgment does not begin until morning.  (He proves this from the Gemara that says that the Beis Din shel Maalah seats itself only when Beis Din shel Mattah is seated.)

According to this, then, the rule of the Maharil should not be create a problem with davening maariv early even if he is mekabeil Yomtov explicity.  One has nothing to do with the other.  You can be mekabeil yomtov as much as you want, but the din does not begin until the next morning.

As I said before, the Maharil was only talking about making kiddush early, not about davening early, and I'm assuming that this is bcause a person can daven before he is mekabeil yomtov, while Kiddush is a real kabbalas yomtov.  (Only according to the Rambam can a person make kiddush without being mekabeil Yomtov, and I believe that's a daas yachid.)  But the minhag is to avoid davening maariv early, too, out of concern for the Maharil and in general in order to say Krias Shma in the right time.

So at the minyan I'm making, we're davening maariv after ג' רבעי מיל out of respect for the Maharil and so Krias Shma shouldn't be too early, but we're not waiting an hour, on the basis of Reb Moshe's psak.

Here's a compilation of shittos regarding the Maharil, taken from ישראל וזמנים by ישראל דוד הארפענעס.  I don't know who he is and I take no responsibility for the content, but it looks good.

 כתוב בשו׳׳ת מהרי׳׳ל (סי׳ ל״ג, ד״ה ועוד) דיש שאין מוסיפין מחול על הקודש בר״ה משום דיומא דדינא הוא, ועל כן אין

 מקדשין אלא בלילה ממש שלא להקדים יום הדין עיי״ש [ומבואר שם דאילו בתפלה מיהו מקדימין (רק בקידוש מאחרינן) דהעיקר הוא קידוש שעל הכוס שהוא מדאורייתא], וכ״ה בלקט יושר (עמוד פ״ו) שכן המנהג בניושטאט, מיהו המג״א (סי׳

 תקפ׳׳א סק״י) מביא משם הלבוש דגם בר״ה צריך להוסיף מחול על הקודש (ומבואר בלבוש שהמתענים בער״ה אין משלימים התענית עד  הלילה כדי להוסיף מחול על הקודש), ועשו״ת  שואל ומשיב (מהדו״ד ח״ד סי׳ קכ״ה) שהאריך  בזה, וכן המהרש״ק בס׳ שנות חיים (סי׳ ס״א) כ׳  דגם בר״ה יש להוסיף כמו בשאר יו״ט (וע״ע  בספרו ס׳ החיים סי׳ חקפ״ב), ובשו״ת מנחת  אברהם (סי׳ מ״ח) כ׳ במונח המהרי״ל שאין מוסיפים יותר משיעור תוספות המחוייב, אבל תוספות משהו מוסיפין, [אלא שהמהרי״ל שם  נתקשה על מנהג איחור הסעודה דהא כבר  קדשוהו בתפלה, וחי׳ דשמא קידוש על הכוס  עיקר דהוא דאורייתא עיי״ש,

שוב מצאתי ככל דבריו הנ״ל בשרית הרמ"ה הנדפסה בשו״ת  הרשב״א סוף ח״ב, אלא דעדיין צ״ע דהא קידוש על הכוס לרוב הפוסקים אינו אלא דרבנן  ובשו״ת מנחת אברהם הנ״ל הוכיח מדברי  המהרי״ל דקידוש ביו״ט הוא מה״ת, וס״ל  להמהרי״ל דלא חל עליו תוספות שבת ויו״ט  בדיבור בעלמא אלא בדברים של קדושת היום  דאלח״ה סוכ״ס הלא כבר קיבל עליו חוס׳ ר״ה  בחפלה, ועדיין צ׳׳ע דהא בסי׳ רס״א ובסי׳ רס״ג  מבואר דתוספות שבת חל על האדם באמירח ברכו ובתפלת ערבית, ועוד דבתפלת עמידה של  שבת ויו׳׳ט ור׳׳ה יש בהם דברי קדושת היום,  שו״ר גם בגליוני הש׳׳ס (יומא דף פא.) שנתקשה  בדברי המהרי׳׳ל

A Bracha on Medicine

If a medicine is not palatable, it is not a food.  If it is not a food, you don't use the brachos that are for food when you take it.  If the medicine is palatable, it is a food, and you make a bracha on it (although that bracha might be she'hakol; see OC 204:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 204:22.  Also, See Rabbi Bodner's ותן ברכה chapter 13:15.1, quoting RS'Z Auerbach's solitary opinion that if you would not eat it as a food, then you do not make a bracha even if it has a good taste.)  That is not what this post is about.  I want to discuss the bracha one would make for the therapeutic quality of the medicine.

Based on the Gemara in Brachos 60a, the Mechaber (OC 230:4) says that when one begins a blood letting, a process once thought to be salubrious, one should say  יהי רצון מלפניך ה'  אלוקי שיהיה עסק זה לי לרפואה כי רופא חנם אתה.  After the process is finished he should say בָּרוּךְ רוֹפֵא חוֹלִים.  The Mishna Berura (SK 6) and the Aruch Hashulchan (5) say that this applies to all medical procedures, and whenever one takes a medicine or engages in a medical procedure he should say these words with Hashem's name.  (We are not noheg to use Hashem's name in the bracha after the procedure, but we certainly ought to say יהי רצון מלפניך ה'  אלוקי, considering we are going to say that when we eat the simanim Rosh Hashannah night.  Taking medicine is far far more serious.)

During my shiur, one of the talmidim asked a good question.  The Gemara in Brachos 35a says that Chazal instituted formal brachos on foods because of the compelling logic that we ought to thank Hashem when we benefit from His world. סברא הוא אסור לו לאדם שיהנה מן העולם הזה בלא ברכה -it would be a sin to benefit from Hashem's world without blessing Him. If so, why shouldn't we make a bracha when we take medicine?  Are we not benefiting from Hashem's world?  Are we not grateful that the medicine cures us or alleviates our pain?  It would seem that the logic that instructs us to express our gratitude for the nourishment we get from food would compel us to make a bracha on the therapeutic benefit we get from a medicine.  

One might propose an answer that the bracha on food is primarily for the pleasure we have from eating, not for the nutrition of the foods.  If so, we would only make a bracha on medicine if we enjoy the administration of the medicine.  I disagree.  (Please note that this is indeed a machlokes Achronim insofar as what Birkas Hamazon is on, the enjoyment or the nutrition.  In fact, this was the topic of my Bar Mitzva Drasha in 1965.  But I do not believe that the logic of the din derabanan of bracha rishona is necessarily the same as the logic of the din deoraysa of bracha achrona.)  While it's true that we make a bracha only on palatable foods, not on nutrients that we don't enjoy ingesting, or on intravenous nutrition, the primary purpose of the bracha is to express our gratitude and acknowledgment to Hashem for sustaining us.  It's like the mitzva of Sukkah:  we are chayav to live there, but Chazal were kovei'a the bracha on eating because when you eat you focus your attention on the enjoyment and circumstances of your meal.  If we didn't eat in a Sukkah, Chazal would have been kovei'a a bracha on sleeping, or reading the newspaper, or sitting and shmuzing in the Sukkah.    Since we do eat there, they chose eating as the best moment to make the bracha.  But the ikkar is the Taduru, and here the ikkar is the nutrition.  Since by medicine you never enjoy taking it, Chazal should have been kovei'a a bracha on all medicines.

The Magen Avraham (OC 216 SK 1) brings that one only makes a bracha on palpable physical enjoyment, and this is why we don't make a bracha upon hearing a beautiful voice, or a massage, or the heat of a fire.  That is all fine, but it doesn't explain why we wouldn't make a bracha when we take a medicine.  It's palpable and it directly affects the body exactly like food.

The answer to his question is that while both food and medicine are beneficial, there is a fundamental difference between them:  Food nourishes us and contributes to the body's regeneration and growth.  Medicine is מבריח ארי, it eliminates a problem.  Medicine eliminates an infection, is cures a malady, it alleviates pain.  It is, in a sense, Rashi's מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, something that you have to do to remove a problem, not something that you do because you want a positive benefit.  The Svara of Bracha applies to enjoyment/benefit that is absolute, not the enjoyment/benefit you have when something stops hurting you.  (see, e.g., Rama in OC 204:8, but see also the Mechaber in 204:9, and how the Aruch Hashulchan resolves them in 204:19.  This is not an exact match: it is just a tzushtell.  Look inside and you'll see what I mean.)

Although we certainly do make brachos on being saved from mortal danger, namely  הטוב והמטיב and שעשה לי נס במקום הזה, those are brachos of שבח והודאה, not ברכת הנהנין.  The logic of ברכת הנהנין is totally different than the logic of ברכות שבח והודאה.  A proof of this distinction is the shitta of Rav Yehuda in the Mishna on 40b who says that we don't make any bracha on a food that comes from a klala, such as locusts: כל שהוא מין קללה אין מברכין עליו.  Does Rav Yehuda disagree with the brachos of הטוב והמטיב and  שעשה לי נס?  No, he does not.  It must be, then, that the logic of ברכת הנהנין is different than the logic of ברכות שבח והודאה.

Someone then pointed out that this would only explain why we don't make a bracha on the most common medicines.  But what about psychoactive drugs, such as caffeine, or marijuana (ingested, not smoked), or psilocybin mushrooms or LSD or medicines that until Bob Dole were considered unmentionable?  The benefit from these medicines is a positive, not merely the elimination of a negative.  (We are discussing drugs that are not injurious to the body or the mind.)

I suppose that the answer is that Chazal didn't want to create a bracha for any medicine or drug because the vast majority of drugs fall into the first category rather than the second.  (Similarly, it would seem that intravenous administration of nutrition would have exactly the same halacha as food and require a bracha.  But since most intravenous procedures are to administer medication, and when food is given in this manner it is because of some very serious malady, no bracha is said.)

Still, it would seem to me that even though Chazal did not create a nusach of a bracha for these drugs, the Svara, the compelling logic of the bracha, would still apply, and therefore, if one takes recreational drugs, he should stop for a moment and express his gratitude to Hashem for creating these excellent adventures.

I want to point out another thing- do you think this would have been printed in Hapardes or Hamaor?  I don't think so.  Let us thank the internet for this particular quirky aspect of Harbatzas Torah.


UPDATE 2019:
The culinary world is no longer predictably staid. Change has become hectic. In the time of the Gemara, raw meat was not muktza on Shabbos, while raw fish was. The opposite is probably the halacha now. Here's a bracha question: My wife very much enjoys seaweed salad. This is real seaweed, unnaturally green and salty.  What bracha do you make on seaweed? The answer is obviously She'hakol, because it derives nourishment from the water, not from the earth. Even if it's anchored to the ground, it does not draw nourishment from the ground any more than mushrooms. But I believe that if people ate seaweed in the time of the Gemara, they would have instituted a specific bracha for it, probably Borei peri hamayim.

Ki Savo: Devarim 26:10. Bowing During Tefilla

I
Tanchuma at the beginning of our Parsha:

היום הזה ה' אלהיך מצוך לעשות. זה שאמר הכתוב, בואו נשתחוה ונכרעה נברכה לפני ה' עושנו (תה' צה ו). והלא כריעה בכלל השתחויה, והשתחויה בכלל כריעה, ומה תלמוד לומר, נשתחוה נכרעה נברכה. אלא צפה משה ברוח הקודש וראה שבית המקדש עתיד ליחרב והבכורים עתידין ליפסק, עמד והתקין לישראל שיהיו מתפללין שלשה פעמים בכל יום, לפי שחביב תפלה לפני הקדוש ברוך הוא מכל מעשים טובים ומכל הקרבנות

The Tanchuma says that the words היום הזה ה' אלהיך מצוך לעשות, This day Hashem commands you to do.... imply that the mitzva of Bikkurim is so fundamental that it should be available to Klal Yisrael forever, on every day, in all times.  Moshe Rabbeinu, foreseeing the destruction of the Bais Hamikdash and the interruption of the Bikkurim ceremony, instituted that we say Tefilla three times a day.

The Tanchuma focuses on the passuk in Tehillim that refers to bowing down to Hashem in two ways, hishtachava'a and kri'a, and sees in the repetition an allusion to an alternative to, a replacement for, the Bikkurim.  The way the Tanchuma is structured is as follows:  An allusion to implied eternity in the words Hayom Hazeh; A reference to the reiteration of the word Bowing in the passuk in Tehillim; And only then the Tanchuma explains that Tefilla reflects the Bikkurim and enables us to experience, even without a Beis Hamikdash, the experience of Bikkurim.  It is interesting to consider what it is about the hishtachava'a in Bikkurim that makes it so fundamental, and how that vital message is expressed in our Tefilla.  (This section was inspired by a Drasha by Rabbi Frand.)

 Where is there bowing in the Bikkurim ceremony?  In passuk 26:10, where it says

והנחתו לפני ה'  אלקיך והשתחוית לפני ה'  אלקיך

that after placing the basket of Bikkurim before Hashem, we are to bow down to Hashem.

There are two approaches as to when this bowing occurred.  The Gaon here in the Aderes Eliahu says:

והשתחוית - זה הכלל כל היוצא מבית המקדש צריך השתחואה

This is a rule: everyone that leaves the Beis Hamikdash needs to bow down.

On the other hand, Tosfos in Sukkah (47b, D'H Habikurim) says:
בספרי (פרשת ראה) משמע דאיכא שתי תנופות דקתני והנחתו לפני ה' אלהיך מלמד שטעונין תנופה ב' פעמים אחת בשעת קריאה ואחת בשעת השתחויה 
that the bowing was done during the second Tenufa, when the Kohen lofts the basket in the cardinal directions.  
We find that the Torah mentions bowing in two contexts.  One connotes respect, and the other communicates gratitude (e.g., Breishis 24:51-2, where Eliezer was told that his mission was successful and that he could bring Rivka back to Yitzchak, it says הנה רבקה לפניך קח ולך ותהי אשה לבן אדניך, כאשר דבר ה'.  ויהי כאשר שמע עבד אברהם את דבריהם וישתחו ארצה לה' לה).  
The halacha (see Brachos 34a) is that in Shmoneh Esrei, we bow at the beginning and the end of two brachos- Avos, the first bracha, which ends with Magen Avraham, and Hoda'ah, which is Modim.  These two bowings express both the Gaon and Tosfos' Sifri.  When we bow in Avos, as we begin Shmoneh Esrei and reflect upon Hashem's greatness, this reflects the Gaon's bowing, that one must bow in the Beis Hamikdash to  demonstrate one's awareness of and subjugation to Hashem.  When we bow in Modim, this reflects the bowing the Sifri refers to, a way to express our gratitude for Hashem's love and beneficence.  As Rebbi Chanina says in Brachos there, דא"ר חנינא ראשונות דומה לעבד שמסדר שבח לפני רבו..... אחרונות דומה לעבד שקבל פרס מרבו ונפטר והולך לו.

So the Tanchuma becomes crystal clear.  When we bring Bikkurim, we bow to express these two feelings: Awe/Humility and Gratitude.  Bikkurim is the highest opportunity to express these feelings of humility and gratitude, and Hashem intimated to Moshe Rabbeinu that this experience is vital to our spirituality and ought to be eternal.  Moshe Rabbeinu, foreseeing that the Bikkurim would not last forever, instituted the Shmoneh Esrei, which forever formalizes our ability to express these two feelings.


II

Chazal (Brachos 34b) tell us that bowing during Tefilla should be limited to those places where it is prescribed, and not done wherever one feels like it.  As mentioned above, in Shmoneh Esrei it is found only five times- the beginning and end of Avos and Hoda'ah, and when we step back at the end.  But most people have the minhag to bow when we say Barchu at an Aliyah to the Torah and when we say Barchu cafter Yishtabach at the beginning of Birkos Krias Shma.  Interestingly, when I spoke to my shiur about this, some said "Nobody bows down by the Borchu of the Aliya," and the others said "Everyone bows down the Borchu of an Aliya."  But I think bowing by the beginning of Birkos Krias Shma is pretty universal.  Where does this minhag come from?  Is it a minhag that is brought in the poskim?  Why the difference in minhagim?

Let's start with the Kri'a at Barchu after Yishtabach.  In Orach Chaim 113:3 the Mechaber says that one should not just bow down wherever he feels like it, and one who does so is repugnant: הכורע בוכל קומה לפניך תשתחוה או בולך לבדך אנחנו מודים או בהודאה דהלל וברכת המזון הרי זה מגונה.  The Rama adds פירוש שאין לכרוע אלא במקום שתקנו חכמים.  The Biur Halacha D"H הכורע says the מגן גבורים דוחק למצוא טעם במנהג, the Magen Giborim tries hard to find an explanation for the minhag to bow at Barchu after Yishtabach.  The Biur Halacha, uncharacteristically, says that he found a basis for the minhag in a passuk (Divrei Hayamim I 29:20) that says    ויאמר דויד לכל הקהל ברכו נא את ה' אלקיכם ויברכו כל הקהל לה' אלקי אבתיהם ויקדו וישתחוו  לה' ולמלך, that David Hamelech told the gathering to say Barchu, and they said Barchu, and they bowed down.  We see here an association between Barchu and bowing.  (It goes without saying that there is a linguistic relation between the word Barchu and Birkayim, the knees.)

The Aruch Hashulchan also mentions this, in OC 57:1, where he says:

ודע שנוהגין לכרוע מעט באמירת "ברכו", ולא ככריעות שבשמונה עשרה. ונכון הוא. ואפילו לפי מה שיתבאר בסימן קל"ט דלקריאת התורה אין לכרוע, מכל מקום בשעת התפילה כורע. וכן המנהג הפשוט.

Note that he says לכרוע מעט...ולא ככריעות שבשמונה עשרה, just bend down a little- NOT like when you bow during Shmoneh Esrei.

So we see that while the source and rationale is obscure, and one might think that it is contrary to the Gemara's disapproval of bowing in places other than the ones listed, the fact is that the minhag is well known and established.

As for bowing before an Aliya:  The immediately preceding Biur Halach, D"H בסוף, brings the לחם חמודות, who, after quoting the Gemara in Brachos that disapproves of bowing where not prescribed by Chazal, says that טועים כל השוחים בברכת התורה תחילה וסוף, it's simply wrong to bow down by the brachos of an Aliya, and all those who do it are making a mistake.  The Biur Halacha does not seem to disagree with this opinion.  Interestingly, though, in Siman 139 SK 19, the Mishna Berura quotes a Magen Avraham that says that our minhag to bow by Birkos Hatorah of an Aliya is to show honor to the Torah- יש נוהגים לשחות ולהשתחוות בעת אמירת הברכות משום כבוד התורה- but you shouldn't bow a second time at the end of the Bracha.

(Aleinu is entirely unrelated to this discussion, because there, the text states ואנחנו כורעים ומשתחוים, so it would be wrong to say it and not do it, like the עדות שקר of Krias Shma without Tefillin- Brachos 14b).

All of this should make no practical difference to the reader.  It is descriptive, not prescriptive.  Each of us should do exactly as our mesora dictates.  I personally do bow after Yishtabach but not at an Aliya, because this is what I saw my father and Rav Rudderman and Reb Moshe do.  Everyone needs to pattern himself after a particular spiritual exemplar, and to do what they did.  I only write this to illustrate how our various minhagim deal with the Gemara, and so that if you see someone doing different than you do, you will understand why, so we can better resist our unfortunate tendency to disparage minagim that are unfamiliar to us.

III
UPDATE:
I was directed to an article by Rabbi Daniel Rakkah in the publication Ohr Yisroel, in which he brings an abundance of sources for kriyos in davening.  The article is in the fifth volume of Ohr Yisroel, which as of this writing is not available on Hebrewbooks.org.  The Editor/Publisher was kind enough to send me a pdf, which can be accessed here.
Thanks to the wonders of the internet, several of Rabbi Rakkah's marei mekomos are easily accessible.  Here are the ones that are currently online:
מחזור ויטרי
כלבו
אורחות חיים
The one that he brings that I cannot get online is the פסקי מהרי"ץ  from  רבי יחיא צאלח.  The Piskei Maharitz quotes a well known Medrash but with the addition of a few words that are unique to his version of the Medrash and which make it relevant to this discussion.
The usual version of the Medrash is

א"ר עקיבא בכל יום שחרית מלאך א׳ פותח פיו ואומר ה׳ מלך הי׳ מלך ה׳ ימלוך לעולם ועד עד שמגיע לברכו וכשמגיע  לברכו חיה אחת עומדת  ברקיע ושמה ישראל וחקוק עד מצחה ישראל עומדת באמצע הרקיע ואומרת ברכו את  ה׳ המבורך וכל גדודי מעלה עונים ואומרים ברוך ה׳ המבורך לעולם ועד.

In Rav Tzalach's version, the sentence is

.....וכשמגעת לברכו כורעת על רגליה ואומרת בקול ברכו את ה' המבורך וכל גדודי מעלה....

This Girsa is not found anywhere but here.  In any case, it does provide an early source for the minhag among the Teimanim.

By the way, I saw the Yalkut Yosef (3:421, 57:9) cited as saying that Rav Ovadiah Yosef does not bend at all by the Barchu of Birkos Krias Shma. 

UPDATE:

I just (2024) saw a Shoshan Kodesh from a talmid of the Ramban (brought to my attention by the Rivevos Ephraim) who says you should bow by Borchu.

https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=19655&hilite=db76f1eb-5f60-488e-8e22-d072120cdcdf&st=%d7%a8%d7%90%d7%a9%d7%95&pgnum=14

Ellul and Rav Gifter

Here in Chicago we are graced with the presence of Harav Shimon Kalman Goldstein, a talmid chacham מובהק and exemplary yarei shamayim. He told me that in Cleveland (he learned bechavrusa with Rav Ausband for many years) they used to read from the Sha'arei Teshuva after Davening during Ellul, and he remembers Rav Gifter (who was in his mid forties at the time) reading the lines in Shaar II:7

כאשר יבואו ימי הזקנה והגיעו ימי השיבה ויכל כחו וימעט. וישח יצרו. גם יזכור קצו כי קרוב הוא ויבין לאחריתו וישוב אל ה' וירחמהו. ואשר אינו חוזר בתשובה בבוא ימי הזקנה יכפל ענשו ורבה משטמה עליו. כמו שאמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה שלשה הקב"ה שונאן דל גאה ועשיר מכחש וזקן מנאף. ונאמר (הושע ז) אכלו זרים כחו והוא לא ידע גם שיבה זרקה בו והוא לא ידע. ומן התמיהה והפליאה. כי יעמוד האדם בחצי ימיו ורואה כי הימים הולכים ודלים. ויחל הריסות הבנין. ויחסר המשג בטבעו ותראה בו היבשת. כענין שנאמר (תהלים קב) ימי כצל נטוי ואני כעשב איבש. איך טח מראות עיניו ומהשכיל לבבו. ולא יראה כי נוסע הוא אל המקום מקום בית עולמו. הלוך ונסוע יומם ולילה:

and Rav Gifter didn't say any droshos, he just said, in his inimitable voice (and it helps if you'd ever heard him, so you know how his Reish'es sound like a lion roaring and his vowels were wrung out to dry: For a low key sample, try this.  For Yiddish, here.),

 ימי שנותינו בהם שבעים שנה ואם בגבורת שמונים שנה-- ביז פערציג איז בארג ארוף: נאך פערציג איז בארג אראפ

Rabbeinu Yonah says that it is amazing that people reach the halfway point in their lives, and they start seeing the inexorable descent toward the end, and they still don't do teshuva.  Rav Gifter didn't interpret or darshen- he just declaimed "David Hamelech says in Tehillim that our productive lives are till seventy, maybe till eighty.  Until forty, it is up the mountain.  After forty, it is downhill....."

Reb Meir Simcha's Yahrtzeit

Today, the fourth of Elul, is the Yahrtzeit of Reb Meir Simcha (Dvinsk, Ohr Sameiach, Meshech Chochma.)  There are some stories about him that you might like.

My father zatza'l, who stayed with and talked in learning with the Rogotchover, told me that by the time he got there, Reb Meir Simcha had already been niftar (Reb Meir Simcha was niftar in 1926).  The Rogotchover was famous for his sharp and mordant words, and he would often say sharp things about Reb Meir Simcha as well.  You realize that the Rogotchover and Reb Meir Simcha were awesome geniuses; my rosh yeshiva, Rav Rudderman, said that the Chofetz Chaim was not in the same category as Reb Meir Simcha in gadlus in Torah, and the Rogotchover was equally famous for his genius.  Still, the kin'as sofrim between these very different gedolim was famous in Litteh, and the stories about them were celebrated.  After Reb Meir Simcha was niftar, the bochurim tried to get him to say something sharp about Reb Meir Simcha, but he absolutely refused to say a word about him.   So the bochurim had to make do with saying over the older stories.  One of the stories was that two Rabbonim came to Reb Meir Simcha with a complaint: they had gone to the Rogotchover to talk in learning, or whatever they wanted to talk about, and he simply threw them out of his house.  This was not uncommon; he was interested only in Torah, and if his visitors couldn't present themselves well, he would berate them and throw them out.    These Rabbonim were shocked by such ill treatment- they were great talmidei chachomim, and they deserved better!  Reb Meir Simcha told them, and I have to say this in Yiddish first:
.נו  האי תנא ירושלמי הוא!  האט ער ארויסגעוורפען צוויי יידען
What this meant was that the Gemara in the beginning of Bava Kamma asks, why does the Mishna say חב המזיק, when it should say   חייב.  So the Gemara answers, the Tanna of the Mishna is from Eretz Yisrael, where they use shortened words, so instead of   חייב he said  חב, he took out the two yuds.  The Rogotchover was famous for favoring the Yerushalmi, in the path of the Rambam, so Reb Meir Simcha said that the Rogotchover learns Yerushalmi, so it's just natural that he would throw out the two Yidden.

Then there's the story about a certain friend of Reb Meir Simcha's, a great talmid chacham, with whom Reb Meir Simcha would often spend time and talk in learning.  They were once in a shul, and someone spoke between mincha and maariv.  The speaker knew how to learn, but was nowhere near the madreiga of these two people.  Reb Meir Simcha's friend heard something in the shiur that he knew to be indefensible, and he attacked the speaker with tens of kashes, which the speaker couldn't even begin to respond to.  Reb Meir Simcha got up and said, pay no attention to this man.  He doesn't know the difference בין ימין ושמאל, between right and left.  The baalei battim were proud that the great Reb Meir Simcha so respected their Rov, and the Rov, relieved, finished his drasha, and they davened ma'ariv.

After Maariv, the friend asked Reb Meir Simcha what he meant by saying that.  After all, it was absolutely clear that he was right and the Rov that was speaking was wrong, and especially, why the harsh words about not knowing the difference between left and right?  Reb Meir Simcha answered that these baalei batim had no bonds to limud hatorah except for the drashos they heard from this Rov.  If they would lose their respect for him, they would have nothing.  This is like the Gemara in Moed Kattan 5a-b:

רבי ינאי הוה ליה ההוא תלמידא דכל יומא הוה מקשי ליה, בשבתא דריגלא לא הוה מקשי ליה. קרי עליה (תהילים נ) ושם דרך אראנו בישע אלהים

This was a talmid of Rav Yannai, that every shiur he would ask questions, but on the semi-annual Shabbosos when everyone came to hear Drashos about yomtov, he was silent.  Rav Yannai applied to him the passuk זֹבֵחַ תּוֹדָה יְכַבְּדָנְנִי וְשָׂם דֶּרֶךְ אַרְאֶנּוּ בְּיֵשַׁע אֱלֹהִים.  Rashi explains that he didn't ask so as not to embarrass Rav Yannai in case he couldn't answer on the spot, which to the baalei batim, who weren't familiar with the give and take of Torah, would denigrate Rav Yannai and they wouldn't respect him.  The passuk says וְשָׂם דֶּרֶךְ, which means I (Hashem) will prepare the way.  But Rav Yannai homiletically changed וְשָׂם, V'sam, to read as וְשָׁם, V'sham, וְשָׁם דֶּרֶךְ. one who evaluates the situation and adjusts his behavior accordingly.  So Rav Yannai's Talmid knew the difference between a  שין שמאלית, a shin dotted on the left,  a Sin, and a שין ימינית, a shin dotted on the right, a Shin.  Reb Meir Simcha's friend, who didn't properly assess the circumstance to realize that this was not the time to ask questions, didn't know the difference between right and left.

Micha's comment:

How was he supposed to know the difference between shin and sin -- he's a Litvak! 

My great-grandfather, Rav Yisrael Avraham Abba Krieger, later R' Yisrael Avraham Abba Meir Simcha Krieger, spent a number of years living with his rebbe, R' Meir Simcha haKohein miDvinsk. I had the opportunity to fly to Israel to see my maternal grandfather, his son, one last time before my grandfather's passing. He was already bedridden, and "Grandpa" spent that week telling me more interesting parts of his life story. But when discussing his father and his rebbe, you could hear the yir'ah in my grandfather's voice. It was always "HaRav Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk", never "he", never even "Rav Meir Simcha". And my grandfather would try to sit up while doing so. My great-grandfather, who went on to be the shtat-rav in Kashduri (Litta), the non-Austritt Kehillah in Frankfurt, and Boston (RYBS's precessor), was obviously close to the rebbetzin. After all he lived in her home from his adolescence through to his wedding day. At Rav Meir Simchah's levayah, R' Yisrael Avraham Abba took on his rebbe's names to keep them alive in his family. R' Meir Simchah had no living children at the time of his passing, and the rebbetzin was worried that the name would be lost in Israel. 

Anyway, Rav Meir Simcha was known in Litta as THE rav to go to when you had Shalom Bayis issues. So, after his petirah, many many thankful couples named children after him. Which is part of the reason why he was zokheh not to really need my greatgrandfather's gesture -- Meir Simcha is a common name pair, much more so than many other rabbanim. But it did comfort the almanah, so it wasn't for naught.

Another story, more widely known, that I remembered:
A baalabos brought in his intended son-in-law to talk in learning with the Rogotchover, because he was proud that he got such a wonderful shidduch, so he wanted to show him off to the Rov.  They began talking in learning, and the Rogotchover suddenly got angry and began yelling at the bachur, calling him Tzig!  Goat!  Amaretz!  The prospective father in law was horrified, and he hurried the bachur out, and broke the shidduch.  A few months later, the baalabos visited the Rogotchover again, and the Rov asked him, nu, how is your son in law, the young man you brought me last time?  The baalabos asked, son in law?  What son in law?  When I heard you call him a Tzig, I broke the shidduch!  I thought he was a talmid chacham, and when I found out he wasn't, the shidduch was off!  The Rogotchover said, Naar einer, you foolish man, my goat knows how to learn ten times better than the rov in your town!

Re'ay: Devarim 14:3, Loathsome Foods. לא תאכל כל תועבה and Kosher Lobster

It's natural to assume that there is something loathsome about non-kosher types of animals, that there is something inherently bad about them, and that this negative quality is inseparably tied to their essence.  If that were true, there could not possibly be any loophole that would enable us to find, for example, lobster or shrimp that was kosher.  They can't possibly be kosher, because it is their quality of shrimpness and lobsterness that makes them anathema.  This perspective is the safest and easiest to follow.  Our passuk seems to support this attitude:  It says  לא תאכל כל תועבה, do not eat any  תועבה foods, and תועבה does mean disgusting or abominable.  

In fact, though, the essence of these prohibitions is not the esthetic character or the palatibility of these things.  We abstain from them specifically and exclusively because Hashem told us not to eat them.  They are abominable because they are treif, not that they are treif because they are abominable.  Indeed, there are theoretical means through which one could produce real shrimp and lobster that are 100% kosher.  We're not talking about surimi, minced pollock that is extruded into ersatz shrimp-like shapes.  We're talking about real swimming ten-legged crustacean antennaed cocktail shrimp, the real thing.  And I'm not talking about some theoretical exception to the biblical law which is rabbinically prohibited.  I'm talking what's-for-breakfast-muttar, as kosher as lox.  

Chulin 66b:

דכתיב את זה תאכלו מכל אשר במים וגו' בימים ובנחלים הוא דכי אית ליה אכול דלית ליה לא תיכול הא בכלים אע"ג דלית ליה אכול 

Chulin 67a:

דבי ר' ישמעאל תנא במים במים שתי פעמים אין זה כלל ופרט אלא ריבה ומיעט במים ריבה בימים ובנחלים מיעט במים חזר וריבה ריבה ומיעט וריבה ריבה הכל מאי רבי חריצין ונעיצין לאיסורא ומאי מיעט בורות שיחין ומערות להתירא 

Rambam 2 Ma'achalos Asuros 17:

המים שבכלים שהשריצו הרי אותן שרצים מותר לשתותן עם המים שנאמר וכל אשר לו סנפיר וקשקשת במים בימים ובנחלים אותם תאכלו. כלומר במים ובימים ובנחלים הוא שאתה אוכל את שיש לו ואין אתה אוכל את שאין לו אבל בכלים בין שיש לו בין שאין לו מותר:

2 Ma'achalos Asuros 18:

שרץ המים הנברא בבורות ובשיחין ובמערות הואיל ואינן מים נובעין והרי הן עצורים הרי הן כמים שבכלים ומותר. ושוחה ושותה ואינו נמנע ואף על פי שבולע בשעת שתייה מאותן השרצים הדקים:

So: the Torah tells us that creatures that live in the water are only kosher if they have scales and fins.  But the Torah tells us that this requirement is limited to water creatures that live in oceans and natural lakes.  If they live in artificial ponds or tanks, they do not require any signs of kashrus, and they would be kosher even without scales or fins.  On the other hand, the Gemara (Chulin 66b-67a,b) continues, this is true only so long as they haven't left the water.  The moment they leave the water, they fall under the heading of land creatures, and thus require signs of kashrus, which they don't have. 

One problem is that if they are the product of eggs or fry that were produced by other crustaceans that were assur, they would be assur under the rule of היוצא מן הטמא טמא, that which comes out of a prohibited animal is prohibited as well.  But in the case of shrimp and lobster, the eggs are microscopic, and so if one would put treif shrimp into a breeding tank, and they spawned, the water containing the spawn would be kosher, because the eggs and larvae are invisible.  When they came into legal existence by becoming visible, they are in a tank or pond, and are automatically kosher.  Thus, if they grew from microscopic size while in a tank, and so long as they are in their tanks, they are kosher.  Once they leave their tanks, they become treif.  

What if they are killed in the water and only are taken out of the tank after they're dead?  (This is not far-fetched.  Lobster is usually prepared by cooking alive in water, and shrimp is usually frozen before shipping, and they could easily be frozen or cooked while immersed.)  This is the subject of an argument between two sets of Rishonim- we'll call it a machlokes Rashi vs. the Rambam.  According to Rashi, if they're killed in the water and taken out afterwards, they remain kosher.  The Rambam holds that they do become treif even if they're taken out after they're dead.

I think it's fascinating that the argument between Rashi et al and the Rambam et al stems from one single letter, the letter Vov.  The Gemara in Chulin (67b) asks a question and does not resolve it, and therefore we are machmir.  

בעי רב יוסף פרשה ומתה מהו מקצתה מהו לאויר העולם מהו תיקו 

But there's an argument as to exactly how the question was worded.  According to Rashi, the Gemara asked what the halacha is if "פירשה ומתה", if it came out of the water/fruit/seed AND THEN IT DIED (before it actually moved around), whether it is assur on the basis of שורץ על הארץ since it never was actually shoreitz, it never was actually shoreitz after it came out.  According to the Rambam, the correct reading of the Gemara is not פירשה  ומתה , it is "פירשה מתה", it came out of the fruit AFTER IT WAS DEAD.  So, according to Rashi's girsa ומתה with a Vov, the Gemara was not asking about a case where it was removed already dead.  That is for sure muttar.  According to the Rambam's girsa of מתה without a Vov, that is exactly what the Gemara is asking, that even if it was removed after it was dead, maybe it is assur anyway.  Since the Gemara doesn't resolve the question, we would pasken it is assur.  (Please note: it's easy-and, unfortunately, common-  to misinterpret the Gemara as meaning that the hetter for insects inside harvested fruit is the same as the hetter for fish in containers.  That is incorrect.  They are entirely different concepts.)

Who do we pasken like?  As you will see, the bottom line, the normative halacha, is the subject of dispute.

Aruch Hashulchan 84:41-43

ודע דלדעת רש"י ותוס' והרבה מן הראשונים לא מיקרי פירש אלא כשפירש חיה אבל אם פירשה  מתה לאו כלום הוא שהרי   עיקר איסור פרישה  הוא משום דמקרי שורץ על הארץ והרי במיתתה לא תוכל לרחוש ושריצה פירושו דבר הרוחש ומנענע ...

ולפ״ז תולעים שבחומץ ובפירות תלושם...שהרתיחן על האור ומתו התולעים  לא איכפת לן אח"כ אם פירשו אבל הרמב"ם והרי"ף ורבנו חננאל והרשב"א ס"ל דגם פירשה מתה הוי בעיא דלא איפשיטא

...

 ובוודאי נראה כיון שיש פלוגתא דרבוותא יש להחמיר אלא שנראה מרבותינו בעלי  הש״ע  בסעיף ד׳ שתפסו לעיקר כדעת המקילים ודעת האוסרים  כתבו בשם יש אוסרים

and he goes on to say that he doesn't agree with the Shulchan Aruch's preference to be meikil, nor with the Shach, the Pri Chadash, and the Kreisi U'Pleisi that are meikil, and he ends by paskening that ובודאי שיש להחמיר, we certainly should be machmir.

One more point needs to be mentioned.  I discussed this with my son in law, Harav Avraham Lawrence, and he said that the hetter only applies when the water spontaneously generated the Shratzim, not when they were spawned by Shratzim that are assur, because יוצא מן הטמא טמא.  I said that the fact that the spawn is microscopic, and the larvae (the microscopic nauplii) are kosher, no less than the invisible protozoa that live in many foods that we eat, and יוצא מן הטמא טמא can't asser when there is a break in the chain of issur.  I believe that his argument is without merit, but גברא רבה אמר מילתא לא תחיכו עליה, and if anyone tries to actually do this, I would bet that the argument will be presented.  Wrong doesn't mean that someone's not going to vociferously argue it.  (Rabbi Dr. Richard Resnick argued even further- that since we know that spontaneous generation is not factually true, the whole hetter should no longer be relied on, and the Gemara that was mattir Sheretz Hamayim that the Gemara was mattir if it wasn't piresh should be overturned.  Again, I think he's wrong because a. we pasken like the Gemara regardless of their errors of natural science, and b. the microscopic stage breaks the chain of issur.)

Let me make this crystal clear.  Many authorities within the last several hundred years (Shach, Kreisi U'Pleisi, etc.) would in actual practice fully allow such shrimp and lobster.  In the mundane reality of psak, despite these opinions,because more recent poskim have tended to the side of issur, (e.g., the Aruch Hashulchan,) any current posek that wanted to rely on the mattirim would encounter significant resistance. (Pond catfish would be assur anyway, because they develop from eggs that are visible as soon as they are spawned, and, as I noted above, since their parent is assur, they are assur as well- היוצא מן הטמא טמא- despite their having been raised in a tank or pond.)

But all this does not diminish the truth of the underlying point that I am making, because most say that even the machmirim are only machmir under rabbinical law, but under Torah law everyone would agree that it is muttar.  The main thing is that you see that it is not the shrimpiness of the shrimp that makes it assur, nor is it the clamminess of the clam.  It is the fact that the Ribono shel Olam prohibited it.  The same is true in the cases of כלאי גפנים, which has an element of intent, as we see in :בבא בתרא ב; and ערלה, which is only assur if it is owned by a person but not if it is hefker; and בשר בחלב  which is בטל בששים only because it is not considered  דרך בישול; and non-cloven-hooved animals, as we see in the rule of קלוט במעי פרה.  These foods are abominations if and only if, when and only when, Hashem said they are assur, because we follow the law of Hashem.  If and when Hashem says it's muttar, you can make a shehakol and eat it with a good appetite.  It's not abominable any more.  (Let's hope the Aris Greenspan and Zivotofsky don't get any ideas about this.....)

This should give us a deeper appreciation of the words we find in the Sifra (end of Kedoshim, Vayikra 20:26, brought by the Rambam in Shmoneh Prakim in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.)

ר' אלעזר בן עזריה אומר מנין שלא יאמר אדם "אי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז. אי אפשי לאכול בשר חזיר. אי אפשי לבוא על הערוה" אבל "אפשי ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי כך"? תלמוד לומר "ואבדיל אתכם מן העמים להיות לי"-- נמצא פורש מן העבירה ומקבל עליו עול מלכות שמים.

Just for convenience, here is the text of the Rambam's discussion on this Chazal, though he quotes it in the name of a different Tanna.

אמרו הפילוסופים שהמושל בנפשו אע״פ שעושה המעשים הטובים והחשובים הוא עושה אותם והוא מתאוה אל הפעולות הרעות ונכסף אליהם ויכבוש את יצרו. ויחלוק עליו בפעולותיו אל מה שיעירוהו אליו כחותיו ותאותו ותכונת נפשו. ויעשה הטובות והוא מצטער בעשייתם ונזוק. אבל החסיד הוא נמשך בפעולתו אחר מה שתעירהו תאותו. ותכונתו. ויעשה הטובות. והוא מתאוה ונכסף אליהם. ובהסכמה מן הפילוסופים שהחסיד יותר חשוב ויותר שלם מן המושל בנפשו. אבל אמרו שהמושל בנפשו כחסיד בענינים רבים. ומעלתו למטה ממנו בהכרח. להיותו מתאוה לפועל הרע ואע״פ שאינו עושה אותו. מפני שתשוקתו לרע היא תכונה רעה בנפש. וכבר אמר שלמה המלך עליו השלום כיוצא בזה (משלי כא) נפש רשע אותה רע. ואמר בשמחת החסיד במעשה הטוב. והצטער מי שאינו צדיק בעשייתה זה המאמר (שס ושם) שמחה לצדיק עשות משפט ומחתה לפועלי און. זהו הנראה מדברי הנביאים נאות למה שזכרוהו הפילוסופים. וכאשר חקרנו דברי חכמים בזה הענין נמצא להם שהמתאוה לעבירות ונכסף אליהם הוא יותר חשוב ויותר שלם. מאשר לא יתאוה אליהם ולא יצטער בהנחתם עד שאמרו שכל אשר יהיה האדם יוחר חשוב ויותר שלם תהיה [יותר] תשוקתו לעבירות והצטערו בהנחתם יותר גדול. והביאו בזה הדברים (סוכה נכ.) ואמרו כל הגדול מחבירו יצרו גדול ממנו. ולא דים זה. עד שאמרו ששכר המושל בנפשו גדול לפי רוב צערו במשלו בנפשו ואמרו(אכוח ס״ה מכ״ג) לפום צערא אגרא. ויותר מזה שהם ציוו להיות האדם מתאוה לעבירות. עד שהזהירו מלומר שאני בטבעי לא אתאוה לזאת העבירה ואע״פ שלא אסרה התורה. והוא אמרם [ת״כ פ׳ קדושים ע״ש] רשב״ג אומר לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לאכול בשר בחלב. אי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז. אי אפשי לבוא על הערוה. אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. ולפי המובן מפשוטי ב׳ המאמרים בתחלת המחשבה הן סותרין זה את זה. ואין הענין כן. אבל שניהם אמת. ואץ מחלוקת ביניהם כלל. והוא שהרעות אשר הן אצל הפילוסופים רעות. אשר אמרו שמי שלא יתאוה אליהם יותר חשוב מן המתאוה אליהן ויכבוש את יצרו מהן. הם הענינים המפורסמים אצל כל בני אדם שהם רעות כשפיכת דמים. וגניבה וגזילה ואוגאה. ולהזיק למי שלא הרע לו. ולגמול רע למטיב לו. ולבזות אב ואם. וכיוצא באלו. והן המצות [יומא סז: ושם חשיב גס גילוי עריוח והרמב״ס חשיב לקמן ג״ע וצ״ע. ועי׳ במהרש״א ס״א אסשר ליישב קצת] שאמרו עליהם חכמים ז״ל שאילו לא נכתבו ראוים הם לכתב (א) ויקראו אותם קצת (חכמינו האחרונים) [חכמים הראשונים]. אשר חלו חלי המדברים מצות השכליות ואין ספק שהנפש אשר תכסף לדבר מהם ותשתוקק אליו. שהיא חסרה. (נ) ושהנפש החשובה לא תתאוה לאחד מאלו הרעות כלל. ולא תצטער בהמנעם מהם. אבל הדברים שאמרו עליהם החכמים. שהכובש את יצרו מהם הוא יותר חשוב. וגמולו יותר גדול. הם התורות השמעיות וזה אמת שאלמלא התורה לא היו רעות כלל. ומפני זה אמרו שצריך האדם שיניח נפשו אוהבת אותם. ולא יהיה [לו] מונע מהם (אלא) [רק] התורה ובחון חכמתם ע״ה ובמה שהמשילו. שהם לא אמרו אל יאמר אדם אי אפשי להרוג הנפש אי אפשי לגנוב אי אפשי לכזב אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. אבל הביאו דברים שמעיים כלם. בשר בחלב. ולבישת שעטנז. ועריות. ואלו המצות וכיוצא בהן. הם אשר קראם הש״י חקות וארז״ל [יומא סז:] חקים שחקקתי לך אין לך רשות להרהר בהן. ועובדי כוכבים משיבין עליהם. והשטן מקטרג בהן כגון פרה אדומה. ושעיר המשתלח וכוי. ואשר קראו אותם האחרונים שכליות. יקראו מצות. כפי מה שבארו החכמים. הנה התבאר לך מכל מה שאמרנו איזה מן העבירות יהיה מי שלא ישתוקק אליהם יותר חשוב מן המשתוקק אליהם. וכובש יצרו מהן. ואיזה מהן יהיה הענץ בהפך וזה חרוש נפלא. בהעמיד שני המאמרים ולשונם מורה על אמיתת מה שבארנו. וכבר נשלמה כוונת זה הפרק

Postscript: 

I'm incorporating the valuable he'aros that arose in the comments.

First, I should have pointed out the Gemara in Bava Metzia 61b that seems to indicate that there is an inherent repulsiveness in shratzim, and shratzim, I think, would include the creatures we've been talking about.

לכדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אמר הקב"ה אילמלא העליתי את ישראל ממצרים אלא בשביל דבר זה שאין מטמאין בשרצים דיי א"ל ומי נפיש אגרייהו טפי מרבית ומציצית וממשקלות א"ל אע"ג דלא נפיש אגרייהו טפי מאיסי למכלינהו

Second, great unknown pointed out that if one were to boil the lobster in its tank, together with some nice potatoes and onions and tomatoes, and after cooling the whole thing one would strain out the חתן הנשף, the  resulting bisque would be both tasty and 100% kosher and muttar according to all poskim.

Finally, I suggested that, especially in light of the Gemara in Bava Metzia, this might be an excellent example of נבל ברשות התורה.  I might be wrong, though, when you consider the Rambam in Shmoneh Prakim I brought above.  The concept of נבל ברשות התורה, by definition, is impossible to pin down.  But it would certainly feel grotesque, wouldn't it?  And if any of you militant Rambam Rationalists takes this seriously and does it, I strongly suggest that you do it under cover of darkness, or you will acquire the permanent sobriquet "Lobster Fresser."  Or, in proper German, Hummer Fresser.

Va'eschanan, Eikev, and Re'eh. Why a Chassan Speaks; Fat is Fate; and Resentful Meshulachim

I In Parshas Va'Eschanan, Devarim 6:7 - ודברת בם, בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך, ובשכבך ובקומך, and in Parshas Eikev, Devarim 11:19 -  ושננתם לבניך, ודברת בם, בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך, ובשכבך ובקומך , the passuk tells us that we need to learn and teach Torah.  Targum Yonasan adds, in both cases, ותהויין הגיין בהון במותביכון בבתיכון בזמן מיעסקכון בחיתונכון, which means, most probably, that you should learn Torah when you are busy with your wedding.  

in 6:7

ותגמרינון לבנך ותהויין הניין בהון במותביכון בבתיכון בזמן מיעסוקכון בחיתונכון ובמיהכון באורחכון ובפניא סמיך למשכביכון ובצפרא סמיך למקמיכון

in 11:19

ותלפון יתהון ית בניכון למגרסא בהון במתביכון בבתיכון עם חיתונכון ובמיהככון בארחא ובפניא סמיך למשכבכון ובצפרא סמיך למקמיכון

This is very strange, in light of the classic Chazal that the people involved in making a wedding, and certainly the Chassan, are granted a dispensation on the obligation of Limud HaTorah.  Multiplying the difficulty is that this passuk itself is used in Shas to teach us that עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה, including the Chassan:

Sukkah 25a

תנו רבנן: ״בשבתך בביתך״ — פרט לעוסק במצוה, ״ובלכתך בדרך״ — פרט לחתן. מכאן אמרו: הכונס את הבתולה — פטור, ואת האלמנה — חייב. מאי משמע? אמר רב הונא: כדרך. מה דרך רשות, אף כל רשות, לאפוקי האי דבמצוה עסוק. מי לא עסקינן דקאזיל לדבר מצוה, וקא אמר רחמנא ליקרי! אם כן לימא קרא ״בשבת ובלכת״, מאי ״בשבתך״ ״ובלכתך״ — בלכת דידך הוא דמיחייבת, הא בלכת דמצוה — פטירת. אי הכי, אפילו כונס את האלמנה נמי? כונס את הבתולה טריד, כונס אלמנה לא טריד.

Maybe the Targum Yonasan holds like Rav Shila there on 25b-26a who argues on the whole din of עוסק and only patters when kavana is extremely unlikely.  But it's still strange that from the passuk the rabbim darshen to patter, he darshens to be mechayeiv - the Gemara from Derech, and the Targum from Beisecha. Second, if you don'ot darshen that oseik is pattur, you don't need a limud to be mechayev an oseik. Rav Shila does not need a passuk to be mechayeiv.

I think the answer has to be that according to the Targum, the Torah mentions the four instances to be mechayeiv, in different senses. Obviously, בשכבך ובקומך are chiyuvim. But the point of בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך is to tell you that it is vitally important, for your own sake, that you learn Torah at these times. When you begin building a home, that is the most important time to dedicate yourself to limud hatorah, so that you build a torahdikkeh house. (The word זבת in בשבתך בביתך does not have to mean "sitting." It can mean settling, as we see in the din of sheves, from  לא תהו בראה לשבת יצרה. Yes, you can ask from the beis in b'veisecha. But, qeulle surprise, sometimes the Torah chooses a word to have more than one meaning.)  Once you've built a torahdikkeh house, you have to find a way to take it along with you.  Torah is the foundation of a bayis neeman. Having a bayis neeman behind you will help you in your travels through the world.

In any case, if you want an interesting source for our minhag that Chasanim say Divrei Torah at Aufrufs and Sheva Brachos, here you have it.

Truth is, I believe the reason our minhag is for a Chassan to speak at the Aufruf and Sheva Brachos because they are so distracted and busy that if they didn't have to speak, days would go by and they would not learn a word.  Now that they have to speak in public, to a critical crowd, in front of a new wife and in laws and strangers, they have no choice but to learn more diligently than usual.  This is also why a father is expected to say a Dvar Torah at a Bris.  In fact, I remember being in the delivery room when my bechor was born, and immediately thinking about what I would say at the bris.  But the Targum is interesting.

After citing the Targum and my pshat, here are the usual reasons offered to explain why chassanim speak at the Sheva Brachos.

a.  The Gemara (Sanhedrin 101) says that at every festive gathering, we should say divrei Torah:

התורה חוגרת שק ועומדת לפני הקב"ה ואומרת לפניו רבונו של עולם עשאוני בניך ככנור שמנגנין בו לצים אמר לה בתי בשעה שאוכלין ושותין במה יתעסקו אמרה לפניו רבונו של עולם אם בעלי מקרא הן יעסקו בתורה ובנביאים ובכתובים אם בעלי משנה הן יעסקו במשנה בהלכות ובהגדות ואם בעלי תלמוד הן יעסקו בהלכות פסח בפסח בהלכות עצרת בעצרת בהלכות חג בחג 

so it's not specific to a Sheva Brachos, but an application of the Gemara's general instruction to say divrei torah at festive gatherings.

b.  Many people have said that because the Gemara (Pesachim 49a) says that the marriage of the daughter of a talmid chacham to an am ha'aretz is ill fated and not a seudas mitzva:

תניא רבי שמעון אומר כל סעודה שאינה של מצוה אין תלמיד חכם רשאי להנות ממנה כגון מאי א"ר יוחנן כגון בת כהן לישראל ובת תלמיד חכם לעם הארץ דא"ר יוחנן בת כהן לישראל אין זווגן עולה יפה

so the Chassan endeavors to demonstrate that he is a talmid chacham and so it is a auspicious marriage and a seudas mitzva.  By the way, many have said that this explains why we "hak up" the Chassan, why we often interrupt him during the speech and don't let him finish his prepared divrei Torah- because we are saying that he doesn't need to prove that he's a talmid chacham, we know that he's a talmid chacham without his having to prove it to us with his speech.

c. Every Chassan is worried about Shalom Bayis, because בדרך הטבע there will have to be times when the couple disagrees about something important.  But the Ohr HaChaim asks, why did the Yam Suf resist when Moshe Rabbeinu told it to split, but in Chulin 7a the river immediately listened to Pinchas ben Yair and split three times. The Ohr HaChaim (Shemos 14:27) answers

אכן תנאי זה הוא בכלל התנאים שהתנה ה' על כל מעשה בראשית להיות כפופים לתורה ועמליה ולעשות כל אשר יגזרו עליהם וממשלתם עליהם כממשלת הבורא ברוך הוא, ולזה תמצא כמו כן בשמים ובארץ ובכוכבים ובשמש וירח שלטו עליהם הצדיקים יחידים ואין צריך לומר מרובים כאשר חקק ה' להם בעת הבריאה, והוא סוד אומרו (ישעי' מ"ג) בוראך יעקב וגו' ואמרו ז"ל (ויקרא רבה פל"ו) שאמר הקדוש ברוך הוא לעולמו מי בראך מי יצרך ישראל והכל בכח התורה. וצא ולמד מ"ש בפסוק בראשית.

והנה ביציאת ישראל ממצרים עדיין לא קבלו התורה ואין גזירתו על הנבראים גזירה ולזה לא הסכים הים ליחלק להם וטען למשה אתה נבראת בששי ואני בג' זה רמז כי אינו בן תורה שאם היה בן תורה הנה הוא קודם לו כי התורה קדמה לעולם כולו, ולזה נתחכם ה' והוליך ימינו לימין משה פירוש הראהו כי הוא בן תורה המתיחס לה ימין דכתיב (דברים לג ב) מימינו וגו' וכשראהו תיכף ומיד נקרע כתנאי הראשון, ולזה כל צדיק וצדיק שיעמוד אחר קבלת התורה יביא בידו שטר חוב א' לכופו ליחלק לפניו, ותמצא שכשלא רצה ליחלק לר' פנחס בן יאיר ולהמתלוה עמו רצה לקונסו ופחד הים ממנו:

This also explains why there was no resistance by Yehoshua crossing the Yarden. 

One may assume that this is either because of the tnai with the bri'ah or because (זוהר תרומה קס"א ב), that אסתכל באורייתא וברא עלמא.

So we see that the teva is meshubad to Torah, and things that can not happen in teva can happen with the koach of Torah. So the chassan darshens in the hope that the zechus of Torah will allow them to have a madreiga of shalom and reiyus that goes beyond what a person could expect bederech hateva.

This is consistent with the Gemara in the beginning of Sotah that 

 וקשין לזווגן כקריעת ים סוף שנאמר אלהים מושיב יחידים ביתה מוציא אסירים בכושרות

It doesn't matter if that's zivug rishon or sheini. The point is that there is a connection between shidduchim and Krias Yam Suf.

II
If you're fat, it's not because you're a slovenly and undisciplined bum.  It's fate.  Regarding the passuk in Devarim 30:15, that says ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המוות ואת הרע, the Medrash Tanchuma in Pekudei says : הקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על הטיפה מה יהא בסופה, אם זכר אם נקבה, אם חלש גיבור, אם עני אם עשיר, אם קצר או ארוך, אם מכוער או נאה, אם עבה או דק, אם בזוי או גס. וכן גוזר על כל קורותיו. אבל אם צדיק אם רשע, לא, אלא הדבר ההוא נותנו בידו של אדם בלבד, שנאמר: ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב, ואת המות ואת הרע (דב' ל טו).   Basically, fat is fate.  Relax and enjoy it.



III
In parshas Re'eh, the Torah objurgates a person that refuses to lend money to a fellow Jew out of fear that the borrower will take advantage of the law of Shemita and not pay back the loan.  The Torah refers to such a person as a Beli'al, the equivalent of an idolater.  The Chafetz Chaim in the intro to Ahavas Chesed discusses this, and brings the Chinuch that says it's talking about a borrower who, under the terms of the loan, should pay back before the debt-annulment of Shevi'is takes place (so we're not dealing with out-and-out Tzedaka,) but you're worried that he won't pay back on time and he'll push you off until Shevi'is comes.

משרשי המצוה כדי לחזק ולקבוע בנפשינו מדת הנדיבות ולהרחיק בתכלית ריחוק מדת הכילות, ואין נדיב יותר בעולם כמלוה מעותיו בלי משכון עם היותו יודע שהזמן קרוב להשמיט מעותיו ולהפסידו ממנו באם לא יוכל לגבותם קודם השמטה. והוציא הכתוב בלשון השמר לך לומר שאל יעלה על רוחך כי על נזק הדל אני מזהירך פן יחסר לו אשר לא תתן לו, כי לא כן הוא ועל הנוגע לך מזהירך כי יקרך עון. וזהו שאמר השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל לאמר קרבה שנת השבע שנת השמיטה של שמיטת קרקעות וכרמים וזיתים, ובהם כמונו כעניים שוים בהם, ואיך עוד אפתח ידי לתת עוד לו מממוני צדקה, נמצא העניים אוכלים אותנו בשלש פיות. דע כי לב בליעל הוא, קשה המעשה כע"ז כמ"ש ז"ל כל המעלים עינו מן הצדקה כאלו עובד ע"ז, נאמר כאן בליעל ונאמר יצאו אנשים בני בליעל.

Declining to lend such a person doesn't sound like idolatry to me, and I'm not sure what the problem is.  It's possible that the problem is that you don't believe that Hashem will pay you back for the borrower's non-payment.  But it seems to me that to lend him money, when you have a legitimate concern about his unfairly delaying until Shevi'is, is no worse than building a fence around your land to keep out vandals.

In any case, what I want to know is this:  Does Usha's rule of Chomesh apply to loans.  Of, better, the Gaon holds that Chomesh is De'oraysa when the poor man is in front of you.  Does that rule of Chomesh apply to loans?  When are you obligated to lend money, and to what extent does this obligation extend?  And you can't say that it's a wishy washy rule, that you ought to do it but if you don't it's no big deal, because it is a very very big deal: the Torah warns you that if you don't lend the money, you are in serious trouble.  What triggers the obligation, and under what circumstances of the borrower and under what financial condition of the lender does it apply.  As we will see in a moment, it is not limited to destitute borrowers.  But it certainly doesn't apply to a profligate wastrel or a speculator that wants to invest in commodity futures.  I don't know the answer to this question, and I would be very happy to hear from someone who has something good to say about this.

4.  Again on the passuk (15:9) השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל לאמר קרבה שנת השבע שנת השמטה ורעה עינך באחיך האביון ולא תתן לו וקרא עליך אל ה' והיה בך חטא., that it is akin to idolatry to refuse a loan to a person that is in need.  From a cursory reading of the passuk, one would understand it to refer to a man who needs a loan because he is hungry or desperate for sustenance of some sort.  However, the Chinuch here in Mitzvah 488 says that it is broader, and it includes a businessman who needs a loan. 
Additionally, the Rambam applies it as a general mitzva, not limited to loans.  The Rambam brings this passuk in three places:

9 Shmitah V'Yovel 30

מי שנמנע מלהלוות את חבירו קודם השמיטה שמא יתאחר החוב שלו וישמט עבר בלא תעשה שנאמר השמר לך וגו'. וחטא גדול הוא שהרי הזהירה עליו תורה בשני לאוין שנאמר השמר לך פן וגו'. וכל מקום שנאמר השמר או פן או אל הרי זה מצות לא תעשה. והתורה הקפידה על מחשבה רעה זו וקראתו בליעל. והרי הוסיף הכתוב להזהיר ולצוות שלא ימנע אלא יתן שנאמר נתן תתן לו ולא ירע לבבך בתתך לו וגו'. והבטיח הקב"ה בשכר מצוה זו בעולם הזה שנאמר כי בגלל הדבר הזה יברכך וגו':

10 Matnas Aniyim 3
כל המעלים עיניו מן הצדקה הרי זה נקרא בליעל כמו שנקרא עובד עכו"ם בליעל. ובעכו"ם הוא אומר יצאו אנשים בני בליעל ובמעלים עיניו מן הצדקה הוא אומר השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל. ונקרא רשע שנאמר ורחמי רשעים אכזרי. ונקרא חוטא שנאמר וקרא עליך אל ה' והיה בך חטא. והקב"ה קרוב לשועת עניים שנאמר שועת עניים אתה תשמע. לפיכך צריך להזהר בצעקתם שהרי ברית כרותה להם שנאמר והיה כי יצעק אלי ושמעתי כי חנון אני:
1 Malveh V'Loveh 1
מצות עשה להלוות לעניי ישראל שנאמר אם כסף תלוה את עמי את העני עמך. יכול רשות תלמוד לומר העבט תעביטנו וגו' ומצוה זו גדולה מן הצדקה אל העני השואל שזה כבר נצרך לשאול וזה עדיין לא הגיע למדה זו. והתורה הקפידה על מי שימנע מלהלוות לעני שנאמר ורעה עינך באחיך האביון וגו':

Although our passuk refers to "your desperate brother," it is clear, again, from the Rambam in Shmita V'Yovel it is clear that he applies it to anyone who needs a loan, even if he is not an Evyon.  As I mentioned above, I don't know the extent of this obligation.

5.  The passuk says that if one refuses to give the loan, he has sinned.  The Rambam quoted above emphasizes this as well. Rashi in our passuk also says a remarkable thing about this:  The passuk says that if the poor man cries to Hashem, Hashem will listen to his cries and punish the one who refused to lend him money.  

and he will cry out [to the Lord] against you: One might think this is a requirement [namely, that this poor man is obliged to “cry out… against you”]. Therefore, Scripture says, “[On his day you shall give him his payment…] so that he will not cry against you [to the Lord]” (Deut. 24:15). - [Sifrei 15:138]		וקרא עליך: יכול מצוה, תלמוד לומר (דברים כד, טו) ולא יקרא:
and it will be a sin to you: in any case, even if he does not cry [against you]. If so, why does it say,“and he will cry out… against you?” [It means that God says:] I hasten to punish in response to the one who cries out more than to the one who does not cry out. — [Sifrei]		והיה בך חטא: מכל מקום, אפילו לא יקרא. אם כן למה נאמר וקרא עליך, ממהר אני ליפרע על ידי הקורא יותר ממי שאינו קורא:

Regarding the first Rashi:  Why on Earth would I have thought that the rejected applicant is obliged to cry out against the one who refused?  Regarding the second Rashi, and the passuk in general: What obligates a man to lend to another?  If a person refuses to take a lulav and esrog, if a person refuses to wear Tefillin, is the punishment so severe?  Why is this so serious here?  What right does the supplicant have to the lender's money?  So let's assume that if a person is in a position to lend money, he is a Gizbar, he is a steward of the money, not its owner, and a steward who is entrusted with assets to be used for another's benefit, and he refuses to do so, is a thief.  But this is a complaint the Hashem has against the wealthy man.  What right does the supplicant have to complain?  It's not his money, he was asking for a favor, what kind of chutzpah is it that he asks Hashem to punish the man who refused to do him a favor?  I would think that such a person is imbalanced, or a potential thief himself, because he views the money as his entitlement, when it actually belongs to the other person.  Bishlema by an item given in collateral, the lender's refusal to let the borrower use it in a time of need is unfair, because until the court takes it from the borrower and gives it finally to the lender, it is to some extent the property of the borrower.  But here, what right does the supplicant have to complain to Hashem- to the extent that you need a passuk to tell you that although he MAY complain to Hashem, he has no OBLIGATION to do so!

I am well aware that meshulachim and aniyim curse the people who don't give them as much as they think they're entitled to.  I've seen this many times.  But it's an ugly trait, and unfit for any normal member of Klal Yisrael.  I assume it stems from the fact that they have taken tzedaka for so long that they perceive the money in your pocket as belonging to them.  They no longer see the demarcation between what's yours and what's theirs, at least insofar as taking is concerned.  But it's not a good middah.  It is a very very bad middah.  The reason it's called "my money" is because it is my money.  What is the hava amina that the poor person is obligated to complain to Hashem????