Toldos, Bereishis 25:31-2. Sale of Bechorah. Ignotum per Ignotius

Although I rarely post other people's Torah, I'm making an exception for this nice vort from הרב שמעון משה דיסקין, Harav Shimon Diskin.  If the introductory material is old hat, skip to the Ketzos, a few paragraphs from the end.

From a legal perspective, it is difficult to understand why Eisav's sale of his Bechorah to Yaakov would be valid.  One of the main issues is the matter of selling something that does not yet exist- so long as their father Yitzchak was alive, the Bechor status had no tangible meaning.  Only after Yitzchak's death would Eisav's Bechorah entitle him to a greater share of inherited property.  Until then, all that Eisav had was an expectation, a דבר שלא בא לעולם.  The halacha  is that אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם, one cannot transfer something that does not yet exist.  This rule is specifically applied to the sale of future inheritance in Bava Metzia 16a-b.  The Mefarshim give three reasons for this halacha:  Reb Elchanan in BB #267 explains that among the Rishonim there are two reasons given, and Reb Chaim proposes a third.  According to the Maharam mei'Ruttenberg it is a problem of intent- that since the item does not currently exist, we view the decision of the seller as being legally incomplete.  There is no גמירות דעת.  According to Reb Yechiel mei'Pariz, the problem is that legal transfer is impossible when the item does not exist- it is not called a מעשה קנין.  Reb Chaim says pshat that the problem is that you have to own something in order to sell it.  Until it exists, it is not yours to sell.

The Rosh (Tshuvos Ha'Rosh 8:18), and quoted by his son (in his T"Peirush ha-Tur," not the "Ba'al ha-Turim"), says that if the seller takes an oath that he will go through with the transaction when the merchandise comes into his possession, the transaction takes effect even now, before he owns the merchandise. This, he explains, is why Yaakov makes a point of eliciting an oath from Eisav (25:33). Since the Bechorah rights were דבר שלא בא לעולם, a Shvu'ah was required to execute the transfer, or at least to make it irreversible.

The Rivash (328), as brought in the Ketzos 278:13, rejects this explanation, stating that an Shvu'ah cannot validate the sale of a  דבר שלא בא לעולם.  He therefore suggests that before Matan Torah, the sale of a  דבר שלא בא לעולם was valid. The law invalidating such a sale was introduced only once the Torah was given.

Obviously, the disagreement between the Rosh and the Rivash hinges on how we understand the problem of  אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם, whether it's an issue of גמירות דעת or מעשה קנין.  Similarly, the Netziv in Harcheiv Davar points out, the Gemara in Bava Metzia (66b) says that according to Rav Nachman, and so we hold le'halacha, if a person sells fruits that have not yet grown, the either party can back out.  But if after the fruit grows the buyer takes possession of hte fruit, he does not need to compensate the seller according to their value at the time of his acquisition.  Rabbeinu Tam explains this to mean that in truth, the sale of a דבר שלא בא לעולם is effective, but voidable.   Other rishonim disagree with Rabbeinu Tam, and hold that there is no sale at all.

            According to Rabbenu Tam, the Netziv explains, we understand the Rosh.  The purpose of the Shvuah was to eliminate the possibility of retraction.  Once that possibility is eliminated, the sale is immediately valid.  Similary, Reb Elchanan, quoted above, says that in countries where such sales are accepted in the marketplace, if the problem was only one of גמירות דעת, that problem is eliminated.  If the problem is one of  מעשה קנין, it would still not be accepted al pi halacha as a kinyan.

Similarly, others have suggested that since we pasken (ח"מ ר"ט:ד) that you can piggyback the kinyan- that if one sells a דבר שלא בא לעולם together with something that exists and belongs to the seller right now, both kinyanim are good, here we can say that Eisav sold his current Bechor status regarding Avodah, as the Ohr Hachaim says.  Since that currently exists, the דבר שלא בא לעולם part can go along with the דבר שבעולם part.

The Ketzos (278:13), where he brings the Rivash, goes like this:

ולפ"ז אפשר לומר בענין יעקב שקנה הבכורה מעשו [והקשו] דהוא דבר שלא בא לעולם. ובריב"ש סי' שכ"ח כתב דקודם מתן תורה דבר שלא בא לעולם נמי קונה. ולפי מ"ש אפשר דאבד עשו הבכורה במה שאמר למה זה לי בכורה דהוא מדין סילוק 

The Ketzos in that Siman focuses on the result of a Bechor, or any yoresh, waiving his inheritance rights.  He says that a Bechor certainly has at all times the ability to make a binding and irreversible statement of waiver, that he declines and abandons his rights to his Bechor privilege.   He says there is no need for the Rivash's answer, because there was no kinyan per se here, there was Siluk, withdrawal.  We don't need to look for a way to validate the Kinyan here.  All that was needed was for Eisav to waive his rights, to do Siluk.  Siluk always works.

The problem with this Ketzos is that even if Siluk works, that just makes the Bechor like any other heir.  Siluk does not mean that the right is transferable!  Eisav giving up his rights does not make Yakov the Bechor.  So what good is the the Ketzos' teretz of Siluk?

I heard an excellent teretz in the name of Harav Shimon Moshe Diskin, Rosh Yeshiva of Kol Torah.  To explain this puzzling Ketzos, he uses an even more puzzling Gaon, and by putting them together, both become clear.  
Despite my dislike of using Latin when an equivalent phrase is available in Hebrew or English or Yiddish, I have to use this phrase that exists only in Latin: Ignotum per ignotius - offering an explanation that is harder to understand than the thing it is meant to explain- explaining the incomprehensible with the doubly incomprehensible.  He answers the question about selling Bechora using a Gaon that is even harder to understand.

 The Gaon in Ki Seitzei seems to say that Bechora depends on conception.  The Gaon apparently holds that the child that is conceived first is the Bechor, not the child that is born first.  This is contradicted by innumerable Chazals, including a Medrash quoted by Rashi in our parsha (25:26).

  ואחרי כן יצא אחיו: שמעתי מדרש אגדה הדורשו לפי פשוטו, בדין היה אוחז בו לעכבו, יעקב נוצר מטיפה ראשונה ועשו מן השניה, צא ולמד משפופרת שפיה קצרה, תן לה שתי אבנים זו תחת זו, הנכנסת ראשונה תצא אחרונה, והנכנסת אחרונה תצא ראשונה, נמצא עשו הנוצר באחרונה יצא ראשון, ויעקב שנוצר ראשונה יצא אחרון, ויעקב בא לעכבו שיהא ראשון ללידה כראשון ליצירה, ויפטור את רחמה, ויטול את הבכורה מן הדין: 

 that  the generative instrumentality- the טיפה- of Yaakov's conception was set into motion prior to that of Eisav's, (not, as so many people read it, the actual conception) and so he ought to have been the Bechor if not for Eisav coming out first, so the sale was just to give legal standing to what should have been the case anyway.  (Even though the concept is טיפה ראשונה, I am going to use the term conception.)  Evidently, despite Yaakov's precedence in conception, Eisav was the legal Bechor, not like the Gaon.  

A great deal of effort has been put into explaining what the Gaon meant.  Indeed, the Netziv says that anyone that says that the Gaon said this is oiver the issur of Lashon Hara, because he never would have said such a thing.  On the other hand, it has been brought down by reliable sources, including Reb Shlomo Kluger (in CM 278:1) from Reb Chaim Volozhiner.  The Noda BeYehuda in his דורש לציון, Drush 4, also suggests, at one point, the exact same pshat in the pessukim in Ki Seitzei, so shver as it is, if we don't understand it, the problem lies with us.

Harav Diskin says that the Gaon didn't mean that Bechora is determined by the moment of conception.  What he meant is that the moment of conception is a factor in determining the Bechor.  However, the moment of birth is a more powerful determinant, so when there is conflict between the two, birth order is dominant.  Where, however, the first-born waives his claim, the moment-of-conception claim is no longer inhibited by the superior claim of the moment-of-birth, and so it becomes the legal determinant.  This is what the Ketzos means.  Waiver certainly would not be enough if Yaakov was just a regular heir.  But here, Yaakov had a claim, albeit an inferior claim, to the bechora, based on earlier conception.  Once Eisav's claim was waived, Yaakov's hitherto potential status of Bechor was actuated.

Chayei Sara, Breishis 24:67. Lamp, Bread, and Cloud; A Different Perspective on Taharas Hamishpacha

This post is very different than it was as it originally appeared, and it is now, I think, satisfactory.  Thank you, Reb Micha Berger, for your valuable contribution.  Sometimes, you go fishing, you catch something worth saving.

Section I

The Signs of the Mothers of Klal Yisrael

Breishis 24:67:

ויביאה יצחק האהלה שרה אמו ויקח את רבקה ותהי לו לאשה ויאהבה וינחם יצחק אחרי אמו

Yitchak brought (Rivka) to the tent of Sarah, his mother, and she became his wife, and he loved her. And Yitzchak was comforted for [the loss of] his mother.

Rashi:

ויביאה האהלה ונעשית דוגמת שרה אמו, כלומר והרי היא שרה אמו, שכל זמן ששרה קיימת היה נר דלוק מערב שבת לערב שבת, וברכה מצויה בעיסה, וענן קשור על האהל, ומשמתה פסקו, וכשבאת רבקה חזרו

to the tent of Sarah his mother: He brought her to the tent, and behold, she was Sarah his mother; i.e., she became the likeness of Sarah his mother, for as long as Sarah was alive, a candle burned from one Sabbath eve to the next, a blessing was found in the dough, and a cloud was attached to the tent. When she died, these things ceased, and when Rivka arrived, they resumed.

It's interesting to notice that between Sara's departure and Rivka's arrival, there was no ever-burning candle, there was no bracha in the dough, and there was no cloud of the Shechina.  So bishlema the cloud, that might refer to specifically the woman's tent, and if there was nobody home, there was no cloud.  But as far as the light and the dough, there certainly were lamps burning, and there certainly was bread made.  Why didn't the zechus of Avraham and Yitzchak bring bracha to the neiros and the Challah?  Apparently the presence of these Brachos in the Jewish home is associated davka with the Imahos.

Section II

Their Appearance in the Midbar and the Mishkan

Similarly, in the Midbar, there were three great signs of Hashem's love for Klal Yisrael, and those were the Amud HaEish, the Mahn, and the Amud HaAnan.  In the Mishkan, the Ner Maaravi burned miraculously until it was extinguished and re-lit; the Lechem Hapanim remained hot and fresh for a whole week (and see Yoma 39a- נשתלחה ברכה בעומר ובשתי הלחם ובלחם הפנים וכל כהן שמגיעו כזית יש אוכלו ושבע ויש אוכלו ומותיר); and there was a cloud of Hashra'as Hashechina over the Aron Kodesh.  The simanim of  Sarah and Rivka- the Lamp, the Bread, and the Cloud that the Imahos brought to the tents of the Avos- correspond to the Eish/Menora, the Mahn/Lechem, and the Anan in the Midbar and the Mishkan.  

Section III

The Same Markers Expressed as Mitzvos

Mishna Shabbos 2:6:

על שלש עבירות נשים מיתות בשעת לידתן עד שאינן זהירות בנדה בחלה ובהדלקת הנר

Three transgressions can be fatal for women: of Niddah, of Challah, and of Candle Lighting.

The three vital mitzvos of women, as the Mishna in Shabbos teaches, are Nidda, Challah, and lighting the Shabbos candles.  Rashi's Medrash that enumerates the elements of Kedusha that were manifest in the tents of the Imahos echoes the Mishna in Shabbos. 

(The Gemara, the Yerushalmi, and the Tanchuma related to this can be found at the end of the post.)

Section IV

What Does Niddah Have To Do With the Anan?

There is no need to explain the correspondence of the Amud Ha'Eish to the Neir, or of the Mahn to Lechem.  What is the connection of the Anan to the laws of Niddah?

The Gemara in Shabbos (31b) says כדדרש ההוא גלילאה עליה דרב חסדא אמר הקב"ה רביעית דם נתתי בכם על עסקי דם הזהרתי אתכם.  But the Abudraham (Friday Night), quoting the Gemara, adds a little kneitch.

דרש ההיא גלילאה עליה דרב חסדא אמר הקב"ה רביעית דם נתתי בכם פירוש הוא הדם הצלול שבלב שממנו משתית הלב וחיי האדם תלויין בו על עסקי הדם הזהרתי אתכם שלא תשמשו עד שתטהרו במעין ובור מקוה מים .

The Abudraham shows us that the focus here is not on the issurim and tumah of Niddah.  The focus is on the woman's responsibility to ensure that Tashmish Hamittah, both the emotional bonding and the procreative process, take place under conditions of pristine Taharah.  This Tahara is not only the absence of Tumah.  This is a creation of Kedusha through the vigilant and scrupulous elimination of Tumah.  (Compare to the philosophy of the פרושים וחברים who were makpid on אכילת חולין על טהרת הקודש)   Just as avoiding Lashon Hara is called a "Sahm Hachaim/elixir of life," not merely "an avoidance of poison," so too creating a state of absolute purity can bring about a positive kedusha.  This positive state of Taharas Hamishpacha is engendered by the woman.

The Anan of the Mibdar comprised seven clouds  (הולך לפנהם יומם. את  מוצא שבעה ענני כבוד היו - אלו הן.  וה׳ הולך לפניהם יומם בעמוד ענן הרי אחד.  ועננך עובר עליהם הרי שתים . ובעמוד ענן הרי שלשה  ובהאריך הענן  ארבע.  ובהעלות הענן חםשה. ואם לא יעלה הענן ששה . כי ענן ה׳ על המשכן שבעה. ארבע מארבע רוחות. ואחד מלמטה. ואחד מלמעלה. ואחד מהלך לפניהם. כל הנמוך מגביהו וכל הנבוה מנמיכו ושורף נחשים ועקרבים מכבד ומרבץ את הדרך לפניהם:  Tanchuma Beshalach 13:3).   One was the Amud that covered all the encampment, and another was the Anan that covered the Ohel Mo'ed.  Chazal tell us that the Hashra'as Hashechina in the Ohel Mo'ed was primarily above the Aron Hakodesh, and specifically between the Kruvim.  We know that the Kruvim represent the Ribono shel Olam and Klal Yisrael, and when the Hashra'as Hashechina was strong and loving, the Kruvim hugged each other (Yoma 54a-  אמר רב קטינא בשעה שהיו ישראל עולין לרגל מגללין להם את הפרוכת ומראין להם את הכרובים שהיו מעורים זה בזה ואומרים להן ראו חבתכם לפני המקום כחבת זכר ונקבה. ) It was this manifestation of Hashra'as Hashechina through the Anan that appeared over the tent of Sarah, and of Rivka, and over the home of every family that carries their spiritual heritage.  (see Sotah 17a, דריש ר"ע איש ואשה זכו שכינה ביניהן , and Rashi there, שכינה ביניהם. שהרי חלק את שמו ושיכנו ביניהן יו"ד באיש וה"י באשה. )

Section V

A Different Perspective On Hilchos Nidda

We tend to view the laws of Nidda as avoiding a negative.  Certainly this is true, to the extent that Nidda is an extremely serious issur, and the punishment for transgressing the issur of Nidda is Kareis, both for the man and for the woman.  

But I think this is a partial truth, and short-sighted.  Nobody would say that the primary focus of Shabbos is avoiding transgressing Hilchos Shabbos.  Obviously, the severity of the issur is a means of ensuring and guarding the kedusha of Mei'ein Olam Haba.  The same is true of Hilchos Niddah.

When a woman properly makes her hefsek tahara, and counts the seven days, and goes to the Mikva, the tevilla is like the tevilla of Geirus, in the sense that it does two entirely separate things.  It ends the previous state, and it creates a new state.  The Tevilla of Teshuva, too, is not just a matter of washing away the past, it is a means of creating a new future, a future imbued with Tahara and Kedusha.  The Tevillos of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur were not a means of removing Tumah, they were a part of the Avodas Hayom and created a necessary state of Kedusha.  

Taharas Niddah is a process of purification; but the purification is not merely purgative; it is not merely restorative;  it is transformative.  

Section VI

The Mussar Haskeil.

It seems that when we face the outside world, in the confrontational aspect of our lives, men are the teachers of Torah, the breadwinners, and the protectors.  Within the household, where the challenge is not so much a matter of confrontation and conflict, but instead one of creating a harmonious gestalt, women are given the stewardship of and responsibility for the spiritual aspects of light, sustenance, and purity.

But the more important lesson is that Zehirus in Hilchos Nidda should not be viewed as an unpleasant necessity.  The main concept of Hilchos Nidda is the opportunity to create a Matzav of Kedusha.

Meticulous care in upholding the laws of Niddah is not just a matter of returning to a baseline of non-tumah.  It brings about a heightened kedusha that elevates the entire household and everyone in it.  Zehirus in Hilchos Nidda is the equivalent of the Anan of Hashra'as Hashechina.

Section VII

Don't Use This for a Sheva Brachos.

Please do not use this for a Sheva Brachos, unless you have no seichel.  If you have no seichel, you could talk about niddah at a Sheva Brachos.  If you do have seichel, and you have to speak at a SB this week, you could say what Rav Yosef Ber said; that when Avraham said to Eliezer to find a shidduch, he said  וְלָקַחְתָּ אִשָּׁה לִבְנִי לְיִצְחָק.  But when Eliezer said this over to Rivka's family, he just said וְלָקַחְתָּ אִשָּׁה לִבְנִי:  Why didn't he finish the sentence verbatim with Yitzchak's name?  The answer is that everyone wants a meyuchas.  Everyone wants the son or the grandson of a Gadol or a Rosh Yeshiva.  But they get nervous when they hear that the boy himself is a talmid chacham that has the potential to become a kli kodesh and real Adam Gadol batorah himself.  Because, after all, they want their daughters to have a "normal life."  So he didn't say Yitzchak's name, because any inquiry about Yitzchak would reveal that he was an olah temimah, not a big chevramahn.  He just said that the boy is the son of Avraham. 

Section VIII

A Remark I Saw Elsewhere from great Unknown

Three aspects of an Adam [as in atem kru'im Adam]: kedusha, tahara, and hakaras hatov. All three were nifgam by the original chait, and the Isha is osekes in the tikun of all three ad hayom. These tikkunim reopen the tzinoros hashefa that are, since the chait, in a default state of sasum.

Sources and Notes

Gemara there, 31b-32a:

נדה מ"ט א"ר יצחק היא קלקלה בחדרי בטנה לפיכך תלקה בחדרי בטנה תינח נדה חלה והדלקת הנר מאי איכא למימר כדדרש ההוא גלילאה עליה דרב חסדא אמר הקב"ה רביעית דם נתתי בכם על עסקי דם הזהרתי אתכם ראשיתקראתי אתכם על עסקי ראשית הזהרתי אתכם נשמה שנתתי בכם קרויה נר על עסקי נר הזהרתי אתכם אם אתם מקיימים אותם מוטב ואם לאו הריני נוטל נשמתכם

Yerushalmi there:

על שאינן זהירות בנדה ובחלה ובהדלקת הנר  
  דם הראשון דמו של עולם.  דכתיב (בראשית ב) ואד יעלה מן הארץ וגרמה לו חוה מיתה לפיכך מסרו מצות נדה לאשה.  
ובחלה אדם הראשון חלה טהורה לעולם היה.  דכתיב (שם) וייצר ה' אלהים את האדם עפר מן האדמה.  ותייא כיי דמר רבי יוסי בר קצרתה כיון שהאשה מקשקשת עיסתה במים היא מגבהת חלתה.  וגרמה לו חוה מיתה.  לפיכך מסרו מצות חלה לאשה
ובהדלקת הנר.  אדם הראשון נרו של עולם היה שנאמר (משלי כ) נר אלהים נשמת אדם.  וגרמה לו חוה מיתה.  לפיכך מסרו מצות הנר לאשה  
תני רבי יוסי אומר ג' דיבקי מיתה הן ושלשתן נמסרו לאשה ואלו הן מצות נדה.  ומצות חלה.  ומצות הדלקה

Tanchuma Noach 1:

ילמדנו רבינו על כמה עבירות נשים מתות בשעת לדתן, כך שנו רבותינו על שלשה וכו' ושלשתן מן התורה, נדה דכתיב (ויקרא, טו ): "ואשה כי יזוב", חלה (במדבר, טו ): "ראשית עריסותיכם", הדלקת הנר דכתיב (ישעיה, נח ): "וקראת לשבת עונג" זו הדלקת הנר בשבת, וא"ת לישב בחשך אין זה עונג שאין יורדי גיהנם נדונין אלא בחשך שנאמר (איוב י, כב ): "אֶרֶץ עֵיפָתָה כְּמוֹ אֹפֶל" 

ומה ראו נשים להצטוות על שלש מצות האלו 
אמר הקב"ה אדה"ר תחלת בריותי היה ונצטווה על עץ הדעת וכתיב בחוה (בראשית, ג ): "ותרא האשה וגו' ותתן גם לאישה עמה ויאכל" וגרמה לו מיתה ושפכה את דמו, וכתיב בתורה (שם ט,) "שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך" תשפוך דמה ותשמור נדתה כדי שיתכפר לה על דם האדם ששפכה 
מצות 
חלה מנין היא טמאה חלתו של עולם דא"ר יוסי בן דוסמקא (נ"א קצרתא) כשם שהאשה מקשקשת עיסתה במים ואח"כ היא מגבהת חלתה כך עשה הקדוש ברוך הוא לאדם הראשון דכתיב (שם ג,) "ואד יעלה מן הארץ והשקה" ואחר כך "וייצר ה' אלהים את האדם עפר וגו'" 
הדלקת הנר מנין היא כבתה נרו של אדם דכתיב (משלי, ה ): "נר אלהים נשמת אדם" לפיכך תשמור הדלקת הר

In the Tanchuma and the Yerushalmi the focus of Tahara is on the Mahn.  But in our Medrash of Sara and Rivka, this extends to Dinei Niddah as well.

Vayeira, Bereishis 18:13. Shalom Bayis and Folding the Tallis

Section I

Shalom Bayis is a Good Thing

Sarah laughed when she heard the guest predict that she would have a son.  Hashem rebuked Avraham for Sarah's scoffing, perhaps because Avraham should have inculcated a greater awareness of the possibility of miracles in the members of his household.   Sarah laughed "Could this desiccated body bear a child?  Could my ancient husband possibly father a child?"  According to other medrashim, Sarah actually had miraculously become youthful again on that morning, and this is what she meant- although I have become young again in my old age, my husband is still an old man who cannot father a child.  According to either pshat, when Hashem quoted her as if she had only said "Could my old body bear a child," this was not quite what she had said, and there was some degree of omission or misdirection.

Rashi 18:13 explains that this was intended to preserve the Shalom Bayis, domestic harmony.  Avraham didn't need to hear that Sarah considered him to be an old man who was incapable of fathering a child.

In 18:9, we are told that the Malachim asked Avraham where his wife was, an odd question in that cloistered society. ויאמרו אליו איה שרה אשתך ויאמר הנה באהל.  Rashi says, הנה באהל: צנועה היא.  Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz explains that their reason for asking was because they wanted to reinforce Avraham Avinu's awareness of Sarah's refinement and modesty.  They were the greatest tzadikim in history, he knew her- his niece- from the day she was born, and they had long since passed their golden anniversary, and אעפ"כ the Ribono shel Olam knew it was important that Avraham Avinu be reminded of what a treasure he had.  No matter what stage the relationship is in, Shalom Bayis needs to be nurtured and reinforced.

Similarly, the Radak in 21:11 says

 כי אף על פי שהיה בן האמה, בנו היה, והיה אוהב אותו, כי היה בכורו והיה מרחם עליו כְּרַחֵם אָב עַל-בָּנִים (תהלים ק"ג יג), ובדרך טובה היה הולך כי הוא גדל עמו ולמדהו דרך ה', כי אפילו לאחרים היה מלמד ומדריך בדרך טובה כל שכן לבנו, והיה רע בעיניו לגרשו מביתו, ולא גער באשתו מפני שלום בית כמו שכתבנו בדבר הגר והיה מצטער על הדבר והיה סובל מריבת 

אשתו עד שבא אליו הדבור".

the point being that when Sarah angrily told Avraham to expel Hagar and Yishmael, Avraham was terribly aggrieved, because he loved Yishmael.  Despite his unhappiness at Sarah's harsh behavior, he did not chastise her, but instead tolerated her behavior silently, so as to preserve the peace in the home.

So we can agree that Shalom Bayis is a good thing.  I am pleased that it makes an appearance in this week's parsha, because it allows me to talk about the minhag of folding the Tallis right after Shabbos.

Section II

Some Men Do Not Fold Their Talleisim on Shabbos

Many men do not fold their Tallis on Shabbos, or if they do, they don't fold it on the lines it is properly folded on.  This is based on the Mishna in Shabbos 113a, as brought in OC 302:3.  Even though most poskim don't consider it Tikun Kli any more (KolBo), many are still machmir either because it is hachanah, preparing for something that won't occur until after Shabbos, or melaben, that you might see a spot and rub it off.  (For a strongly expressed opinion that we must be machmir,here and here are Harav Greenblatt's teshuvos.)  The Mishna Berura (302:19) says that although one may fold a Tallis not on its original creases, (and by the way, this is not specific to Talleisim; if you're machmir by your tallis, you shouldn't fold your pants at night either.  In fact many aren't machmir at all and do fold their talleisim and their pants at night in the normal manner.) it is praiseworthy to not fold it at all until Shabbos is over.

If you are not folding it on its regular creases, it stands to reason that you will have to refold it later on the original creases, or the new way of folding will become the real creases.  So the Maharsham (Daas Torah 302:3) says that he should re-fold it correctly after Shabbos.  Others say that is not necessary, because you can switch from one fold each week, or just not fold it on the original creases.  In any case, many of us wait until after Shabbos to fold our Talleisim.  

Section III

There is a Well Known Segula For Shalom Bayis to Fold the Tallis Right After Shabbos.

I think that it is almost universally known that a man should fold his tallis right away after Shabbos because it is a Segula for שלום בית.  I have been told that some women make it absolutely clear to their husbands that they better not do a thing until they have folded their Talleisim.  Because it is a segula for Shalom Bayis.

Where does this come from?  It is so well known and observed, it must be a Medrash somewhere, or a Zohar, or from the Ari Za'l, right?

Section IV  

The Reason for This Minhag is Not the Reason Everyone Thinks It Is.

Nope.  It's in the Taamei Haminhagim, and nowhere else.  It just had a mazal of becoming popular.  But that does not mean that the minhag only comes from there.  It is only the explanation of the minhag that comes from there.  The minhag itself does have a serious provenance and is brought by the poskim, but based on a totally different reason.  It's like Gresham's law applied to the reasons for minhagim.

The Magen Avraham (OC 300) says the following:
   מהרי"ל היה לו טלית של שבת והיה קופלו בכל מוצאי שבת כדי להתעסק במצוה מיד עכ"ל וכן היו עושין אנשי ציפורי
The Maharil had a Tallis for Shabbos and he folded it every Motzei Shabbos in order to immediately be involved in a Mitzva.  So, too, says the Magen Avraham, the men of Tzipori did.

I found three points of interest here.
1.  That the Maharil had a special Tallis for Shabbos.
2.  That he folded it immediately after Shabbos because he wanted to do a Mitzva right away.
3.  That this is how the Magen Avraham learned pshat in the minhag of the people of Tzipori as brought in Brachos 53.

Point 1 is a general mussar haskeil, that it is meritorious to have a special garment that you wear only on Shabbos.  I guess it's based on Shabbos 113 וכבדתו", שלא יהא מלבושך של שבת כמלבושך של חול".

Section V

In Fact, Several Commentators Have Been Less Than Complimentary Regarding the Alleged Reason

Point 2 shows us the true source of the minhag- like our minhag to fix something in the Sukkah right after Yom Kippur.  How Shalom Bayis got involved is anyone's guess, but that reason has no makor other than the Taamei Haminhagim.  I particularly liked this reaction to that explanation- והבל יפצה פיהם, which is a way of saying that he respectfully disagrees with the reason proposed by the the Taamei Haminhagim.  The one he is quoting as objurgating the T'H is here.  So it turns out that the minhag actually has nothing to do with Shalom Bayis, and therefore has nothing to do with the parsha, but I had to put this somewhere.  Also, I like the Otzar's choice of words.  Maybe he was being complimentary when he called it Havolim.
This also illustrates the danger of berating something that sounds foolish, because you never know what can turn up in a dark corner that might make you regret saying it, such as this, which places the minhag in a whole different schema.
Also, please realize that the person who used that expression is someone I know nothing about: only that he was born in Kovneh, ended up in Pittsburgh, and printed his sefer in 1918.  And here's his picture.  You'll have to scroll up a little to see it.  He does, however, have a haskama from Reb Yitzchok Elchonon, and a more hearty haskama from Reb Leibele Chosid of Kelm, רב לייבעלע חסיד, who was close to my mother's mother's family and used to eat the cheese made at my mother's mother's family's house, but had nothing to do with the Kelmer Talmud Torah, but I know nothing more about him..  So while I'm sure he was a nice man, this Rabbi Hirschowitz Ish Kovneh of Pittsburgh 1918, he's not necessarily ואליו תשמעון.

Point 3 is particularly interesting.  I heard that Rav Eliashiv, in the new sefer on Brachos, says an excellent pshat based on this Magen Avraham.  The Gemara in Brachos 53a says 

אמר רבי יוחנן המהלך בערבי שבתות בטבריא ובמוצאי שבתות בצפורי והריח ריח אינו מברך מפני שחזקתו אינו עשוי אלא לגמר בו את הכלים

and Rashi explains that 

בטבריא. היו רגילים לגמר ערבי שבתות ובצפורי במו"ש

that in Tveria they used to perfume their clothes before Shabbos began, and in Tzipori, after Shabbos.  One would assume that the minhag of Tveria is kavod Shabbos, and the minhag of Tzipori is like what we do with Besamim by Havdala, and indeed this is how Rabbeinu Yona learned the Gemara there (in the pages of the Rif 39b).  But Rav Eliashiv explains that we see that the Magen Avraham understood the minhag of Tzipori as being a way of being mechabeid Shabbos- not like the mitzva of besamim by havdala, which is for the neshama yeseira, but rather because you're putting away your Shabbos Tallis, and you want to ensure that next week when you wear it for Shabbos, it will be fragrant.  So they had the minhag to prepare the clothing immediately after Shabbos ended- precisely the idea of the Maharil.  The difference between the Anshei Tveria and the Anshei Tzippori is whether it is more Kavod Shabbos to do it right before Shabbos begins, or as soon as the previous Shabbos ended.
The Yaavetz in his Siddur in the Seder Motz'Sh 11 also says like the Magen Avraham, that it was preparation/kavod for the coming Shabbos.

Section VI

Something That Works Better Than a Segula

Eli sent me a link to the introduction of a sefer called טיב החסד (published two years ago by R' Gamliel Rabinowitz/Rappaport, associated with ישיבת שער השמים),  in which he tells us a story about the Satmerer Rov's reaction to the Shalom Bayis explanation of the minhag:

הרה"ק מסאטמר זצוק"ל שמע פעם מאחד הרבנים שמדקדק לקפל הטלית מיד במוצאי שבת קודש, שמקובל לסגולה לשלום בית. ענה לו רבי יואלש בחן פקחותו, כמה שהסגולה עוזרת איני יודע. אבל אם מיד במוצאי שבת תקפל גם השרוולים ותיגש לעזור בעבודת הבית זה בוודאי יעזור

that he's not sure how much the segula (of folding the tallis right after Shabbos is to bring Shalom Bayis) helps.  But if right after Shabbos someone would fold up his sleeves and get to work helping to put the house in order, that for sure would help.

Section VII

The Big Mussar Haskeil

Minhagei Yisrael are Kodesh Kodoshim.  The Reasons Advanced for Some Minhagim, not so much.  but I liked this anonymous comment:

November 2, 2012 at 3:30 PMYou made it clear that the origin for folding one's tallis Motzei Shabbos is not connected to a segula for Shalom Bayis. That does not mean it is not connected now. A man with a wife who believes that folding the tallis is a segulah for Shalom Bayis better fold his tallis or there won't be Shalom Bayis. You wrote not that long ago, there is no reason why the Shabbos Licht must be lit before the husband comes back from Shul Friday evening (related to davening at plag) but that your own Eishes Chayil insists on it. What's the advantage in arguing?

Section VIII

Post Script

I mentioned R' Leib Chosid above, and said I didn't know much about him, other than my mother's mother's family being close with him.  I did a search and found this article:

A very rare and original Kelme type was Rebbe Leib Tsigler, famous as “Rebbe Leib Hasid.” He was in fact only a small, slim little Jew, but he possessed a very great mind with a very warm Jewish heart. His spiritual, illuminated face always had a smile. And his good eyes looked with love on everyone. Together with his extraordinary goodness, his boundless piousness was literally limitless. He spent entire days and nights in Torah and worship.
His father was a simple Jew, who had a mill in Virpyan [Verpena], a village near Kelme, and Rebbe Leib, in his early youth, had to bear the yoke of earning money and helping his father in his difficult work. Understand that under such circumstances, the child Leib did not have the opportunity to devote himself to Torah study. Once married, however, he gave up his work in the mill and began to study Torah and ethics with great diligence and in a very short time he reached a high level of learning. He studied Torah for the love of it. Even then, when he was already famous as a great scholar and well-versed in the Talmud and post-Talmudic commentaries, he remained a simple Kelmer resident.
He was a rare modest person. When someone called him “rebbe,” he protested and thoughtfully said: “My name is Leib Tsigler and I am not a rabbi.” When Kelme Jews actually did call him “rebbe” and honored him in shul with tributes appropriate to a rabbi, he completely stopped going to shul, with the exceptions of rosh hashanah and yom kippur, public reading of the Torah, yizkor [prayers for the dead] and Purim.
As already said, he was a great scholar, but much greater than his erudition was his goodness, his reverence to God, ethics and habits. Non-Jews literally idolized him and blessed him, and during his lifetime he became a legendary figure in the entire area. Even the great men of the generation of that time recognized him as a just and perfect man.
Even the maskilim had great respect for him. In the obituaries in talpiot in 1895 and in luah ahi'asaf in 1896, he is described as a symbol of truth and goodness, piety and wisdom. He died at the age of seventy on the 21^st of tammuz 5654 [25^th of July 1894] in a dacha [country house] in the shtetl Tzitavian [Tytuvenai]. Four thousand people, among them twelve rabbis, from all of the surrounding cities andshtetlekh, accompanied him to his eternal rest.
Among the thousands of mourners could be seen his regular doctor, a Christian. After all the eulogies by the rabbis, the Christian doctor went over to the grave and made a vow that in memory of the Hasid's soul he would heal all the poor sick Jews and non-Jews without cost for an entire year.

And I found this:

Tsitevyan Jews were proud of the Gaon and Tsadik rabbi Leib Tsigler (Leib Hosid) from Vertyan who lived in their town.... 

Lech Lecha, Bereishis 16:5, Vayeira 18:12. Praying for Miracles

The Gemara in Brachos (60a) says that praying for a miracle is called Tefillas Shav.  Shav, literally, means worthless.  When the word Shav appears in the Aseres HaDibros, it means taking Hashem's name in vain- i.e., for nothing, and is a prohibition.

As to whether "Shav" in the context of prayer means "worthless" or "prohibited," see Taanis 24a, on the basis of which Reb Akiva Eiger (OC 230) says that it is prohibited.  I have seen the Gaon quoted as saying Shav only means a waste of time, but I have not seen any reliable evidence that he said that. that it is a waste of time to pray that a miracle happen; it is a Tefillas Shav.  

Based on the Gemara in Brachos, the Steipler is quoted as having said that once doctors have determined that by the laws of nature, בדרך הטבע, the patient cannot live, then it is wrong- assur- to daven that he recover.

בספר 'ארחות רבינו' (ח"א ע' של"ה) שהסטייפלר זצ"ל הורה על חולה שאין תרופה למחלתו על פי דרך הטבע, שאסור להתפלל על נס, שהוא כמי שמתפלל על תחית המתים, או כמי שמתפלל על קטוע אבר שיצמח לו אבר אחר

I also saw an article quoting a highly regarded Rosh Yeshiva in Otniel to the same effect- considering the similarity in expression, I assume he was thinking of what the Steipler said:

רב היישוב עתניאל, הרב רא"ם הכהן, פסק כי אסור להתפלל לרפואת חולה שנמצא במצב של מוות מוחי. הרב, שנחשב לבעל השפעה בציבור הדתי, נימק את הפסיקה בכך שמדובר ב"תפילת שווא" - כלומר כזו שאינה יכולה להתקיים בדרך הטבע.

בתשובה שפרסם בעלון "שבת בשבתו", המופץ בבתי הכנסת, הסביר: "האפשרות שהמוח ישוב לתפקד אינה קיימת,

ממש כשם שאיבר חדש לא יכול לצמוח".

There is a great deal to say about this.  Besides the body of one hundred twenty one comments on the ynet site, which comprises an extraordinary compendium of ignoramuses, psychotics, mechutzafim, the willfully blind, and a few reasonably well-informed readers, I had been planning to discuss this issue- whether one may daven for the miraculous recovery of a person that בדרך הטבע is sure to die.  For example, there is the Sforno in this week's parsha (18:12) that says 

ותצחק שרה שחשבה שהיה דבר המלאך ברכת נביא בלבד כענין אלישע לא נבואה ושליחות האל ית'. וחשבה שלא יושג זה בזקנים בברכת שום נביא כי אמנם להשיב הבחרו' אחר הזקנה הרי הוא כתחיית המתים שלא תהיה זולתי במצות האל פרטית או בתפלה משגת חן מאתו:

Note that the Sforno is saying that while it would be a joke to think that a bracha can change the teva, tefilla does have that power.

Other mekoros that I'll discuss if I have a chance:   רמ"א , בכור שור, ישועות יעקב, נפש חיה in OC 187:4 and 682:4 from the Kolbo, Mahrsh"a in Kiddushin 29b, נפש החיים ג' י"ב, רוח חיים ב' ד, רבנו בחיי, and others, all of whom say things that are worth hearing.

But several articles that I recently read motivated me to post this before I was ready to discuss the mekoros in the Gemara, Rishonim, and Achronim.  

First, there was an article that wrote that despite diagnoses of brain death, certain new tests can reveal unexpected brain activity.

But I assumed that the use of the term brain death was just sloppy reporting, because when brain death is diagnosed, there is nothing left- no hope, no improvement, no life, only inexorable and ghastly deterioration.

But then I saw this, where on a nationally televised reality show in Denmark, (!) parents of a brain dead woman were encouraged to turn off the respirator so that the doctors could harvest the vital organs and give them to patients that had a chance to live.  And when the respirator was turned off, sholom aleichem, the patient not only didn't stop breathing and die, but she slowly improved to the point that there is a real possibility of a full recovery. Another link to the story, with photos- here.

Later, this one joined the ranks.

So I don't know whether one should be mispallel for a person that cannot live על פי דרך הטבע.  There most certainly are cases where it is absolutely clear that the patient is not decaying only because of extreme intervention, and we'll bli neder discuss the issues about davening for a miracle.  But I do know that in other cases where a diagnosis of brain death has been made, tefilla might still be appropriate according to everyone, because one of the following three possibilities might pertain:

Possibility One:   Misdiagnosis due to human error.  This is not necessarily indicative of murderous indifference.  Remember this?  That's why in the beginning of Bava Kamma, Adam is called Mav'eh, and why a mumcheh l'beis din is pattur.  Even the greatest of us needs to be mispallel that we don't err.

Possibility Two:   Misdiagnosis due to incompetence or negligence.

Possibility Three: Intentional misstatement of fact because someone decided that the patient, even if he survived, would not have much quality of life, and the people who need the transplant would live and flourish, so in the balance, it's worth taking harvesting the organs even if it is a little premature.

Here is another brief discussion.  The issue is that in Brachos 60, gender of fetus is tefillas shov.  Bava Matzia 42a, until you measure the grain, you can daven for a larger volume.

שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות ברכת הפירות סימן רל

סעיף א

המתפלל על מה שעבר, כגון שנכנס לעיר ושמע קול צוחה בעיר, ואמר: יה"ר שלא יהא קול זה בתוך ביתי; או שהיתה אשתו מעוברת אחר מ' יום לעיבורה, ואמר: יה"ר שתלד אשתי זכר, ה"ז תפלת שוא, אלא יתפלל אדם על העתיד לבא, ויתן הודאה על שעבר, כגון הנכנס לכרך, אומר: יר"מ ה' אלהינו שתכניסני לכרך הזה לשלום; נכנס בשלום, אומר: מודה אני לפניך ה' אלהינו שהכנסתני לכרך הזה לשלום;...

סעיף ב

הנכנס למוד את גרנו, אומר: יהי רצון מלפניך ה' אלהי שתשלח ברכה בכרי הזה; התחיל למוד, אומר: ברוך השולח ברכה בכרי הזה; מדד ואח"כ בירך הרי זה תפלת שוא, שאין הברכה מצויה אלא בדבר הסמוי (פי' דנעלם ואינו נראה) מן העין. 

משנה ברורה על שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות ברכת הפירות סימן רל סעיף א

אחר מ"ם יום לעיבורה - שכבר נצטייר צורת הולד אבל תוך מ"ם יום מועיל תפלה. ואפילו אחר מ"ם יום יוכל להתפלל שיהיה הולד זרע קיימא ויהיה עוסק במצות ומע"ט:

ערוך השולחן אורח חיים הלכות ברכת הפירות סימן רל

סעיף א

דבר מובן בשכל שעניין התפלה הוא רק על העתיד ולא על העבר דמה יועיל על העבר ועל העבר לא שייך רק לשון הודאה לתת תודה לו יתברך על הטוב שעשה לו ועל העתיד הוי להיפך דהודאה לא שייך רק על מה שהיה ותפלה שייך על העתיד שמבקש מהשי"ת שיעשה לו כך וכך:

סעיף ב

ולכן הנכנס לעיר ושמע קול צווחה בעיר מאיזה צרה שנתהוה בה ואומר יהי רצון שלא תהיה זה בתוך ביתי הרי זו תפלת שוא דזהו תפלה על העבר ומאי דהוה הוה אבל יכול לומר מובטחני שאין זה בתוך ביתי אם הוא צדיק גמור כמעשה דהלל הזקן שאמר כן ועליו נאמר משמועה רעה לא יירא נכון לבו בטוח בד' [ברכות ס'.] והעניין מתפרש בשני פנים אחד כפשוטו שהוא בטוח שאין זה בביתו והשנית מפני שהרגיל את בני ביתו שיקבלו הכל בשמחה הן הטוב הן ההיפך וא"כ ממילא אפילו אם ח"ו קרם איזה צרה לא יצעקו בקולות אלא יקבלו באהבה ובשתיקה:

סעיף ג

וכן מי שהיתה אשתו מעוברת ורצונו בזכר עד מ' יום יכול להתפלל ולומר יהי רצון שתלד אשתי זכר כי עד מ' יום הוה מיא בעלמא אבל לאחר מ' יום שנתרקם צורת הולד ואם מתפלל אז יהי רצון שתלד אשתי זכר ה"ז תפלת שוא דמה שהיה היה ולא ישתנה עוד ואף שמצינו שדינה נתהפכה מזכר לנקבה זה היה בתוך מ' ואפילו אם שם היה לאחר מ' אין מזכירין מעשה נסים [שם] וענייני אבותינו הקדושים היו כולם בנס:

From Rav Pinchas Zilberstein

הגורן שיתרבה אינו נס גלוי כל כך, כי לפעמים הפירות משמינים, וכדו', כיוצא בזה טי סקס, אינו נס גלוי כל כך, כי הריאות לא יפתחו, והקב"ה עושה שהריאות יתפתחו מאידך, לעשות מנקיבה לזכר, ולשנות את כל הבריה, זה נס גלוי יוצא מדרך הטבע, ועל זה אסור להתפלל כמו כן כאשר חסר לילד גפיים, ולהתפלל שיהיה לו גפיים, זה גם נס יוצא מגדר הרגיל ועל זה אין להתפלל

 חבצלת השורון  Rav Steinman

ובנוגע לעיקר שאלתך הכואב, לכאורה הישוב כך, ברכה היא ענין קיים בהבריאה, הריבוי שיארע מן המיעוט זו לא הנהגה ניסית מוחלטת, ולכן אין זה שייך גם כלפי הדין שאסור ליהנות ממעשה ניסים, הקב"ה אומר שאם יקיימו את המצוות יהיה ברכה בתבואה, עד שכל אחד המודד אומר ברוך השולח ברכה בכרי הזה, דמשמע שכך הוא כמעט טבע משא"כ שינוי אינו ברכה, וכההיא דהיתה אשתו מעוברת, זוהי הנהגה ניסית מוחלטת

In a cab in Israel.....

*



A perfect illustration for the post about the Schenirer/Scherman Effect.

***

Not מינות not פלוס

The local synagogue had a Scholar in Residence program this week.  My wife attended one of the speeches and told me what she heard.  She said it was thoroughly considered and very well organized, and she would love to use the methodology in her literature classes.  She was wondering about the content, though, because it didn't seem to be consistent with the interpretations we are familiar with.

The essence was that it is hard to understand why Kna'an was punished for the sin of his father, Cham.  He was at most a child when Cham sinned.  

So this speaker brought a medrash here (36:4)  בתוך אהלו, אהלה כתיב, בתוך אהלה של אשתו. 
אמר רבי הונא בשם ר' אליעזר בנו של ר' יוסי הגלילי: נח כשיצא מן התיבה הכישו ארי ושברו, ובא לשמש מטתו ונתפזר זרעו ונתבזה.   The passuk refers to what we would assume was Noach's tent in the feminine form.   The Medrash explains that Noach had gone into his wife's tent, and attempted to have marital relations with her, but because of the injury he suffered on the Teiva he was unable to consummate the act naturally, and he was disgraced.

The speaker explained that what Cham did should be understood as an example of the ancient manner of usurping the authority of the old king and asserting one's own authority by sleeping with the old king's wife.  After Noach was shown to be incapable of acting in a masculine fashion, Chom entered, and taking advantage of Noach's inebriation, had relations with Noach's wife, who was, I assume, his mother.

The result of this incestuous act was the impregnation of his mother with Kna'an.  Kna'an was the son of Chom by his mother; Kna'an was a physical manifestation of this horrible sin.

This pshat is excellent and satisfying and clear and not to be found among the various interpretations in Chazal.  This is not a criticism.  This is merely an observation.  After all, the Ibn Ezra more often than not interprets Tanach in his own way, irrespective of what Chazal do or don't say.

However.  I think that the difference between a person that knows kol hatorah kullah and has a clear and thorough understanding of the hashkafa of the Torah, and a person that has a less than perfect understanding, matters in this case. The difference is that when you say a pshat in a passuk in Chumash, it is vital that it impart a lesson that is consistent with the entire Torah and that is true in the deepest sense of the word.  I personally couldn't care less what happened: facts are mute, facts don't speak.  Facts are gathered and interpreted and presented by human beings, and their perspective colors the meaning of the facts.  I want to know what Chazal understood the passuk to mean.

What I'm saying is that this scholarly and creative interpretation is very nice, and I enjoyed hearing it, and its author is a successful and respected marbitz Torah, and is definitely an ehrliche yid.  But this pshat is of no more value to me than a new perspective on Shakespeare.  It elucidates the narrative qua narrative.  It might tell me something about human nature, or about the ancient world, or about the story, but it doesn't really have anything to do with what I call Torah.  There are no hidden depths, there is no global message, there is no key to the thoughts of Chazal- it is Pshat without being Hashkafa.  It is reminiscent of the spirit of Wissenschaft des Judentums.  From my perspective, from the perspective of a "chareidi" indoctrination, this methodology is inapposite.  

The way I put it was that it is certainly not מינות.  But it's not פלוס, either.  (This bon mot will only make sense in הברה אשכנזית.)  

Eli has let us know that this approach is not unprecedented.  It is cited in the Da'as Mikra from יש"ר מגוריציה, Rav Reggio, and is also to be found in the writings of Volf Heidenheim.  In fact, Heidenheim's interpretation is even more dramatic- he says that Cham impregnated his mother on the Teiva, and Noach only realized who was responsible when he saw how Cham behaved when Noach was drunk.  Eli was kind enough to send us a pdf of the Heidenheim peirush, and it is available here.  And if you are so disposed, here are some portraits:
Rav Volf Heidenheim  also, here.
Rav Yitzchak Reggio

By the way, Rav Reggio also authored a defense of shaving on Chol Hamoed.  His father strenuously disagreed with his conclusions and printed a rebuttal.  I found this little vignette here.

In consideration of the fact that I was not personally at the shiur, I am putting a letter I received from a Yeshiva-mahn who was present there, and who does like this approach to learning Tanach.

I was at the lecture/shiur
He mentioned that there are 2 ways to teach chumash 1) to report how chazal 
understood the text 2) to try and approach the text in a manner similar to the 
way chazal did which is to look at the text and try to see whats difficult and 
why and attempt to answer based on the text alone.

His solution to the question still left unanswered why is it that Kannan is 
listed as 4 th among the sons of Cham. Seemingly he should have been the first 
and also why was Cham himself not  the subject of Noach's curse since it was his 
act.  One could argue that just as Noach's sons are not listed in order of birth 
neither were Cham's but it still begs the question of why that particular order.
Regarding your hashkafah critique he did address that by saying the Torah  
relayed this  event to teach  Klall Yisroel who Kanann was and that his 
descendents were thus born into  a family where which was devoid of basic 
morality so that when we enter Eretz yisroel we would understand to keep away 
from those that we couldnt  kill or chase away

....... 

http://www.tanach.org/  uses the literary/pshat approach in elucidating the parshah and I find it refreshing way to look at psukim which makes the parshas a unified whole even when they dont necessarily offer a chidush

I disagree with him: to me, it's like learning the Gemara without the Rishonim.  It's of use only to the extent that when  you see that your pshat is not how the Rishonim learned, you have to figure out why they didn't learn like you.  You can't learn Mishna without Gemara, and you can't learn Gemara without Rishonim, and you certainly cannot learn Tanach without the peirush of Gedolei Torah and Hashkafa.  The Hertz Chumash is not for Bnei Torah.

Josh, in a comment, brought up the issue of the many gedolei Torah that found illumination in the thoughts of philosophers that were not Jewish.  I responded that it is hard to know where Chazal (Medrash Eicha 2:13) drew the line in "מַלְכָּהּ וְשָׂרֶיהָ בַגּוֹיִם אֵין תּוֹרָה" אם יאמר לך אדם יש חכמה בגוים תאמן הדא הוא דכתיב (עובדיה א, ח ): "וְהַאֲבַדְתִּי חֲכָמִים מֵאֱדוֹם וּתְבוּנָה מֵהַר עֵשָׂו" יש תורה בגוים אל תאמן דכתיב "מַלְכָּהּ וְשָׂרֶיהָ בַגּוֹיִם אֵין תּוֹרָה".

I came across a short paragraph from Rav Gifter that touches upon this question, as follows:

ביאר המהר''ל ז''ל בס' ''נצח ישראל'' - שחכמה היא החכמה הטבעית שמגיעה להשגת האדם באמצעות החושים, ותורה היא חכמה הניתנת לאדם ממנו ית' שלא עפ''י הטבע.

וביאור הדברים דבקרא כתוב ה' יתן חכמה מפיו דעת ותבונה - היינו שהחכמה נתנה ממנו בבריאה לצורך האדם בבחינת מתנה הנפרדת מעל הנותן, אבל ישנה מדרגה שניה בחכמה העליונה והיא נקראת דעת ותבונה שלא הורידה ה' בבריאה התחתונה והיא קשורה בו ית' והאדם משיגה ע''י שהקב''ה, כביכול, מנשב חכמה זו באדם, עיין ''דרך עץ חיים'' לרמח''ל ז''ל, וזו היא ''תורה''. אל לנו הטעות שאומות העולם משוללים לגמרי מכל השגה שלמעלה מהחושים, לא כן הדבר. גם אצלם ישנה השגה שמגיעים אליה בלי השלטת החושים, וזו ההשגה נקראת ''אינטואיציה'' - אלא שהחילוק בין זה לתורה הוא שבאים לזה דרך החושים שע''י ההשגה שקבלו באמצעות החושים ניתן להם הכח לעלות מעל ההשגה המצומצמת ולראותה ביתר היקף ורוחב. ומתוך השגה זו הרי ידוע לנו שנולדו כמה דברים בעולם המחשבה והמדע האנושי, משא''כ בתורה שמגיעים לידי ההשגה מתחלה שלא ע''י החושים, והיא באה מלמעלה למטה ע''י שהקב''ה מנשב באדם.

Eli sent a link to something attributed to Rav Hai Gaon, here.    The gist of the story is that a Rav Hai Gaon wanted a  Rav Matzliach to inquire with a Catholic priest who was a scholar as to the meaning of a word in Tehillim.  Rav Hai saw that this Rav Matzliach was not happy about going to the priest, and he chastised him loudly, saying that Chazal often asked non-Jews what a certain word meant.  Rav Matzliach did go, and the priest told him that the word was Assyriac and what its meaning was.   The same sefer brings that the Rambam in 17 Kiddush Hachodesh 24 says that determinations of empirical facts that are demonstrated by clear evidence can be relied on no matter what their source.

 רב מצליח בן אלבצק הדיין בסיציליא בשובו מבגדד שלח לו אגרת בספור חיי רה״ג ומעלותיו החשובות ובתוך שאר הדברים ספר ביום אחד נפל הדבור בבית הישיבה אדות פסוק אחד ורמז רה״ג לרב מצליח שילך אצל קתוליק הנוצרים אדות מה שנמצא אתו בבאור זה הבתיב. וכראות הגאון כי קשה הדבר לרב מצליח התרעם עליו באמרו האבות הצדיקים הקדמונים אשר היו קדושים לא נמנעו מלחקור על באור ? 1לות אצל בעלי אמונות שונות. אז הלך רב מצליח אל הקתוליק ושאל את פיו וקבל ממנו תרגומו כלשון סורית.

The Rambam is really not relevant, but here it is anyway:

. ומאחר שכל אלו הדברים בראיות ברורות הם שאין בהם דופי ואי אפשר לאדם להרהר אחריהם, אין חוששין למחבר בין שחברו אותם נביאים בין שחברו אותם האומות. שכל דבר שנתגלה טעמו ונודעה אמיתתו בראיות שאין בהם דופי אנו סומכין על זה האיש שאמרו או שלמדו על הראיה שנתגלתה והטעם שנודע:

Again, I would suggest that even Rav Hai Gaon would not have gone to Father O'Riley, to be  historically accurate, Patriarch Cerularius, to find out the pshat in a story in Chumash, but you'll have to come to your own conclusions.

And finally, Eli directs us to a paper that addresses the issue of studying from scholars whose religious hashkafos are inimical to ours.  It is available here.  I think he talks a little too much about the relatively minor issue of אם דומה רבך למלאך ה' צבאות בקש תורה מפיהו at the expense of deeper ones- such as the להט החרב המתהפכת that defines the dichotomy of תורה and חכמה- but all in all it's a nice article.

Hakafos and Credit

Last night I spoke at a siyum.  L W, הרוצה בעילום שמו, a good friend who has been a member of my shiur for eight years, invited us to a party to express his pleasure and gratitude for having learned with us.  He is a model of hakaras hatov, and he has a natural affinity for limud hatorah.

Some years ago, when we were learning Kiddushin or Gittin, we were a few blatt ahead, and I decided on a program for the talmidim- each one would prepare a piece of achronisheh torah and present it to the shiur.  LW was the first, and, as it turned out, the only one to do it.  We simply didn't have enough time, because I only say shiur six days a week.

His presentation was the Staipler on the Machlokes Rambam and Tur in Shlichus, where the baalim became incompetent after he sent the shliach.  He prepared thoroughly, and did an excellent presentation.  Recently, he was speaking at someone else's house, and there were Kollel yungeleit there, and you could see that their minds were wandering as he spoke, until he mentioned the machlokes Rambam and Tur.  Watching their eyes come into sudden focus and their faces all turn at once was very funny- it was as if a bell had rung and woken them all up at the same time.

In any case, I spoke last night, and I'd like to write the main part of the speech here.  It can come into handy for people that need a speech for similar occasions- a siyum or for Simchas Torah.

The first vort comes from several sources- heard it from attributed to the Ri'm and I saw it from the Lubavitcher Rashab.

Simchas Torah is different than Shavuos.  On Shavuos, we celebrate Mattan Torah, and the Torah includes kiyum hamitzvos, and learning, and middos, the whole package of what having the Torah means to us.  Simchas Torah is a siyum, simple and clear.  We finished reading the Chumash, we begin it again, and we celebrate the idea of limud and chazaras hatorah.  If so, the only people dancing ought to be the people who actually learn.  The many baalei batim who are yotzei the mitzva of talmud torah with Eilu Devarim, Reb Yishmael, and Krias Shma, really don't have much to be celebrating.  So why are they dancing?  It must be that they're dancing on credit.  They are saying that even though they didn't learn all year, next year they'll learn, and they're celebrating the learning they plan to do in the future.  Dance now, learn later.  That's called enjoying the yomtov on credit.  This is why they call them Hakafos- because "hakafa" means "on credit."

Our chasan haneshef did not dance on credit.  His Simchas Torah was honestly earned: he came to the shiur straight from work, not having eaten, and he remembers a great deal more than the maggid shiur does (besides where Rav Kahana slept and Reb Yochanan's bracha at the Shaarei Tevila.)

Another thing I heard on the topic of Hakafos is from the Kloizenberger.  The Kloizenberger said that all mitzvos must be done with joy, with a leiv samei'ach, with simcha and tuv leivav.  The reality is that many mitzvos are done without any thought, and, unfortunately, as if they were an imposition.  For all of those mitzvos- the hanachas tefillin, the tzitzis, the limud hatorah- that we should have done with simcha, we owe a lot of simcha by the end of the year.  So at the Hakafos, we dance and we jump and we sing to make up for all the simcha we owe the Ribono shel Olam.  That's another pshat in Hakafos- we are paying back now for the simcha we owe the Ribono shel Olam from the entire year that passed.

Here, too, this does not apply.  Larry, with his natural affinity for limud hatorah, looks forward to the shiur and thinks about it afterwards.  He learns with pleasure and he expresses his enjoyment and gratitude for it, sometimes to his maggid shiur's embarrassment.  His simcha of Torah is consistent for the whole year, and he doesn't have to dance on Simchas Torah to pay for all the simcha he owes.

So there are two ideas that use the play on words of Hakafa: the first, that many people dance now on credit for the learning they promise to do the next year, and the second, that even the people who did learn should have learned with more simcha, and they have to pay for the simcha they owe.  As it happens, neither applies to our friend.