Yisro, Shemos 18:20. Bikkur Cholim, Visiting the Sick.

והודעת להם את הדרך ילכו בה ואת המעשה אשר יעשון

You shall let them know the path they shall walk upon and the acts they shall do.

Bava Metzia 30b 

תני רב יוסף (שמות יח) והודעת להם זה בית חייהם את הדרך זו גמילות חסדים ילכו זה ביקור חולים בה זו קבורה ואת המעשה זה הדין אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין

Rav Yosef said that the words "they shall walk" refer to the mitzva of Bikkur Cholim, of visiting the sick.

It appears that there is some special connection between Bikkur Cholim and the idea of walking.  In truth, one is rewarded for the effort one makes, the "walking," in pursuit of every mitzva.  But it seems that there is some special connection between this mitzva of Bikkur Cholim, and walking.  Over the last couple of years, the question has come up here several times- why is there a special connection between Bikkur Cholim and Schar Halicha, the special reward for the the act of going to do the mitzvah.  We have discussed it twice in Parshas Bo, in 2008 and 2012, here and here.  

Normally, the question would not be strong, because it's common to find drashos from words that seem to have no discernible connection to the drasha.  What made the question more interesting was the Gaon (Aderes Eliahu Devarim 1:12), who says that the reason the Gemara (Pesachim 30b and Sotah 12) associates Bikkur Cholim with the word ילכו is because the tachlis- the purpose?- of Bikkur Cholim is the הליכה, the walking, the preparation.  The words of the Gaon are

ילכו זה ביקור חולים מפני שבכל המצוות ההליכה אינה תכלית המצוה אבל כאן ההליכה עצמה היא המצוה 

Yeilchu, "they shall walk,"  is Bikkur Cholim, because in all mitzvos the walking is not the purpose of the mitzva, but here, the walking itself is the mitzva.  What can the Gaon possibly mean?

Tal Benschar, Michael, and great unknown commented on this question when we discussed it in the past, and Michael suggested that Schar Halicha is particularly significant when the mitzva involves going before the Shechina (e.g., going to Daven, going to the Beis Hamikdash for the Shalosh Regalim,) and that in Bikkur Cholim, too, the Shechina is present above the bed of the sick person.  Thereupon, great unknown directed us to Rav Schwab in his Ma'ayan Beis HaShoeiva page 188, in Parshas Yisro, and I made a note to myself that when we get there, I would quote Rav Schwab, because he says precisely what the commenters were suggesting, and he says it very nicely.  Thinking about this, I also realized something new about the Gaon's vort.

Rav Schwab brings the Gemara (.נדרים מ) that:

 ואמר רבין אמר רב מנין שהשכינה שרויה למעלה ממטתו של חולה שנאמר יי' יסעדנו על ערש דוי תניא נמי הכי הנכנס לבקר את החולה לא ישב לא על גבי מטה ולא ע"ג ספסל ולא על גבי כסא אלא מתעטף ויושב ע"ג קרקע מפני שהשכינה שרויה למעלה ממטתו של חולה שנאמר יי' יסעדנו

Ravin said in the name of Rav, the Shechina is present above the bed of a sick person.

Then Rav Schwab points out that 

והנה בכל מקום כשהמטרה הוא מקום השראת השכינה, מצינו שעצם ההליכה יש לה חשיבות ושכר לעצמו, וכדלהלן (בראשית רבה פרשה נה, ח) "ויקם וילך אל המקום" (בראשית כא, ג) ניתן לו שכר קימה ושכר הליכה; (אבות פרק ה) ארבע מידות בהולכי לבית המדרש: הולך ואינו עושה שכר הליכה בידו (סוטה כב.) ההיא אלמנה דהואי בי כנישתא בשיבבותה כל יומא הות אתיא ומצלה בי מדרשיה דר' יוחנן אמר לה בתי לא בית הכנסת בשיבבותך אמרה ליה רבי ולא  שכר פסיעות יש לי  (ברכות ו:) אמר רבי חלבו אמר רב הונא היוצא מבית הכנסת אל יפסיע פסיעה גסה אמר אביי לא אמרן אלא למיפק אבל למיעל מצוה למרהט שנא' (הושע ו) ונדעה נרדפה לדעת את ה' ושם א"ר זירא  אגרא דפרקא רהטא 

wherever the mitzva involves presenting one's self in a place where the Shechina manifests itself, we find that the act of walking has a special significance and is rewarded separately from the reward for actually doing the mitzva.

ולפי"ז מובן הטעם שלא פטרו זקן ואינו לפי כבודו, שכלום יש זקן שקנה חכמה שיחשוב ביקור למקום השראת השכינה כלמטה מכבודו  ומה לו אם החולה הוא קטן למטה ממדריגתו מ"מ הקב"ה שרוי למעלה ממטתו

This is why, he explains, that while other acts of solicitude for another person's well being might be limited by the need to maintain a certain degree of public gravitas, so, for example, a king would not have a mitzva of returning a lost pair of galoshes, we find no such exclusion by the mitzva of visiting the sick.  The reason is because this mitzva involves presenting one's self to the Shechina, and the status of the sick person is irrelevant; no matter how highly regarded the visitor is, it is an honor to him to be present.

With this idea from Rav Schwab, we understand the Gaon.  The Gaon said that the reason the Torah hinted to the mitzva of Bikkur Cholim in the words Yeilchu bah, they should walk, is because in Bikkur Cholim, the walking itself is the Mitzva.  What the Gaon means is that because Bikkur Cholim is a way we enter a place where the Shechina manifests itself, walking becomes a separate mitzva- a mitzva additional to and rewarded separately from the mitzva of Bikkur Cholim.  

But the Gaon is telling us even more than that.  Bikkur Cholim is under the rubric of Gemillas Chesed, loving kindness to a fellow Jew.  Every Chesed has two beneficiaries- the recipient and the provider.  The benefit to the recipient is obvious, and the dual benefit to the provider is the mitzva bein adam la'makom and the spiritual betterment that comes of doing kindness to a fellow human being.  But specifically in the case of Bikkur Cholim, we ought to realize that beside the obvious benefit to the sick person, and beside the obvious benefit to the visitor's middos tovos, the visitor also benefits personally from the unique spiritual elevation of being in the presence of the Shechina.  The Gaon is telling us that, counter-intuitive though it may be, the main beneficiary is the visitor.

Look at the Gaon's words: בכל המצוות, ההליכה אינה תכלית המצוה. אבל כאן ההליכה עצמה היא המצוה.  The fact remains that as far as the sick person is concerned, your walking cannot be anything more than הכנה, preparation.  If, for some reason, the walking is more than mere הכנה here, then it must be that the primary beneficiary of the mitzva is the person who is walking, not the choleh.   I don't care if pshat is like Rav Schwab or not.  As far as pshat in the Gaon is concerned, there is no other way to read it.  Without diminishing the benefit to the sick person, the Gaon is saying that the benefit to the visitor is more central to the Mitzva.

In his last years, as my father זצ"ל suffered through his terminal decline, we wondered why such a good and great man would experience such a terrible deterioration.  He had saved many lives, he founded yeshivos and schools, he helped the poor, he was a masmid and a world class talmid chacham and pikei'ach.  For what it's worth, I decided that the Ribono shel Olam was giving the community the chance to return some chesed, to show hakaras hatov.  "Here," Hashem was saying, "this man who has done so much for you, this man is weak and sick and hungry for friendly face.  Now you have a chance to show your hakaras hatov."  Of course, some people came, even to the last days, and some people moved on to chanfeh others from whom they could derive more benefit and whose association would bring more glory to them.  Even among those that came once a year, usually during Ellul, some clearly were patting themselves on the shoulder, thinking "What a fine man I am, visiting the Rabbi in his sad condition."  Wrong.  You were doing yourself the biggest chesed by visiting.  I don't know what the best metaphor is, but those last years separated the men from the boys, they winnowed the grain from the chaff, and they were an x-ray that showed what lay beneath the surface, and it wasn't always pretty.

• Thank you very much, Michael, for sending me the text of the Kli Yakar in Parshas Korach, which, as discussed in the comments, states clearly that the person who is visiting benefits no less than the person being visited.  While Rav Schwab talked about the Shechina being there because the sick person re-examines his life and regrets his past, the Kli Yakar doesn't mention the Shechina being there.  He says that when people visit the sick or see someone else suffering, they do some soul searching which leads to some degree of teshuva, and this redounds to the benefit of the person who is suffering, who inspired that teshuva.  The Kli Yakar says that Moshe Rabbeinu asked Hashem that Korach and his followers should come to an end that is completely outside human experience, so that nobody would look at them and think that such a thing could happen to them for their own sins, and so no benefit will come to the camp of Korach for inspiring teshuva.    Implicit in the Kli Yakar, and central to our discussion, is this: that just as the Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva is called בהמצאו, so, too, the bed of a sick person, which is mesugal to Teshuva, is בהמצאו.  A time and place that inspires Teshuva is a time and place where the Shechina is more accessible.

 אם כמות כל האדם ימותון אלה וגו'. במסכת נדרים (לט ב) אמר ריש לקיש רמז לביקור חולים מן התורה שנאמר אם כמות כל אדם וגו' שהם חולים ומוטלים על עריסותיהם ובני אדם מבקרים אותם, לא ה' שלחני. ופירש רש"י שסמך על סוף המקרא שאמרו פקודת כל האדם יפקד עליהם פקידה זו היינו ביקור. והנה מקום אתי לפרש פקידה זו בדרך אחר כי יש שני מיני תועלת בביקור זה. האחד הוא שמבקרין אחרי צרכיו של החולה. השני הוא לצורך ההולכים שמה כי כמו שטוב ללכת אל בית אבל כדי שהחי יתן אל לבו כך טוב ללכת אל החולה כי על ידי זה יבקש ויפשפש במעשיו כי ילכו שמה אבירי לב הרחוקים מצדקה אשר אין פחד אלהים לנגד עיניהם ולבם הערל טח מהבין לאחריתם כי תוהו הוא וסופו למקום רימה. וזהו פקודת כל האדם כי הסוף הוא פקודת כל אדם יפקד עליהם יפקד לשון זכירה ורצה לומר אם יפקד ויזכר עליהם פקודת כל אדם היינו המיתה וזה ודאי על ידי שיבקרו אותם ויתגלגל זכות זה לרבים על ידיהם ואינן מקבלים עונש כמדתם אז כדבריהם כן הוא שלא ה' שלחני. אבל אם בריאה יברא ה' וגו' שלא ימותו כדרך כל העולם ואז לא יזכר על ידם פקודת כל האדם כי מחידוש לא ילפינן כי לא יעלה על לב אדם למות במיתה משונה כזו בזאת ידעון כי נאצו האנשים את ה' ואינן ראוין שיתגלגל על ידם שום זכות לזולתם:

וטעם למיתה כזו, לפי מה שכתבתי למעלה שכפרו בחידוש העולם ובבריאתו, אמר משה אם בריאה אם באמת היתה בריאה חדשה בששת ימי המעשה אז יאמת ה' דברי ויברא גם עתה חדשה בארץ ועל ידה יכירו וידעו כי ה' עושה חדשות. ומה שנברא בריאה זו דוקא לפי שאמרו חז"ל (אבות ג ב) אלמלא מוראה איש את רעהו חיים בלעו, והמה לא רצו בשום מנהיג כי אמרו כל העדה כולם קדושים ובתוכם ה' ומדוע תתנשאו על קהל ה', ולפי סברתם הנבערה יבלע איש את רעהו חיים על כן יענשו כמדתם שירדו שאול חיים. כי אפילו המתעצל בהספדו של אדם כשר אמרו חז"ל (שבת קה ב) שראוי לקוברו בחייו לפי שנראה שאינו מרגיש בהעדר השלם שהיה מטיל מוראו על הבריות, כל שכן עדת קרח שבפה מלא אמרו שאינן רוצין בשום מתנשא לכל ראש. על כן אמר משה שאם ימותו על מטתם ולא ירדו שאול חיים אז לא ה' שלחני לעשות כל המינוים של השררות והנהגת העם, אמנם אם ירדו שאול חיים בזאת ידעון כי נמדד להם כמדתם כי ה' שלחני לעשות כל המינוים כדי שכל העם הזה איש על מקומו יבוא בשלום. לכך נאמר ויאבדו מתוך הקהל,מתוך שרצה ה' שיהיו כל ישראל בקהילה אחת ובאגודה אחת וכל קהילה ואסיפה צריכה למנהיג כדי שלא יבלע איש את רעהו והמה לא רצו בזה על כן נאבדו כי הוא יצא לחלק ובין אחים יפריד על ידי מחלוקתו:

UPDATE:

I HAVE A NEW PSHAT IN THE GAON BY BIKKUR, BASED ON THE MAHARSHA IN SOTAH 46B. IT IS HERE.

also- 

Please note that this relates somewhat to the question on the Mishna in Bikkurim 3:3. 

ג,ג  הקרובים מביאין תאנים וענבים, והרחוקים מביאין גרוגרות וצימוקים.  והשור הולך לפניהם, וקרניו מצופות זהב, ועטרה של זית בראשו; והחליל מכה לפניהם, עד שהן מגיעין קרוב לירושלים.  הגיעו קרוב לירושלים, שלחו לפניהם, ועטרו את ביכוריהן.  והפחות והסגנים והגזברין יוצאין לקראתם; לפי כבוד הנכנסין, היו יוצאין.  וכל בעלי אומנייות שבירושלים עומדין לפניהם, ושואלין בשלומן, אחינו אנשי מקום פלוני, באתם בשלום.

Rav in Mishnayos

וכל בעלי אומניות שבירושלים עומדים מפניהם. אף על גב דאין בעלי אומניות חייבין לעמוד מפני תלמידי חכמים בשעה שעוסקים במלאכתם כדי שלא יתבטלו ממלאכתם, מכל מקום היו חייבים לעמוד מפני מביאי בכורים דחביבה מצוה בשעתה. ומטעם זה עומדים מפני נושאי המטה שהמת בה ומפני נושאי התינוק לברית מילה:

Shoshanim l'David on that Rav, brought in Tos Anshei Sheim

בכורים ג ג  שושנים לדוד 

יש לדחות דשאני התם דבעידנא דאזלי הם עוסקים במצוה ממש דמקרא כתיב והלכת אל המקום וגם בהוצאת המת י"ל דעוסק במצוה ממש שכבוד היא למת לנשאו על כתפו... אבל בזה אכתי לאו עוסק במצוה הוא דאין שום מצוה בהולכת התינוק והכנה למצוה הוא דהויא ומנ"ל דצריכין גם בזה לעמוד. ואפשר דמ"מ שכר פסיעות יש. ומ"מ לא מצאתי כן להפוסקים ז"ל אלא ראה זה במרדכי שצריכים לעמוד כל העם בשעת מילה אמנם לאו משום כבוד העוסקים במצוה מטו בה אלא משום כבוד המצוה עצמה, והביא זכר לדבר ויעמוד כל העם בברית

With the Gaon in mind, we can say that here are Bikkur Cholim is another example.

Beshalach, Shemos 17:16. Remembering Amalek During Davening.

For Jan, of New Jersey, I will try to provide a brief summary in English of the paragraphs I cite.

The mitzva to remember the lasting damage caused by Amalek, and our hope that what they did will one day be reversed, occurs in several places in our tefilla, but one might daven his whole life and not realize what he is saying.

The passuk says ויאמר כי יד על כס י-ה מלחמה לד' בעמלק מדר דר

Rashi:

כי יד על כס יה: ידו של הקב"ה הורמה לישבע בכסאו להיות לו מלחמה ואיבה בעמלק עולמית, ומהו כס, ולא נאמר כסא, ואף השם נחלק לחציו, נשבע הקב"ה שאין שמו שלם ואין כסאו שלם עד שימחה שמו של עמלק כולו, וכשימחה שמו יהיה השם שלם והכסא שלם, שנאמר (תהלים ט ז) האויב תמו חרבות לנצח, זהו עמלק שכתוב בו (עמוס א יא) ועברתו שמרה נצח, (תהלים שם) וערים נתשת אבד זכרם המה, מהו אומר אחריו (תהלים ט ח) וה' לעולם ישב, הרי השם שלם, (תהלים שם) כונן למשפט כסאו, הרי כסאו שלם:

For there is a hand on the throne of the Eternal:  כִּי-יָד עַל כֵּס יָ-הּ. The hand of the Holy One, blessed be He, was raised to swear by His throne, to have a war and [bear] hatred against Amalek for eternity. Now what is the meaning of כֵּס [as opposed to כִּסֵא and also [why is] the Divine Name divided in half? [I.e., why is the Name יָ-הּ used instead of י-ה-ו-ה ?] [The answer is that] the Holy One, blessed be He, swore that His Name will not be complete and His throne will not be complete until the name of Amalek is completely obliterated. And when his name is obliterated, the Divine Name will be complete, and the throne will be complete....., as it is said: “The enemy has been destroyed; swords exist forever (לָנֶצַח)” (Ps. 9:7); this [who they are referring to] is Amalek, about whom it is written: “and kept their fury forever (נֶצַח)” (Amos 1:11). "And You have uprooted the cities-their remembrance is lost" (Ps. 9:7) [i.e., Amalek’s obliteration]. What does it say afterwards? “And the Lord (וַיהוה) shall sit forever” (Ps. 9:8); thus [after Amalek is obliterated] the Name is complete. "He has established His throne (כִּסְאוֹ) for judgment" (Ps. 9:8). Thus the throne is complete [i.e., thus the throne, here spelled with an “aleph,” is now complete]. — [from Midrash Tanchuma Ki Seitzei]                

According to Rashi, the three letters which are lacking from Hashem’s Name and throne are א, ו, and ה, which can be rearranged to spell the word הוא. In other words, our verse teaches that Hashem has declared a war against Amalek in every generation. When this is finally won, the letters in the word הוא will be returned to their rightful places, at which time His Name and Throne will be restored to their complete glory and His kingship will be permanently established.

The sefer Avnei Shoham (and others) uses Rashi to reveal the meaning of words we say every day in davening.  After Krias Shama, we say לדור ודור הוא קים ושמו קים וכסאו נכון ומלכותו ואמונתו לעד קימת.  "For generation after generation (Le'dor va'dor), He (Hu) is established and His Name is established and His Throne (Kis'o) is firmly set and His kingdom and faithfulness is forever established.   In light of our passuk and Rashi, we see that the words לדור ודור echo the words  מדר דר– in our passuk, and that the words הוא קים mean that the letters in the word הוא, which have been diminished in our world, will be returned to their rightful places. After these letters are restored, we will see that שמו קים וכסאו נכון – Hashem’s name and throne are established and lasting, and מלכותו ואמונתו לעד קימת – His kingdom and faithfulness will be permanent and endure forever.


A reference in Kaddish:
From Sefer HaPardes/Rashi:

בס׳ הפרדס לרש״י  פי׳ קדיש. יתגדל ויתקדש כוי,והאיך יכול להתגדל שמו של הקב׳׳ה, שמא חס ושלום כביכול חסר הוא, אין וודאי חסר הוא, כדכתיב כי יד על כס יה,נשבע הקב׳׳ה שלא יהי׳ הכסא שלם עד שימחה זכר עמלק. וכן מצינו שמו ה׳, וכשהוא אומר כס יה אינו אלא חצי ה׳ באותיות, וכמו כן קורא לכסא כס, הרי שהן חסרין אותיות, לכך אגו מתפללים יתגדל ויתקדש, כלומר יהי רצון מלפני מי שאמר והיה העולם שיגאלנו מבין האומות וימחה את זכר עמלק ויתקדש שמו להיות שלם

In Kaddish, we say "May the infinite Name be made great and sanctified...."  But is Hashem's name in need of being made great?  Yes, it is, because after the attach of Amalek Hashem swore that His Name and His Throne are not entire until the effect of Amalek is erased.  When it says Keis Kah, Kah is only half of the letters of Hashem's name, and Keis is half the letters of Kisei.  We pray that they should be made entire, meaning, that He should redeem us from our exile and erase the name of Amalek and then His Name will be holy and entire.

Tosfos Brachos 3a brings a corollary thought from the Machzor Vitri (written by Rav Simcha of Vitri, a pupil of Rashi) which explains that the congregational response to Yisgadal in kaddish, Yehei Shmei Rabba, is also a reference to this mitzva:

 ועונין יהא שמיה הגדול מבורך, מכאן יש לפתור מה שפי׳ במחזור ויטרי יהא שמיה רבה, שזו תפלה שאנו מתפללין שימלא שמו, כדכחיב כי יד על כס יה, שלא יהא שמו שלם וכסאו שלם עד שימחה זרעו של עמלק, ופירושו כך: יהא שמי׳׳ה שם יה רבא, כלומר שאנו מתפללין שיהא שמו גדול ושלם, ומבורך לעולם הוי תפלה אחרת, כלומד ומבורך לעולם הבא. וזה לא נראה, מדקאמר הכא יהא שמיה הגדול מבורך משמע דתפלה אחת היא, ואינו רוצה לומר שיהא שמו גדול ושלם, אלא יהא שמו הגדול מבורך

Tosfos quotes the Machzor Vitri as saying that the response in Kaddish, Yehei Shmei Rabbah, is a prayer that Hashem's name be made whole, and the interpretation is as follows:  The word Shmeih in Yehei Shmeih is a compound of Shem Yud Hei, which means the Name comprising the letters Yud and Hei; Rabba, may it be made whole again.  The word Mevorach that follows begins another thought.  Tosfos disagrees with this interpretation.



--A reference at the end of Davening:  (guest emendation)
This is also reflected directly in the pasuk we say at the end of Aleinu- ביום ההוא יהיה ה' אחד ושמו אחד: i.e., on the day when the הוא is restored and the Name of Hashem is complete.  On a deeper level, see the sugya Pesachim  50a on " אטו האידנא לאו אחד הוא ?"  Note carefully the reference in that gemara to וזה זכרי לדר דר and the obvious connection to the parasha of Amalek --

Beshalach, The Splitting of the Sea: A Difference of Opinion on Miracles

The Gemara in Sotah, and the Mechilta here, bring a machlokes about who was the first to jump into the Yam Suf.  Sota 36b-37a:

תניא היה ר"מ אומר כשעמדו ישראל על הים היו שבטים מנצחים זה עם זה זה אומר אני יורד תחלה לים וזה אומר אני יורד תחלה לים קפץ שבטו של בנימין וירד לים תחילה שנאמר (תהילים סח) שם בנימין צעיר רודם אל תקרי רודם אלא רד ים והיו שרי יהודה רוגמים אותם שנאמר (תהילים סח) שרי יהודה רגמתם לפיכך זכה בנימין הצדיק ונעשה אושפיזכן לגבורה שנאמר (דברים לג) ובין כתפיו שכן אמר לו רבי יהודה לא כך היה מעשה אלא זה אומר אין אני יורד תחילה לים וזה אומר אין אני יורד תחילה לים קפץ נחשון בן עמינדב וירד לים תחילה שנאמר (הושע יב) סבבוני בכחש אפרים ובמרמה בית ישראל ויהודה עוד רד עם אל ועליו מפרש בקבלה (תהילים סט) הושיעני אלהים כי באו מים עד נפש טבעתי ביון מצולה ואין מעמד וגו' (תהילים סט) אל תשטפני שבולת מים ואל תבלעני מצולה וגו'

As they stood at the edge of the sea, the Shvatim fought among themselves, each one saying "I will be the first to jump in."  Reb Meir says that the first to actually jump in was the (whole) tribe of Binyamin.  Rav Yehuda says it was Nachshon, the leader of the tribe of Yehuda.

A remarkable thing about this Gemara is that Reb Meir says that not only did they fight about it, but the leaders of Yehuda actually threw rocks at the tribe of Binyamin- רוגמים אותם.  And not only did the leaders of Yehuda throw rocks at Binyamin, but it seems that they threw the rocks at Binyamin after Binyamin jumped into the sea.  This is incomprehensible.  I understand they would argue about who gets to do the kiddush Hashem.  But throwing rocks?  And throwing the rocks after they've already jumped in?  What is the pshat?

The Netziv in Devarim (33:12), by the brachos of Moshe to the Shvatim, says an interesting thing.

In the Haamek Davar he says:

״לבנימין אמר ידיד ה׳ ישכן לבטח עליו - טבע שבט בנימין וגדוליו להתהלך בדרך החסידות והפקרות למעלה מטבע אנושי בבטחון כאשר יבואר. על כן סמך ברכת שבטו לשבט לוי. והיינו שבעת שמת שאול והיה דוד מקונן עליו והחל לפני הקינה

ללמד לבני יהודה קשת הנה היא כתובה על ספר הישר ולא היה אותה שעה ראוי לאזהרת מלך מה שנגע לענייני מדינה. אלא היא מכלל הקינה שבעת מלוך שאול היה דוד בעצמו מתגבר על גלית במקל ובאבן ולא היה נצרך ללמד את בני יהודה

קשת, והיינו משום חכות שאול היה אז. אבל היום הכרח ללמד את בני יהודה קשת והנה היא כתובה על ספר הישר הוא ספר דברים כדאיתא במסכת ע״ז פרק ב׳ והיינו מקרא שאנו עומדים בו דברכת יהודה היה ידיו רב לו ובברכת בנימין

כתיב ישכון לבטח עליו וא״צ לרוב טכסיסי מלחמה״.

Binyamin always felt that the greatest good that we should aspire to is the experience of open miracles, through Hashem's usurpation of Teva- the supernatural.  Yehuda felt that our work in this world is to achieve what we can through our own efforts, efforts that are rewarded with Hashem's Hashgacha Pratis of success through nissim nistarim, nissim that are amazing and awe inspiring, but cloaked in nature- the preternatural.

In the Harchev Davar he brings the Mechilta here in Beshalach that says

משל למלך שהיו לו שני בנים. אמר לגדול הקיצני בשלוש שעות ביום ולהקטן אמר הקיצני עם עמוד השחר, הגיע עמוד השחר ובא הקטן להקיץ, אמר הגדול לי אמר אבא בשלוש שעות והקטן אמר לי אמר אב א להקיצו עם עמוד השחר, וכיון שצהבו זב״ז הקיץ המלך. אמר, בני שניכם רציתם לקיים דברי, לשניכם אשלם שכר, כך לשבט יהודה נתן מלכות ב״ד ולשבט בנימין נתן בהמ״ק

a king asked one son to wake him at dawn, and the other to wake him at nine o'clock.  Come dawn, the six o'clock son went to wake his father, and the nine o'clock son started berating him, what are you doing, you meshuggener, why are you waking father so early???  As they fought, the father woke up and thanked them for doing exactly what he wanted them to do.
The Netziv says

והמשל נפלא, וגם תחילת הענין יש להבין מדוע גבר בנימין על יהודה והיאך לא חלק לו כבוד. אבל הענין שנס קריעת ים סוף היה מיועד להיות באחד משני אופנים, אם בהנהגת נס נסתר סמוך להליכות הטבע, וע״ז הקדים הקב״ה רוח קדים עזה

כל הלילה ומייבש והולך לאט לאט. אם בדרך נס נגלה שבשעת קפיצה בעומק הים יהא נקרע. והכל לפי הכנה של ישראל. אם לא ימסרו נפשם באמונה לקפוץ בים אז יהא בדרך השגחה פרטית על הליכות הטבע ואם ימסרו נפשם באמונה אז בע״כ

יהא נקרע פתאם. והיה דעת שבט יהודה שכבודו של הקב״ה להמעיט הנס ככל האפשר ע״כ אין ראוי לקפוץ בים עד שיתייבש ע״י הרוח והיה נצרך עוד לשהו י איזה שעות ואז ילכו תחילה כאשר יהודה גבר באחיו. אבל דעת בנימין הי׳ שכבוד ושל הקב״ה הוא להראות נס נגלה, ע״כ אין רצונם לשהות כלל. ואחר דשבט יהודה לא היה ברצונם לילך עתה ע״כ ילכו הם תחילה, והנה קפץ שבטו של בנימין ונקרע פתאום. והיינו מכוון למשל שהמלך ציוה לבנו הגדול להקיצו בשלוש שעות ביום

כדרכן של מלכים כך נתן הקב״ה דעת ורצון השבט הגדול שהוא יהודה לילך בהליכות הטבע להראות שהקב״ה מהוה הכל והטבע בידו, ונתן דעת ורצון השבט הקטן שהוא בנימין להתהלך בדרך גבוה ונעלה להראות שהקב״ה אדון הכל ומשדד

הטבע לגמרי. ע״כ נתן הקב״ה ליהודה מלכות בי״ד שמתהלך בדרך הטבע כמו שנתבאר לעיל, ולבנימין נתן בהמ״ק שניסים קבועים היו בו 

Here, too, Binyamin wanted the open miracle of the splitting of the sea, so they wanted to jump immediately and trigger a neis nigleh, a total overturning of nature; Yehuda wanted some admixture of teva, and they wanted to wait for the the wind that was blowing all night to move more water and dry more land before they jumped in, in order for the miracle to be minimized.

It's remarkable how this Netziv's pshat highlights Klal Yisrael's unchangeable nature.  We haven't changed a bit since Krias Yam Suf.  Today, too, we know that we can exist only through nissim.  The Yishuv in Eretz Yisrael exists only because of a constant neis.  But what is the right way to bring about that neis?  And which is better, a neis niglah or a neis nistar?  There are those, like Shevet Binyamin, that want us to achieve a Geula only by nissim niglim, while others that feel, like Shevet Yehuda, that the time has come to achieve things in what passes for sort of derech hateva, through our efforts that bring about a neis nistar of hashgacha pratis.  And of course, we still hold that the best way to resolve theological differences is by throwing stones.  Who knows?  Maybe it is.

There have been some changes, though.  What's changed is that the first time, the Neis Nistar people were throwing stones at the Neis Niglah people, and now it's the other way around; also, this time the Neis Niglah people believe that we should prepare for the Neis by doing absolutely nothing different than we've been doing for the last two thousand years.


post script- this has nothing to do with the above, but I wanted to post it because I liked it.  We're all familiar with the story, that Nachshon ben Aminadav was the first to jump in, and the water didn't split immediately, it reached his nose, he was at the penultimate point of his life, he said הושיעני אלהים כי באו מים עד נפש טבעתי ביון מצולה ואין מעמד, Save me, O God, for water has come up to my soul.  I have sunk in muddy depths and there is no place to stand; I have come into the deep water, and the current has swept me away.  It was only then that the sea split and he was saved.  My son, Harav Mordechai of Marlboro, NJ, says that we can learn a lesson about avodas Hashem from this story.  If Nachshon had held his nose up higher, the geula would have taken longer.  
(And shiduchim.  The Gemara in the beginning of Sotah says that a shiduch is like Krias Yam Suf.  In shiduchim, it's not a good idea to hold your nose up too high.)

Beshalach, Shemos 16:23. Preparing the Mahn with Thought: BCI Update

A double portion of the Mahn came down on Friday, because people would not be allowed to carry it to their houses on Shabbos.  This way, they had their Shabbos food in their houses before Shabbos.  They were also told be sure to cook or bake the Mahn before Shabbos began.  

את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו

There is a discussion in the Mechilta here about exactly how the Mahn was prepared.  Rebbi Yehoshua holds that the mere thought of baking would miraculously transform the Mahn into a baked preparation, and the thought of cooking would render the Mahn cooked.  Rebbi Elazar HaModa'i says that it would taste as if it were prepared the way you wanted, but there was no physical change.  (I suppose this is what underlies the machlokes Reb Ami and Reb Asi in Yoma 74b whether the tribulation of the Mahn was not having food in the pantry or not seeing the food you're tasting.)

יאמר אליהם הוא אשר דבר ה', אמרו לו אימתי אמר להם מחר: את אשר תאפו אפו, ר' יהושע אומר מי שהוא רוצה אפוי היה מתאפה לו והרוצה מבושל היה מתבשל לו. ר' אלעזר המודעי אומר הרוצה לאכול דבר אפוי היה טועם בו כל אפויים שבעולם והרוצה לאכול דבר מבושל היה טועם בו כל בשולים שבעולם ר' אליעזר אומר על אפוי אפו ועל מבושל בשלו הא כיצד יום טוב שחל להיות ערב שבת מנין שאין רשאין לא לאפות ולא לבשל אלא אם כן עירבו ת"ל את אשר תאפו אפו אפו על אפוי ובשלו על מבושל:

Two years ago, I posted a discussion about BCI technology, with which a person can control a computer via thought patterns.  Absolutely no movement is involved; sensors detect and analyze variations in brain wave activity and the program responds to this variation.  Once you can move and click a cursor with brain activity, you can do every single one of the thirty nine melachos of Shabbos without lifting a finger.  

BCI stands for brain–computer interface (BCI).  Other terms used are mind-machine interface (MMI), and direct neural interface, and brain–machine interface (BMI),  For the latest on BCI, go here.

Having seen this Mechilta, and some other sources, it is time for an update.  Some of this material was briefly mentioned in the original post, but most of it is new, like the Mechilta.

Harav Tzvi Pesach Frank, in his pirush on Chumash here and in a teshuva, and the Mirkeves Hamishna and the Netziv in their peirushim on the Mechilta, note that our Mechilta shows that according to Rebbi Yehoshua, this form of melacha is assur on Shabbos; that it needed to be done before Shabbos, even though the cooking and baking would be effected by thought alone.

(Please note that this Mechilta is completely incomprehensible- to me- if we're going to read it literally from a halachic standpoint.  Even if thought would make it cooked, the thought did not cook it.  I'm not talking about the Bishul b'chama/Bishul b'eish issue, I'm talking about no bishul at all happening.  It turned it into a food that was identical with something that had been cooked.  It was נתהפך to become a thing that is Mevushal, but there is no event of בישול taking place.  What we have here is like a thought that takes an object that was in a Reshus Hayachid and makes it re-appear in a Reshus Harabbim.  There was no akira, there was no ha'avara, there was no hanacha.  Before it was there, now it's here.  We have the shiur of a melacha, and we have the effect of a melacha, but the melacha wasn't done.  There's a consequence without a sequence.  Bishlema by netilas neshama, causing death is the melacha, and however you do it it's assur.  Here, it's the act of bishul that is assur and the fact that the food gets cooked is for the chiyuv on a shiur of the melacha.  It's like Zorei'ah, planting: the issur is the planting, and the fact that the seed sprouts is just a test of whether your act of planting was a melacha.  Here, it's impossible that such a thing would be bishul.  Maybe it would be makeh b'patish, but that doesn't make sense either, since it was perfectly good even without the machshava.  But I don't care that this is shver.  The Achronim see the Mechilta as a raya to this question, so I'm going with that.  I guess the problem is not bishul, but Mesaken Manna, like the next source says.)

The Moshav Zkeinim in Bamidbar (11:8) says the following:

מושב זקנים

בהעלותך במדבר י״א ח

ובשלו בפרור.  פרש״י שלא ירד לקדירה מעולם, מלמד שהיה משתנה להם לכל המתבשלים, וכן פי׳ לגבי וטחנו מלמד שמשתנה לכל הנטחנים, מפני שלא היו טוחנין אותו. ויש מפרשים שטו העם צדיקים מוצאים אותו על פתח אהליהם בלי טורח, ורשעים היו מוצאים אותו כשהיו שטים על פני המדבר ולקטים דרך צער וטורח. וכן דכו במדוכה ובשלו בפרור לרשעים והצדיקים לצונן. דכתיב (במדבר ט"ו ל"ב) ויהיו בני ישראל וכו' וימצאו איש מקושש עצים ולמה אלא מפני שהיה רוצה לבשל. ועוד אמרינן בסיפרי ועשו אותו עוגות וכו' ותימה הא כתיב (שמות ט״ז כ״ג) את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו ואת כל העודף, אלמא היה נאפה ומתבשל ואין לומר לאו דווקא אפו אלא תחשבו עליו, ולדבר(י) המתבשל למה היה אסור בשבת לחשוב עליו שיש בו טעם תבשיל. וי"ל (דלשון)  (דכיוו) דלא היה מתהפך אלא על פי דבורו לתבשיל חשוב תקון דהא אפילו הפרת נדרים לצורך שבת איבעיא לן בנדרים (ע"ז א') ובסוף שבת (קנ״ז א') אי שרי בשבת ואע"ג דהתם שרי הכא חשיב תקון.

which means that he holds it is assur, although he says דבורו.

On the other hand, Tosfos in several places indicates that it would be muttar; Fact 1.Designating Truma on Shabbos is assur under Mesaken Manna, a toldah of Makkeh Be'Patish.  Fact 2. Although lechatchila one should not designate Truma with thought alone, if one does so it is effective.  Combining Fact 1 and 2, Tosfos in Gittin 31a DH Bemachshava, and in Chulin 7a DH Vedilma and Bechoros 59a DH Bemachshava says that to do so on Shabbos with thought alone would be muttar.  Also, the Shittah in Beitza 34b says this.  (It's easy to mis-read Tosfos, but what he's saying is that even though machshava would be effective and muttar as far as hilchos Shabbos are concerned, the possibility of doing it with machshava is not sufficient to be mattir a physical hafrasha.)

The Achiezer in 2:49:4 talks about our Tosfos, and mentions that he has several problems with Tosfos' Shittah which he does not answer.  But he says that even according to Tosfos, that it's muttar to be mafrish on Shabbos with thought alone, that's only because Tevel has inherent Truma potential, so you're only designating which part is Truma.  But by Hekdesh, where you're creating an entirely new status, and this status causes a transfer of ownership, such a machshava is like a maaseh and would be assur on Shabbos.  But he says that this is only because ownership transfers generate a concern that you might write, and so are assur miderabanan.  The implication is that a real melacha, if done with Machshava, would be muttar.

Along the same lines, see Reb Akiva Eiger brought in the Shaar Tziyun in 633 sk 14, regarding a too-tall sukkah that has a pile of dirt in middle, and before yomtov you weren't mevateil the dirt, that he is not sure if if it is muttar to be mentally mevateil the dirt to the ground, because it would make the Sukka kasher and therefore be mesaken manna/makeh b'patish.  I cannot find this RAE anywhere except this Shaar Tziyun.  Anyway, from this RAE is appears that he's mesupak regarding the issue of mesaken manna with machshava.

And the best part- Reb Meir Don Plotzki (Kli Chemda) in Beshalach proposes that there is a difference between Shabbos and Yomtov.  On Shabbos, which is an eternal and immutable commemoration of Hashem's Shvisa creating the world through His Machshava, the issur includes melacha that is done with machshava.  But Yomtov, whose kedusha is created by Beis Din, by humans, the issur is only on melacha that is done with an act, the human sort of melacha.  Wouldn't that be interesting, to be mattir BCI melacha on Yomtov but not on Shabbos?

I found a nice article on this topic.  He cites most, if not all, of my references, here.  Here's his summation:

סקירת השיטות שראינו, מהן ניתן להפיק שיטה הלכתית בנוגע ל-BCI:

א.    הגרשז"א – המחשבה כמעשה (בהלכות מסוימות) לענין שבת.

ב.    הרב רוזן – בדיקת התוצאות הסופיות של תהליכים (גם פנימיים) וקישורם למקורם.

ג.    עמדת ה'חומרא' של הכלי-חמדה – כשעשיית המלאכה נעשית כרגיל על ידי המחשבה, אזי זו איננה מנגנון של כ'לאחר-יד' גרידא.

ד.    עמדת ה'קולא' של הכלי-חמדה – פעולה המתבצעת על ידי מחשבה אינה מלאכה גמורה בגידרה, אלא 'רק' איסורא.

ה.    הקהילות יעקב – מעמד של 'עדיף מכלאחר-יד' לפעולה סגולית בהלכות שבת, שלא כדרכה.

ו.     הקהילות יעקב – דרכה של פעולה כזו היא תמיד ה'לא טבעית', לא גזרו חכמים בה.

ז.     הרב זאב לב (והגרשז"א) – החילוק בין החפצא לגברא באדם ובפעולותיו בעולם. זהו היחס המפורש ביותר לנושא, ובשילוב עם חילוק החפצא/גברא זהו פיתוח של מערך מחשבתי עם השלכות הלכתיות קונקרטיות.

Another update:
First, I saw Rav Carlebach's sefer on Chumash has a discussion about this.
Second, another discussion with new sources is in the end of the new Mishnas Reb Akiva Eiger in his additions, #160, here.

Another update:
Gil Student has a nice post on this topic, in which he quotes R Zalmen Menachem Koren who said the question was asked to Reb Shlomo Zalmen Auerbach. I am posting the article here, and it is available in situ here.

I. Bionic Men

Reports, albeit somewhat dubious, are circulating regarding Russian development of combat exoskeletons that can mechanically increase the strength and endurance of soldiers. Worn like body armor, these artificial extensions of the body are expected, within five years, to receive direction through brain waves. When a soldier thinks about moving his arm or leg, the mechanical extension will move, thereby multiplying the soldier’s strength. While combat is almost always a case of life-threatening danger that overrides the rules of Shabbos, the tantalizing reports still raise the question of whether such technology can be used on Shabbos in non-combat situations.

The basic technology already exists. Computers have already been developed that can receive instructions through brain waves. This Brain Computer Interface (BCI) technology currently requires direct contact with the skull but the possibility of remote connection, a sort of brain wifi, is certainly conceivable. I’m hardly an expert so it may already exist and I just do not know about it. I see three questions related to Shabbos with this technology.

First, can we use BCI to perform a forbidden labor? Can I command, through my thoughts, a plow to plow my field or my coffee maker to brew me fresh coffee? Second, can I use this technology to utilize a machine to do something that is not otherwise forbidden, such as turning the page in a book or lifting a fork full of food? (We’ll get to the third question at the end of this essay).

II. Thinking Labor

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was asked this question, apparently multiple times. He believed that there is a Talmudic precedent for prohibiting an activity on Shabbos that is done through thought (beyond thinking about business and similar thoughts, which is a separate issue). R. Zalman Menachem Koren, the editor of Rav Auerbach’s writings on electricity (Me’orei Eish Ha-Shalem, vol. 2 pp. 765-766), discusses Rav Auerbach’s oral response. Rav Auerbach pointed to the prohibition against designating food as terumah, the portion given to priests and forbidden to others, on Shabbos (Tosafos, Gittin 31a sv. be-machashavah). Even an activity that consists of thought can be forbidden.

In one of his earliest writings (Me’orei Eish, ch. 4), Rav Auerbach quotes a responsum by Rav Avraham Walkin (Zekan Aharon vol. 1 no. 15), in which the author argued that someone who miraculously cooks through thought or speech violates a biblical prohibition. Rav Walkin proves this from the man (manna) that the Jews are in the Desert. The Torah (Ex. 16:23) forbids cooking the man on Shabbos. However, the man required no preparation–you merely thought what you want and it tasted that way. Clearly, Rav Walkin argues, cooking through thought is biblically forbidden. Rav Auerbach rejects this entire line of argument (although not necessarily the conclusion) because the Torah only forbids cooking with fire, not miraculous cooking. Whatever you may be doing wrong by thinking man to be cooked, it isn’t cooking.

Rav Yisrael Rosen (Be-Chatzros Beis Hashem, p. 90) writes that he asked Rav Auerbach the same question and received the same answer about designating terumah. However, Rav Rosen challenges this proof. He points out that designating terumah violates the rabbinic prohibition of fixing an object. If so, it is not a Shabbos rule that thought can violate the prohibition but a function of designating terumah. Since the rules of terumah allow thought, the food is “fixed” and the Shabbos rules are violated. There is no general rule here to be extracted that Shabbos can be violated by thought.

Rav Rosen quotes Rav Meir Dan Plotzki (Keli Chemdah, Beshalach) who also attempts to prove from the cooking of the man that a forbidden labor caused by thought is prohibited. However, Rav Auerbach’s above objection should apply similarly. Rav Plotzki also gets philosophical. He points out that on Shabbos, we rest like God did after creating the world. Since God created the world through thought, a labor that is caused by thought is also forbidden. Although one can counter that God created the world through speech, it is not clear to me whether divine speech and divine thought are distinct.

III. Miraculous Labor

Rav Rosen briefly raises the idea that performing a forbidden activity through thought is comparable to performing it using supernatural powers. For example, killing someone by invoking God’s name or writing by asking a question of the Urim Ve-Tumim. If directly causing a labor by speaking is allowed, then certainly causing it by thinking is permitted. Rav Shay Schachter advances this argument in a recent lecture, citing many more examples. He quotes a responsum by Rav Chaim Palaggi (Lev Chaim, vol. 2 OC 188), in which the author permits extinguishing a fire on Shabbos supernaturally (with a segulah), such as reciting Psalm 98.

I believe his father, Rav Hershel Schachter, implies such a position in an article. In Be-Ikvei Ha-Tzon (p. 47), the senior Rav Schachter writes in regard to gerama and what is required for an act to be forbidden on Shabbos:

אף דבעינן מעשה האדם, לאפוקי שוא״ת ומחשבה, מכ״מ כח גברא לא בעינן

Even though we need a human action–as opposed to sitting doing nothing and thinking–we do not need human power

Maybe I am overreading this brief phrase but I think it might permit otherwise forbidden activities caused by thought.

IV. Natural Labor

However, Rav Asher Weiss (in an online essay, perhaps from his book on Exodus), rejects the comparison to miracles offered by the younger Rav Schachter. Rav Weiss argues that miraculous and supernatural actions are inherently different from natural causation. A supernatural activity is really caused by God, not man, and therefore is permitted. But when a person directly causes a forbidden activity, even if just by thinking, then it makes sense to say that he has effectively pushed the plow himself.

However, lacking a definitive proof, Rav Weiss hedges, saying that at best causing a forbidden activity by thinking constitutes gerama, which is rabbinically forbidden except in exigent circumstances. He concludes that whether this constitutes direct or indirect labor requires more study, but it is definitely forbidden under normal circumstances.

V. Extended Human

However, this discussion only answers the first question: can you use thought to perform a forbidden action? Regarding an electronic prosthetic limb, the issue turns to whether you may use thought to move an electronic device. It is not entirely the same for two reasons:

First, electronic motion may be only rabbinically prohibited. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the device itself might be considered part of the person, which brings us to the third question: what is the distinction between a person and the machines he uses? Some today argue to an extreme that your computers are an extension of your own mind. More moderate thinkers suggest that artificial appendages become part of you. Is a hearing aid distinct from you? A pacemaker? An artificial heart? If an artificial limb is considered part of you, then you may use it on Shabbos like you use your arm.

Personally, I’m a simple man and look at the issue simply. If it’s organic then it is part of you, even a donated organ and even if grown in a laboratory. If it is inorganic, even partially, then it is not part of you. If and when they make completely organic computers, then maybe that can become part of you, as well. I am not a halakhic authority so my conclusions are tentative and should not be followed. But it would seem that this line of thinking implies that artificial body parts that violate rabbinic Shabbos prohibitions (absent the considerations of thought, discussed above) may only be used by someone who would otherwise be defined as ill but not life threatening. Similarly, artificial body parts that violate biblical prohibitions may only be used by someone who would otherwise be in a life threatening situation. I am not aware what halakhic authorities have said on this subject. (In short, the Bionic Man is assur according to some authorities.)

When it comes to exoskeletons, we have to ask whether they are external to the human body. If they are, as I suggest, then we arrive at the dispute above. According to Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Rav Asher Weiss, they are forbidden. According to Rav Shay Schachter and possibly his father, Rav Hershel Schachter, this might be allowed (I did not hear the younger Rav Schachter reach a definitive conclusion). Rav Rosen also seems to lean toward leniency but does not reach a final conclusion.

 - In the comments on that post, someone wrote the following.

The Mishnas Yaakov (R Yaakov Rosenthal, Dayan of Haifa) seems to learn the Tosfos as I did, that there is no issur of hafrasha on Shabbos bemachshava, and seems to indicate that the rashash learned the same way.

UPDATE FEBRUARY 2019

 I decided that even if machshava would be assur on Shabbos, it could not possibly be more assur than Mechameir achar Be'heima. I'm not talking about Shvisas Be'heima, which only applies to your own animal, I'm talking about Mechameir, a general issur to cause an animal to do melacha by walking after it and doing what farmers do to make their animals work. Obviously, it is not the animal we're worried about by mechameir, because mechamer applies to any animal, while shvisas only applies to your own animal, according to the Rashba and Ran in Shabbos 153b.  If so, the issur is the fact that you're getting  a melacha done not beyadayim. BCI can not possibly be more assur than that. This means that at worst, it would be a lahv, maybe a bittul assei (see Minchas Chinuch 32 after the Massach on mechameir) not the issur melacha mammosh.

Pharaoh's Impenetrable Heart.

Hashem hardened Pharaoh's heart so that he would not do teshuva and release the Bnei Yisrael.  This is stated several times.  In Shemos see 3:19, ואני ידעתי כי לא יתן אתכם מלך מצרים להלך ולא ביד חזקה, in Va'eira see 7:3 ואני אקשה את לב פרעה, and in Bo, 11:1, כי אני הכבדתי את לבו. From the emphasis and the repeated explanation that it was Hashem's desire to show the world how mighty Egypt would be like a plaything to Hashem, one might think that this was a singularity, a event exclusive to that one place and time.  It is not.  The ability to do Teshuva has been taken away from other people as well and continues to be a possibility.

I don't mean to provide excuses for people that want to fool themselves into thinking they can't do teshuva.  This only happens to highly accomplished resha'im.  If  you're not a world-class achiever in something else, you probably aren't a world-class Rasha either.  To emphasize this, here is something from the Brisker Rov, (quoted by Rav Shlomo Wahrman, author of שארית יוסף and Rosh Yeshiva of Hebrew Academy of Nassau County,) in HaPardes year Year 62 number 1, 1987, to the effect that even an Amaleiki can do teshuva.

 שמעתי מהגרי״ז מבריסק דתשובה מועלת גם לעמלקים דהרי בשמואל א׳ פט״ו כתיב לך והחרמת את החטאים את עמלק

 דמבואר דהוא רק בזמן שחוטאים משא״כ כשעושים תשובה דשוב אי״ז חטאים וכדאמרה ברוריא דביתהו דר״מ בברכות (י.) עה׳׳פ יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב וכוי אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם.

So no matter how bad you are, unless you are worse than an Amaleiki you certainly can do teshuva.  And let's not forget Gittin 57b, 

נעמן גר תושב היה נבוזראדן גר צדק היה מבני בניו של המן למדו תורה בבני ברק מבני בניו של סיסרא למדו תינוקות בירושלים מבני בניו של סנחריב למדו תורה ברבים מאן אינון שמעיה ואבטליון

But there are people who do lose access to Teshuva.  First, the Rambam:   (6 Teshuva 3)

ואפשר שיחטא אדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שיתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהא הפרעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאו שיעשה. הוא שהקב"ה אמר על ידי ישעיהו השמן לב העם הזה וגו'. וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא. כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא. לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה. לפי שחטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו. נתן הדין למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו. לפיכך חזק הקב"ה את לבו. ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך. כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו. וכן סיחון לפי עונות שהיו לו נתחייב למונעו מן התשובה שנאמר כי הקשה ה' אלהיך את רוחו ואמץ את לבבו. וכן הכנענים לפי תועבותיהן מנע מהן התשובה עד שעשו מלחמה עם ישראל. שנאמר כי מאת ה' היתה לחזק את לבם לקראת המלחמה עם ישראל למען החרימם. וכן ישראל בימי אליהו לפי שהרבו לפשוע מנע מאותן המרבים לפשוע תשובה שנאמר ואתה הסבות את לבם אחורנית כלומר מנעת מהן התשובה. נמצאת אומר שלא גזר האל על פרעה להרע לישראל. ולא על סיחון לחטוא בארצו. ולא על הכנענים להתעיב. ולא על ישראל לעבוד עכו"ם אלא כולן חטאו מעצמן וכולן נתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה:

מונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו.  That means "they withhold Teshuva from him and do not let him turn away from his wickedness."

Then, Reb Yisrael Salanter:

Reb Yisrael Salanter says that in the case of a regular person, Hashem seeks his Teshuva.  But a person might fall to a point where Hashem no longer seeks his Teshuva, and even if he makes tentative steps towards teshuva he will receive no divine assistance.  Then there is the very worst possible level, where not only does he receive no assistance or encouragement, but even if he manages to push himself to try to do teshuva, Hashem makes it impossible for him to follow through.  Teshuva does not exist in this person's world.  (I'm not sure if that means that he can't do Teshuva, or if it means that even if he does Teshuva Shleimah, it will not be accepted.  After all, from Middas Hadin, Teshuva is impossible. 

Finally, I found it interesting that several Achronim (the Nesivos, Rav Bergman, and several others, with approximately the same approach) use this idea to explain the discussion between Reb Meir and Bruria in Brachos 10a.  Reb Meir held that since they were beyond teshuva, there was no point in their living, and they would be better off dead, to avoid further sins, and the world would be better without them.  Bruria taineh'd that the inability, or the loss of siyata dishmaya to do teshuva is an onesh, and for onshim you can be mispallel.  So she told Reb Meir to daven that their onesh of "no access to Teshuva" should be removed, and then maybe they could be mashpia on them to do teshuva.   Or it could be they were arguing about whether they were on level two or three of Reb Yisrael Salanter's chart.  Neither pshat, I'm sorry to say, clicks in the words of Reb Meir or Bruria.  Also, I find it hard to believe that Reb Meir had any way of knowing that they were already on the madreiga of Ein Maspikin, because then the Tzadikim of Yerushalayim who weren't mochi'ach the resha'im (Shabbos 55a) would have the same excuse.  There are those that want to support this pshat by saying that Reb Meir recognized the syndrome from the fact that all his efforts to be mekareiv them, and their being unaffected by the proximity of such an Adam Gadol, so it must be that they are beyond hope.  Sorry, not convinced.   But it's a nice pshat anyway, because even if it's not a valid interpretation of the conversation between Reb Meir and Bruria, the idea that even a person from whom Teshuva has been taken away has hope, the hope that through Tefilla his access to Teshuva will be restored.

NOTE:  in the comments, Reb Micha Berger presents a formidable argument to the effect that it is incorrect to characterize the Kappara of Teshuva as being l'maala miderech hateva.  Please see there, where I cite  Rabbeinu Bachay and the Shla'h (partially cited in the notes in the Kad Hakemach and more fully in my comment) and Reb Micha's response and citations.
Reb Micha has since posted on this question at his Aish Das website, writing, as always, with serious thought and care.
 On that topic, here's a nice video about the human ability to change.

Va'eira, Guest Post by Rabbi Pinches Friedman

On maintaining the purity of Jewish Traditions and the importance of rejecting foreign influence in our cultural and personal lives.                 Link


On the topic of changing our primary self-perception from "Jew" to that of "citizen of our host country", a friend brought me a copy of Life magazine from April 18th, 1938.  The magazine had a few pages about the Jews, with a special focus on the then-current troubles in Europe.  There are pictures of terrified Jews who heard that a pogrom was starting, of elderly men at a seder, of the stores in Germany with each window labeled with a perfectly well centered and calligraphic

 Jude

all rendered as only Life magazine's artists could.

There was a paragraph on one page that caught my attention, a remarkable paragraph.  It's not news to anyone.  Reb Meir Simcha said it, Reb Elchonon said it; and it was true in Spain, and it was true one hundred times before.  It was just strange seeing it in Life magazine.

"Of all the countries of Europe, the Jew loved Germany best.  There, he became more German than the most patriotic Junker.  Jews all over the world reflected this feeling.  In the 19th Century, Germany became the cultural capital of world Jewry."

I always wondered, what's wrong with being a patriot?  Nothing.  On the contrary.  To not have hakaras hatov to the country that sheltered you is despicable.  But we're not talking about hakaras hatov.  We're talking about a level of patriotism that Life magazine found remarkable- more German that the most patriotic Junker.  Chazal tell us that they merited the Geula because they retained the markers of the Jewish People, but I'll bet we'll find a Chazal that says that they were super-loyal Mitzrim before the Avdus started.

Va'eira, Shemos 9:20. Iyov's Silence

I don't want your money.  But like other websites, I am soliciting contributions from you.  This far-from-perfect ma'amar is being posted in the hopes that someone can contribute something to the discussion.  I do, however, want to stress that while I can't offer a black and white explanation, I think that ambiguity and Tzarich Iyun is incomparably better than half-baked mussar that is not oisgehalten in halacha, hashkafa, or reality.

The Egyptians were warned that the plague of Barad was coming, and those that feared Hashem's power brought their livestock in from the fields.  Shemos 9:20- 

הירא את דבר ה' מעבדי פרעה הניס את עבדיו ואת מקנהו אל הבתים.

Targum Yonasan says that the ירא את-דבר יהוה, the ones fearful of Hashem, is a reference to Iyov, Job, who is described in the first passuk in Iyov (איש היה בארץ עוץ איוב שמו והיה האיש ההוא תם וישר וירא אלקים וסר מרע) as a ירא ה. as a  

 אִיוֹב דַהֲוָה דָחִיל מִפִּתְגָמָא דַיְיָ מֵעַבְדוֹי דְפַרְעה כְּנַש יַת עַבְדוֹי וְיַת גֵיתוֹי לְגוֹ בֵיתָא

It's interesting that Iyov makes an appearance in the story of Klal Yisrael's sojourn in Egypt.  But this is not the first time he appears.  

When Pharaoh first discussed the Jewish problem with his advisers, the Gemara (Sotah 11a) says that these advisors were individuals we are familiar with: they were Bilaam, Iyov, and Yisro.  

א"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר סימאי שלשה היו באותה עצה בלעם ואיוב ויתרו בלעם שיעץ נהרג איוב ששתק נידון ביסורין יתרו שברח זכו מבני בניו שישבו בלשכת הגזית 

Bilaam advised subjugating the Jews, and he was later killed.  Iyov was silent, and he suffered terrible afflictions, the subject of Sefer Iyov.  Yisro refused to participate in this ur-Wannsee conference, and he fled, and because of that he was rewarded with descendants who sat in the Sanhedrin.

What, exactly, was Iyov's sin?  He stood by and did not stop a רודף.  Was this a sin of omission or a sin of commission?  Did his silence do nothing, and he was punished for not making an attempt to fight the decision, or did his silence encourage and contribute to the enactment?

In other words, did he have a duty to actively oppose it, and he was punished for failing to do his duty?  Or, or was he punished because his silence was interpreted as assent, or at least as indifference, and his indifference/assent factored into the decision to crush the Jews?

The reason I ask is because if Iyov was a yarei shamayim and a decent man, it's hard to believe that he would have allowed his silence to contribute to suffering.  (The Ben Yehoyada in Sanhedrin does say that Iyov's silence contributed to the enactment)  If, on the other hand, it was just a a matter of not caring, it's still surprising, but I can conceive of the possibility:  A Yarei Shamayim would not have participated, but a Yarei Shamayim might have been indifferent.  They weren't his people.  Every day injustices take place in the world, and we simply don't pay attention.  We could go out and protest.  We could march in the street and yell about the suffering in Tibet or Africa or India.  But we don't.  We have our own people to worry about, and we can't fix the whole world.  The reality is that in life, there are disasters, and we don't lose a moment of sleep over the suffering of strangers on the other side of the world.  So what was the complaint against Iyov?  Why should he have endangered himself on behalf of the Jews?

The Torah gives us certain mitzvos that mandate that we not stand by and watch the perpetration of injustice.  These are the Mitzvos of:

הוכח תוכיח

השבת אבידה

לא תעמד על דם רעך

On the basis of these mitzvos, we have a duty to stand up and fight a danger to a fellow:  as the Rambam says (1 Rotzei'ach 14)

כל היכול להציל ולא הציל עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך. וכן הרואה את חבירו טובע בים. או ליסטים באים עליו. או חיה רעה באה עליו. ויכול להצילו הוא בעצמו. או ששכר אחרים להצילו ולא הציל. או ששמע עובדי כוכבים או מוסרים מחשבים עליו רעה או טומנין לו פח ולא גלה אוזן חבירו והודיעו. או שידע בעובד כוכבים או באונס שהוא בא על חבירו ויכול לפייסו בגלל חבירו להסיר מה שבלבו ולא פייסו וכל כיוצא בדברים אלו. העושה אותם עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך:

So we have the Gemara (Shabbos 54b) that says

כל מי שאפשר למחות לאנשי ביתו ולא מיחה נתפס על אנשי ביתו באנשי עירו נתפס על אנשי עירו בכל העולם כולו נתפס על כל העולם כולו אמר רב פפא והני דבי ריש גלותא נתפסו על כולי עלמא כי הא דאמר רבי חנינא מאי דכתיב (ישעיהו ג) ה' במשפט יבא עם זקני עמו ושריו אם שרים חטאו זקנים מה חטאו אלא אימא על זקנים שלא מיחו בשרים

that failure to protest where you can make a difference makes you liable for what follows.

Similarly, we find that Aharon was punished for his silence, in Bamidbar 12:1, where the Shach al Hatorah says

ותדבר מרים ואהרן במשה. היל"ל וידברו מרים  ואהרן, אבל אמר ותדבר מרים, כי עיקר  הדבור היה למרים,כי הנשים הם דברניות, ואהרן  הודה לה או החריש ולא מיחה בה, וע״ז נענש הוא ג״כ שנא׳ ויחר אף ה׳ בם .

But let's assume that our din of לא תעמד על דם רעך, our chiyuv to stand up and protest, stems from our din of ערבות, as the Shla'h says (חלק ג, תורה שבכתב, תורת כהנים, פרק דרך חיים תוכחת מוסר, פרשת קדושים, where he says that kal vachomer the chiyuv applies to preventing a man from destroying his neshama by doing aveiros, also in Minchas Chinuch 239:4.)  If so, it's reasonable to assume that the yesod of הוכח תוכיח and השבת אבידה is also the din of ערבות.  Since when did Iyov have a din Arvus with the Jews?  

So I think we are forced to look at this Chazal and say that despite the fact that he had none of the mitzvos listed above and no din of Arvus, there is a duty to oppose injustice, and it was a sin to fail to stand up.  Maybe it's not a din in Beis Din, but there is some kind of fundamental meta-mitzva obligation.   

But what is the extent of this obligation?  From the fact that Yisro ran away, it appears there was danger in opposing the decision.  If there was danger in protesting, what was Iyov's duty?  We, that we have a halacha of (Vayikra 19:16)  לא תעמד על דם רעך, and most likely (See Choshen Mishpat 426 and thousands of Rishonim and Achronim) we're allowed to endanger ourselves to save others, but we're not obligated to endanger ourselves in order to save another person.  So what was wrong with Iyov's silence, if speaking up would have been dangerous?  Let's assume, then, that there was no danger to Iyov.  Why did Yisro run away?  I don't know.  Maybe that was after the majority decided. Or it was a middas chasidus.  But it's most likely there was no danger to Iyov, and he was punished for failing to protest.  To me, it is clear that Iyov suffered for his indifference, for his failure to at least cry out against the injustice, even if he couldn't do anything about it, as the Brisker Rov said.

Here are some suggestions.
1.  It could be that for the average man, there is no din of Arvus outside of what the Torah is mechayeiv.  But when a person is in a position of power, when he is on a consortium of consultants to the government, then he has obligations greater than the man in the street.  You are taking upon yourself responsibilities, and you can't then ignore them.  For a man in that position, silence is a breach of duty.

2.  The Jews were known as rachmanim, bayshanim, and gomlei chasadim, they were a people with a unique bond to the Ribono shel Olam.  Even if indifference to suffering is not a reason for punishment, indifference to the suffering of the Jews is a sign that you don't care about the Ribono shel Olam.  If you have any bond to the Ribono shel Olam, you love the Jews.  So his indifference was a siman- a symptom of a fundamental flaw in your spiritual relationship with the Ribono shel Olam.  As the Sh'lah says, ואמר לא תעמוד שלא יתעכב כיון שהוא רעך בתורה ובמצוות אי נמי לשון שתיקה דמך תחת דמו ונפשך תחת נפשו אם תעמוד על דם רעך.  It's possible that before Mattan Torah, every Tzadik was a ריע with everyone who did mitzvos.  Since Iyov was a tzadik, he was a ריע with the Bnei Yisrael, and the mitzva did apply to him.

3.  The punishment for Iyov's indifference was Hashem's indifference.  The Satan wanted to torture Iyov, and Middah keneged middah, Hashem said nothing, He simply did not interfere. 

4.  That all of our proofs from the mitzvos in the Torah, that it's only based on the din Arvus, הוכח תוכיח השבת אבידה and לא תעמד, and we don't find any such dinim by Bnei Noach, are just wrong.  It's not the dinim that mandates this behavior, it is essential humanity.  Whatever danger there was to Iyov did not justify his silence.  If you see an innocent human being suffering, you should cry out in protest.  If you don't, you're no better than Iyov.