The Makriv is Part of the Korban.

Both Jews and Gentiles can bring sacrifices to the Beis Hamikdash.  But there is an important difference between them.
A Jew who is an idolater is not allowed to bring any  Korban to the Beis Hamikdash.  (Chulin 5a, and Eiruvin perek Hadar)  On the other hand, a Gentile that is an idolater is allowed to bring a Korban.  מכם ולא כולכם להוציא את המומר מכם בכם חלקתי ולא באומות.  When I said this Gemara, my shiur expressed their surprise.  How can it be that we are more machmir by the Korban of a Jew than that of a non-Jew?  What is the logic of the distinction?  If a requirement for accepting a person's Korban is that he has at least a fundamental faith in God, why doesn't that matter when a Gentile brings a Korban?  If a corrupted owner corrupts the animal, what difference does it make who the owner is?  Gentiles are just as tainted by Idolatry as Jews are.  

(The members of the shiur offered two answers.
1.  We only accept the Korban of a Gentile mipnei darkei shalom, to show respect and to avoid antagonizing them, but it's not really a Korban.  That is false, period.  It's a korban and it has halachos of korban.
2.  It's not such a sin for a Gentile to be an idolater.  False again.  It's a capital offense, and that's pretty serious.  Also, it's illogical. Why would it be less of a sin for a Gentile to be an idolater?  They have just as much of a duty to recognize the Ribono shel Olam as we do.  They are not just the extras in our movie.)

The Oneg Yomtov's Answer

See Oneg Yomtov in middle of note on the bottom in #45, who asks this question.  

His first answer is that if the Kohanim doing the avoda in the Mikdash are acting as our agents  (שלוחי דידן, Nedarim 35b,) then this halacha makes sense, because according to our halacha, there is no law of agency by Gentiles, and if the Torah said you take korbanos from Gentiles despite the the general rule that the is no din of shlichus by Gentiles, then apparently a Gentile's Korban does not need the Agency that is required by a Jew's Korban.  If the Kohanim are not bringing his korban as his agents, then we don't care if he's an idolater.  On the other hand, by a Jew, for whom the Kohanim are acting as Shlichim, as his  agents, it is he who is bringing the Korban, and therefore his status matters.

But he says that this answer won't work according to the Rambam that paskens that even in a Yisrael's Korban, Kohanim never are acting as the principal's agent (שלוחי דשמיא).  He reiterates the question: how can it be that we accept from Akum mumar but not Yisrael mumar.  It's illogical; the Gemara itself had rejected this idea in a different context (regarding regular shechita of Chulin animals-השתא שחיטת מין דישראל אסורה דעובדי כוכבים מיבעיא), and if it's such an apparently illogical svara, and there is an alternative ways to darshen the passuk by Kodshim, how can the Gemara let such a drasha stand?

He answers that even if the Kohen is not the person's agent, there is still a difference between Korban Yisrael and Korban Akum.  By a Yisrael's Korban, there is Semicha, leaning on the animal before Shechita, and there is no such act by a Korban Akum.  Perhaps it is because of the din of Semicha by a Jew's Korban that we don't allow a Mumar to bring a Korban.  But he finds fault with this answer as well.  He that if the basis of not allowing a idolatrous Jew to bring a Korban is that we can't allow him to do Semicha, then a mumar should be able to be makriv bechor and maaser (and ofos), korbanos that have no Semicha.

I don't know why he didn't mention a bigger hole in his pshat- that according to him, a woman who is a mumeres should be able to bring a korban!  And if you're going to answer that he means that since men do semicha, you see that the nature of the korban is such that it is in the parsha of semicha, then what's bothering him about Bechor and Maaser?  And what about Korban Ofos, bird korbanos?  There's no smicha there.

Another little question on his teretz is from the Gemara in Temura 2a.  Machlokes RM and RY; RM- does do semicha.  RY- No he does not.  According to RM, also a group korban has semicha from every participant.  RY- three times it says Korbano.  One to exclude non-Jew ( to tell you that not even the Kohen should do Semicha on a goy's korban,) one to exclude someone else's korban, and one to exclude Yoreish.  Alternatively, he uses on drasha to exclude someone else's and a goy's, because the idea is that there is no shlichus for semicha (because we know from elsewhere that the goy himself doesn't do it.)

So according to his teretz, you could say a chiddush that a yoreish who is a mumar should be able to bring his father's korban according to Rav Yehuda.  


The Brisker Rov's Distinction

The Gemara in Zevachim 45b says that the tzitz is not meratzeh by the korban of a goy because by korbanos it says it says Leratzon lahem, and not for akum; since Ritzui Tzitz has to do with Ritzui, and there's no Ritzui by akum, so there's no din of tzitz by their korbanos.
The Brisker Rov there in Zevachim 45 says that you shouldn't make the mistake of thinking that the reason there's no din tzitz by korban akum is because ritzui tzitz is a din hartza'a which doesn't exist by akum.  That's not the pshat.  The pshat is that the whole korban akum is not coming for hartza'a, so ritzui tzitz is irrelevant and cannot be mattir the Korban.  With this, too, we understand why Korban Akum is not a problem.  The exclusion of a mumar only applies to a korban of ritzui.

The Brisker Rov's opinion can be viewed in a sefer of Reb Dovid's shiurim.  Also, from another sefer, quoting the Rav,

 דר״ש ס״ל דקדשי עכו״ם חלוקים בעצם החפצא מקדשי ישראל, דיש קדושה של קרבן ישראל ויש קדושה של קרבן עכו״ם, וילפינן לה מדכתיב בקרבנות דבר אל בני ישראל, וכמש״כ הרמב״ם בהל׳ מעילה (פ״ה הל׳ טו), אבל רבי יוסי ס״ל דאין חילוק בעצם החפצא ביניהם, משום דכתיב בהו לה׳, וקדושה אחת להם, ומשו״ה א״א לחלק ביניהם לגבי הדינים שחילק ר״ש. וזהו מה שמקשה הגמי, דהברייתא דאין ציץ מרצה על קרבנות עכו״ם היא דלא כר׳ יוסי, דקס״ד דדין זה הוא ג״כ משום שלקרבן עכו״ם ישנה קדושה אחרת, ומשני דבזה גם ר״י מודה, דהא דאין ציץ מרצה על קרבנותיהם אינו מחמת דין הקדשם, אלא הוא מיעוט בבעלים של הקרבנות, דבריצוי ציץ כתיב לרצון להם, ועכו״ם לאו בני ריצוי נינהו.

(ועיי״ש שהוכיח מפירוש הר״ש משנ״ץ על התו״כ ( בפרש ת אחרי פרשתא ז הלכה ה דבקרבנות עכו״ם ליכא הרצאת קרבן, דאינם לרצון ל פ נ , ה' , ונתרבו רק לענין שיכולים להביא קרבן. אבל הקרבן אינו מרצה כלל על הבעלים, ולפיכך גם הציץ אינו מרצה על הדם שנטמא, דריצוי ציץ לא נאמר אלא בקרבנות שיש בהם הרצאת בעלים עכ״ד

My Proposed Answer

So, let's get back to our question. 
You have the Oneg Yomtov that says that even if you hold shluchi derachmana, that's only by korban yisrael, not by korban akum.  Also, you have the Gemara in Zevachim says that there's no ritzui by korban akum.  And we have the general dinim that there is no semicha or vidui by the Korban of a Gentile.

I want to explain, in baalebatishe words, what the yesod of the difference is, and, like in Reb Moshe's approach, it explains many of the differences in halacha between Korban Yisrael and Korban Akum.

The difference is that when a Yisrael brings a korban, he is part of the korban.  The makriv is part of the yesod of the korban, just as kehuna, and kli shareis, and me'kom hamizbei'ach are parts of the dinim of the korban.  When a yisrael does smicha it is because he is the korban too, except we don't shecht him.  He is the part that we don't shecht or burn on the mizbei'ach.  He has ritzui because the Zerikas Hadam created a din of ritzui on the Korban, and he is a part of the Korban.  By akum, the makriv is not part of the korban.  He is the person who donated the korban.  Therefore, while he is doing a good thing, there is no din ritzui, a din which is exclusively related to a Korban.  (There's no need to extend this, and it causes more problems than it's worth, but one might relate this to the din that the special Din Shlichus the Torah creates by a Yisrael does not exist by Akum.)

This concept appears in the Gemara in, for example, Taanis 26a, where the Gemara says

אלו הן מעמדות לפי שנאמר (במדבר כח) צו את בני ישראל את קרבני לחמי וכי היאך קרבנו של אדם קרב והוא אינו עומד על גביו התקינו נביאים הראשונים עשרים וארבעה משמרות על כל משמר ומשמר היה מעמד בירושלים של כהנים של לוים ושל ישראלים 

The Netziv finds a source for this halacha in the passuk in Balak, where Bilaam told Balak to stand at the altars while his Korbanos were being brought.

With this, I just want to suggest that unlike other korbanos, where if a mumar brings it, it is just passul, it could be that if a mumar brings Ketores, there's a bigger problem.  I think that if a mumar brings ketores, it has a din of חיסר אחת מכל סממניה חייב מיתה (Kerisus 6a), if one leaves out one ingredient of the ketores, he is subject to the death penalty.  The makriv is one of the ingredients of the ketores, too, and if he's a mumar, he's chayav missa.  I've found this svara to be quite useful, and have used it in many places in Kodshim.

I don't know if you need more reasons why the 250 people of Korach died after bringing the Ketores, but if you do, now you have one.

With this in mind, please see the post in Pekudei that explains the lomdus of the Korban of a Yisrael, and the tremendous chiddush of the Akeida.
Turns Out To Be a Machlokes Between the Chazon Yechezkel and the Brisker Rov.

After writing this, I spoke to my son Shlomo, a Brisker.  He told me that this is a machlokes between the Chazon Yechezkel and the Brisker Rov.  The Chazon Yechezkel, in the beginning of Zevachim, says that the pshat in Shelo Lishma is that it becomes a korban without a Baalim.  The Brisker Rov said that is impossible.  It is impossible to have a korban without a Baalim.  Rev Michel Feinstein (the Rov's son in law) tries to make a lomdishe yes and no hybrid of yes and no baalim.  But the point is that in Brisk, the Rov's svara is talked about as being that the Baalim is a cheilek of the Korban.  So I didn't discover America.

The Chazon Yechezkel is here, at the end of the page, DH אלא שלא עלו לבעלים, and the following pages, where he brings the Brisker Rov's questions and deals with them.  The Brisker Rov's opinion is not printed anywhere in the official Brisker Sefarim, but it is in the shiurim they say in the Brisker Yeshivos.


Reb Moshe's Answer

And here is how Reb Moshe answers the question, in his Dibros on Chulin.  The derech we're discussing is on the next page, except that he doesn't go as far as I do regarding the lomdus of the difference.  He goes on to use this approach to explain many of the differences in halacha between Korban Yisrael and Korban Akum.  This is not the first time I found a whole sugya encapsulated in one paragraph in the Dibros.   אפילו ספר תורה שבהיכל צריך מזל.

Korach. How are We Supposed to Know?

I saw an interesting thing in Volume 4 of Rav Shach's letters.  He asks on the Gemara in Bava Metzia 85b

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מאי דכתיב (ירמיהו ט) מי האיש החכם ויבן את זאת ואשר דבר פי ה' אליו ויגידה על מה אבדה הארץ דבר זה אמרו חכמים ולא פירשוהו אמרו נביאים ולא פירשוהו עד שפירשו הקב"ה בעצמו שנאמר (ירמיהו ט) ויאמר ה' על עזבם את תורתי אשר נתתי לפניהם אמר רב יהודה אמר רב שלא ברכו בתורה תחילה 

When the second Beis Hamikdash was destroyed, the question was asked, what precipitated this terrible tragedy?  The question was asked to the Chachamim, and they did not explain it, the question was asked to the Nevi'im and they did not explain it, and finally Hashem told them that the terrible destruction had taken place because they had lost respect for the Torah.

Rav Shach asks, if the wise men and the Neviim had no idea what the problem was- (there were many problems and the Neviim and Chachamim had been warning the people for decades, but evidently none of those issues explained the terrible destruction and exile)- how can the people be blamed for this sin?  How can you expect the people to regret a sin that no human being, not even the wisest or the most spiritual,  recognized?

A similar question can be asked in Parshas Korach.  Korach and the two hundred and fifty men were the greatest of the Dor Dei'ah.  They must have presented a strong argument.  How can the rest of the people be blamed for not knowing who was right?  In the parsha of the Meraglim, how are we supposed to know who to trust?  The other meraglim were at least the equals of Yehoshua and Kaleiv, and they decided ten to two that they should stay in the Midbar!

It appears, says Rav Shach, that when it comes to one's personal moral decisions, he knows more than all the chachamim and all the neviim.  We have an innate spiritual compass that enables us to know right from wrong, no matter how hidden it is from the rational mind.

Unfortunately, access to this innate ability requires the utmost honesty and sincerity, a real Catch 22.  Every sheigitz in the street can easily say that he doesn't care what anyone says, he's doing what he knows in his heart is right.  This is true.  But the Ribono shel Olam knows if a person is honestly and humbly recognizing the wisdom of his Chelek Eloka Mi'Maal or just wiping his hands on it.

gU cited Reb Elchonon's assertion that faith is the natural state of man, and only because of his unwillingness to forego his pleasures and sense of freedom does man throw away his awareness of and faith in God.  His words:

ם שאיננו בכלל שוטה. אשר אי אפשר להסתפק באמיתתם, אמנם רק בתנאי שלא יהא האדם משוחד: היינו שיהא חופשי מתאוות עולם הזה ומרצונותיו. וא"כ סיבת המינות והכפירה אין מקורה בקלקול השכל מצד עצמו, כי אם מפני רצונו לתאוותיו המטה ומעור את שכלו ומעתה מובן היטב מה שהזהירה התורה ''ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם'' - זו מינות, היינו שהאדם מוזהר להכניע ולשעבד את רצונותיו כדי שיהא השכל חופשי מנטיות הרצון - וממילא יכיר את האמת המוכרחת לכל בן דעת שהקב''ה ברא את העולם, כמאמר רבי עקיבא שהעולם מעיד על הקב''ה שבראו והכפירה אין לה שום מקום בשכל האדם, כי אם ברצונותיו ותאוותיו ואילו לא הגיעו תאוותיו למדרגה גסה לא היה אפשר בשום אופן לבוא לידי טעות של כפירה או עבודה זרה. ע''כ גדול עוונו מנשוא שהגביר תאוותיו על שכלו כל כך עד שלא יכיר אמת פשוטה כזאת 

והמצוה להאמין היינו שלא יגביר תאוותיו על שכלו, וממילא תבוא האמונה בהכרח. ואין צורך להשתדל להשיג אמונה, אלא להסיר את הגורמים להפסידה, והיא תבוא מאליה 

Similarly, Rav Dessler says 

מעולם לא היה מי שהוא אפיקורוס באמת. כל מי שפקר יודע בפנים קרב לבו שמתעלם הוא מן האמת, ומה שטוען שאינו
רואה ואינו שומע היינו שאינו ר ו צ ה לראות ואינו ר ו צ ה לשמוע 

Not exactly the same as what we're talking about, I think, but close.   

Update, June 2017. I was talking to R Avi Schron about this, and this is how he puts it, with an emphasis on deep inculcation and assimilation of middos tovos so that a person will instinctively, naturally, reject whatever is incompatible with those middos.

As I thought about the question we discussed while it's true we have a natural moral compass my point was that basic strengthening of ones adherence to Torah and Mitzvot will strengthen that moral compass. Chazal tell us that the Yidden should have learned from the מעשה of Miriam and not listened to the לשון הרע.  If that principle has been kept strong the rest of the story wouldn't have occurred.  They would have not heard the Meraglim at all.
The same can be applied to Korach, the 250 men would not have joined had they followed principles לשון הרע and not listened to Korach's  complaining they would have not gotten involved at all.
On the other hand, Aharon told everyone to bring their Jewelry for the עגל, the women and  שבט לוי did not listen to Aharon.  The woman had a strong sense of what's right and did not want their Jewelry to be used for Avodah Zara.  They knew Avodah Zara is wrong and it doesn't matter who is telling them to do it. They had the fortitude to resist an order by the chief commander.
If we develop our Middos  and adherence to basic Halacha then our moral compass will be much more accurate. 

Korach, Bamidbar 17:3. When People Who Sin Become Sinners את מחתות החטאים האלה.

The Gemara (Brachos 10a):

הנהו בריוני דהוו בשבבותיה דר"מ והוו קא מצערו ליה טובא הוה קא בעי ר' מאיר רחמי עלויהו כי היכי דלימותו אמרה לי' ברוריא דביתהו מאי דעתך משום דכתיב (תהלים קד, לה) יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב ועוד שפיל לסיפיה דקרא ורשעים עוד אינם כיון דיתמו חטאים ורשעים עוד אינם אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם בעא רחמי עלויהו והדרו בתשובה:

Reb Meir was plagued by wicked neighbors, and he intended to pray that they be dispatched to their divine judgment.  Bruria, his wife, said to him, it says in the passuk "may sins be eliminated from the Earth," it doesn't say "sinners."  Better pray that they repent and abandon their sins.  Reb Meir prayed for them, and as a result of his prayers they did do teshuva.  (The Maharsha there, and in Sukka on the same page, asks the obvious question, "how can one person's prayers influence another's piety?  הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים, all is in controlled by heaven except for piety and fear of Hashem!"  Among the answers are: Reb Meir asked that Hashem ensure they meet righteous people whose example would inspire them; or that Tefilla can even help bring inspiration to other people, as every mother that prays that her child be a tzadik knows.  Even fathers say in birkas habanim שיתן בלבך אהבתו ויראתו ותהיה יראת השם על פניך כל ימיך שלא תחטא.  See also an excellent discussion of the Mahrsha at Chaim Brown's site.) 

Everyone there asks that Beruria's point seems incorrect.  Tanach is filled with examples of sinners- Chot'im- being referred to as sins- Chata'im.  One good example is our parsha, where Aharon was commanded to gather the incense plates of the supporters of Korach, who were killed by divine retribution for their rebellion, and they are referred to as Chata'tim.  את מחתות החטאים האלה בנפשותם.  

Additional examples from all over:

    תהלים נא, טו    אלמדה פושעים דרכיך, וחטאים אליך ישובו  

תהלים א, א      אשרי האיש אשר לא הלך בעצת רשעים ובדרך חטאים לא עמד ובמושב לצים לא ישב

בראשית יג, יג   ואנשי סדום רעים וחטאים לה' מאד

ישעיה א, כח     ושבר פושעים וחטאים יחדיו ישובו 

We even find this usage in Yiddish.  We refer to an unusually wealthy man not as an עשיר-wealthy, but as an עושר- wealth.

The Nesivos in his Nachlas Yaakov (and Emes L'Yaakov and Iyei Hayam) says two answers to this question.  

Answer I 

He brings from the Ramban in Breishis 25:28  יכנה האיש במעשהו לתדירותו, that a person that embodies a certain behavior can be given a name that refers to that behavior.  A person that is totally immersed in prayer can be called Prayer.  A person that is thoroughly and obdurately sinful can be called Sins.  (In English, the equivalent would be the difference between "A man who sins" and "A sinner," the change from adjectival phrase to noun.  But a better word would be sinnerman, as in the traditional spiritual song.)  This only applies when the person is so sinful that he cannot be defined as separate from his sins, they are a part of what defines him.  Divine assistance to do teshuva is withheld from such people (see, e.g., Rambam 6 Teshuva 3.)  Bruria was saying that only such people are called חטאים.  People who sin, but are not hopelessly sinful, are not called חטאים, they are called חוטאים.

שהחטא כבר נעשה עצמיות מהם ואי אפשר להתפרד מהם והן אותן שמונעין מהן דרכי התשובה והן ראויין לקללן משא"כ אותן שמכונין בשם חוטאים שהחטא אינו בהן עצמיות רק במקרה שאפשר להם עדיין בתשובה אסור לקללן דאמור ישובו עדיין

The distinction he makes in this answer is borne out with a simple glance at the unpronounced and therefore disregarded dikduk.  In the Mandelkorn, there are separate lists for חטא with a Patach and חטא with a Chataf Patach.  A Chataf Patach replaces a Tzeirei, as in Cheit, and חטאים with the Chataf Patach means sins.  If you're referring to people who have done sins, then you would say חוטאיםf. But when it says חטאים with a simple Patach, it also means sinners, but it's a different kind of sinner than חוטאים.  The difference is like the difference between גונב and גנב, between נוגח and נגח.  A Goneiv is a man who stole.  A Ganav is a professional crook.  When it says גנב or נגח or חטאים with a simple Patach, it becomes a label, a behavior that has become definitive of the person or thing.  So Beruria was asking Reb Meir, "Does it say Chot'im, which means people who sin?  No, it says Chata'im without a Chataf Patach, and that means a lifer, a recidivist, somebody who embodies sin."

All the pesukim we cited above have a regular Patach.

אֵת מַחְתּוֹת הַחַטָּאִים הָאֵלֶּה, יִתַּמּוּ חַטָּאִים מִן הָאָרֶץ. וְחַטָּאִים אֵלֶיךָ יָשׁוּבוּ, וְאַנְשֵׁי סְדֹם רָעִים וְחַטָּאִים,  וְשֶׁבֶר פֹּשְׁעִים וְחַטָּאִים יַחְדָּו וְעֹזְבֵי ה' יִכְלוּ

There are many appearances of חטא in Tanach with a Chataf Patach.  The only appearance of חטאים in that form is in Koheles 10:4.

אִם רוּחַ הַמּוֹשֵׁל תַּעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ מְקוֹמְךָ אַלתַּנַּח  כִּי מַרְפֵּא יַנִּיחַ חֲטָאִים גְּדוֹלִים.

Bruria told Reb Meir that certainly, when a person is beyond redemption, one may curse him.  "יתמו חטאים מן הארץ"!  As I tell my shiur, Rav Huna says (Kiddushin 20a, אמר רב הונא כיון שעבר אדם עבירה ושנה בה הותרה לו הותרה לו סלקא דעתך אלא נעשית לו כהיתר,) that if a person does a sin twice, it becomes like it's muttar, he doesn't even think twice about doing it.  But what if a person does a sin three times?  What does he feel at that point?  I say that at that point he decides it's a mitzva.  For such a person, the possibility of Teshuva is vanishingly small.  But where neighborhood troublemakers are just Biryonim, there is hope for them.  I am sure that Reb Meir had rebuked them- there is a chiyuv de'oraysa of  לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך ולא -תישא עליו חטא (Vayikra 19:17).  But what Reb Meir had not tried was Tefilla.  Bruria told him "Don't write them off; True, they ignored your tochacha, and it seems that there's no hope for them, but first, daven for them, and let's see what happens."

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Answer II

The Nesivos says another teretz, and I think it's even more interesting than the first teretz.  

He says that for some people, avoiding sin is extremely difficult because of how they were created, whether it is a stronger yetzer hara or many other possible reasons.  From the Akeida in Shaar 63:

כי רבים מהם היותם על השיעור ההוא מהרוע לא היה רוע בחירתם אלא מצד חוזק חומרם ורוע תכונתם הטבעית שעלה כך בגורלם מהסבות שנזדמנו להם בעת הורתם אשר לא עצרו כח לכבשו. וכמו שכתב הרב המורה פרק ל״ג חלק שלישי כי מי שטבעו חם ביותר אי אפשר שיהיה ירא שמים בתאוותיו וכבר חשבו קצת החכמים שאין האדם רצוניי על הרעות וכל שכן אם הם נמשכות אל רוע תכונתם. עם שכבר דחה אותם הפילוסוף וביאר שהכל בידי אדם כמו שכתבנו בשער כ״ב מכל מקום דינא רבא ודינא זוטא איכא בינייהו כי אחר שהם לא בחרו לחם אלו ההתחלות הפחותות והטבע העלה אותם בגורלם וידו חלקתם לא בקו עד שאם יכבשום היה ראויין לשכר גדול כמו שאמר (אבות פ״ה) לפום צערא אגרא הנה כשלא עמדו כנגדם ראוי להמציא להם תקון 

So Bruria was saying that there are two kinds of sinners.  There are sinners that are born with strong evil inclinations, or amid terrible circumstances, and there are sinners that choose to do their sins out of a desire to be wicked.  For the people who purely out of wickedness choose to sin, prayer is a waste of time.  But for those poor people that were born with the bad luck of some inherent or circumstantial predisposition to sin, prayer is perfectly appropriate, because you are asking Hashem to level the playing field, to remove their unfortunate predisposition.  So Beruria told Reb Meir, when it says in Tehillim that David Hamelech cursed חטאים, he couldn't possibly be cursing people whose hot nature drives them to sin.  So he must have been saying יתמו חטאים, may Hashem help them by cooling off their burning Yetzer Hara.  Perhaps these people are of the nebach resha'im type, and for them, the proper tefilla is that they be freed from the terrible Yetzer Hara that drives them to sin.  As the Nesivos says, along the same lines, in his Nachlas Yaakov,

וזה ענין ההבדל בין חוטאים לחטאים כי חוטאים מורה על שהוא פועל החטא כי חוטא

על משקל פועל וחטאים מורה על שרשו שהוא תכונה רעה בנפש כאלו הוא נעדר הפועל ולזה אמרו מ׳ כתיב חוטאים חטאי׳ כתיב וזה אין שייך לומר שיבקש רחמים על אותן שימותו וע״כ הבקשה כמו שפרש״י שיכלה היצה״ר מהם ושיתרפא התכונה רעה מהם וזה אמרה דביתהו כיון שלא קילל דור רק אותן החוטאים ברוע בחירתם משא״כ אותן החוטאים מצד רוע חומרם אדרבא אבקש רחמי׳ עליהם שיתרפאו מהם א״כ אין לבקש רחמי׳ על אנשי׳ פ טים שימותו דדלמא חוטאים מצד רוע חומרם ולו נתכנו עלילות:

(Again, see the link to the Divrei Chaim I have above for a discussion of how Tefilla helps to restore Bechira.)

One of the reasons I like the second answer better is that the first answer doesn't work well in the language of the Gemara.  According to that pshat, Beruria was saying that the passuk in Tehillim was indeed a curse against recidivist sinners, but there people were not like that.  The problem is that she said that this explains the passuk ועוד שפיל לסיפיה דקרא ורשעים עוד אינם כיון דיתמו חטאים ורשעים עוד אינם אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם , "look at the end of the passuk!  There will no longer be wicked people- because Chata'im came to an end, the result is there will no longer be wicked people.  Pray for them that they do Teshuva."  According to the first answer, the passuk is not talking about people for whom you pray, it's talking about people whom you curse.

So, to summarize:

• The word חטאים can mean people who have sinned, and it can mean veteran sinners.  Rav Meir's neighbors were people who sinned, the congregation of Korach were sinners.
• Also, the Akeida that not all sinners are equally culpable.  Some people are faced with physical or emotional or cultural drives that are far harder to resist than those that others face.  They're all judged for their sins, but you don't throw the book at the ones that are nebach resha'im.   As the Baal Ha'Akeidah puts it, דינא רבא ודינא זוטא איכא בינייהו.  Does this support Rav Dessler's  "נקודת הבחירה"?  I don't know.  

Modern Hebrew Names for Children

Part three of a three part series on naming children.  Part one discussed the proper time to name a daughter; part two talked about the momentous spiritual significance of the parents' naming their child.  

This post is longer than usual.  The length results from dialogue with readers that I incorporated into the post.  As far as basic structure, it is very simple, as follows:
1. Are modern Hebrew names acceptable to our Gedolim.   (It goes without saying that Modern Orthodox authorities are in favor of these names.  I am focusing the group I consider myself part of, the Old world Yeshiva Orthodox, or what the  booboisie calls Hareidim or Ultra-Orthodox.)
2. The difference between modern Hebrew names and non-Jewish names.
3.  Harav Kanievsky's opinion
   a. Three explanations for this opinion
4.  Rav Moshe Feinstein's opinion
5.  English and Hebrew lists of Hebrew names, both traditional and modern.

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May a parent give a child a modern Hebrew name, a name that has not been used before?  Or are we obliged to choose a name from Tanach or other long standing tradition?

This post does not address non-Hebrew names.  We discussed that here, where we reproduced and commented upon an article written by Dr. Steven Oppenheimer.  There is an obvious difference between modern Hebrew names which are clearly associated with the Jewish people, and non-Jewish names, which might be a sign of assimilation.  Right now we're focusing on non-traditional Hebrew names.

I titled this piece "Modern names for children" because I'm thinking of the name parents give a child- the name you use when you get an aliyah or the first name with which you identify yourself in a document.  Of course one can choose for himself a different name for other purposes.  Many people acquire or give themselves a name that is entirely unrelated to the name they were given at the bris/aliyah, even Jewish names that are different than their given name.  As the Medrash (קהלת רבה פ"ז) says, every person has three names; one that his parents give him, one that his associates give him, and one that is written in Heaven in his book of creation.
  "שלשה שמות נקראו לאדם. אחד שיקראו לו אביו ואמו אחד שקראו לו אחרים  ואחד שקרוי לו בספר תולדות ברייתו". 
But I am talking about what we think of as the "official" name.

Harav Chaim Kanievsky's opinion

Rav Chaim Kanievsky famously refuses to give a bracha to a person with a non-traditional name.  His adamant and strongly expressed opinion is documented in several books, including ויקרא שמו בישראל, and  שמות בארץ, and שמא גרים.  One very well known example of his position is his reaction to the name Shira.  When asked to give a bracha to a person with that name, his reaction is always the same- Shira is not a name, and the real name is Sarah.  Not only does he deny the validity of such names, but he says that names of modern coinage are null and void, and don't need to be changed to a proper name.  They don't exist.  All you need to do it choose an appropriate name.  He has told Shiras that their name is Sarah, he has told an Eliran that his name is Elchanan Eliahu, and he told a Zohar that his name is Meir.

This is how the author of Sheimos Ba'aretz quotes Reb Chaim.

האם נראה לכם שכדאי שבפרשת מצורע, נקרא לבננו בשם 'מצורע'? או שבפרשת  פרה נקרא לבת בשם 'פרה' ?", תהה מרן הגר"ח קניבסקי שליט"א, "ואם כן, מדוע בשבת שירה קוראים לבת 'שירה'?"ה... 

If you had a boy in the week of Parshas Metzora, would you name him "Metzora?" If you had a girl during Parshas Parah, would you name her "Parah?"  So why would someone call a girl born during the week of  Shabbas Shira "Shira?"
Rav Chaim holds that the only names that are valid are the names in Tanach or in Even Ezer siman 129.

Again from Reb Chaim: the gist of it is, as he is quoted saying, ' "והנה שמות שהמשוגעים המציאו, יש לבטלם לגמרי" which means that he disapproves of neologisms and wishes they would be completely eliminated.

 שאלו את הגר"ח מהו ההבדל בין השמות המודרניים, מכל השמות של האמוראים שנקראו בארמית, וכל נשות ישראל בכל הדורות נקראו בשמות באידיש, ומה ההבדל בין אידיש לעברית? וזאת ועוד, שהגמרא (יומא יא, ב) אומרת ששמותיהם של רוב היהודים בחו"ל הם משמות גויים, ורק על שמו של רשע מצאנו בגמרא (יומא לח, ב) שאין ראוי לקרוא על שמו? והשיב ע"כ הגר"ח קניבסקי: "שמות שמצאנו שכתוב בגמרא, שהתנאים והאמוראים נקראו בהם, אפשר לקוראם. אבל להוציא שמות חדשים, כמו שיש היום זה לא ראוי", והגר"ח הצביע על דברי המדרש שהבאנו לעיל. ועדיין דעתם של השואלים לא היתה נוחה מהענין והצביעו על כך שבדורות התנאים והאמוראים התחדשו כל הזמן שמות חדשים ובערי אשכנז היו קוראים תמיד בשמות חדשים, לפי השפה המדוברת, וגם בערי ארצות המזרח קראו היהודים לילדיהם בשמות מקומיים.  ועל כך השיב הגר"ח שליט"א: "מה שמצינו בדורות הקודמים שקראו מדעת עצמם, כנראה היה להם סיבות שקראו, ועל זה אין קושיה. אבל מה שבזמנינו קוראים שמות מדעת עצמם, אין לה ראוי לעשות. חז"ל אומרים לקרוא על שם אבותינו, ומה שהם קראו שמות אחרים, היתה להם סיבה אחרת. אבל סתם להמציא שמות, זה לא היה אף פעם ותמיד היה טעם לזה. כל השמות היו מאבותינו או מאבות אבותיהם, אבל לא מהגויים. היו שמות שהתחלפו מהגויים, אבל חלילה להמציא שמות". 

The first question everyone asks is "What about Rav Kanievsky's name, "Chaim?" Where do we find in Tanach or Shas that someone was named Chaim?

Reb Chaim was asked this question, and he answered that we find this name in a Teimani Medrash.  כמדומה באיזה ממדרשי תימן הקטנים .

However, we don't really know anything about the provenance of these Teimani Medrashim.  As Eli put it,

.....some of these Midrashim are actually compilations, ~1000 or less years old, so this could be as old as R. Chayim the Tosafist, or maybe even Rabbeinu Vidal of Toulouse (a.k.a. מגיד משנה).
Saint Vivian was a French bishop who lived during the Visigoth invasion of the 5th century. Around the same time, Flavius Vivianus was a consul of the Eastern Roman Empire.

Eli mentioned Rabbeinu Vidal and, lehavdil, Saint Vivian, because the names Vidal and Vivian both mean life, as does Chaim.  There are many names for Life- for women, this includes Chaya, Chava, Vita, Vida, and Zoe.

But Eli later wrote that he found a reliable source for the name "Chaim."

I found an earlier use of Chayim: the Sura Gaon Rav Tzamach bar Rav Chayim (d. 895 approx), probably pre-dates the unnamed midrash from Teiman.

I don't know for a fact why Rav Kanievsky feels so strongly about this issue.  When a parent names a child, the name is the product of love and deep emotion (especially the mother's,) and if he denies a parent's right to give voice to such intimate and deep feelings, I am sure that he has a good reason.   Nothing in this article should be misconstrued as disrespectful to Harav Kanievsky.  Anything he says would be at home in the Beis Medrash of Ravina and Rav Ashi.  I can only speculate and suggest possible explanations.

1.  The Medrash (Breishis 37:7) says that those generations that had Ruach HaKodesh would give their child a name that was informed by their destiny.  We, that do not have Ruach HaKodesh, just give names of our ancestors to our children.

"ולעבר יולד שני בנים שם האחד פלג כי בימיו נפלגה הארץ"    רבי יוסי ורשב"ג רבי יוסי אומר הראשונים על ידי שהיו מכירים את ייחוסיהם היו מוציאין שמן לשם המאורע אבל אנו שאין אנו מכירים את ייחוסינו אנו מוציאין לשם אבותינו רשב"ג אומר הראשונים על ידי שהיו משתמשין ברוח הקודש היו מוציאין לשם המאורע אבל אנו שאין אנו משתמשין ברוח הקודש אנו מוציאין לשם אבותינו א"ר יוסי בן חלפתא נביא גדול היה עבר שהוציא לשם המאורע הה"ד ולעבר יולד שני בנים וגו'

Perhaps, based on that Medrash, there are only those two options.  Either you have ruach hakodesh or you name after an ancestor.  No other option is valid.

2.  The Zohar and the Gemara in Yoma and the Rogotchover I've mentioned in the parts one and two of this series can be read to imply that a name influences a person's personality.  If so, one cannot risk making up a name, because he has no way of knowing what kind of influence this name will have.

3.  Perhaps HaRav Kanievsky holds like that because he feels that such names are a symptom of cultural anomie, like Latisha and Shaniqua and Shonda, and that he holds that the symptom aggravates the underlying problem, and that fighting the symptom will mitigate the problem.

Eli's comments here responding to these explanations need to be in the main body of the post:

1. I don't think the late 9th century Chayim is much more of a source than the 12th century R. Chayim. It only pre-dates the invention of the name (actually, the adoption of a Goyische name).
2. R.Ch.K saying modern coinages are null and void, and don't need to be changed is really nothing but strong rhetoric, as there is no formal process for changing a name, proper or not. The real test for his position would be if he would ignore a Get with a "null and void" name, or better, approve a Get with the "correct" Sara instead of the "null and void" Shira, before waiting 30 days as one should do for a regular name change. 
3. R. Yossi in Medrash cannot be used to support R.Ch.K. position, as we know for a fact names were invented much after R. Yossi's generation. All the sources for names affecting destiny are not strong enough against our Mesorah to invent names, and adopt Goyische names if they sound right. Ask Rabbi Bon.
4. Naming your son Shakil is not the same, in terms of Jewish identity, as naming him Tal or Zohar. I can see reasons to oppose the latter names, but based solely on לא שינו את שמם, using Zohar is much more distinctive than Yaacov (to be changed to Jacob in the workplace).

Regarding Eli's point 2, I should mention that Rabbi Meir Peikus just told me that when his son got married, the mesader kiddushin was Rav Aharon Shechter of Chaim Berlin.  They sat down to write the tna'im, and his mechutan told Rav Shechter that the Kallah's name was Ilana Rus.  Rav Shechter gave him a really hard time- Ilana is not a name!  What kind of name is Ilana?  Rabbi Peikus said that even if it is a taina, it's a taina that is twenty one years late.  They finally got Rav Shechter to move on by noting that at least her second name was Rus.
Regarding his fourth point, of course he's right.  A distinctive Hebrew name separates and identifies us as Jewish more than the common biblical names which are just as often used by non-Jews.  I would say that Reb Chaim views them as a product of Am Yisrael, not of Mesoras Yisrael- nationalistic rather than religious.  More importantly, and I think this is undeniably true, is that the tremendous increase in this kind of neologism since the advent of Zionism can be reasonably interpreted- in most cases- as a rejection of the Galus identity and an emphatic declaration (I would say asseveration) of the identity of "The New Jew."

Eli responded

I understand one can oppose modern names as a way to separate from modern Jews (religious and non-religious alike), or as demonstration of embracing the old-world as a reaction to the idea of the New Jew. לא שינו את שמם cannot be used as a source for that, only an inspiration.

Lest you, the reader, go away thinking that we're grasping at straws in suggesting a "movement" that wishes to recast Jewish identity, here are two illustrations of the idea of the creation of  the "New Jew."   Against this background, Harav Kanievsky's opinion becomes more understandable.

From the World Zionist Organization website:

For some Zionists, especially the East European Jewish intellectuals, Zionism was not only a national movement committed to the establishment of a Jewish homeland. It also wished to create a modern, secular Jewish identity. According to this formulation it was not religion that was to provide the basis for Jewish identity but ethnicity and nationalism. The Hebrew language, the land of Israel, Jewish history, literature, customs, folklore and their interplay were to provide a new more open-ended paradigm for Jewish identity.

From historian Rabbi Ken Spiro's essay on Modern Zionism:

The key factor which shaped their [secular Zionist thinkers] worldview was a nationalism based not only on the notion of creating a physical Jewish homeland, but also of creating a new kind of Jew to build and maintain this homeland. Many of these early Zionist thinkers felt that centuries of ghettoization and persecution had robbed the Jews of their pride and strength. To build a homeland required a proud, self-sufficient Jew: a Jew who could farm, defend himself, and build the land.The pious, poor, ghettoized Jew—who presented a pathetic image of a man stooped-over and always at the mercy of his persecutors—had to be done away with. To build a state required something all-together different—a “Hebrew.” The early Zionists called themselves “Hebrews” and not Jews, and deliberately changed their German or Russian or Yiddish names to sound more Hebraic and nationalistic (for example, David Gruen became David Ben-Gurion. Shimon Persky became Shimon Perez). It was a deliberate attempt to create a totally new Jewish identity and rid themselves of any aspect of the religious, Diaspora Jewish identity…These early Zionist leaders knew of course that religion had preserved Jewish identity in the ghettos and shtetls of Europe, but in the modern Jewish state, they felt there would be no need for it. Of course the Bible would be used as a source of Jewish history and culture but there was no room for religion or ritual in the modern Jewish state.

I would only add that not everyone that names their daughter Shira intends a militant rejection of tradition.  One of my daughters in law is a Shira, and her parents are fine upstanding Lakewood people.  My niece's name is Yonit and her fathers for at least four generations back have been roshei yeshiva.  Rav Gifter named his daughter Shlomis to celebrate the end of WW II, and not after Ms. Divri.  I think this is an Eretz Yisrael thing, a land where everything becomes political and polarized.  If you need a bracha for someone that has a modern name, go to someone other than HaRav Kanievsky.

And let us emphasize

Reb Moshe Feinstein's opinion 

Although we began with Harav Kanievsky's opinion, most communities follow Reb Moshe Feinstein's much milder approach.

His Teshuvos on this issue are in EH 3:35. OC 4:66, and OC 5:10. The gist of what he says is that lechatchila, a name should reflect our Jewish heritage.  Non-Jewish names are very inappropriate and would never be approved of by Gedolei Yisrael.   

 עצם הדבר שמשנים את שמותיהם לשמות נכרים וודאי הוא דבר מגונה מאוד .... אבל איסור ממש לא מצינו בזה   Reb Moshe does not say that it had no validity as a name for the first person that had it, just that it was wrong for the person that named him to give a non-Jewish name.  Furthermore, once a person was given such a name, it becomes kosher for his or her descendants, because that person's children should honor and perpetuate the original bearer of the name.  

He proposes that the value of לא שינו was only when that was the only flag of identity, which wouldn't apply after Mattan Torah, because now the Taryag mitzvos adequately distinguish us, but he says he is not sure that this rationale is reliable le'halacha.  He therefore strongly discourages giving names that are not part of the Jewish heritage.

Reb Moshe does not even address modern Hebrew names.  He only talks about the legitimacy and appropriateness of non-Jewish names, but his criticisms of non-Jewish names would not apply to modern Hebrew names.

On the other hand, when Reb Moshe's daughter in law wanted to name her daughter Aviva, after an Avraham, Reb Moshe said that Aviva doesn't make any sense.  It's not a word- it's either Aviv or it doesn't mean anything.  So he said that if you want to name a girl after an Avraham, you should name her Ahuva, because the Hei is the most important letter.

Along those lines, I also would add that, as I mention in the comments, I have a very hard time with feminized theophoric names.  For example: Gavriel is a compound word comprising Gevura and El, Strength and God.  El is God.  God is expressed in the male gender.  To call someone Gavrielah is a gender change which , in my opinion, is bizarre and grotesque.  I don't buy the explanation that the name is given to remember a person named Gavriel.  One must remember the original source of the name, and not do violence to its meaning.

An Afterword

Finally, I want to put in a comment that someone wrote in when I posted this in an earlier form.  I'm putting it in here mostly because I like the forthright manner and the tone of his comment.  I don't necessarily agree that his point applies to all of our sub-groups, but it's a shrewd observation.  

shimonmatisyahu said...Look, as per some of the past comments, I don't know when the name Shira began being used. But what I do know, such as with my ancestry, while the boys were given regular one or two Hebrew names, the girls were thrown some Yiddish sounding word as a name that really had no meaning to it. Another difference of naming between genders that I have seen is that tons of girls are named Chava, but it is rare to find a guy in the frum world with the name Odom, because "it is not a name of a Yid". So another words, since females aren't looked upon as holy as males, it is OK to call them Chava even if the first Chava wasn't Jewish, but a "Ben Torah" should not be given the "goyishe" name Odom.

Basically, what he saying is that while a boy's name is given serious thought, because he embodies the family's honor and he needs to present a public image of authority and strength, some people name daughters like they name their pets.


Lists of Modern Hebrew Names

A very nice list in English is available here.  This list is a section of a massive collection of names from many cultures and nationalities.  A similar list in Hebrew, which includes and labels both modern and traditional names, is available here.

The Profound Significance of Naming a Child

(This post is the second of a three part series focusing on naming children.   Part one discussed the proper time to name a daughter.  Part three will discuss the debate about modern Hebrew names.)

How important is the moment that a child is given a name?

The best way to begin this discussion is by quoting a remarkable halacha from the Drisha.  (The Drisha is the name of a gloss on the Tur, written by Rav Yehoshua Falk, a student of the Rama and the Maharshal.  He is also the author of the Prisha and the Sma, and was one of the great community leaders of his time, the founding member of the Vaad Arba Ha'aratzos.) 
The Drisha is in YD 360 (easy to remember, it's Shin Samach, Shas.) The halacha there deals with precedence: If a person has several events that he ought to attend, and he has to chose which to attend first, (also, possibly, where he can only do one but not both, which would broaden the discussion to include not only precedence but also priority,) which event has precedence?  The occasions listed include bikkur cholim, attending a funeral, nichum aveilim, accompanying a Chasan or Kallah to the Chupa, attending a Sheva Brachos, and going to a Bris. I'm not going to write the list, because there are many qualifying factors.  But, all things being equal, the halacha is that Bris Milah comes before Chasan and Kallah. The Drisha says that attending the naming of a girl has a status equal to attending a Bris Milah.  The same way that attending a Bris has precedence over attending to simchas chasan v'kallah, so too, attending a girl-naming has precedence over simchas chasan v'kallah. 

Please note that even though I say "the naming of a girl," the gender of the child is irrelevant.  When the Drisha says that the naming ceremony is of equal weight to that of a bris, he is referring to the naming of a child in general.  His assertion only has practical relevance for the naming of a girl, because a boy is usually named at his Bris.  But the rule is gender neutral.  It is the naming of a child that the Drisha highlights.

We all realize the enormous significance of a Bris Milah.  In the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, one siman (YD 260) is entirely dedicated to the statement that the Mitzva of Bris is uniquely important- "מצוות עשה לאב למול את בנו, וגדולה מצווה זו משאר מצוות עשה".  It is so unusually important that one who does not attend the festive celebration of a Bris to which he was invited is viewed as if he were in a state of excommunication (YD 265:12.)   In light of this extraordinary significance, one would think that merely naming a child is far less meaningful.   Thus, the Drisha's statement, made without any citation, is very novel.  In fact, the lack of a citation indicates that the Drisha held its truth to be self evident.

How are we to understand the profound significance the Drisha attaches to the naming of a child?


1. The Giving of a Name reflects significance and a meaningful destiny.   Being Called a name means that you have a Calling. 

          A.  The Rashba
The Rashba (Teshuvos 4:30) was asked why the Torah lists the names of the predecessors of Avraham Avinu in a form that is different from the one used elsewhere in the Torah.  In most places, the Torah says "a child was born and he was given a name."  Here, most of the names are listed, but it does not say "was born to X and he called him/gave him the name Y."  
He answers that a name relates to permanence, to firm establishment.  Something that is ephemeral and insubstantial does not really have a name.  Therefore, until Sheis was born to Adam, none of the children are introduced with the "and he called him...." form.  Only when Sheis, who was the progenitor of all mankind, was named, does it use that form.  His son, Enosh, also was of such a significance as to merit this usage.  But the descendants of Enosh, till Noach, where utterly without significance.  Noach, who survived the Mabul and was the progenitor of all that lived after the Mabul, also is "given a name."  After Noach, in that the permanence of the world was guaranteed, there was no need to use the phrase "gave him a name." 

 שו"ת הרשב"א חלק ד סימן ל

שאלת: למה אמר הכתוב, בכל אותם הדורות שהיו מאדם עד אברהם אבינו ע"ה, בענין התולדות: ויולד פלוני לפלוני, ולא אמר: ויולד לפלוני בן, ויקרא את שמו פלוני.

תשובה: דע, כי קריאת השם, יורה על הקיום. ובדבר המתפסד, ואין לו קיום, אין ראוי לקרות לו שם.
 ויורה ע"ז: 'שם רשעים ירקב', 'ולא שם לו על פני חוץ'. וההפך: 'ונתתי להם בבתי ובחומותי יד ושם', 'לפני שמש ינון שמו'. ועל כן, תמצא דקדוק הכתוב כל התולדות שנולדו מאדם ועד שת, שנמחו כולם, ולא נשאר להם שורש, לא הזכיר בא' מהם: ויקרא את שמו, עד שנולד שת. ומפני שנשתת ממנו העולם, כתוב בו: וידע אדם עוד את אשתו, ותלד בן. ותקרא את שמו שת: כי שת לי אלהים זרע אחר. וכתב הטעם בצדו: כי שת לי אלהים זרע אחר תחת הבל. שזה זרע אחר שיש לו קיום, תחת הבל, כי הרגו קין, ואין לו קיום, ולא נשתת זרעו. וללמד: כי מזה נשתת העולם, ולתולדותיו יהיה קיום. והוא שאמר: ולשת גם הוא יולד בן, ויקרא את שמו אנוש. אח"כ חזר והזכיר התולדות עד נח. ומפני שאף תולדות אלו גם כן נמחו במבול, ולא נשאר מהם רק נח, חזר שלא להזכיר בהם קריאת שם. ונח, שנשאר ונתקיים ממנו העולם, חזר ואמר בו קריאת שם. דכתיב: ויחי למך וגו', ויולד בן. ויקרא את שמו נח לאמר: זה ינחמנו. ואחרי שהיה לעולם קיום, ולא נשחתו הדורות אח"כ, אלא שנחלקו לאומות, לא הקפיד בקריאת השם.

The lesson of the Rashba is that not the name, but the act of giving a name, is associated with a significant life and a lasting legacy.  One might say that the Rashba holds that קריאת שם, calling a name, means that this child has a calling.  If the child has no "calling," there's no point in calling him anything.

With the Rashba we understand precisely the tefilla said at a bris, a tefilla quoted by the Rishonim ר"ש מגרמייזא and ר"י ב"ר יקר.  When we name the child, we say 

קיים את הילד הזה לאביו ולאמו ויקרא שמו בישראל כך. 

Hashem, firmly establish the child to his parents, and his name will be called, in the nation of Israel, .....  What does this introduction mean?  With the Rashba, it becomes crystal clear.  קיום- permanence and significance- is strongly related to the act of giving a name.  (Similarly, the Gemara in Nedarim 32a says that the act of the Bris Milah gives "Kiyum", permanence, to the Heaven and Earth.)  Therefore we say קיים את הילד הזה לאביו ולאמו ויקרא שמו- give this child קיום now as we give him his name.  

Getting back to our topic:  This Rashba might explain why the naming of a child is so meaningful.  Before the act of naming, the child was, in some spiritual sense, ephemeral and not a significant and lasting part of the fabric of our world.  With the naming of a child, the world has changed.

          B.  The Rogotchover.

The Rogotchover, in Breishis 2:19-20 says that the true name of a thing is the quality that distinguishes it from whatever is not it. When a thing loses its particular quality or specific function it loses its name. (He also discussed this in Bechukosai on vehishbati chaya raa, where there is a machlokes Reb Yehuda and Reb Shimon whether this means physical elimination or that the animals will remain, but, for example,  the lion will no longer be a predator; and that Reb Yehuda is leshitaso that ein biur chametz ella sreifa.) I believe that the naming of a child is the moment when that neshama's true tafkid/yiud/purpose is determined. That unique purpose is a vital component of God's plan and it can be achieved only by this person. This primal occasion, when a person's part in the world is established, is a moment of significance shared by every fellow human being.

          C.  The Maharal

The Maharal in Gevuros Hashem says, similarly, that a name is related to the essence of a thing or person.  It's interesting to see how the Maharal echoes the Rashba; he says that a true name, such as Moshe Rabbeinu's, is so deep and spiritual as to be undiminished by time and unaffected by tribulation.
We find this idea expressed almost exactly the same way in Reb Chaim Volozhiner's Ruach Chaim in the beginning of the first perek of Avos.
Similarly, Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch (Breishis 2:19) says the word Shem (name) comes from the word Sham (place). A person's name (Shem) indicates his place in the world. When someone is given a name, that name has a profound effect on that person's essence. 

          D.  Reb Meir

The Gemara in Yoma 83b says that Reb Meir knew the hidden soul of a person just by knowing his name.  (His fellow students from Reb Akiva's yeshiva, Reb Yosi and Reb Yehuda, did not do any such thing.)  They once had some involvement with a man named Kidor, and Reb Meir saw in that name a wickedness, and he was on guard against him.  Reb Yosi and Reb Yehuda disregarded this omen, and it almost caused them a great loss.  This relates to the idea of a name being a manifestation of a person's spiritual essence.

רבי מאיר ורבי יהודה ורבי יוסי הוו קא אזלי באורחא, רבי מאיר הוה דייק בשמא רבי יהודה ורבי יוסי לא הוו דייקו בשמא. כי מטו לההוא דוכתא בעו אושפיזא, יהבו להו. אמרו לו: מה שמך? - אמר להו: כידור. - אמר: שמע מינה אדם רשע הוא, שנאמר 'כִּי דוֹר תַּהְפֻּכֹת הֵמָּה בָּנִים לֹא אֵמֻן בָּם'. רבי יהודה ורבי יוסי אשלימו ליה כיסייהו רבי מאיר לא אשלים ליה כיסיה. אזל אותביה בי קיבריה דאבוה אתחזי ליה בחלמיה: תא שקיל כיסא דמנח ארישא דההוא גברא. למחר אמר להו: הכי אתחזי לי בחלמאי! אמרי ליה: חלמא דבי שמשי לית בהו ממשא. אזל רבי מאיר, ונטריה כולי יומא ואייתיה. למחר אמרו לו: הב לן כיסן! אמר להו: לא היו דברים מעולם. אמר להו רבי מאיר: אמאי לא דייקיתו בשמא? אמרו ליה: אמאי לא אמרת לן מר? אמר להו: אימר דאמרי אנא חששא, אחזוקי מי אמרי? משכוהו ועיילוהו לחנותא, חזו טלפחי אשפמיה, אזלו ויהבו סימנא לדביתהו, ושקלוהו לכיסייהו ואייתו. אזל איהו וקטליה לאיתתיה. היינו דתניא: מים ראשונים האכילו בשר חזיר, מים אחרונים הרגו את הנפש. ולבסוף הוו דייקי בשמא, כי מטו לההוא ביתא דשמיה בלה, לא עיילו לגביה. אמרי: שמע מינה רשע הוא, דכתיב "וָאֹמַר לַבָּלָה נִאוּפִים" (יחזקאל כג).

          E.  The Medrash Rabba

The Medrash Rabba (Breishis 37:25) says that those generations that had Ruach HaKodesh would give their child a name that was informed by their destiny.  We, who do not have Ruach HaKodesh, just give names of our ancestors to our children.

"ולעבר יולד שני בנים שם האחד פלג כי בימיו נפלגה הארץ" ר' יוסי אומר: הראשונים על ידי שהיו מכירים יחסיהם היו מוציאים לשם המאורע, אבל אנו שאין אנו יודעין את יחסינו אנו מוציאין לשם אבותינו. רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר: הראשונים על ידי שהיו משתמשין ברוח הקודש היו מוציאין לשם המאורע אבל אנו שאין אנו משתמשין ברוח הקודש אנו מוציאין לשם אבותינו. אמר ר' יוסי בר' חלפתא נביא גדול היה עבר שהוציא לשם המאורע.

I hope that you noticed that the Reb Yosi that says that the early generations used to give a name that was informed by Ruach Hakodesh, but that we just name for our ancestors, is the same Reb Yosi in Yoma 83b who initially ignored Reb Meir's warning that a person's name reflects their personality.  Apparently, Reb Yosi holds that because we no longer have Ruach Hakodesh, the names we give our children don't show anything about them, and Reb Meir holds that for some reason it still does.  Alternatively, everyone agrees that a name does say something about the person, but Reb Yosi holds that the predilections a person was born with do not determine what he will be when he matures, and Reb Meir was a Determinist (at least as far as taking risks was concerned.  Reb Meir certainly didn't deny that Bechira enables a person to change, but, as Damon Runyon said, “The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, but that's how the smart money bets.”  Or, in Reb Meir's own words, ?אימר דאמרי אנא חששא, אחזוקי מי אמרי)  In the end, though, the Gemara in Yoma does say that Reb Yosi did pay attention to the implications of a person's name.  It's hard to know whether the Medrash is the pre-Kidor Reb Yosi or the post-Kidor Reb  Yosi.

Furthermore, we need to mention that although the Medrash says that the Ruach Hakodesh of naming a child no longer pertains, the Arizal held that it does.

האר"י ז"ל כותב ב"שער הגילגולים" (פנ"ט) ש"השם שקוראים לו אביו ואמו בעת שנימול, הוא נכתב למעלה בכסא הכבוד וכך הוא נקרא באקראי, כי הקב"ה מזמין אותו השם בפי אביו ואמו שיקראוהו כן,  ולכן רבי מאיר ורבי יהושע בדקו בשמא".

See also ספר הגלגולים הקדמה כ"ג,

 ונמצא כי  כאשר נולד האדם, וקוראים לו אביו ואמו שם אחד העולה בדעתם, אינו באקראי ובהזדמן, כי אם הקב״ה משים בפיו השם ההוא המוכרח אל הנשמה ההיא, כמש״ה אשר שם שמות בארץ, כפי מקום האבר שבאדם העליון, אשר ממנו חוצב, והשם הזה נרשם למעלה בכסא הכבוד כגודע, ולכן ארז״ ל  שמא גרים. נם זהו טעם  של ר׳ יהושע ן׳ קרחה ור״מ  דהוו בדקי בשמא.

and the אור החיים דברים כ"ט י"ז kind of says it-

 ואומרו ומחה הי את שמו מתחת השמים . דע כי שורש נשמות האדם יסודותם בהררי קודש תחת השמים בסוד השמים כסאי והנשמות הם חצובות מתחת כסא כבודו יתברך והבן . וכבר ידעת סוד השם כי היא הנשמה וכמו שהארכנו במקומות אחרים ואמר הכתוכ על המשתרר בלבבו ומחה ה׳ שמו שהיא נשמתו משרשה שהיא תחת השמים וזו היא כריתות הנפש משרשה :

and עמק המלך שער א' סוף פרק ד, but I didn't see that one inside, so don't blame me if he doesn't say it.

Who knows?  Maybe it's worth coming to a naming of a child simply to be in the presence of a person that is being touched by Ruach Hakodesh, as the Arizal says he is.

          F.  The Yalkut 
The Yalkut Shimoni in Yeshayahu 449 (in Perek 41) says that if mankind would only have merited it, Hashem would give every person a name, and from that name his character and his behavioral traits would be known.

מי פעל ועשה קורא הדורת מראש -

אלו זכו הדורות היה הקב"ה קורא שמותם, כשם שקרא לאדם ולחוה, שנאמר: ויקרא את שמם אדם. וכן אתה מוצא, כשהיה הקב"ה רואה צדיק נולד, הוא בכבודו היה קורא שמו. קרא לאברהם: והיה שמך אברהם.וכן ליצחק: וקראת את שמו יצחק. וכן ליעקב: והיה שמך ישראל. 

וכן לשלמה: כי שלמה יהיה שמו.וכן ליאשיה: הנה בן נולד לבית דוד יאשיהו שמו. 

ואלו זכו הדורות היה הקב"ה קורא שם לכל אחד ואחד ומשמו היו יודעים את טיבו ואת מעשיו

וכן אתה מוצא במצרים: אלה משפחות לוי משפחת הלבני - על שם טיט ולבנים.משפחת השמעי ששמע הקב"ה את תפלתם.משפחת החברוני - שנתחברה להם שכינה. 

אמרו רבותינו: כשהיה רבי מאיר רואה אדם היה למד שמו ומשמו היה יודע את מעשיו. פעם אחת באו אצלו שני תלמידים והיה שם אחד מהם כידור. אמר רבי מאיר לתלמידיו: הזהרו מכידור זה!אמרו לו: רבי, בן תורה הוא. אמר להם: אעפ"כ הזהרו ממנו. אחר ימים הלכו למרחץ והפקידו בגדיהם אצל כידור ונכנסו למרחץ. מה עשה אותו כידור? נטל בגדיהם והלך לו, יצאו ולא מצאוהו הלכו לבתיהם ולבשו בגדים אחרים. באו לפני ר' מאיר, א"ל: מה ראיתם להחליף בגדיכם? ספרו לו המאורע. א"ל: לא אמרתי לכם הזהרו עצמכם מכידור זה!אמרו לו: בבקשה ממך רבינו, מנין היית יודע? אמר: משמו שנקרא כידור, שנאמר: כי דור תהפוכות המה. 

NOTE: 
It is important to realize that there might be two disparate approaches in these Medrashim.  One is that the Ruach Hakodesh of giving a name enables a person to identify the essential personality and life-purpose of the child.  The other approach is that the name alludes to what the future holds for that child-  of Ruach HaKodesh gives a person an omniscient awareness which enables him to "remember" the child in the context of his life experience, even before that experience has taken place.  For example, this is the opinion of the Tiferes Yisrael in Shekalim 6:1, where he says that many kings' names reflected their life experience, and they were named to reflect that which was later to come.

ועל שם כך נקרא יאשיהו, רוצה לומר, כבר נתייאש הקב"ה מהם. וכמו כן רוב המלכים כשתדקדק בהם תמצא ששמם מורה על פי מה שאירע בימיהם. שאול, ע"ש ששאלו העם מלך, והוא היה רק נשאל להם משבט אחר, כי לא הבשילו אשכלות שבט יהודה עדיין, ופרשת 'אשימה עלי מלך' אכלוהו ישראל פגה, כי קודם לזמן הראוי שאלוהו. דוד ע"ש דודיו ואהבתו לעמו, כאמרו "תהי ידך בי ובבית אבי" לא כשאול שהתאכזר להרוג עיר ואם בישראל מנער ועד זקן. שלמה על שם השלום שהיה בימיו. ירבעם ירב עם, שעשו ריב ומרידה על ידו. רחבעם רע חב עם, או רחב עם, שנתרחבו מתחת צמצום אחדות מלכות בית דוד. אסא על שם הרופאים אשר דרש. יהושפט על שם משפט ה' אשר העמיד בכל עיר, ויאמר להשופטים אשר העמיד ראו מה אתם עושים כי לה' תשפוטו. אחזיהו, אחזו יהוא, כי נשבה מיהוא. יואש, שכבר היה מיואש זרע בית דוד, וסברו כולם כי השמידה אותם עתליה. אמציהו, כי אמצו ה' נגד אדום. עזריה, על שם שעזרו א-לוקים. ונקרא ג"כ עוזיהו, על שם עוז ה' כי היה הרעש בימיו. חזקיהו, על שם שחזקהו ה' נגד סנחריב ומחליו. מנשה, כי נשה ממקומו לשוב. יהויקים, כי הקים ה' אויבו עליו להשחית. צדקיהו כי צדיק היה, והצדיק דין שמים עליו לומר צדיק הוא ה' כי פיהו מריתי. וכפי הנראה נקרא שם המלכים ביום לידתם על פי נביא. והארכתי קצת זה כאן אף שאינו מקומו, לבעבור כי פלא הוא 

The Tiferes Yisrael says that the events that inform the names stem from occurrences that are entirely extraneous to the personality or character of the person.

On the other hand, it is equally possible that the Medrashim do not disagree at all.  They mean to say that the person's essential character and life-purpose inexorably and inevitably lead to a life-experience that expresses that character and purpose.  The Yalkut in Yeshayahu that says that the Livni family got their name because they worked with bricks (הלבני - על שם טיט ולבנים) might mean that they gravitated to that work because of an inherent predisposition.

2.  Naming a child is a Meta-Mitzva

          A.  Reb Moshe

Reb Moshe, (Igros vol 7, EH 4:102) says that perhaps our naming of a child is a sort of Mitzva that is related to Hashem telling Adam Harishon to name all the creatures.

אגר"מ אה"ע ח"ד קב

קריאת שם לבת היא כשם הבנים שהוא רצון השי"ת שיקראו שמות אע"פ שאין על זה ציווי, ויתכן אף דהוא בכלל הציווי לאדה"ר שיקרא שמות, ולדורות נשאר רצון וציווי זה. ולכן הנהיגו אבותינו ורבותינו מדורות הראשונים שיקראו שם הבנות ג"כ בקדושה בשעת קרה"ת ובבקשת רחמים עליה. 

...naming a daughter is like naming a son, it is the will of Hashem names should be given, even though there is no specific commandment to do so.  It is reasonable to say that this is included in the commandment to Adam to give names, and for all generations this will of Hashem and commandment remained.  This is why our forefathers and teachers from the early times led us to give names to daughters in a time of holiness, when we read from the Torah, and while asking that Hashem be merciful with her.

The idea that this is the will of Hashem makes it what I think of as a super-Mitzva- something that is not listed among the Taryag, but might be so fundamental that it is more meaningful than and stands above the Taryag mitzvos in general.  Another example of a Meta-Mitzva is tikun hamidos, which might be the whole tachlis of man's existence (See Reb Itzaleh Volozhiner's intro to his father's Ruach Chaim,) but is not the subject of any particular mitzva.
If so, this approach might validate the parity the Drisha gives to attending a Bris Milah and attending the naming of a child.

3.  Naming a child concretizes the bond with the parents and Klal Yisrael.

             A.   Rabbeinu Nachshon Gaon
The Rosh, (פ״ג דמ״ק ס״ס פח)  and other Rishonim (see Ramban in Toras Ha'Adam,) bring a minhag from the Gaon Rabbeinu Nachshon:

ינוקא דאיתילד והוא בר תרן או תלתא או ארבעה יומין רגילין וגמירי כי נח נפשיה מהלין ליה על קבריה ולא מברכין על המילה ומסקי ליה שמא דכי מרחמין מן שמיא והוי תחית המתים ליהוי ידיע ינוקא ומבחן ליה לאבוה, וכן הביא גם הרא"ש פ"ג דמו"ק סי' קל"ה בשם רב נחשון ע״כ.

He says that in the tragic event of a child's death after a few days, the minhag is to make a bris at the cemetery and name the child there before the burial.  More interesting, he says that it is this naming that will enable the child and the parents to recognize each other at Techiyas Hameishim.
See also here, especially in notes 222 and 224.
This is brought lehalacha in YD 263:8.

תינוק שמת קודם שיגיע להיות בן ח' מלין אותו על קברו בצור או בקנה ואין מברכין על המילה אבל משימים לו שם לזכר שירחמוהו מן השמים ויחיה בתחיית המתים: 

What would the minhag be with a girl?  It should be obvious that the naming would take place for a girl as well.  It is not the bris itself that creates a permanent bond, it is the act of naming and making a part of the family.  For a boy, that requires two actions, both giving a name and making a bris, because the bris milah is a part of enfolding a male child into the nation of Israel.  For a girl, it is giving a name alone that creates that permanent bond.  The act of giving a name concretizes the relationship of that child to its family and to Klal Yisrael.  This explains the Drisha as well.  Giving a name accomplishes precisely that which a bris accomplishes.

I don't want it to sound like saying that a child that never got a name is meaningless.  What I understand them to be saying is that a child that was never named is pure neshama without any meaningful bond to this physical world.  Naming bonds the neshama to the physical world.  Only after such a bond is created does a relationship with the parents have meaning.

4.  Having a name makes receiving Bracha possible; the name is a window to the soul.

          A.  The Ramban 
The Ramban (Bamidbar 1:32) says

 ועוד כי הבא לפני אב הנביאים ואחיו קדוש ה' והוא נודע אליהם בשמו יהיה לו בדבר הזה זכות וחיים, כי בא בסוד העם ובכתב בני ישראל וזכות הרבים במספרם, וכן לכולם זכות במספר שימנו לפני משה ואהרן כי ישימו עליהם עינם לטובה, יבקשו עליהם רחמים

The Ramban discusses why it was necessary for Moshe Rabbeinu to know each person's name when he was counted, as recounted in the beginning of Bamidbar.  He says that it is through knowing the person's name that Moshe and Aharon could know their secret soul and give them a true bracha.

Rav Shamshon Refael Hirsch toward the beginning of Bamidbar discusses the idea that a person's name is a window to his soul, but I don't have the exact MM in front of me.

5.  The Mysterious שבוע הבת

          A.  Eli's suggestion.  
In the original of this post, Eli brought an opinion that the expression שבוע הבת might refer to the naming of a daughter.  This is what he said:

Ramban in Torat Ha'adam (p.109 in Shevvel's edition) brings a Beraita that could have been the Drish'a source. In there it says "שבוע הבן ושבוע הבת, שבוע הבן קודם". We have no clue what שבוע הבת is, but some speculate that it's a Naming occasion (If one so wishes, it can be argued that based on this Naming should be delayed to the eighth day, or to the next Shabbat), and we see it is comparable to שבוע הבן, which some Rishonim explain as Mila.

6.  The Nusach of the Mi Shebeirach when naming a daughter.

Reb Moshe has his own nusach for this mi shebeirach, as follows: Please note, this is all one nusach, and he goes straight from the mi shebeirach for the health of the mother to the naming of the daughter.

,מי שברך אבותינו אברהם יצחק ויעקב משה אהרן דוד ושלמה הוא יברך את האשה היולדת פלונית בת פלונית עם בתה הנולדה לה למזל טוב בעבור שבעלה עלה לתורה בשכר וה הקב"ה ימלא רחמים עליה להחלימה ולרפאותה ולהחזיקה ולהחיותה וישלח לה מהרה רפואה שלימה מן השמים לכל אבריה וגידיה בתוך שאר חולי ישראל רפואת הנפש ורפיאת הגוף השתא בעגלא ובזמן קריב.     ואת בתה הנולדה לה למזל טוב לאורך ימים ושנים יקרא שמה בישראל פלונית בת פלוני ויזכו אביה ואמה לגדלה לחופה ולמעשים טובים ונאמר אמן. 

He adds that one may change the nusach from "l'gadla l'chupa u'l'maasim tovim" to "legadla l'Torah u'l'ven Torah u'l'maasim tovim.

והרוצה יוכל להוסיף ויזכו אביה ואמה לגדלה לתורה ולבן תורה לחופה ולמעשים טובים