I just came across an article in Israel National News titled
Stop worrying about Gazan civilians
One cannot find any moral hand-wringing among the classic Bible commentators when fighting the enemy.
by Dr. Elliott Resnick (former chief editor of The Jewish Press.)
In that article, he writes
“We don’t target civilians,” Israel’s leaders announce with great vigor.
Indeed, they don’t. But they have no moral obligation to pursue this policy. Indeed, they arguably have a moral obligation to abandon it as it often endangers the lives of Israeli soldiers.
Halakhic expert Rabbi Chaim Jachter writes, “Rav Shaul Yisraeli [who served on Israel’s Supreme Rabbinical Court] notes that ‘We do not find the obligation in war to distinguish between blood and blood (combatants and non-combatants). In the course of war, when laying siege to a city and the like, there is no obligation to make such distinctions.’”
True, the Sifri requires that we leave an escape route when besieging a city, but the Ramban notes that this rule only applies in optional wars. It doesn’t apply in obligatory wars such as the one we’re now fighting in Gaza.
In Contemporary Halakhic Problems (volume 3), prominent posek Rabbi J. David Bleich writes, “Not only does one search in vain for a ruling prohibiting military activity likely to result in the death of civilians, but to this writer’s knowledge, there exists no discussion in classical rabbinic sources that takes cognizance of the likelihood of causing civilian casualties in the course of hostilities legitimately undertaken as posing a halakhic or moral problem.”
Likewise, the Torah contains no record of Bnei Yisrael risking their lives to save those of enemy civilians. On the contrary, it records them fighting fiercely to achieve victory. And in doing so, they often targeted non-combatants (even if we leave aside their wars of extermination against Amalek and the seven Canaanite nations, which were waged on G-d’s explicit command).
When our ancestors fought against Midian, for example, they killed every man, every boy, and practically every woman (for seducing Jewish men). One cannot find any moral hand-wringing over this massacre among the classic Bible commentators.
The scholars cited have earned their recognition as talmidei chachamim, and the article's author is well known as a prudent and judicious individual, if, perhaps, less than phlegmatic. But it bears pointing out that, coincidentally, this issue is addressed by the mefarshim specifically in this week's parsha, and in several other places as well.
In Vayishlach, you have the conflicts of Yaakov against Eisav, and of Shimon and Levi against Shechem.
ויירא יעקב מאוד ויצר לו
In Vayishlach, Breishis 32:8, it says
ויירא יעקב מאוד ויצר לו
Rashi -
ויירא שמא יהרג, ויצר לו שמא יהרוג אחרים
The Mizrachi and the Maharal/Gur Aryeh say that Yaakov could not have been distressed over the prospect of killing Eisav if he refused the gifts and proceeded with murderous intent, because in that case, killing Eisav to protect himself would be a positive moral obligation.
According to the Mizrachi, even Eisav's cohort would be equally liable, even if Eisav had forced them to join his army, because duress does not excuse retzicha- רציחה is יהרג ואל יעבור. What bothered Yaakov Avinu was that while he, as Eisav's target, was not precluded from using disproportionate force against Eisav (the target of the murderer is given an absolute legal sanction to kill the rodeif by any means he chooses- השכם להרגו without consideration of alternative methods of protecting himself,) he is prohibited from using excessive force to protect others from those who pursue them (להציל את הנרדף באחד מאבריו של רודף). To protect others, one is obligated to limit the defense to what is necessary. Yaakov was afraid that in the heat of war, he would just kill everyone like a berserker, without considering that he could stop them by injuring them.
ויצר לו שמא יהרוג אחרים. ב"ר י"מ שמא יהרוג את עשו ויקללנו אביו וכן מצאתי בתנחומא אבל מהריגתן של אחרים לא היה מצר מפני שהבא להורגך השכם להורגו .... וא"ת והלא עשו גברא אלמא הוה ושמא הביאם בעל כרחם. י"ל אפי' הכי לא היה להם לשמוע לו... אך קשה דילמא לא להרוג אותו נתכוונו אלא להרוג האחרים שהיו עמו דהשת' לית בהו משום הבא להרגך השכם להרגו אלא משום רודף והרודף אחר חבירו להרגו אין הורגין אותו אלא כשאינן יכולין להציל את הנרדף באחד מאיבריו של רודף בשיקטעו ידו או רגלו וכיוצא בהם שאז ניתן רשו' לרודף להציל את הנרדף בנפשו של רודף אעפ"י שעדין לא הרג הרודף את הנרדף כמו ששנינו בסיפרי אליבא דחכמים אבל אם היה יכול להציל את הנרדף בא' מאבריו ועבר והרגו הוא כרוצח גמור לפיכך צ"ל דויצר לו שמא יהרוג את אחרים לאו אעשו לחודיה קאי אלא אכולהו
Bottom line:
According to the Mizrachi, war allows only what is necessary to end the threat. Killing an attacker when injuring him would stop the threat is a sin. Because niceties and nuance in war is suicidal, in practice one does what is necessary, even at the expense of the totally innocent. But the true halacha requires limiting force.
According to the Rambam brought in the Maharal (also brought in the Rosh al haTorah there,) the citizenry is not innocent; they are guilty of not stopping their leaders. As the Maharal points out, this ought to be limited to individuals who have the power to do something, (and involves the political question whether authoritarians and dictators are really the expression of the will of the people, and opposition to their rule is only the desire to re-order the system, not to change the system, like the French revolution was followed by the Terror and ultimately by Napoleon,) and certainly not the women and children.
According to the Maharal by Yaakov vs. Eisav, anyone who opposes the war and poses no threat deserves to live. But the reality of war mandates that if he did not run away, he has knowingly exposed himself to death. At most, according to the Maharal, killing him, while justified in time of war, is a דחוייה, and not a הותרה, and as such, remains an עבירה, albeit a necessary evil.
According to the Maharal by Shechem, when a "nation" perpetrates an atrocity against another "nation," or attacks it without justification,
אף על גב דלא עשה רק אחד מהם, כיון דמכלל העם הוא, כיון שפרצו להם תחלה מותרים ליקח נקמתם מהם.
The Maharal's נקמתם מהם would even allow "targeting civilians." However:
1. I think that it is obvious that one must draw a line between an attack by an individual that is attributed to an entire nation and an attack that is the crime of individuals within that nation that is not attributable to the nation as a whole. The Maharal would not apply where some villains attacked on their own. If the Sinaloa cartel blew up a police station in Texas, I don't think the Maharal would say that the US had the right to destroy Mexico. The gang is an enemy of Mexico, not representative of Mexico. He is talking about מכלל העם הוא, a case where the nation, in some way, has aided or abetted the attack, through action or inaction. In the case of Hamas ימח שמם וזכרם it is obvious that they are the voice of Gaza, no less than שכם בן חמור fully represented his city.
2. Even in the Maharal's case, I do not believe that מותרים ליקח נקמתם מהם against a nation makes the killing of the innocent any less terrible. It is Nekama, like the nekama of a גואל הדם who has a hetter, to kill the rotzei'ach, but not a mitzva. Is it a good thing to be a גואל הדם? Muttar does not necessarily make it a good thing. It is like יפת תואר, a necessary evil allowed under extreme circumstances. This is also Rav Zilberstein's approach. But I have no proof that the Maharal holds like that. In any case, I think it is very unlikely that there are any innocents among the adults in Gaza, and the children are on an inexorable trajectory of retzicha as well.
The Ohr Hachaim also addresses this. His second answer is like the Rambam, that they were guilty by abetting the crime. His first answer is interesting, though - that when Shimon and Levi entered the city to kill Shechem and Chamor, the citizens threatened Shimon and Levi with deadly force in order to protect their leaders. Once they threatened Shimon and Levi with deadly force, they had a din rodef. Of course, Shimon and Levi could have turned around and left, but since they had the right to kill Shechem and Chamor, they were not obligated to do so.
ויהרגו כל זכר ואת חמור וגו'. קשה למה יהרגו מי שלא חטא. ועוד למה לא הקדימו בבעל עבירה תחילה:
אכן הנה בני יעקב לא היה בדעתם להרוג אלא בעל עבירה אלא שכל בני העיר רצו לעמוד בפרץ כנגדם לבל יהרגו מלכם אשר על כן הרגום מדין רודף, והוא אומרו ויהרגו כל זכר ובזה השיגו להרוג את חמור ואת שכם וזולת זה לא היו יכולין לנקום נקם מהמחוייב להם מיתה:
עוד טעם שהרגו כל בני העיר לצד שהם היו בעזר שכם לגזול דינה ובני נח מחוייבים מיתה על הגזל אבל על העריות אין חיוב כי דינה לא היתה אשת איש:
סרו רדו מתוך העמלקי פן אוסיפך עמו
In Shmuel I 15:6, Shaul's war against Amalek.
ויאמר שאול אל הקיני לכו סרו רדו מתוך העמלקי פן אוסיפך עמו ואתה עשיתה חסד עם כל בני ישראל בעלותם ממצרים ויסר קיני מתוך עמלקי.
Shaul warned the Keini to run away, because he did not want to kill them in light of kindness they had shown the Jewish People 450 years earlier. It seems clear that had they not run away, Shaul and his army would have killed many of them despite their innocence. The universally accepted fact, the reality of war is scorched earth, the guilty and the innocent alike. While it is justified, it is a bad thing and must be avoided where possible.
כי דמים רבים שפכת ארצה לפני
The Radak in Divrei Hayamim I 22:8, who says that David Hamelech's killing of innocent non-combatants is one of the reasons he was not allowed to build the Beis Hamikdash. A just war involves the killing of everyone who is part of or on the territory of the enemy nation, but it is a pernicious act that harms the soul. There are no two ways to read the Radak.
ויהי עלי דבר ה' לאמר דם לרב שפכת ומלחמות גדלות עשית לא תבנה בית לשמי כי דמים רבים שפכת ארצה לפני
דמים רבים שפכת ארצה לפני, נראה כי דם נקיים היה בדמים אשר שפך, כמו דם אוריה (ש"ב יא,יד ואי'), וזהו "לפני". גם בדמי הכהנים (ש"א כב,יח-יט) היה הוא הסבה, כמו שאמר "הנה אנכי סבותי בכל נפש בית אביך" (ש"א כב,כב). גם בדמי הגוים אשר שפך, אותם שלא היו בני מלחמתו, אפשר שהיו בהם אנשים טובים וחסידים; אע"פ כן לא נענש עליהם, כי כונתו לכלות הרשעים שלא יפרצו בישראל. ולהציל עצמו כשהיה בארץ פלשתים "לא יחַיה איש ואשה" (ש"א כז,ט). אבל כיון שנזדמן לו שפיכות דמים לרב, מנעהו מלבנות בית המקדש, שהוא לשלום ולכפרת עונות ולעתרת תפלה, כמו שמנע להניף ברזל במזבח ובבית המקדש: לפי שהברזל עושין ממנו כלי הריגה, לא יעשו ממנו כלי שלום ברוב:
As you note, it's not clear from the Maharal if killing innocents is regrettable or not. You argue that it is. But the Maharal's tone and wording seem to suggest the opposite, in my opinion. "Ein zeh chiluk" is a rather cavalier (in tone) and definitive (in content) statement, it seems to me. Also, the Maharal cites the war against the Midyanim to make his point, and the orders in that war to kill almost all the women (plus all the men and boys) came directly from Moshe.So, lefi aniyus dati, I don't think killing civilians is a concession to the realities of war like yefas to'ar is. I think the Maharal's attitude toward killing civilians was similar to that of the World War II generation, which felt perfectly comfortable with bombing German and Japanese civilians.
and in a later message,
.....
I think your distinction between battles of nations and fights of individuals explains all the difficulties. I don't think the addition of the postulation that killing is regrettable is necessary, in my humble opinion.
As for your general comments on war strategy and the population of Gaza: I agree with you. The problem is that no facts about Gaza's population or any other warring population justify killing a 90-year-old dementia patient or a one-day-old baby. And yet, such people do indeed die in war. That's certainly true in modern wars which feature missiles and bombs dropped from the sky, but it was also true in ancient wars. When an army besieges a city, everyone suffers -- old and young, men and women, people who want to fight and people who would prefer to surrender but can't because they're in the minority and will be killed if they open their mouths.
That's why I very much like the Maharal's answer. Essentially, he says we need not justify every individual we kill in war. It's very possible that we will kill innocent people. But it doesn't matter. The individual belongs to a larger nation and the battle is against the nation.
I think every Torah Jews instinctively understands this concept. After all, we the Jewish people are always punished and rewarded collectively. So are other nations. Did every Mitzri afflict us? And yet, the plagues affected all of them. Similarly, did every member of Ninveh sin? Every baby? Of course not. And yet, Hashem was planning on decimating the entire city.
Hashem actually did decimate Sodom (with its one-day-old babies) and promises in the future to punish nations like Edom even though obviously the one-day-old babies of Edom don't deserve to be punished for their own sins. Collective reward and punishment is a basic part of Judaism and it's also the implicit assumption of every war. Nation vs. nation, not a select group of guilty individuals against another selection group of guilty individuals.
So, yes, I agree with you that Gazans are probably one of the least innocent populations -- perhaps the least innocent population -- in the history of war. In this war, women actually deserve to die for their own grave sins -- raising suicide bombers, etc. But I still think the Maharal's answer is necessary. It is the only one that allows for firing missiles -- or dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima -- with a clean conscience.
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