Toldos, Breishis 25:22. Rivka Didn't Have Any Rabbis at Home To Talk To?

UPDATED NOVEMBER 2020

Rivka had a problem: her experience during pregnancy indicated to her that her child, or children, would be drawn both to Avodas Hashem and to Avoda Zara. Concerned and anxious about what kind of child she was carrying, she sought an explanation.  But, as Rashi points out, it doesn't say that she was mispallel, it says ‘vateileich lidrosh es Hashem', "she went to seek Hashem," which shows that she went somewhere to seek the answer.  Where did she go? 

Rashi says that she went to the Beis Medrash of Sheim, and in the next passuk Rashi brings that Hashem answered her through the nevuah of Sheim. This is in the Medrash Rabbah here 63:6, and 20:6, 45:10, and 48:20, and sort of in the Yerushalmi in Sotah right in the beginning of seventh perek, and the Zohar here on this passuk. Some say to Sheim, some say through a malach.

According to those that say she went to Sheim or Eiver, why did Rivka go to Sheim and Eiver with her problem? Why didn’t she just ask her own husband, Yitzchak? What about Avraham, who lived until Yakov and Eisav were 15 years old?  Was there something about the nature of her question that required that she not go to them, and instead go to Sheim?

(The Ibn Ezra, as usual, solves the problem by disregarding what Chazal say: he says that she did go to Avraham. The Abravanel also says this as an alternative to the various Medrashim.  This is, of course, a valid interpretation of the passuk, but it does nothing to explain what Chazal were thinking.)

The Gur Aryeh (and, I'm told, the Baal Haturim in his pirush) says that she was afraid that the problem she perceived in her child arose from, and reflected, her own flaws, and she was ashamed to go to her husband. .

An acquaintance of mine suggested that the fact that Yitzchok learned in the Beis Medrash of Sheim and Eiver showed that they were the gedolei hador, so they were first people to consult. Another friend vehemently disagreed, saying that there is no question that Yitzchok, and of course Avraham, were far greater than Sheim and Eiver, and the fact that Yitzchak left home to learn there proves nothing.

The Ramban on Breishis 27:4 discusses this tangentially. He asks, when Rivka overheard Yitzchak tell Eisav that he would give him the brachos, she came up with a ruse to subvert Eisav's plan. Why didn’t she simply tell Yitzchak about what she heard from Sheim, that “ve’rav ya'avod tza’ir,” which meant that Eisav would serve Yaakov, and which would mean that the brachos should go to Yaakov? The Ramban answers  "Apparently Rivkah never told him [Yitzchok] about G-d's prophecy to her, "and the older shall serve the younger" (Breishis 25:23), for if she had, how could Isaac go against the word of Hashem? At first, she did not tell him because of her sense of morality and modesty, for "she went to inquire of Ha’elokim" (Breishis 25:22), and she had gone without Isaac's permission; or perhaps she thought, "I need not report a prophecy to a prophet, for he is greater than he who told me," [Sheim, according to the Medrash.] And now she did not want to say to him, "I was told such and such by the Lord before I gave birth," for she reasoned, out of  [Yitzchak's] love for [Eisav], [Yitzchak] would not bless Yakov, but would leave everything in Hashem's hands; and she knew that for this reason [giving Jacob cooked food that tasted like game] Yakov would receive the blessing from his mouth with a full heart and a willing soul.” (Then the Ramban says something vague about hidden intentions of Hashem.)  So: from the Ramban we see several possiblities: 1. that either she didn't want to tell Yitzchak what Shem told her because she went to consult Shem without Yitzchak's permission; or 2. that she figured that if the lesser navi (Shem) knew something, then certainly the greater navi (Yitzchak) knew it as well, (and 3. if he didn't, then there must be a reason Hashem did not want Yitzchak to know about it).

The Chizkuni says this as well-- that Rivka never told Yitzchak what she was told, and that she must have been told to not tell him, or at least was not told to tell him.  This, too, is a post facto validation of her decision to seek the answer outside her home.

I would say, expanding on the Ramban and the Chizkuni, that the three points we elicited from the Ramban are not either/or.  They all are true.  Rivka reasoned that if her husband or father in law knew what was going on, they would have told her.  From their silence she deduced two things: that they didn't know, and that Hashem didn't want them to know.  So she make an independent decision and went elsewhere, thinking that even if Hashem didn't want Yitzchak and Avraham to know, Hashem might tell her.  As it turned out, she was 100% correct.

The Netziv here also deals with the question. He says there are two types of nevuah, two types of nevi'im. One is a navi to whom Hashem speaks; the other is one who sees hidden things through ruach hakodesh, like Shmuel, the "Ro'eh," to whom people would go to find out where their missing donkeys had gone. As is evident from Shmuel, these two types of Nevu'ah are not mutually exclusive; but the Netziv says that Avraham was a type one navi only, while Shem was type 2, and that’s why Rivka went to him.  She needed a see-er, a Ro'eh, an “Adam Gadol she’yad'ah ki hu ro’eh veyodei’ah.”

Rabbi Kenny Nieman said that she went to Sheim because he was the zakein— Sheim lived 600 years, and he was probably around 550 at that time. Rivka's husband and father in law were, comparatively, youngsters.  The distinctive wisdom of a zakein, especially a zakein who was a navi for 400 years, is the greatest possible resource. This teretz reminded me of the dinner for MTJ where they were mechabeid Reb Moshe, and when Reb Yakov Kaminetski spoke, he said that it might seem to be gaivah for him to evaluate Reb Moshe, but there cannot be any doubt that he (Reb Yaakov) is the zakein, and so he had a right to state his opinion of Reb Moshe’s gadlus.

Thank you, Eli, for finding the Medrash Seichel Tov, (authored/compiled by R. Menahem Ben Shlomo, Italy (?), in 1139) that says exactly this:

ותלך.  לבית מדרשו של עבר: לדרוש את ה׳. לבקש רחמים על העובר, ואע׳פ שאברהם קיים, הלכה אצל
זקנים ללמדך שכל המקבל  פני זקן שבדור, כאילו מקבל פני שכינה

Translation: And She Went: To the Beis Medrash of Eiver.  To Seek Hashem:  To pray for mercy for the fetus.  Even though Avraham was alive, she went to the Elder.  This is (stated in the passuk in order) to teach you that anyone that attends the presence of an Elder it is as if he attends the presence of the Shechina.

Reb Berel Povarsky has a very nice discussion about this kashe. He asks this, and many other questions, such as, didn’t she know that her husband had a bad brother, Yishmo’eil, and that there was a process of ‘zikuch’ before the 12 shvatim could be born? Also, Chazal said that Shem showed her Rebbi and Antoninus. How does a good descendant console her for a son who is a rasha? Answer— she knew everything, but wondered, why did the zikuch by Avrohom take place through his pilegesh, Hagar, and now it is taking place through me— lamah zeh anochi— why am I the one that has to bear the bad one. This, of course, was not a question she could ask her husband’s family, because of the concern that the cause was some personal flaw she carried, similar to the Gur Aryeh. The answer that Shem gave her was that Yishma’eil, being the zikuch son, and having been born by the pilegesh, had no redeeming qualities, and is and will always be a pereh adam. (But see above end of Chayei Soroh that Yishmo’eil did tshuvoh before he died, and Eisav never did.) But Eisav needed to have a higher character, and not just be an outlaw, and so you were the one to bear him and to infuse into him these higher qualities. This is why she was shown Rebbi and Antoninus; to show her both the benefit Klal Yisrael will have from him, and also the more refined character a ben Eisav is capable of.

And here is what I think: that she didn’t go to Sheim, but rather to his Beis Medrash. She wanted to ask Hashem herself, or to be mispallel, and to do so required that she go to a makom kadosh, just as Chana went to the Bais Hamikdash when she wanted to ask Hashem for children. And just as Chana was then answered through Eli, the Kohen Gadol who was there at the time, Rivka’s question/tefilla was answered through Sheim, who was a kohen gadol (Nedarim 32b and Targum Yerushalmi Breishis 14:18), or his descendant, Ever, who was in the Beis Medrash at that time. She could have asked her husband or her father in law, but the more appropriate response to a challenge is to attempt to resolve the question yourself, and not to abdicate the opportunity for personal growth by passing off the issue to someone else. Even if Malkitzedek lost the Kehuna for giving a bracha to Avraham before thanking Hashem, it doesn't really matter.  He was the Gadol in a place that was meyuchad for Limud Hatorah and Hashra'as Hashechina.

The word "lidrosh" here means what it means in ישעיהו נה where it says   דרשו ה' בהמצאו  .  The Gemara in Rosh Hashanna 18a says that בהמצאו means either in the setting of a tzibbur, because the Shechina rests on a tzibbur, or during Aseres Yemei Teshuva, when the Shechina makes itself available.  The same בהמצאו  applies to a place of kedusha.  It may be negi'us, but I think my pshat is peshuto shel mikra.

Having said this, it becomes clear that this is what the Medrash Seichel Tov that I brought above means:

לבית מדרשו של עבר: לדרוש את ה׳. לבקש רחמים על העובר

She went to the Beis Medrash of Eiver, not to Eiver himself; and she went to be mevakesh rachamim on the fetus, not to ask Sheim or Eiver any questions.  Precisely like Channah.

What's the lesson here, then?  The lesson is this:  That a person, certainly one who has problems having or raising children, but also anyone that faces a life difficulty, should do as Channah and Rivka did.  Go to the presence of a zakein who is a tzadik and a great talmid chacham, and be mispallel to Hashem for help with your problem. Certainly, seeing a bracha is wise.  As the Gemara in Bava Basra 116a says,

דרש ר' פנחס בר חמא כל שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו ילך אצל חכם ויבקש עליו רחמים שנא' (משלי טז) חמת מלך מלאכי מות ואיש חכם יכפרנה

But the lesson from this week's parsha is that it is good to find the right place and to be mispallel there yourself.

If someone else has already said this, I don't want to know about it, thank you.  I know that the Ramban says that 'lidrosh' means tefilla, and that the Abravanel argues.  But what I am saying, that Rivka went to a place where there was Hashra'as Hashechina, and connecting it to the story of Chana and how she was answered, and the Gemara in Rosh Hashanna, and the Passuk in Yeshaya, is far more comprehensive than what the Ramban says, especially since unlike the Ramban who is arguing with Rashi, what I'm saying explains Rashi.  So don't tell me that it's mefurash in the Ramban.  It's not mefurash in the Ramban and it's befeirush not like the Ramban.

UPDATE NOVEMBER 2020

This came in a comment. It is a clever and excellent pshat.

YybturnerNovember 26, 2020 at 3:22 PM

I always thought she went to Yeshivas Sheim v'Eiber because when the Medrash says she went past a Beis Medrash it was obviously Shem v'Ever, at that moment. So she went straight in to ask.

UPDATE NOVEMBER 2023

There's so much online... I came across this publication that lists seven answers to this question. I don't vouch for it, but it can't hurt to put it up here. If you have to say a drasha, it's always helpful to have more angles of attack.

הנה רבקה אמנו, יושבת בצילם של אבות וגדולי האומה, אבותינו הק דושים, אברהם ויצחק, ועתה

שרבקה נבוכה בעקבות שהבנים מתרוצצים בקרבה, הולכת לקבול לפני שם ועבר, וצ"ע למה לא שאלה

פי קודשם של יצחק או אברהם, שהיא נמצאת בצילם, ומדוע הניחה את אברהם אבינו שהיתה עמו, והיה נביא גדול, והלכה לירושלים אל שם, והלא אברהם אבינו חי עד שהיו יעקב ועשו בני ט"ו שנה, ויעקב הכין אותו נזיד עדשים להברות אבלותו של אביו על אברהם?

ביאור א'

במדרש שכל טוב מתרץ שאע"פ שאברהם אבינו קיים היה, הלכה אצל זקנים, ללמדך שכל המקבל פני זקן שבדור, כאילו מקבל פני שכינה.

ביאור ב'

בעלי התוס' עה"ת מתרצים שרצתה לדרוש בהן אם מותר לה להפיל העובר מחמת צער הלידה, וידעה כי אברהם ויצחק לא יתירו לה להפיל עוברים מזרעם. ונראה כי הדברים עולים בקנה אחד עם מ"ש במדרש הגדול, דורשי רשומות אומרין אמרה רבקה לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע א"כ עתיד עשו להרוג ולכלות אדירי חכמה שהן עתידין להיות מבניו של יעקב, מי יאמר לפניך על הים זה אלי ואנוהו (שמות ט"ו, ב'), ולמי תאמר על הר סיני אנכי ה' אלהיך (שמות כ', ב'), מיד חגרה מתניה ועמדה בתפילתה. ומבואר שצערה של רבקה לא היה על צער לידה של צער הגוף גרידא, אלא אותו הצער היה על צערם של ישראל בכל הדורות.

ביאור ג'

עוד מתרצים בעלי התוס' עה"ת, כשהיתה רבקה מצטערת מהריונה, בלי ספק אברהם חמיה ויצחק בעלה היו מצטערים בשבילה, ואין הנבואה שורה מתוך עצבות אלא מתוך שמחה. ועוד כי רבקה היתה צנועה והסתירה הדבר מבעלה ומחמיה והלכה אצל שם.

ביאור ד'

עי"ל ע"פ מ"ש בגמ' (ב"ב קטז.), דרש ר' פנחס בר חמא, כל שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו, ילך אצל חכם ויבקש עליו רחמים, שנא' "חמת מלך מלאכי מות ואיש חכם יכפרנה", וכתב הנמוק"י שם שילך לפני תופס ישיבה, וידוע כי שם ועבר קבעו אז ישיבתם לכל. ועל כן בדוקא הלכה לפני שם ועבר, כי יש מעלה לתופס ישיבה דוקא, וגם מפני שיש לתופס ישיבה את הסגולה לרפא את החולים, מפני שהוא מעמיד תלמידים, וממילא בנוסף למה שישיבו לה דבר, גם יש להם כח מיוחד לרפא את החולה, ואפשר שאחרי שיצאה רבקה מבית שם ועבר ובירכוה, כבר פסק לה צער העיבור ממה שהיו מתרוצצים בקרבה, כי לא מצינו בכתובים שמאז עוד סבלה.

ביאור ה'

עי"ל בס"ד דאדרבה רבקה לא רצתה לצער את יצחק או אברהם ולהפריעם בלימודם, לכן הלכה לפני שם ועבר , שהם קבעו ישיבתם ללמד ולהורות לרבים, והיו מזומנים למי שהיה צריך לדרוש בחכמים. וראיה לדבר, שהרי כשיצחק רצה לתת את הברכות לעשיו, ו גם נאמר לרבקה בנבואה שיעקב יטול הברכות, לא דיברה עם יצחק בדבר להניאו מכוונתו וליתן את הברכות ליעקב בדין, אלא שלא רצתה להפריעו מלימודו ועבודת השי"ת, וכן כל אותו הזמן שעשיו יצא לתרבות רעה, לא סיפרה לו על אודות עשיו שמרמהו כי ציד בפיו, והכל כדי שלא להפריעו בלימודו ולא לצערו. שו"ר שכן תירץ במושב זקנים, שלא רצתה לצער את אברהם. 

ומספרים שכאשר היתה אימו של רבינו הגר"ח מוולאז'ין מתייסרת בצער לידה, עמד על ידה בעלה והיה משוחח בלימוד עם הגאון בעל השאגת אריה, וכאשר החלו לתקוף אותה חבלי לידה, נשכה שפתותיה שלא להשמיע קול זעקה וצווחה, קול צער ויללה, פן עי"כ יסור אליה בעלה, והגאון שאגת אריה יפנה לדרכו, ואז יפסיקו לדבר בלימוד, וכך בעודה מתייסרת וצוותת שפתותיה בתעצומות נפש לרוב יקרתה לתורה, שלא להניא בעלה מעסק התורה, אותה שעה העיר ה' את רוחו של מרן הגר"ח מוואלז'ין זצ"ל שנולד בהריון זה, ועלה ונתעלה ונעשה מרכבה לשכינה בתורתו וביראתו ובהעמדת תלמידים.

ויש עוד מעשה מופלא על מסירות נפשה של אשתו של מרן הגרי"ש אלישיב זצ"ל, שכאשר בנה חלה מאד ונפל למשכב עם יותר מ' 40 מעלות חום, התייראה פן כשישוב בעלה מבהמ"ד, יראה את בנו בחוליו ויגרם לו היסח הדעת בלימוד התורה, על כן הניחה את השולחן בחוץ פתח הבית, כאשר השלחן חוסם את הכניסה לבית, וכסא מונח מבחוץ, ו ערכה עליו את ארוחת הצהרים, וכך לא נודע למרן הרב אלישיב על חוליו של בנו, שבבואו לביתו, התיישב מבחוץ ואכל וחזר לתלמודו.

ביאור ו'

הנה באחת הפעמים שזכיתי לדבר קדם קמיה מרן עט"ר גאון ישראל רבינו עובדיה יוסף זצ"ל (ראה בס' כרם רבנן עמ' ק"פ), סיפרתי שהיה אחד כתב בצוואתו שכל הירושה שלו תחולק ע"פ מה שיפסוק גדול הדור, והיה ספק גדול מיהו גדול הדור, האם הגר"ח מוולוז'ין, או איזה גאון עצום אחר שהיה בזמנו, שהיו שניהם גדולים בתורה, ובהעמדת תלמידים. ופסקו הב"ד שמי שנקרא גדול הדור זה הגר"ח מוולוז'ין, בהיות והוא יצק מים וקיבל את תורתו מרבינו הגר"א, ולכן כיון שהגר"ח היה לו רב, ואילו לגאון השני לא היה רב, אלא הוא מעצמו ישב ולמד, לכן הוא נחשב לגדול הדור. עפ"ז נראה לומר שאע"פ שהיה אברהם קיים,

והגם שהוא היה קברניט הדור (ב"ב צא:) , והיה נביא ה', ואור העולם שניצול מאור כשדים, וכן יצחק היה קיים, וכיון שהיו שם ועבר קיימים, שהם רבותיהם של אברהם ויצחק , לכן הלכה רבקה לפניהם.

ביאור ז'

בספר תורת העובר (עמ' שע"ו), מביא מספר אמרי שפר למהר"י חלאוה זצ"ל שתירץ שרבקה לא הלכה לאברהם, פן יאמר בשלו הצער הגדול הזה עליה, לפי שהתפלל עליה שתהר וע"י תפילתו נתעברה, והעלימה ממנו העניין כדי שלא ישנאנה בראותו שהיא משונה בהריונה משאר הנשים, עכת"ד. והביא עוד בזה מהמהר"ל בגור אריה, שכתב וז"ל: והא דלא שאלה את יצחק או את אברהם י"ל דהיתה רבקה סבורה דשמא בשביל חטא יש לה צער העיבור כ "כ שאמרו רז"ל כי הנשים הצדקניות לא היו בפתקא של חוה כדאיתא בפ"ק דסוטה י"ב, והיתה מתייראת שתתגנה בעיני בעלה או שיאמר אברהם ליצחק שאינה הגונה לו וישא אחרת או יגרשנה, עכ"ל.  

Chayei Sarah: Avraham and Sara's Long and Happy Lives

I once read Anthony Hecht’s translation of the Chorus of Oedipus at Colonos:

What is unwisdom but the lusting after
Longevity: to be old and full of days!
For the vast and unremitting tide of years
Casts up to view more sorrowful things than joyful.

It has been pointed out that Avraham's life would seem to be an example of this sorrowful poem.  How hard Avraham’s life was, even though he was the Yedid Hashem, the Av Hamon Goyim!  Among the ten nisyonos mentioned in Avos 5:3 (according to Rabbeinu Yonah, while according the Rambam this is not separate from the Akeidah itself) is that he came back from the Akeidah joyously and found that Sara died alone while he and his children were away from home.  Then, despite having been promised the whole land, when Sara died, and while she waited in an Aron, Avraham had to start bargaining to get a place to bury her. So anyone who thinks that being beloved by Hashem means having an easy life had better think again. 

And even so, when it comes to our Tzadikim, Sophocles is wrong.  We find that Avraham died “zakein ve’savei’ah.”  Despite all his trials, he felt that he lived a full and satisfying life, because he knew that whatever happened he tried to do his best, and whatever he experienced was right and good for him.   The basic difference is whether you live as an eved Hashem, trying to emulate the 13 Middos by doing what you can for Hashem and for other people, or you live for what you can enjoy and accumulate for yourself.

The image that I have is of an airplane; Dinner has just been served, and the pilot's voice comes over the intercom, and he says, I'm sorry to inform you that we've lost both engines: we're going to try to glide to a soft landing on the water, but I have to tell you that we're in a pretty desperate situation.  Good luck and goodbye.  Some people will react by trying to finish their meal as fast as they can.  People whose existence is so self centered focus exclusively on what they can ingest and accumulate, and ultimately are not really living a true life at all.

Chayei Sara, Breishis 23:10. Efron Sat Among His People: The Median can be the Cardinal Point

23:10.  Efron sat “be’soch bnei Chais” Rashi says that this day he had been appointed as a ‘sar’ of his people.  Rabbi David Zupnick Z'l told me that Heidenheim, in his pirush on Rashi, asks what made Rashi say this, and he answers that in all of Tanach this expression of ‘besoch’ of a people means being a master, and that in Melachim II 3:14, this is what the Isha Hashunamis meant when she told Eliahu that there was nothing she needed because she was "besoch ami'.

יג וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ אֱמָרנָא אֵלֶיהָ הִנֵּה חָרַדְתְּ אֵלֵינוּ אֶת כָּל הַחֲרָדָה הַזֹּאת מֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת לָךְ הֲיֵשׁ לְדַבֶּר לָךְ אֶל הַמֶּלֶךְ אוֹ אֶל שַׂר הַצָּבָא;  וַתֹּאמֶר בְּתוֹךְ עַמִּי אָנֹכִי יֹשָׁבֶת.

she did not need his help in any material things.

I later realized that the same idea is evident in the Gemara in Bava Kamma 88a, where the Gemara darshens the passuk “mikerev achecha” to mean that only “muvchar she'bi’achecha” can be a king, and not an eved meshuchrar or even a geir.  Kerev and toch not only mean the same thing but also carry the same connotation.

Why?  Why does a word that means common also connote uncommon?  Wy does 'undistinguished' or median also connote greatness?  This Zohar about the Shunamite woman is interesting, and has some potential to explain the Gemara in Bava Kamma, but it does nothing to explain Efron:

ועל דא תנינן דלא איצטריך ליה לבר נש לאיתפרשא מכללא דסגיאין בגין דלא יתרשים איהו בלחודוי
ולא יקטרגון עליה לעילא דכתיב בשונמית ותאמר בתוך עמי אנוכי יושבת לא בעינא לאפקי גרמי
מכללא דסגיאין בתוך עמי יתיבנא עד יומא דאובתוך עמי בכללא חדא.

Breaking the Plate at the Tna'im. A Trivial Discussion of a Little Minhag

I'm writing this little bagatelle because it came up in conversation recently, and I thought that if my friend had to deal with certain mechutan issues involving this minhag, a little overview might be helpful to other people as well. This kind of post is not going to become a habit.

We Ashkenazim have a minhag that the mothers of the Chasan and Kallah break an earthenware plate after the Tna'im is read.  (I am not talking about the glass under the Chupah.  That minhag stems from Brachos 31b, as Tosfos says there.

רב בריה דרבינא עבד הלולא לבריה חזנהו לרבנן דהוו קבדחי טובא  אייתי כסא דמוקרא בת ארבע מאה זוזי ותבר קמייהו ואעציבו רב אשי עבד הלולא לבריה חזנהו לרבנן דהוו קא בדחי טובא אייתי כסא דזוגיתא חיורתא ותבר קמייהו ואעציבו אמרו ליה רבנן לרב המנונא זוטי בהלולא דמר בריה דרבינא לישרי לן מר אמר להו ווי לן דמיתנן ווי לן דמיתנן

 I'm not talking about that.  I'm talking about breaking the plate at the Te'na'im.) 

All our minhagim are holy and meaningful, but among those holy and meaningful minhagim, this one does not stand on the highest rung.  But it's worth bearing in mind that, as I've said before, the meaning of our minhagim is fluid and dynamic; they ebb and flow.  What a minhag means to one generation, to one group, might be very different than what it means to another.  See, e.g., our discussion of the Kittel here, where we showed that wearing the kittel could symbolize diametrically opposed ideas, and that with time, one idea has become dominant, and our discussion of masks on Purim here.  The symbol's meaning is what you understand it to be, and even minor minhagim can come to assume greater significance.  The same is true regarding the breaking of the plate.  Here's a list of the various interpretations that have attributed to it by our mefarshim.  I'm listing all the time honored classics; I'M NOT IMPLYING ANY PARITY HERE! Some are stranger than others, several are similar but have differences in tone.  Pick the one you like.  They're all kosher.

The first written mention of this minhag is in the Sefer Ma'adanei Yomtov, written around 1600 by Reb Yomtov Lippman Heller, the author of the Tosfos Yomtov. He was a talmid of the Maharal.  And he is the Ketzos' grandfather.

1.  To temper the celebration Zeicher Le'Mikdash.  Ma'adanei Yomtov (cited by Eliahu Rabba,  which is cited by Pri Megadim in OC 560 Mishbetzos SK 7, and cited by Mishna Berura there SK 9, but I found it here) says the purpose is to shock the onlookers, in order to temper excessive joy that is inconsistent with mourning for the Churban Beis Hamikdash.

2.  To show that the Te'na'im is irreversible, and whoever breaks it can never be made whole.   The Pri Megadim brings the Maharit, which he understands to mean that although we break glass under the Chupa, we should break earthenware at the Tna'im, because glass can be melted and remade, but earthenware, once broken, can never be repaired.  This is also said in the name of the Gaon in the She'iltos on the Ma'aseh Rav in numbers 133 and 134, here.

3.  As a re-enactment of Mattan Torah, the breaking of the Luchos, and our ultimate redemption.  The Pri Megadim himself says the following: Mattan Torah was Kidushin, and it ought to have been followed by Nesu'in.  The sin of the Egel, followed by the breaking of the luchos, and ultimately the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash, left us almost bereft of the Hashra'as Hashechina that should have been ours as the beloved of Hakadosh Baruch Hu.  But the day will come that Hashem will betroth us again, and that kidushin will be followed by a nisu'in and a permanent union.  So we break earthenware at the Tna'im, to symbolize the breaking of the luchos and the impermanence of Klal Yisrael's first kiddushin, but we break glass at the chupa, because glass can always be repaired; in a sense, it can never be permanently or irreparably broken.

4. To show that breaking a tna'im is worse than getting divorced.  The Gaon is quoted here as having said that it is worse to break a Tna'im than to get married and divorced.  Or, that it is better to get married even if you know you're going to get divorced than to break a tna'im.  So we use irreparable earthenware at the Tna'im, and glass at the Chuppah.


5.  To show that the only one way to break a tna'im: by dying.  The Baal Shem Tov is quoted in Taamei Haminhagim (page 411) as having explained this Maharit as meaning that a tna'im cannot be broken for any reason at all, but a marriage can be dissolved via a get.


6. To remind the chasan that even if his wife turns out to be a shrew, he should be grateful, because suffering through a miserable marriage will earn him a ticket straight to Olam Haba.  (Hopefully, without her.)  The Ta'amei Haminhagim also brings from the Likutei Maharan the following reason:  you break an earthenware vessel at the Tna'im to remind the Chasan that there is a Gehinnom, and that he better not be mindlessly driven by his bodily desires.  Also, he says, even if (Chas veshalom!) the answer to the question is "motzei," and it turns out that his wife is no good, he should still not "traitorously" divorce her, because his lifetime of suffering will save him from Gehinnom.

7.  To prevent excessive frivolity so that we don't forget our Yiras Shamayim.  See above from Brachos 31, Rav Hamnuna Zuti, who, when asked to sing at a wedding, sang "Woe to us, we all will die....." and the rule of Rav Yochanan/Rav Shimon bar Yochai,

א"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י אסור לאדם שימלא שחוק פיו בעולם הזה

that one may not "fill his mouth with joy in this world."  Some learn that this 'reigning in of levity' is so that we should remember the Churban, that we should elevate Yerushalayim over our joys, as indicated in the Ramban in Toras Ha'adam.  This approach is seen in the Tosfos Yomtov's pshat, #1 on this list, and that's why this halacha is discussed in Hilchos Tisha Ba'av.  HOWEVER: Rabbeinu Yonah in Brachos there says that this rule applied even when the Beis Hamikdash stands, because immoderate levity is incompatible with Yir'as Shamayim.  The same reasoning would apply to our discussion-- that the breaking of the plate at the Tna'im is more in line with Rav Hamnuna Zuti's dirge than it is with Zeicher Le'Mikdash.

8.  Why do the mothers do this?  Well, it seems that in some places, this was not done by the mothers.  In this drawing from 1724, a man is doing it (the fellow bottom center with the jug raised above his head).

and here's another drawing of men breaking stuff at a Tna'im:

While I haven't found anyone who explains the change, I would guess that it indicates that the Kallah, by sending her female representatives, is aware of and agrees to what is happening. There was a time when we would just give them away, but that's not how it's done now, and it's not much of a 'commitment to get married' if the kallah has no idea of what's happening. Also, see the first comment for Rebbitzen Divrei Chaim's note.

And, here's the bonus video. It's from a Sardinian wedding, and they're not Jews.  There were Jews in Sardinia from before the destruction of the second Beis Hamikdash until the expulsion that accompanied the Inquisition in the late fifteenth century.  If you want to believe they got the minhag from us, go ahead and believe it.  I think people, Jews and Gentiles, do it because it's just fun to break stuff.


Now, you are all experts on this minhag.  I hope this has cheered you up.

Vayeira. Guest Post by Harav Eli: The Expulsion of Hagar and ....

Following the birth of Yitzhak, the Torah tells about Avraham expelling his son from Hagar. A simple reading of the Psukim gives the impression that expulsion was of a young child:

1. He is called הילד or הנער. While נער could be used for a wide range of ages (from the 3-months old Moshe to ומשרתו יהושע בן נון נער), the term ילד typically refers to a young child (even though 17-years-old Yosef is also referred to as הילד איננו)

2. At the end of the Parsha the Mal'ach tells Hagar to carry her son. Well, maybe he was dried out and sick. But, it seems Hagar carries the boy even at the beginning of the journey - ויתן אל הגר שם על שכמה ואת הילד וישלחה [although some Meforshim explain this to mean she carried only the bread and water].

3. It says Hagar throws him under the bush, meaning that he wasn't too heavy. [Again, some of the Meforshim say this is not to be taken literally].

4. The end of the parsha - ויהי א' את הנער ויגדל also sounds like he was young at the time

However, the consensus of Chazal and all Meforshim I remember, is that this boy is in fact Yishma'el, although he is not mentioned by his name. At the time of the events Yishmael was at least 16 years old.

Luley Divreihem (in the style of the Ibn Ezra), we might suggest that the boy mentioned here could be a younger (second ?) son of Avraham and Hagar. If it is not Yishmael, that's why the Torah presents this nameless boy, never mentioned before, in such a lengthy description of  בן הגר המצרית אשר ילדה לאברהם. This boy might be of similar age to Yitzchak, or a bit older.

This explains also why Hashem comforts Avraham by saying  וגם את בן האמה לגוי אשימנו. If we're talking about Yishmael, this would have been redundant as Yishmael was already promised a much bigger future: הנה ברכתי אותו והפריתי אותו והרביתי אותו במאוד מאוד שנים עשר נשיאים יוליד ונתתיו לגוי גדול

Furthermore, in next week's parsha we find that Avraham sends away בני הפילגשים plural. Who are they? One Pilegesh we know of is Ktura. The other is Hagar (assuming they are not the same person). But, Yishmael was not sent away - he buried his father together with Yitzchak. So, it seems Hagar had more sons that were sent away.

Yet, as far as I know this (seemingly obvious) Pshat  was not picked up by any Medrash or any of the Meforshim. Why?

Lech Lecha, Bereishis 14:24. Military Logistical Support

(There was a previous version of this post that was much more interesting and one hundred percent wrong.  This boring correction will have to do for the moment.)

During the war of the Four Kings against the Five, Avram's nephew, Lot, was taken captive.  Avram gathered an army and went to war with his nephew's captors.  Ultimately, he vanquished the Four Kings and freed Lot, and, tangentially, saved Bera, the king of Sdom, who had fallen into a pit while fleeing the Four Kings.  After the battle was over, Bera offered Avram the spoils of war, which were obviously Avram's by right of conquest.  Avram declined his share, but noted that his refusal to be enriched by the spoils of war did not speak for the men who had joined his army:

הַנְּעָרִים, וְחֵלֶק הָאֲנָשִׁים, אֲשֶׁר הָלְכוּ אִתִּי:  עָנֵר אֶשְׁכֹּל וּמַמְרֵא, הֵם יִקְחוּ חֶלְקָם

the Ne'arim, the Anashim, and 'Aneir, Eshkol, and Mamrei' and that they were entitled to take their share. 

Rashi says that the Ne'arim and the Anashim fought in the battle, but Aneir, Eshkol, and Mamrei did not actually bear arms for Avram.  They only "guarded the possessions" of the combatants.  Even so, Rashi explains, the passuk indicates parity among all their chalakim; Aneir and his friends were entitled to a share equal to that of the actual combatants.  Rashi brings that this lesson was applied by David Hamelech in Shmuel I 30:23-4.

כג ויאמר דוד לא תעשו כן אחי:  את אשר נתן ה' לנו וישמר אתנו ויתן את הגדוד הבא עלינו בידנו.  כד ומי ישמע לכם לדבר הזה  כי כחלק הירד במלחמה וכחלק הישב על הכלים יחדו יחלקו.  

This also teaches us how we should appraise the relative status of those who enable others to learn by supporting and encouraging them, the yosheiv ahl hakeilim.  As John Milton said, "They also serve who only stand and wait."

While I understand this as applied to Reb Akiva's Rachel, I find it difficult to understand in the context of an army.  I would have thought that the persons who exposed themselves to immediate mortal danger and who exerted all possible human effort should be entitled to more.  War in those days was not fought with rifles and computers- it was done hand to hand, with extremely heavy swords and spears, wielded by antagonists who were fighting for their lives.  Yes, analysts and strategists have ten thousand times the effect of  individual soldiers.  But I think that the warriors deserve more recognition and reward than cooks and laundrymen and blacksmiths and the ישב על הכלים. 

The Rambam paskens like this, more or less, in 4 Melachim 9:

  כָּל הֲרוּגֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ, מָמוֹנָן לַמֶּלֶךְ; וְכָל הַמַּמְלָכוֹת שֶׁכּוֹבֵשׁ, הֲרֵי אוֹצְרוֹת הַמְּלָכִים לַמֶּלֶךְ.  וּשְׁאָר הַבִּזָּה שֶׁבּוֹזְזִין--בּוֹזְזִין וְנוֹתְנִין לְפָנָיו, וְהוּא נוֹטֵל מַחֲצִית בָּרֹאשׁ; וּמַחֲצִית הַבִּזָּה, חוֹלְקִין אוֹתָהּ.  כָּל אַנְשֵׁי הַצָּבָא בְּיַחַד עִם הָעָם הַיּוֹשְׁבִין עַל הַכֵּלִים בַּמַּחֲנֶה לְשָׁמְרָהּ, חוֹלְקִין בְּשׁוֹוֶה--שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר "כִּי כְּחֵלֶק הַיֹּרֵד בַּמִּלְחָמָה, וּכְחֵלֶק הַיֹּשֵׁב עַל-הַכֵּלִים--יַחְדָּו יַחֲלֹקוּ"

In Mattos, Bamidbar 31, the Torah describes the war with Midian.  Each Shevet sent out one thousand warriors, a total of 12,000, one fiftieth of the population.  Obviously, besides these twelve thousand there were many more who supported them.  No army in history could fight a war without support-- food, weapons, clothing, horses, people to guard the camp while the army is fighting, and more. I don't know what the ratio is in modern armies, but as an uneducated guess, I would say that for every actual combatant, there would have to be at least two people behind the lines focused exclusively on vital support services.  It is not correct to answer that the war against Midian was a matter of an afternoon's work, that it required no infrastructure, because the Tanchuma says there were three thousand from each shevet--  (31:4) "Elef lamateh elef lamateh" means one thousand warriors, one thousand support and supply (like Reb Yishmael in the Sifri as brought in the Baal Haturim), and one thousand for tefilla.  According to Reb Akiva that elef means one thousand, the repetition elef/elef means that shevet Levi also sent one thousand.  But even though Reb Akiva holds that they were not mentioned, he will have to agree that the thousand had support of a yosheiv ahl hakeilim group.

After the war was won, Moshe Rabbeinu told the people that the spoils were to be divided, with half going to the "tofsei hamilchama", those that "held the battle", and half to the rest of the people.  Who are the tofsei milchama?  We will have to say that this includes the support as well as the soldiers.  According to the shittah that elef lamateh was only one thousand, then the phrase tofsei milchama is not the same as chalutzei tzava, because tofsei has to include many more who were yosheiv ahl hakeilim.  Or, possibly, the phrase elef lamateh of chalutzei tzava included the yosheiv ahl hakeilim group and there were only a couple hundred armed warriors from each shevet.  According to Reb Yishmael, Chalutzei Tzava itself includes all the support group, a total of three thousand per shevet.

Noach: Interbreeding and Genetic Manipulation

I'm not finished with the last post.  But its time for Parshas Noach, and there is something I've been meaning to write about.  Earlier Posts on Parshas Noach:

Luxury at a Price
The Two Reasons We Were Zocheh to Tzitzis
The Victim of Victimless Crime


One of the behaviors of the generation of the Mabul, as Rashi says (6:12), was spontaneous inter-specific mating of animals. 
וַיַּרְא אֱ--לֹהִים אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְהִנֵּה נִשְׁחָתָה כִּי הִשְׁחִית כָּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ עַל הָאָרֶץ:
And God saw the earth, and behold it had become corrupted, for all flesh had corrupted its way on the earth.


Rashi:
כי השחית כל בשר: אפילו בהמה חיה ועוף נזקקין לשאינן מינן:
Even cattle, beasts, and fowl would mate with those that were not of their own species.

This is made clear in the Medrash here, 28:8, in the name of Rav Azariah.

This Rashi might be understood as referring to the animal behavior as a symptom or a reflection of human degradation (see Beis Halevi), but not as inherently iniquitous or repugnant.

But later (8:1), Rashi says that when Hashem remembered the animals in the Ark and looked upon them with favor, this was because Hashem knew that these individual animals had not engaged in inter-specific sexual congress. This does indicate that such behavior is inherently iniquitous or repugnant.  Furthermore, the Gemara in Sanhedrin 108a states that mankind was guilty of intentional cross species animal husbandry.  According to the Mizrachi, (also mentioned by the Maharsha there) this is an alternative to the Medrash of Rav Azariah; according to the Maharal, this is consistent with the Medrash (and see Rav Povarsky's Bahd Kodesh here).  But in any case, whether the interbreeding was spontaneous or forced, it is clear that it ultimately generated chaos, a suspension of the laws of nature-- androlomusia (Medrash 26:5). 


In Vayikra 19:19, the Torah prohibits us from intentional mating of animals of different species:
אֶת חֻקֹּתַי, תִּשְׁמֹרוּ בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם  שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם  וּבֶגֶד כִּלְאַיִם שַׁעַטְנֵז  לֹא יַעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ.

The Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya there say that interbreeding of species for the purpose of creating an animal that is not part of the natural world expresses a denial of the perfection of the world as created (see, e.g., Chulin 127), it is an act of rebellion against God's will, and it is Makchish- it weakens- God's act of creation.  I would say that this 'Makchish,' weakening, is derived from the term androlomusia, a breach in the laws of nature, resulting in chaos.  It is as if natural law- physics, mathematics, biology- is a treaty between Man and God; if Mankind breaches the treaty, all natural law is subject to abrogation by God, as occurred at the time of the Mabul..


Now, here is a paragraph from an editorial in Nature, published June 2007.


Many a technology has at some time or another been deemed an affront to God, but perhaps none invites the accusation as directly as synthetic biology. Only a deity predisposed to cut-and-paste would suffer any serious challenge from genetic engineering as it has been practised in the past. But the efforts to design living organisms from scratch — either with a wholly artificial genome made by DNA synthesis technology or, more ambitiously, by using non-natural, bespoke molecular machinery — really might seem to justify the suggestion, made recently by the ETC Group, an environmental pressure group based in Ottawa, Canada, that "for the first time, God has competition".

I suppose it's nice to see that these people were mechavein to, and so eloquently stated, the essential thesis of the Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya.  And, of course, the Ramban issue does not apply only to synthetic biology, but even to gene splicing, which is now so common as to often be done in high school science projects.

The natural halachic reaction to this Rashi is that the fact remains that after Matan Torah, we have 365 prohibitions, no more, no less, and if no specific prohibition covers an act, there is no reason to avoid it other than the vague mussar of "kedoshim tihyu".  After all, the issur of Kilayim in Vayikra 19:19 is called a "chok."  If it is a chok, perhaps the issur is limited to the specific cases that were prohibited and not meant to be extrapolated, and we have no right to establish a binyan av. Perhaps, then, the manipulation of genetic material in a laboratory, which does not involve the unnatural act of mating dissimilar animals, is not prohibited.


Continuing the train of thought, here's a piece of Torah from Reb Elchonon Wasserman.  Every single line in this  piece is a fascinating chiddush.  Items 1 and 2 will appear irrelevant to our discussion, but you will see that they lead back to this topic.  Unfortunately, I can't find a full text copy of the Kovetz Shiurim online, and I'm not getting paid enough to type it, so I'll just give you the mareh makom and a synopsis.  Kesuvos 60, # 203 in my copy.
1.  Citing Rabbeinu Chananel in Chagiga 16- a child conceived through artificial insemination, and certainly in vitro, does not generate tumas leida for the mother.  (Ed: Of course there would be the standard "ein pesichas hakever belo dahm."  But neither the chumra of tumas leidah, nor the kula of dahm tohar, would apply to a child of AI, and certainly not to in vitro fertilization.)
2. This would only be true where AI and IV are rare.  If they were to become common, their halacha would be the same as natural conception. (Ed: in the previous piece he says like Reb Moshe and the Avnei Nezer, that bishul be'chama is only different than bishul in fire so long as it is rare.  Once it becomes common, there would be a din of bishul basar be'chalav, the issur of bishul korban pesach, and a de'oraysa of bishul on Shabbos, even in bishul bechama.  See, e.g., this.)
3. Now that cross-pollination is common, cross-pollination is prohibited between any trees for which grafting would be assur.  (Ed: the Chazon Ish (Zeraim, Kilayim 3) leaves undecided the question of whether grafting among dissimilar citrus trees is prohibited.  According to many poskim, the issur of harkava is the reason that we avoid grafted Esrogim, though the Chazon Ish prohibits grafted Esrogim even if the the issur of harkava does not apply.  According to Reb Elchonon, then, the act of intentional cross-pollination between dissimilar citrus trees would be a safek de'oraysa.  If so, it would seem that the fruit of any naturally cross-pollinated esrog would be passul.  If so, there hasn't been a kosher esrog in the world since the time of Adam Harishon, because cross-pollination with other similar citruses occurs whenever the wind blows.  In fact, I believe that the only reason we can use them on Sukkos, even though they inevitably contain a certain percentage of lemon genes from cross pollination, is that yichus goes after the mother (the ovary/stigma), not the father (the pollen/stamen.))

Some aspects of this issue have been addressed by certain rabbinical figures, some of whom propose that the prohibition of harkava only applies to living entities. Genetic material, on the other hand, is not alive, and, they say, may be manipulated at will.  This might come as a surprise to the Ramban, to Reb Elchanan, and to the editors of Nature.  It is similar to an argument that ma'aseh Onan is muttar for anyone that was already mekayeim pirya ve'riya.

Regarding Cloning, there are those who do not discourage it.  Rabbi J. David Bleich, in Tradition, Spring 1998, argues that cloning is muttar because

"The matter of identification as a member of a species is best summed up in a pithy comment attributed to Rav Chaim Soloveitchik. It is reported that Rav Chaim explained a certain Halachic concept by posing the following query: Why is a horse a horse? The answer is that a horse is a horse because its mother was of that species. For that reason the Mishna, Bechorot 5b, declares that the offspring of a kosher animal is kosher even if it has the appearance and physical attributes of a non-kosher animal and, conversely, the offspring of a non-kosher animal is non-kosher even if it has the appearance and physical attributes of a kosher animal. Thus, identity as a member of a particular species is determined not by distinguishing characteristics, but by birth."

He then cites Reb Elchanan in Kovetz He'aros 8:33 who broadly applies the rule of the Mishna in Bechoros.The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 116:1) has also been cited as support for the approach.

On the other hand, Rav Eliashiv has been quoted (see Torah U’madda Journal 9:195 and 216) as stating that cloning violates the spirit of the Torah, as it is similar to Kilayim.  Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 15:45:4) emphatically objects to cloning. 

But there is a fundamental distinction between that discussion, which focuses on the product of cloning, and   Rashi and the Ramban's statements, which address the process of hybridization.  In fact, the Chazon Ish in YD 168:1 is arguably a strong source for the prohibition of interspecific gene splicing.

In any case, it could be argued that the Torah is warning us that the creation of new life forms, either by conflation or synthesis, endangers all life on earth.  One doesn't have to be a Luddite or a fundamentalist to recognize that if the black plague, which involved a natural life form which co-existed with humanity for millennia, reduced the population of Europe by sixty percent, the escape of a carelessly or maliciously engineered organism could do at least as well.  I don't mean to rehash the trope of endless science fiction novels and thrillers.  The idea here is that besides the natural danger, a more important factor might be the breach of the natural treaty between man and G-d.  True, Hashem promised that the wholesale abrogation of the laws of nature will never happen again.  But this does not exhaust the list of alternative horrors.  There are many who consider themselves Orthodox Jews who have a hard time believing the literal truth of the story of the Mabul and Noach.  Here's hoping that the thesis I presented here is incorrect, so that we don't have to witness conclusive proof of the literal truth of the story of the Mabul.

___{|____

~~~~~~~~~~~\_____/~~~~~~~~~~~