Mishpatim. The First Civil Law- How to Treat an Eved.

Parshas Mishpatim introduces the Torah's laws of money matters.  The first subject is the involuntary servitude of a thief.  A thief that cannot make restitution is sold, and the proceeds of the sale are given to the victim of his theft (See Rambam 2 Avadim 2-3, Tanna Kamma in Kiddushin 14b.) The main focus of this section is on the rights of the servant- that despite the moral degradation that led to his  ignoble servility, while he is under your control you must treat him with respect, and his term of servitude cannot exceed six years, and when he leaves after six years you must give him a parting gift.

Why is this the first of the civil laws to be taught?  Is there something fundamental about this particular law?

The most straightforward answer is that a society is not judged on the basis of how it treats it's most honored members.  It is judged on the basis of how it treats the weak and the despised, the humble and the humiliated.  The Torah is telling us to remember that no matter what stratum of society a person occupies, he is entitled to respect and protection.

There are three other answers I found very interesting;  The first two reveal something about people, and the third is an interesting thought about the Ribono shel Olam's Hashgacha.

Here are the first two.
Rav Sorotzkin in his Aznaim LaTorah says (from one of his sons) that it was vital that we be taught to be kind to avadim at this specific moment.  History (the Workers' Revolution, the French Revolution) shows that freed slaves, liberated serfs, those that manage to push the cruel boot of oppression off their necks, become the most vicious masters.  They remember how they suffered and they say "I suffered terribly for years, I still remember how I froze and I starved and I worked like an animal, and nobody cared, and now you can suffer."  It was at the moment they were leaving servitude that Hashem had to tell them "No!  When you become masters, show kindness and sympathy.  Leave behind the resentment and anger, and learn what a Jewish master is supposed to be."

On the opposite side of the spectrum, we have the Maharil Diskin.  The Maharil Diskin says that that they were taught this law davka at this point because having suffered so terribly, they were completely receptive to the lesson that they should be kind to their slaves.  They deeply understood and appreciated this lesson because it resonated with their own feelings.  They naturally felt that if they ever were in the position of being masters, that they would be different than the Egyptians, their wicked oppressors.  This, the first lesson of civil law, struck a chord of harmony with their feelings, and they understood it very emotionally and deeply.

Chaim B. sent in that Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz takes the same approach in 5731:4.  It's hard for the master to free his slave after six years because he loses sight of the slave's humanity, he is blind to the slave's desire for freedom and views him only as a revenue-producing commodity whose loss is a hit to the balance sheet. Therefore, the Torah used the moment when Bnei Yisrael had the greatest appreciation for the meaning of freedom to give them this mitzvah - the roshem of leaving avdus would stay with them forever and help them keep the proper perspective.

Please note that these two answers are diametrically opposed.  Rav Sorotzkin says that a freed slave will be predisposed to tyranny, and they had to be warned not to give in to this base instinct.  Rav Diskin says that a freed slave will naturally understand how right and good it would be to be kind to others when the tables are turned, and they received this lesson with joy and understanding.  Opposite answers!  Completely incompatible!  Upon reading these two pshatim, one is tempted to saw that if one is true, the other must be false, that one of these is מגלה פנים בתורה שלא כהלכה!

Giving in to this temptation would obscure a fascinating insight.  The fact is that both phenomena exist, and both interpretations are true.  People react differently to personal suffering.  Some people suffer, and they come out like angels.  Some suffer, and it turns them into devils.  The Torah is written for everyone, and speaks to both groups with one halacha.  The "angels" are told to nurture their empathy, and the "devils" are warned that they need to fight their tendency to act out their resentment for their suffering.

When you read the two answers, I would wager that one answer seemed right to you and the other seemed forced.  Now you know which group you would probably be in.  

great Unknown sent in a nice variation on this idea:

"There is no dispute among the pshotim. Rav Sorotzkin [Jr] points out that the tendency to cruelty is buried in the former slave's psyche. It is a potential for evil that will be manifested in the future - despite [as he writes] the person's current certainty that he would never be as cruel as his former masters. This had to be headed off.
But how to ingrain the lesson into the deepest level of the Jewish psyche? Do this, Rav Diskin answers, by explicitly formalizing and emphasizing their current generous emotions. Thus, those feelings would enter into the depths of their nefoshos, to combat the natural evil tendency discussed by Rav Sorotzkin. 
This is the thrust of the Sichos Mussar."

Another commenter anonymously sent in pretty much the same thing as gU.  

"The moment of emancipation always fills the liberated people with warm feelings of relief and happiness and love for all the others that also have suffered.  With the passage of time, the euphoria wears off, and after the person faces the inevitable challenges of adjusting to his new reality, these feelings might fade and be replaced with a bitterness and a resentment towards others.  So the Ribono shel Olam seized that initial moment of happiness to teach us about how to treat avadim.  At that moment, Klal Yisrael was fully receptive, and the lesson was absorbed emotionally and intellectually so deeply that it lasted even after the return to the hardships of reality that might otherwise have twisted the positive emotions into their opposite."

Another very nice enhancement was added by another anonymous commenter.  He said out that one does not need to say that these are two different groups of people (or even that it is the same people at different times).  The truth is that every human being has within him both of these traits, but one of them is dominant.  The Torah is talking to the two sides of the human personality simultaneously, along the lines of בשני יצריך.  The Ribono shel Olam created us with both, and the Torah addresses both.

The answers we discussed above revolve around one basic thought: that the Jews were ending two hundred years during which their primary identity was "Avadim."  The moment had come when they were liberated and reborn as a free people.  The most appropriate law to teach them was how to treat a fellow Jew who becomes an Eved.

The next answer is categorically different.  Instead of focusing on human nature, it teaches a profound lesson in hashkafa- on the dynamics of Hashem's relationship with Klal Yisrael, and Klal Yisrael's relationship with their environment.

The Satmarer in his Vayoeil Moshe here brings from the Yerushalmi in Rosh Hashanna 3:5 that not only was this parsha the first of the monetary laws that is taught in the Torah, but it was actually taught to the Jews while they were still in Egypt.  (Eli points out that this is more than a Yerushalmi, it was said in our haftara by Yirmiahu Hanavi!   אנכי כרתי ברית את אבותיכם ביום הוצאי אותם מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים לאמר מקץ שבע שנים תשלחו)   He explains that Parsha of Avadim begins with the law that a slave sold involuntarily must be freed after no longer than six years.  The reason this law was so important was because this parsha served as a stimulus:  without the stimulus of "the law of freeing slaves" being taught to Klal Yisrael, Yetzias Mitzrayim could not have taken place  In order for the Geula to take place, in order to prime the teva for the nissim of Yetzias Mitzrayim, Klal Yisrael had to have the portion of the Torah that spoke of Shichrur Avadim.  It is only the zechus of the Torah that enables such a great miracle.  Specifically, it had to be the portion of the Torah that imparts to the world the kedusha and ruchnius of how to treat an eved.  The catalyst for Yetzias Mitzrayim was learning the parsha of Shilu'ach Avadim.

(Another commenter, unfortunately anonymous, tells us that "The Meshech Chochma, Shmos 6:13 [taryag] goes one step beyond the Va'yo'el Moshe and says that the halacha was noge'ah l'ma'aseh even in mitzrayim. Also note that according to this, shiluach avadim was given to klal yisroel before hachodesh hazeh lachem.")

A very similar thought can be found in the Ohr Hachaim.  The Ohr Hachaim in Breishis 21:1, discusses the story of Avimelech and his household being afflicted after Avimelech took Sarah, and Avraham and Sarah praying that they be cured.  After this episode, the Torah says that Hashem remembered Sara as He had promised, and she became pregnant.  Chazal say that if a person who needs an answer from Hashem prays for another who needs the same thing, the need of the one who prays is answered first.  Here, too, since the house of Avimelech was cursed with the inability to have children, when Avraham and Sara prayed for him they were answered first.  The Ohr Hachaim says the following:  Of course Hashem would have remembered His promise to Sara with or without Avimelech.  But Hashem's promise was that He would arrange for Avraham and Sara to have a mitzva whose Segula was that Sara become pregnant: הזמין לו מצוה שסגולתה שיפקד ובזה נתקיימה הבטחתו.  Again:   it wasn't a simple promise "I will do X and Y."  The promise was that when the time comes, "I will arrange that a mitzva whose metaphysical effect is the fulfillment of the promise will present itself."  If you take advantage of the mitzva, good.  If not, tough.

This Ohr Hachaim is similar to what the Satmarer said.  Hashem promises.  But the promise is that you will have the opportunity to earn what He promised.  Also, it echoes the idea that Rav Feivelsohn said, as I wrote about here, that even a bracha that Hashem fulfills requires that you be mispallel so that the bracha will actualize.

The Vilner Gaon uses this hashkafa-concept in one of his classic pshatim.  I enjoy the Yiddish, so I'm putting the whole thing here in Yiddish, but the relevant part of the Gaon's vort is at the end in simple Hebrew.   (I got it from here.) 

מסכת בבא קמא (דף ל”ז ע”א): שור של ישראל שנגח לשור של כנעני פטור. און דאס איז דערפאר ווייל מיר דרשנען שור רעהו ולא שור של עכו”ם.

שטעלט זיך א קשיא פון די וואכעדיקע סדרה, ווען דער אויבערשטער זאגט צו משה רבינו: “דבר נא באזני העם וישאלו איש מאת רעהו”, וואס דא מיינט דאך “רעהו” די מצריים, זעהט מען דאך אז רעהו קען מיינען אויך עכו”ם?

איז דא א געוואלדיקער חידוש פונעם ווילנער גאון, צו ערשט איז ער מקדים צוויי אנדערע קשיות אין די פסוקים, קודם כל פארוואס האט די אויבערשטער געדארפט אנזאגן דבר נא באזני העם אין נא אלא לשון בקשה, פארוואס דארף מען בעטן מיט א לשון בקשה, ווער וואלט נישט מסכים געווען צו בארגן כלי כסף וכלי זהב, און נאך א קשיא אויפן פסוק ובני ישראל עשו כדבר משה וישאלו ממצרים כלי כסף וכלי זהב וגו’ שרייבט רש”י כדבר משה שאמר להם וישאלו איש מאת רעהו, וואס האט דא רש”י צוגעלייגט וואָס שטייט נישט אין פסוק?

זאגט דער הייליקער ווילנער גאון א מוראדיקער דערהער בזה הלשון:

ויש לומר דלא היה ביכולתם לעשות כזאת, אם לא אשר מקודם יכופו את יצרם לעשות חסד איש עם רעהו ואזי עולם חסד יבנה, וישפיעו מדת החסד בעולם, גם על המצריים, ועל ידי זה ויתן ה’ את חן העם בעיני מצרים וגו’, ולפי זה מה שנאמר ‘רעהו’ הכונה לישראל, ושפיר שייך בזה לשון בקשה, לפי זה מיושבים היטב דברי רש”י, דכתיב ובני ישראל עשו כדבר משה במה שאמר להם במצרים וישאלו איש מאת רעהו, דהיינו כי בני ישראל עשו חסד זה לזה על ידי שאלה, ועל ידי זה וישאלו ממצרים כלי כסף וגו’ וה’ נתן את חן העם בעיני מצרים וישאלום.

The point is that the request of וישאלו איש מאת רעהו was not that they initially borrow from the Mitzrim.  There was no way on Earth the Egyptians would have been willing the lend them anything bederech hateva, and the word רעהו would not have been used to to Klal Yisrael to describe their Egyptian neighbors.  The Mitzva was that the Jews should borrow from each other.  Once they did this chesed, once they put into the briyah the kiyum of the mitzva of lending and chesed, it engendered the midda of chesed in the world and elicited similar feelings from the Mitzrim, and they became willing to lend the Jews with an open hand.

This basic Hashkafa concept is the same in the Gaon, the Ohr Hachaim, and the Satmarer Rov.  Sometimes, when the Ribono shel Olam wants to grant us a bracha, Hashem gives us a mitzva to do that is in some way related to the desired event, and the Zechus of doing that Mitzva brings about the Bracha.
When Hashem wanted Sara to have a child, He arranged that Sara have the Mitzva of praying for the afflicted household of Avimelech.  The result of that mitzva was that relief Sarah had sought on behalf of Avimelech was granted to her.  
When Hashem wanted the Egyptians to lend to the Jews, he had the Jews lend to each other, and through that Chesed, the feeling of Chesed came to the world and engendered a miraculous sense of Chesed in the Egyptian neighbors of the Jews.  
When Hashem wanted the Jews to be freed from slavery, He gave them the Parsha of Shilu'ach Avadim to accept and to learn.  The zechus of accepting and learning that Parsha brought about the power of Shichrur of Klal Yisrael, and they themselves were freed from slavery.

Yisro, Shemos 20:7. Mitzvos According to the Ramban, Ahava and Yir'ah.

The Magen Avraham (658 sk 12 quoting Mateh Moshe, and in 671 sk 1 without attribution,) says that a person should forego his own Hiddur Mitzva in order to enable another person to do the basic Mitzva.  Here is the case:
Reuven has the means to fulfill a Mitzva with Hiddur, with glory and beauty.  There is another town where nobody can fulfill the mitzva at all.  If he were to take some of the money he set aside for the mitzvah and send it to the other another town, he would still be able to fulfill the mitzvah adequately, but without hiddur.  The Magen Avraham says מוטב, it is better that he choose the second option.  It is clear from the Magen Avraham in 658 that this chiddush is not limited to helping a tzibbur; the same is true for helping another individual to do his mitzva. This is also mentioned by the Shaarei Teshuva in 671 sk 12.  (The Ben Ish Chai in his Tshuvos Torah Lishma argues and holds that this is only true when you are being mezakeh a community, for מצוה דרבים, but you can not give up your hiddur for another individual's mitzva.  Othersמחנה חיים 29whittle the Magen Avraham's rule down to a toothpick because they basically don't agree with him.)  The cases where the Magen Avraham tells us this rule are as follows:

In 658 the case is that you have enough oil to light the Chanuka menora with hiddur, increasing the number every night, but there is someone who can't afford oil, or has no access to candles, then you should- not must, should- split the oil with him, and you will each light just one candle every night.

In 671 the case is that he has two hundred dollars.  Option One: He can buy a splendid esrog, but his friend, who lives many miles away, will have no esrog at all.  Option Two: He can spend one hundred for an adequate esrog for himself and give the other hundred to his friend to buy an esrog.  The Magen Avraham says he should choose Option Two.

If the Magen Avraham only quoted the Mateh Moshe in the case of Chanuka, I would say it's a rule in Pirsum Haneis, publicizing the miracle of Chanuka, so paying for someone else's candle is your way of doing Pirsum, through the other person.   But he extrapolates from Chanuka to an individual who doesn't have an Esrog, so the Magen Avraham takes it to be a rule of general application.

There is a discussion in the Shaarei Teshuva that is somewhat related.  In OC 482, the Shaarei Teshuva brings the Beis Yehuda's question: two people, each has a half zayis of matza shmura, what should they do.  The Beis Yehuda says they should fight it out- כל דאלים גבר, which the Shaarei Teshuva finds very difficult to understand.  First of all, it's immoral (the Igeres Shmuel brought there is a topic for another day.) Second, it would be ineffective, because of Matza Gezula, even if it is less than a kezayis.  (I think that the Beis Yehuda, when he says כל דאלים גבר, is not using the phrase in its usual sense.  He means they should agree to a fight, winner take all.)  So the Shaarei Teshuva offers two possible resolutions: that each eat what he has, assuming that half a kezayis is also a mitzva (even though it is not a complete fulfillment, it is called a mitzva, which is the subject of a very broad machlokes among the achronim and perhaps the rishonim) or that they should flip a coin, winner take all.  (Actually, he says Gorel.  Maybe he was worried about Asmachta.)  He says that it is pashut that the loser, by enabling a complete fulfillment of a mitzva, is better off than had he personally done a half mitzva, along the lines of Yessachar/Zevulun.  Also, since there was a gorel, it's not like he threw away his mitzva.  Here, too, you see the idea that enabling someone else's full mitzva outweighs your own partial mitzva.  In the Magen Avraham's case, the partial mitzva was Hiddur.  Here, it is a half zayis.


The connection to our parsha is the Ramban.  The Ramban (in 20:7, quoted below) presents a concept of Mitzvos which, he says, has application in practical halacha (in the rule of עשה דוחה לא תעשה.)  He says that the essence of positive commandments is to show love of G-d: I do what He wants done because I love Him. The motive to avoid aveiros is not love, but fear and the duty of obedience. The connection to the Magen Avraham now becomes obvious.  According to the Ramban, the primary motive for doing mitzvos is to see to it that Hashem's will is done, and it should make no difference whether I do the mitzva myself or I enable someone else to do it.  If, on the other hand, mitzvos are primarily a matter of personal obligation, then it would be hard to see why I should give up the opportunity to do my duty optimally just so that someone else should fulfill his basic obligation.  Certainly, if Mitzvos are motivated by yir'ah, my interest is to protect myself and ensure my own survival and safety.  Whether or not other people do mitzvos is irrelevant to me.

(מצוות צריכות כוונה או אין צריכות is not an issue here; even if the mitzva is to show ahavas hashem, that does not exclude a mitzvah done without kavana, because the pashtus is that אין צריכות is based on סתמא לשמה.)  

There are some issues here that are beyond resolution.  For example:  In financial matters, we have rules of tzedaka; that we give maaser, or a chomesh; and the tithe or fifth are only if a person can cover his own basic needs.  If not, his obligation is שלישית השקל בשנה (Rambam 7 Matnos Aniyim 5).  The Tur brings from Rav Saadiah Gaon that  חייב אדם להקדים פרנסתו לכל אדם ואינו חייב לתת צדקה עד שיהיה לו פרנסתו שנאמר וחי אחיך עמך חייך קודמין לחיי אחיך, but the Beis Yosef says that there is some kind of error in that quote; the Baal HaTanyah distinguishes between basic life needs and "mosros:"

ולא אמרו חייך קודמין אלא כשביד אחד קיתון של מים וכו' שהוא דבר השוה לשניהם בשוה לשתות להשיב נפשם בצמא, אבל אם העני צריך לחם לפי הטף ועצים וכסות בקרה וכהאי גוונא, כל הדברים האלו קודמין לכל מלבושי כבוד וזבח משפחה בשר ודגים וכל מטעמים של האדם וכל בני ביתו, ולא שייך בזה חייך קודמין מאחר שאינן חיי נפש ממש כמו של העני שוה בשוה ממש.

Instead of approaching it as if it were a new topic, why doesn't the Magen Avraham and all those that follow apply the rules of Tzedaka to this question?  The Baal Hatanya's rule would be a perfect model for the Magen Avraham.  If it's my mitzva against his I do mine.   If it's my hiddur against his,  That's like my mosros against his basic needs and I ought to help him. 

And of course, the basic issue is a matter of hashkafa, a matter that has no ultimate answer.  The issue for Mitzvos is really the same as it is in the philosophy of politics.  How do the rights and needs of the individual relate to those of society in mitzvos- Utilitarianism or Objectivism?  Capitalism, Socialism, or Communism?

Coming back to questions that might have a clear answer, here are the some discussions that might clarify the shittos here.

1.  Does the Magen Avraham depend on whether hiddur is de'oraysa or derabannan?  (Also here and here.)  I am not sure.


2.  Does the Magen Avraham depend on whether hiddur is part of the mitzva or a separate mitzva?  It seems to me that if hiddur is a separate mitzva, then it is no different than any other mitzva kiyumis, and I highly doubt that the Magen Avraham would say that given a choice between fulfilling your own mitzva kiyumis or funding someone else's mitzva chiyuvis, that is is good to fund the other person.  Somehow, I think that he's only talking about hiddur.  And so the Magen Avraham has to hold that Hiddur is part of the mitzva, not a separate mitzva.
(As I mentioned above, the Ben Ish Chai in his Teshuvos Torah Lishmah is not convinced by the Magen Avraham.  He holds that one should not give up his mitzva of hiddur to enable someone else to do his.

מיהו הלכה זו שחדש המג״א ז״ל בהלכות חנוכה הנז׳ עדיין לא פסיקא לי די״ל מאחר דאין כאן מצוה דרבים ורק עבד כן בשביל יחיד אין לו לעזוב הדור מצותו בשביל יחיד ומצוה דדיה קדים. 

My feeling is that he is assuming that Hiddur is a separate mitzva.  Given that assumption, he is right to disagree with the Magen Avraham.)


3.  Since the achronim talk about the din of Arvus, that not only do we have a din Arvus on each other, but it's even a din of Areiv Kablan (here and here), what's the hava amina not like the Magen Avraham?  And even without that, what about the din of אע"פ שיצא מוציא which is based on the rule that the regular din of ערבות makes it that I'm still a מחוייב בדבר as long as the other person wasn't yotzei yet?  So of course I can't patchke with hiddur when, from the perspective of Arvus, I haven't yet been yotzei the basic mitzva!

4.  Does this only apply where the other mitzva is the same?  Or is it true in general, for example, where I could buy a super esrog, but it would be better to buy a regular esrog and give the extra money to someone who can then buy a tallis or tefillin?  The Ksav Sofer understands the Magen Avraham as being based on the din of arvus, so even though you are giving up on your hiddur, you gain a share in your friend's mitzva.  But maybe that only applies where the two mitzvos are the same, but you have no right to take money from your mitzva A and give it away for someone elses mitzva B, because of the din of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה, osek b'mitzva, that you should do the current mitzva as well as you can and not diminish it by doing other mitzvos at the same time?  Especially according to the Ritva (Sukka 25a) that an osek is not just pattur, but even assur to do the other mitzvah and the Ran (Sukkah 11a) that osek is pattur even if there's no tircha .


5.  According to the Ramban, since mitzvos Asei are based on ahava, is the Magen Avraham (and the Shaarei Teshuva's gorel) not indisputable?  In other words, if it was yir'ah, then all I care is to protect myself.  If it's ahava, what difference does it make if I do the mitzva or someone else does the mitzva- if my motive is to do Hashem's will because I love Him, all that should matter is whether Hashem is pleased, not whether I get a bigger mitzva reward.  Or am I making a mistake by conflating the Ramban and Shimon Hatzadik in Pirkei Avos 1:3,

 אנטיגנוס איש סוכו קיבל משמעון הצדיק.  הוא היה אומר, אל תהיו כעבדים המשמשין את הרב, על מנת לקבל פרס, אלא הוו כעבדים המשמשין את הרב, על מנת שלא לקבל פרס; ויהי מורא שמים עליכם

☛ R Micha Berger made a very good point.  I knew something was wrong with what I had written, and I couldn't put my finger on it (therefore, ☛,) and R Micha showed me what I had missed.    I have been defining יראה as fear, and that is simplistic and misleading.  In fact, the word can include either יראת העונש OR  יראת הרוממות.  The latter would provide a perfect underpinning for the Magen Avraham, perhaps even more than אהבה.  

Here are the Ramban's words.

ובמדרשו של רבי נחוניא בן הקנה (ספר הבהיר אות קפב) הזכירו עוד סוד גדול בזכור ושמור, ועל הכלל תהיה הזכירה ביום והשמירה בלילה, וזהו מאמר החכמים (ב''ק לב:) שאומרים בערב שבת באי כלה באי כלה, באו ונצא לקראת שבת מלכה כלה, ויקראו לברכת היום קדושא רבא (פסחים קו.) שהוא הקדוש הגדול, ותבין זה. ואמת הוא ג''כ כי מדת זכור רמזו במצות עשה, והוא היוצא ממדת האהבה והוא למדת הרחמים, כי העושה מצות אדוניו אהוב לו ואדוניו מרחם עליו, ומדת שמור במצות לא תעשה, והוא למדת הדין ויוצא ממדת היראה, כי הנשמר מעשות דבר הרע בעיני אדוניו ירא אותו, ולכן מצות עשה גדולה ממצות לא תעשה, כמו שהאהבה גדולה מהיראה, כי המקיים ועושה בגופו ובממונו רצון אדוניו הוא גדול מהנשמר מעשות הרע בעיניו, ולכך אמרו דאתי עשה ודחי לא תעשה, ומפני זה יהיה העונש במצות לא תעשה גדול ועושין בו דין כגון מלקות ומיתה, ואין עושין בו דין במצות עשה כלל אלא במורדין, כמו לולב וציצית איני עושה, סוכה איני עושה, שסנהדרין היו מכין אותו עד שיקבל עליו לעשות או עד שתצא נפשו: 

6.  Does the din of the Magen Avraham follow from the rule of חטא בשביל שיזכה חבירך,  that Reuven may do a relatively minor sin to save his innocent friend from doing a major sin?

      A.  Is the Magen Avraham a simple restatement, an exact match to that rule?  To illustrate:
 חטא בשביל שיזכה חבירך means "Saving X from a major sin justifies (perhaps requires) that Y do a minor sin," 
and here, that would mean one of two things, either a or b:
                 a.  "Enabling X to do a major mitzva justifies (perhaps requires)  that Y relinquish a minor mitzva."  
                 b. To state it more strongly, let's not talk about enabling X to do a mitzva; let's talk about bittul asei, the transgressive failure to do a mitzva:  
"Saving X from failing to do a major mitzva justifies (perhaps requires)  that Y relinquish a minor mitzva."  

Or is there a difference between saving a person from sin and helping him fulfill a mitzva, because an Aveira, albeit oneis, is a פגם, a stain, whereas failure to do a mitzva is just a missed opportunity?

      B.  Is the Magen Avraham even stronger than that case, based on the Ramban that says that fulfilling mitzvos is a stronger show of our relationship with Hashem than avoiding aveiros?  Or is the Ramban a poor example, because he's talking about the reward for fulfilling, not the punishment for not fulfilling.

Since I mention that sugya in Shabbos 4a, here's the relevant Tosfos, with the interesting parts in bold:

וכיאומרים לו לאדם חטא בשביל שיזכה חבירך. והא דאמר בבכל מערבין (עירובין לב: ושם) רבי סבר ניחא ליה לחבר דליעבד איסורא קלילא ולא ליעבד עם הארץ איסורא רבה התם כדי שלא יאכל ע"ה טבל על ידו דאמר לי' מלא לך כלכלה של תאנים מתאנתי אבל הכא שלא נעשה האיסור על ידו אין אומרים לו חטא אפי' איסור קל שלא יבא חבירו לידי איסור חמור ואומר ריב"א דאפי' למדביק עצמו אין לפשוט משם להתיר דהתם עדיין לא נעשה האיסור ומוטב שיעשה איסור קל ולא יעשה איסור חמור על ידו אבל הכא המעשה של איסור כבר נעשה וממילא יגמור לא יעשה אפי' איסור קל בידים והא דתנן בהשולח (גיטין דף מא: ושם) מי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין כופין את רבו ועושה אותו בן חורין ואע"ג דבהאי פירקא (דף לח:) א"ר יהודה כל המשחרר עבדו עובר בעשה דלעולם בהם תעבודו שאני פריה ורביה דמצוה רבה היא כדמשני התם בר"א שנכנס לבה"מ ולא מצא שם י' ושחרר את עבדו להשלימו לי' מצוה דרבים שאני ועוד י"ל דדוקא היכא דפשע קאמר וכי אומרים לו לאדם חטא כדי כו' ואתי שפיר הא דאמרי' בריש תמיד נשחט (פסחים דף נט. ושם) דאתי עשה דפסח שיש בו כרת ודחי עשה דהשלמה וקא עברי כהנים בעשה דהשלמה ומקריבין למחוסר כפורים כפרתו כדי שיביא פסחו וכן בפרק בתרא דעירובין (דף קג: ושם) כהן שנמצא בו יבלת חבירו חותכה לו לו בשיניו אע"ג דהוי שבות וגבי חציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין שנהגו בה מנהג הפקר וכפו את רבה בהשולח (גיטין דף לח:) משום שהיתה מחזרת וממציאה עצמה לזנות ודומי' לאנוסין והוי נמי כמצוה דרבים

I'm also taking into consideration the Magen Avraham 306 sk 29, who brings the shittos about sinning to save others from more serious sins, so we can't say that he doesn't pasken like the Gemara in Shabbos.


7.  Now that we've introduced a comparison to חטא בשביל שיזכה חבירך, I don't know why I should only look at the Ramban to support the Magen Avraham.  After all, the Maharik says that Asei is docheh Lo Sa'aseh because the Asei is more important/chamur.  See here in middle of the first column.  If Asei is more chamur, then, as we said in the previous paragraph, the rule of חטא בשביל שיזכה חבירך should apply to mitzvos asei as well.


8.  When Reb Shlomo Zalman said that Reuven has no obligation to spend a dime to prevent Shimon's need to be mechallel Shabbos for Piku'ach nefesh, (If Reuven would give Shimon his candle and sit in the dark, Shimon, who is sick, won't need to light a candle on Shabbos for piku'ach nefesh), why doesn't he bring the Magen Avraham (because I think that if the Magen Avraham holds it is mutav by kiyum mitzvos, where there's a din of עד חומש, wouldn't he hold it was obligatory where you can prevent dechiyas Shabbos, where it's כל ממונו ובלבד שלא יעבור על המצווה)?


9.  What would the Magen Avraham say in a case where you have the ability to do a Mitzva Kiyumis, but you could use the money to enable your friend to do a Mitzva Chiyuvis?  What would you say?

Beshalach, Shemos. Men and Angels

This website generally avoids matters of practical halacha.  However, a coincidence in the Mefarshim of this week's parsha inspired us to attempt an exercise in practical rabbinics.

In halacha, we take the issue of kavod, honor, seriously.  The superior is to enter a room first.  When two are traveling, the rebbi should be on the right and the talmid on the left.  When three are traveling, the rebbi is in middle, the superior talmid slightly behind on his right, and the less advanced talmid on their left.  If several people need something, the greater person has precedence.  What would be the halacha if one was traveling with a malach.  Who would be the more honored, the man or the malach?  If you met your rebbi and a malach, to whom would you offer Shalom Aleichem first?

This is an ancient question.  Coincidentally, Reb Meir Simcha and the Barditchever both address the question in this week's parsha.  

Before getting to Reb Meir Simcha and the Barditchever , let us run through some of the history of the discussion:
The best place to start is with Rav Saadia Gaon. and the Ibn Ezra.  The Ibn Ezra in the beginning of Bereishis says 

ואל תשים לבך לדברי הגאון שאמר שהאדם נכבד מהמלאכים. וכבר ביארתי בספר היסוד, כי כל ראיותיו הפוכות. וידענו כי אין בבני אדם נכבדים כמו הנביאים, ויהושע נפל על פניו לפני מלאך ה' והשתחוה, ואמר: "מָה אֲדֹנִי מְדַבֵּר אֶל עַבְדּוֹ" (יהושע ה יד), וכן זכריה ודניאל; ולמה אאריך?

When he says "pay no attention to the גאון" he's referring to Rav Saadiah Gaon in Emunos Ve'Deios, though I can't find it there.

This is further discussed by Rabbeinu Bachay 

כי הדבר ידוע כי לולא העוון לא היה הפרש בין אדם למלאך אבל יהיה גדול ממנו כמאמר רבותינו, גדולים צדיקים יותר ממלאכי השרת (סנהדרין צג.

the Shelah,

מעלת ישראל למעלה אף ממעלות מלאכי עליון, כי גדולים צדיקים יותר ממלאכי השרת, מהטעם שאבאר לקמן. ויען כי בחקירה זו יש מחלוקת גדולה בין חכמי ישראל

והרב אברהם בן עזרא ז"ל שלח יד לשונו בגאון וחרה בו אפו על אשר שלח ידו במלאכים... והוא האריך להביא ראיות מדברי הנבואה על שפל מדרגת האדם וגריעותו בערך הכוכבים כל שכן בערך המלאכים, לא ראיתי להביאם ולהאריך בהם, זולת מה שכתב בסוף בזה הלשון "ואני אומר כי ילוד אשה שיחשבו כי השיגה ידו בחכמתו אל מדריגה גבוהה, וכדבריו כן הוא רק נגד החיות והבהמות והעופות, כאשר הוא "מלפנו מבהמות הארץ וגו'", ואם יגבה לבו באמונתו וכו', ואם בעבור דעתו משפטי נזיקין כי הם לא נתנו כי אם לישר המעוותים, כי אלו היינו יושבים במקום שאין שור אין צריך למשפט שור נגח... ובספר עבודת הקדש פרק ד' מחלק התכלית דחה את כל ראיותיו...

אמנם מבואר מדברי רבותינו האמיתיים הם אמת ודבריהם אמת, שבני אדם נכבדים ממלאכי השרת, ולא מאותם המתחדשים בכל רגע כדברי הרב אברהם בן עזרא ז"ל, אבל מהשרים היושבים ראשונה במלכות קיימים תמיד במדרגתן.

the Nefesh HaChaim

ועל פי זה יבואר פשר דבר בענין שינוי דעת שבין גדולי הראשונים ז"ל, אם האדם מישראל גדול מהמלאך או מלאך גדול ממנו, וכל אחד משני הדעות מביא ראיות מפורשות ממקראות מפורשים. ועל פי דברינו הנ"ל יתבאר, אשר באמת אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים, רק בבחינות חלוקים. כי ודאי מלאך גדול מהאדם, הן בעצם מהותו הן בגודל קדושתו ונפלאות השגתו, אין ערך ודמיון ביניהם כלל. וכמו שכתוב בזהר חדש בראשית ויקרא אלקים לאור יום, השגת המלאכים היא השגה גדולה, מה שאין כן למטה מהם, השגה שניה וכו' השגה שלישית היא השגת המדרגה התחתונה אשר בעפר יסודה, והיא השגת בני אדם, ושם ט"ז ב' המלאכים הקרובים מקבלים כח שפע אספקלריא של מעלה תחלה, ומהם יורד לשמים וכל צבאם, ... אמנם בדבר אחד יתרון גדול לאדם מהמלאכים, והוא העלאת והתקשרות העולמות והכחות והאורות אחד בחבירו, אשר זה אין בכח כלל לשום מלאך, והוא מטעם הנ"ל, כי המלאך הוא בעצם כח אחד פרטי לבד, שאין בו כלילות כל העולמות יחד... אבל נשמת האדם בכל ג' החלקי נפש רוח נשמה שלו היא כלולה מכל העולמות, לכן אין בכח ויכולת המלאך כלל להעלות ולקשר ולייחד כל עולם בהעולם נטוי על ראשיהם, כיון שאינו כלול ומשותף מהם, וגם עליית עצמותו של המלאך עד מדרגתו להתקשר בעולם שעליו, אין תלוי בו בעצמו, ולכן נקראים המלאכים עומדים... ורק האדם לבד הוא המעלה והמקשר ומייחד את העולמות והאורות בכח מעשיו, מחמת שהוא כלול מכולם. ואז גם המלאך משיג עליה ותוספת קדושה על קדושתו אשר באה בכח מעשה האדם, מפני שגם הוא כלול בהאדם... (שער א פרק י)

וזהו הטעם שהמלאכים המקדישים בשמי מרום ממתינים מלשלש קדושתם עד אחר שאנו משלשים קדושה למטה, אף שקדושתם למעלה מקדושתנו, לא שהם חולקים כבוד לישראל, אלא שאין בכחם ויכולתם כלל מצד עצמם לפתוח פיהם להקדיש ליוצרם, עד עליית קול קדושת ישראל אליהם מלמטה, כי ענין אמירת הקדושה הוא העלאת העולמות והתקשרותם על כולם בעולם שמעליו, להוסיף קדושתם וצחצוח אורם... וזה אין בכח שום מלאך ושרף לעשותו בעצמו תחלה כנ"ל, לכן לא יפתח פיו עד עליית הבל פיהם של קדושת ישראל קבוצי מטה... (שם פרק יא)

and of course we have to remember the Gemara in Chulin 91 a and b

חביבין ישראל לפני הקב"ה יותר ממלאכי השרת שישראל אומרים שירה בכל שעה ומלאכי השרת אין אומרים שירה אלא פעם אחת ביום ואמרי לה פעם אחת בשבת ואמרי לה...פעם אחת בעולם.   וישראל מזכירין את השם אחר שתי תיבות שנאמר שמע ישראל ה' וגו' ומלאכי השרת אין מזכירין את השם אלא לאחר ג' תיבות כדכתיב קדוש קדוש קדוש ה' צבאות.   ואין מה"ש אומרים שירה למעלה עד שיאמרו ישראל למטה שנאמר ברן יחד כוכבי בקר והדר ויריעו כל בני אלהים אלא אחת אומרת קדוש ואחת אומרת קדוש קדוש ואחת אומרת קדוש קדוש קדוש ה' צבאות והאיכא ברוך ברוך אופנים הוא דאמרי ליה.   ואיבעית אימא כיון דאתיהיב רשותא אתיהיב  וישר אל מלאך ויוכל בכה ויתחנן לו איני יודע מי נעשה שר למי כשהוא אומר כי שרית עם אלהים הוי אומר יעקב נעשה שר למלאך בכה ויתחנן לו איני יודע מי בכה למי כשהוא אומר ויאמר שלחני הוי אומר מלאך בכה ליעקב

Here is Reb Meir Simcha 

ה' איש מלחמה. הנה מכבר אמרתי ליתן סעד לדברי חכמי הקבלה אשר א״צ חיזוק כי נפש האדם גבוה יותר ממלאכים

(I'm not bringing down the rest of Reb Meir Simcha because I don't understand more than two words in a row, and Rav Kuperman, consistent with his stated policy, makes only one comment- that he doesn't comment on such matters.)

and here is Reb Levi Yitzchak, on a different passuk

ויסע מלאך האלהים ההולך לפני מחנה ישראל וגו' ויעמוד מאחוריהם (יד, יט). דידוע דהמלאכים הם יותר גבוהים מישראל מחמת קדושתם, אפס כשהשם יתברך מראה אהבתו לעמו ישראל ואוהב את ישראל, אז ישראל הם למעלה מכל מלאכי מעלה. והנה בעת קריעת ים סוף הראה הקב"ה אהבתו לישראל, והיו ישראל למעלה מכולן. וזהו ויסע מלאך האלהים ההולך 'לפני מחנה ישראל' ויעמוד מאחריהם, פירוש שהמלאכים שהולכים לפני מחנה ישראל, שהם למעלה ממדריגת ישראל, אז בקריעת ים סוף עמדו אחר מדריגת ישראל, שישראל היו למעלה מן המלאכים, שהשם יתברך הראה להם אהבתו

Frankly, this is not the type of thing I like to post.  It is mosif not chochmah and not yir'ah- because no matter what you say, all you are doing is ordering two things relative only to each other, neither of which can be quantified on any absolute scale, only by elevating one or depreciating the other, which really tells you nothing useful.  And the likelihood that it will be nogei'ah le'halacha is low.  But whenever I think about men and malachim, I enjoy remembering the story with Harav Leib Bakst (a story I verified with his son.)  When Harav Bakst was a young man in Shanghai, he was stricken with severe appendicitis, and he hovered between life and death.  He dreamed that he was in front of the Beis Din shel Ma’alah, and the Mashgiach, R’ Yeruchem, was on the Beis Din (I like the idea of being judged by contemporaries.) The members of the Beis Din were arguing about who is more chashuv, Malachim or people. Some said that people are more chashuv, because Malachim can only do one thing, but people can do many things at one time. They then asked Rav Bakst, what does he say, does this mean that people are better than Malachim? He said he did not want to answer. They told him that he had no choice, and he had to answer. So he told them that this did not prove that people are better, because pshat that a Malach can do only one thing is that when he does his shlichus, he does it with his entire being, with all his kochos. But when people do more than one thing at a time, it is because they are not doing the things they are doing 100%, they are not being done perfectly. Even for people, if they need to do something perfectly, they can only do one thing at a time. R’ Yeruchem said that what he said was good, and the Beis Din paskened that he will live. And then he woke up. When the Mirrer oilam wanted to make a shinui hasheim, he refused, saying that Beis Din had already paskened that he will live, and he will live, and there is no reason to make a shinui hasheim. 

They say that Harav Bakst's life reflected that idea, of focus and dedication to achievement by bringing all his power to doing one thing perfectly. He used to say, “A person can only do one thing at a time, if he does it the way it needs to be done.” The same thing applies to the moments when we should be focused on achieving kedusha, like, for example, when we come to shul, or whenever we steal some time from our daily activities to say tehillim or to learn, we have to give it total and exclusive focus. 

(One little he'ara. Seeking Shleimus is also a goal. That means that you don't focus your whole life on any one nekuda, it means that every single thing that you do is intended to contribute to the goal of being an adam hashaleim. It means Torah, and Avodah, and Gemilus Chasadim, and Zikui Harabbim, and being a loving father and husband.) 

Focus is essential.   My father Zatza'l used to say that if you don't dream about your buildings at night you should not be in real estate.   I have people in my shiur that have been coming for many years, and I sometimes doubt that they learned anything over the years, I wonder whether they know more now than they did when they began coming.  Baruch Hashem, there are others that have learned a velt!  The successes encourage me to continue.  But Oy! nebach! what a pathetic! tragic! waste of time! -  to come to a shiur for years and years and learn nothing, gornisht, because you were more interested in showing off how clever or learned you are, or because you simply are a good-hearted שבתי בבית השם intellectual lump that never makes the effort to focus and learn and remember.

Beshalach, Shemos. The Mechila of Shira.

The Shem Mishmuel on this week's parsha, in the second year section (from  מדרש שוח״ט פרק יח and שה״ש ד־ב). 

במד"ר בשירה נמחלו עוונותיהם של ישראל נראה דכמו יוה"כ הוא התדבקות הנפש במקור העליון ושורש הנשמה וממילא נמחלו עוונותיהם של ישראל והוא כעין השקה שע"י חיבור באה הטהרה כן בעת שאמרו שירה התדבקו במקור העליון וממילא נמחלו עוונותיהם

This is how I would translate it:

In the Medrash Rabba: With Shira, the sins of Klal Yisrael were forgiven.  It appears that just as Yom Kippur is the adherence of the spirit to the sublime source and root of the Soul, and from this it naturally follows that the sins of Yisrael are forgiven, similar to the intimate connection of tamei water to the water in a mikva- through conjoining comes purification.  So too when they said Shira they were attached to the sublime source, it followed naturally that their sins were forgiven.

The Shem MiShmuel assumes that Shira brings Mechila.  The Litvishe assumption would be the opposite- not that Shira brings Mechila, but that if a person is zocheh to mechila, then he comes to Shira- that the direction of causality would be being נמחלו להן עונותיהן, and נעשה בריה חדשה, and נעשה לו נס, and then אמרו שירה.  But if you look at the Medrash, it's hard to deny that the Shem MiShmuel is right.

 (Yalkut here פרק טו רמז רנד and in Shoftim  ו רמז ס) :

ויסע משה את ישראל אמר רבי סימון לא כל שרוצה לומר שירה אומר שירה אלא כל מי שנעשה לו נס ואומר שירה בידוע שמוחלין לו על כל עונותיו ונעשה בריה חדשה. ישראל כשנעשה להם נס ואמרו שירה נמחלו להן עונותיהן שנאמר ויסע משה את ישראל שהסיען מעונותיהן 

וכן אתה מוצא בדבורה וברק שנעשה להם נס ואמרו שירה. ומנין שנמחלו עונותיהן רבי איבו בשם רבי אבא בכל מקום נאמר ויוסיפו בני ישראל לעשות הרע וכאן כתיב ויעשו בני ישראל תחלת עשיה והיכן הן מה שעשו לשעבר אלא מחל להן הקב"ה מה שעשו לשעבר 

וכן אתה מוצא בדוד שנעשה לו נס ואמר שירה ומנין שנמחל לו על כל עונותיו דכתיב בתר שירתו ואלה דברי דוד האחרונים היכן הן הראשונים אלא מלמד שמחל לו הקב"ה

The beginning of the Medrash says לא כל שרוצה לומר שירה אומר שירה אלא כל מי שנעשה לו נס ואומר שירה בידוע שמוחלין לו על כל עונותיו ונעשה בריה חדשה- not just anyone can say Shira! If a person experiences a miracle and says Shira, it is proof that he got mechila.  It does sound from there that the Shira is a סימן of מחילה, not the סיבה.
But the fact is that the Medrash is unequivocal:  It says  כשנעשה להם נס ואמרו שירה נמחלו להן עונותיהן.  Anyway, the proof of the Mechila is the passuk ויסע משה את ישראל, which is after the Shira.  This is indeed like the Shem MiShmuel.

The Girsa in Shocher Tov (18:6) also supports this pshat.  There, it says that the sin that was forgiven was Klal Yisrael's rebelliousness when they stood before the Red Sea.  Clearly, they were not busy doing Teshuva.  They were sinning right before Kri'as Yam Suf.  But the miracle brought them Mechila. No teshuva, just a miracle and Shira.

 דבר אחר את דברי השירה הזאת. אמר ר' סימון לא כל מי שהוא רוצה לומר שירה אומר, אלא כל מי שנעשה לו נס ואומר שירה, בידוע שמוחלין לו עונותיו, ונעשה כבריה חדשה. ישראל כשנעשה להם נס אמרו שירה, שנאמר אז ישיר משה ובני ישראל, ונמחלו כל עונותיהם, שנאמר ויסע משה את ישראל מים סוף (שם שם בב), מלמד שהסיע מהן חטאיהן שחטאו על ים סוף , שנאמר וימרו על ים ביס סוף

The Shem MiShmuel's explanation reminds us of Reb Akiva in the last Mishna in Yoma (85b- מקוה ישראל ה' מה מקוה מטהר את הטמאים אף הקב"ה מטהר את ישראל), and it reminds Reb Chaim B. of the last Rambam in Mikvaos ( כיון שהסכים בלבו לפרוש מאותן העצות והביא נפשו במי הדעת טהור. הרי הוא אומר וזרקתי עליכם מים טהורים וטהרתם מכל טומאותיכם ומכל גלוליכם אטהר אתכם.)

And finally, the Mishna Berura (51 sk 17) brings that the Zohar says

ויאמר שירת הים בשמחה וידמה בדעתו כאילו באותו היום עבר בים והאומר בשמחה מוחלין לו עונותיו

that one should say Az Yashir in pesukei d'zimra with joy, and imagine as if he himself just went through the sea; and one who says it with joy, they forgive him his sins.

I don't know if this is a din in Shira, but it might be:  The Mishna Berura (54 sk 5) brings the Elyah Rabba who brings the Matteh Moshe שהקליפות מבטלים לעלות התפילה וע"י פסוקי דזמרה מכריתים אותם.

I'd like to point out some other associations of Shira and Mechila.

• Chaim B points out that another place were Mechila and Shira are associated- Adam Harishon's Mizmor Shir L'Yom Hashabbos, from Medrash Rabbah Bereishis 22:13.  After Adam saw that Kayin was forgiven, he asked, what happened to the Gzeira?  Kayin answered, I did teshuva and was forgiven- BUT Chaim's Medrash is Mechila-therefore-Shira, and our Medrash is Shira-therefore-Mechilla.

פגע בו אדם הראשון. אמר לו: מה נעשה בדינך? אמר לו: עשיתי תשובה ונתפשרתי. התחיל אדם הראשון מטפח על פניו, אמר: כך היא כחה של תשובה, ואני לא הייתי יודע! מיד עמד אדה'ר ואמר: 'מזמור שיר ליום השבת' (תהלים צב

• The passuk in the Tochecha in Ki Savo, Devarim 28:47, תחת, אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלוקיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב.  This implies that great joy-שמחה וטוב לבב- in our relationship with Hashem brings middas harachamim from the Ribono shel Olam, and middas harachamim is the source of mechilla.

• We find that Shira is associated with Korbanos.  In fact, the Gemara in Arachin 11 says that just as the Zerikas Hadam, the ultimate absolution service of a korban, must be in the daytime, so too the shira that accompanies korbanos must be in the daytime.  Furthermore, we find an association between the Shiras Hayam and building the Beis Hamikdash.  They said זֶה קלִי וְאַנְוֵהוּ, and Onkelos translates this to mean דֵּין אֱלָקי וְאֶבְנֵי לֵיהּ מַקְדַּשׁ.  This is my G-d and I will build for Him a Temple.  Why would the Shira mention that they would later build a Beis Hamikdash?  Why this mitzva out of all the 248 Mitzvos Asei?  You have to say that there is some connection between Shira and Avoda.  Shira is associated with the Beis Hamikdash, and Shira is associated with the Kapara of Korbanos.  This indicates that the Shira is an avoda that brings the same kapara as the Avodah in the Beis Hamikdash, the Avodah of Korbanos.  Or to put it in more emotional terms, you might say "When you say Shira with a whole heart, you are standing in the Beis Hamikdash on Yom Kippur being makriv the holiest korbanos a human being is capable of bringing."  (Rosh Hashannah 26a- כיון דלזכרון הוא כבפנים דמי) 

• Another important thing relating to Shira is what they say in the name of Reb Chaim.  Reb Chaim said that Shira is among Devarim Shebikdusha, e.g., Kaddish and Kedusha and Barchu, such that it requires the presence of a minyan, a Tzibur of Baalei Bris Milah.  Miriam only was able to say her Shira because of the Tzibur of men, because women do not create a din of Tzibur by themselves.  He also uses this to explain Chulin 91b, that the Malachim do not say Shira until Klal Yisrael does.  He says that Malachim, too, do not create a din of Tzibur by themselves, and that is why they cannot say Shira or Kedusha until Klal Yisrael does, because then they can be mitztareif to our minyan/Tzibur.

Since we opened with the Medrash that says that נמחלו עוונותיהם, through Shira their sins were forgiven, let's talk about other people who get a mechila, and see if there's any connection to the Medrash.

In Breishis 36:3, a wife of Eisav is named בשמת בת ישמעאל, but in 28:9 she is named מחלת בת ישמעאל.  Rashi in 36 brings from a Medrash, and it is also in our Yerushalmi in Bikurim 3:3, that three are granted forgiveness from their sins.  This is why Basmas was here called Machlas; when Eisav married her, his sins were forgiven (mechila).  
Rashi:

בשמת בת ישמעאל: ולהלן קורה לה מחלת, מצינו באגדת מדרש ספר שמואל שלשה מוחלין להן עוונותיהן גר שנתגייר והעולה לגדולה והנושא אשה, ולמד הטעם מכאן לכך נקראת מחלת שנמחלו עוונתיו

The Yerushalmi, and as brought by the Gaon on OC 562:2:

רב זעירא הוו בעיין ממניתיה ולא בעי מקבל עליו, כד שמע ההן תניא הני חכם חתן נשיא גדולה מכפרת, מקביל עליה ממניתיה. חכם מפני שיבה תקום והדרת פני זקן, מה כתיב בתריה וכי יגור אתכם גר בארצכם לא תונו אותו, מה הגר מוחלין לו על כל עונותיו, אף חכם שנתמנה מוחלין לו על כל עונותיו. חתן, וילך עשו אל ישמעאל, ויקח את מחלת בת ישמעאל, וכי מחלת שמה, והלא בשמת שמה, אלא שנמחלו לו כל עונותיו. נשיא, בן שנה שאול במלכו, וכי בן שנה היה, אלא שנמחלו לו כל עונותיו כתינוק בן שנה.

It appears that there are four:

one who is appointed Chacham

a convert
one who gets married
one who is crowned king.

So Rashi's "three" is difficult to understand.

One would assume that the answer is that "appointed Chacham" and "crowned King" are essentially the same, in that both assume supreme authority and responsibility, each in his own sphere.

But if  you read the Yerushalmi, you see that it gives disparate reasons for the people listed that leads us to an unexpected explanation for Rashi.  
1.  The Yerushalmi assumes mechila by a Ger, because conversion is like rebirth; 
2.  then, since the ascent to leadership is next to the passuk of Geir, (these are sequential pesukim in Vayikra 19:32-33, we extend the concept to one who is elevated to position of Chacham.

 מפני שיבה תקום והדרת פני זקן ויראת מאלהיך אני ה'.  וכי יגור אתך גר בארצכם לא תונו אתו  

3.  Chassan is derived from the name of Basmas/Machlas.
4.  Rise to kingship is derived from the description of Shaul as being one year old when he became king, as if he had been reborn.  

So we no longer can say that Chacham and King are two ways of saying the same thing. Do we have a problem in Rashi again?

In Sanhedrin 14a the Gemara has the same story with רבי זירא instead of רב זעירא.  It says that רבי זירא הוה מיטמר למיסמכיה דאמר רבי אלעזר לעולם הוי קבל וקיים כיון דשמעה להא דא"ר אלעזר אין אדם עולה לגדולה אלא א"כ מוחלין לו על כל עונותיו אמצי ליה אנפשיה.  Reb Reuven Margolios brings mekoros to show that this is all because certain shinuyim have a din like a shinui haguf.  He connects this to the Gemara (Makkos 22) that a Shor that used to be Hekdesh and was redeemed is viewed as if it were a chimera of hekdesh and chulin, to the point that if you were to harness it and work with it, it would be assur on the basis of harnessing together two dissimilar animals- Kilayim.  Shinui of Kedusha is so fundamental that it equals Shinui Haguf.  We might not appreciate or understand this, because we have mere physical eyes, and we see physical things.  If our eyes were sensitive to the brilliant spectrum of spirituality, we would see a davar kadosh as fundamentally different from a davar gashmi.

If so, the Yerushalmi's connection of Chacham to Geir is not merely a hekeish, it's a mah matzinu with a svara.  Elevation to a matzav of kedusha is halachicly the same as shinui haguf.  The Hekesh teaches us that the עליה רוחנית of becoming a Manhig Ruchni of the Klal also has a din of shinui haguf legabei mechila.

So we have a good explanation for Rashi.  But it is not the explanation we would naturally assume, that the three are
-Geir
-Chacham and Melech
-Chassan,
In fact, the three actually are
-Geir and Chacham
-Melech
-Chassan



In the Poskim, three reasons are given for the minhag of a Chassan and Kallah to fast until the chupah, all cited in OC there in 562 and especially in the Beis Shmuel SK 6.
1. Fasting is appropriate for a day of forgiveness.
2. So their minds should be focused and sober when the marriage in formalized.
3.  It is appropriate to fast whenever you go to do a precious mitzvah.

You have to wonder, why would they look for reasons, when the Yerushalmi clearly supports the first of the reasons, and it is an excellent svara as well.  It's a day of mechila, it's like Yom Kippur, so fasting is appropriate.  

1. Perhaps those that give additional reasons hold that the Yerushalmi is no reason to fast.  Perhaps they hold that the mechila of the Yerushalmi is not conditional, and so fasting is irrelevant.
2. Or, the machlokes is like the machlokes Rebbi and the Rabanan in Shavuos 13a, that Rebbi holds that Yom Kippur brings kapara whether he does teshuva or not, and the Rabanan hold it only works in combination with Teshuva.  If you hold like Rebbi, maybe the mechila of the chasan is absolute, and there's no reason to fast or do teshuva.  Only on Yom Kippur itself is there a din deoraysa of fasting, which is unrelated to the kapara.  But there is no such din for a Chassan.  If, on the other hand, you hold like the Rabanan, since the kapara depends on teshuva, the chasan should be fasting.
3.  Based on what we've said, I think we can offer another explanation.  All you see from the Yerushalmi is that getting married has a din of Shinui, and a fundamental shinui brings mechilla.  It could be the shinui is the simple change from single to married, which is automatic, and suffices for mechila, as we see by Basmas.  But it is also an opportunity for the other din of mechilla- the mechilla based on aliya ruchanis, the shinui of the Geir and the Chacham.  Marriage is an opportunity for an aliyah ruchanis that is like that of a geir.  This kind of aliyah is not automatic.  To achieve this mechila, it is indeed kedai to fast and do teshuva.  Everyone has a Shinui Hasheim.  If you're smart, and lucky, you can also use the opportunity to attain an aliyah ruchanis that will be a Shinui HaGuf.

Back to our Parsha:

The connection between the Mechila of Shira and the Yerushalmi as we have explained it is not superficial. Please note the words of the Medrash I brought above, which I show in bold here:

ויסע משה את ישראל אמר רבי סימון לא כל שרוצה לומר שירה אומר שירה אלא כל מי שנעשה לו נס ואומר שירה בידוע שמוחלין לו על כל עונותיו ונעשה בריה חדשה. ישראל כשנעשה להם נס ואמרו שירה נמחלו להן עונותיהן שנאמר ויסע

It is interesting to see that the concept of Briyah Chadasha appears here by Shira, which ties it together with the focus on Shinui that we discussed in the Gemara in Sanhedrin.

Bo, Shemos 13:15. Not a Kohen, Not a Yisrael

At the end of our sedra, in the parsha of Pidyon HaBen, the passuk says that first-born animals are to be brought as korbanos, and first-born children are to be redeemed.  When our children ask us why we are doing this, we are to tell them that Hashem saved our children in Mitzrayim, and

על כן אני זבח לה' כל פטר רחם הזכרים וכל בכור בני אפדה

To whom is this passuk saying "be makriv, and be podeh, and tell your children "I am doing these things because of the miracles in Mitzrayim""?  Who is the passuk talking to?  There is no individual to whom both dinim apply.  The Yisrael redeems his son, but the Kohen does not.  The Kohen brings the animal as a korban, but the Yisrael does not.  It's an elementary question:   אל מי הפסוק מדבר?  Obviously, a non-kohen can shecht a korban, so אני זבח might be talking to the Yisrael who gave the animal to the Kohen who may then shecht it on the Kohen's behalf, but that's a very, very poor explanation.  If someone chashuv says it, I apologize.

This is not my question.  This morning before Pesukei D'Zimra Harav Shimon Kalman G asked me.
When I originally posted it, I was sure that it was a well known question.  Apparently, it's not. So until we find that it was addressed in the past, here are some suggestions.

UPDATE:  Eli found that the Steipler asks the question in his Birkas Peretz.  I have a copy of his answer below after answer #3.

1.  THE REB MEIR SIMCHA PSHAT
Reb Meir Simcha in 13:13 says that before the Chet Ha'Eigel, there was a law of Pidyon, but the rules were different.

1. Nobody was exempted (my assumption; he doesn't say it.)
2. Animals were to be brought as korbanos by the owner.
3. Children were redeemed, and the money became hekdesh and was used to buy a korban for the father.  

According to this, we can say the passuk is addressing everyone.  Everyone had to bring their  first-born animals as korbanos and also redeem their first-born children- the זובח and the פודה are the same person.  True, the parsha begins with כי יביאך, and the חטא העגל occurred long before that, but that doesn't matter.  When the parsha was taught, it had to make sense under the conditions of that moment.  At that time, it meant one thing, and subsequent to the חטא העגל, the words would have to be reinterpreted as addressing different individuals, similar to what Reb Yaakov Kaminetsky says by the parsha of Yibum.

2.  THE TOSFOS RID PSHAT
אני זבח doesn't mean "I am bringing it as a Zevach."  It means I am designating it as a Zevach, or ensuring that it is brought as a Zevach.  We know that the Yisrael has a special mitzva to be mekadeish the Bechor even though it is born with Kedusha (Nazir 4b, מנין לנולד לו בכור בתוך עדרו שמצוה עליו להקדישו שנאמר הזכר תקדיש, also ibn Ezra here 13:1.)  So it could be that אני זבח means I am playing an active role in seeing to it that it is brought as a korban by being mekadesh it and giving it to the Kohen to bring as a korban.
This is not farfetched: remember the Tosfos Rid in Kiddushin by Bris Milah.

3.  THE REB CHAIM PSHAT
 Reb Chaim in the Rambam Hilchos Arachin shows from the Gemara in Temura 7b and 8b that the original owner is the one that can make it into a Temura.  He says that because the Torah uses the word Nesinah, כל זמן שלא נתנו לכהן לא יצא מרשות בעלים.  It belongs to the Yisrael.  This is true not only if you hold Tovas Hana'a is mamon, but even if you hold that Tovas Hana'a is not mamon.  Until he gives it to the Kohen, he is the Baalim and he is the miskaper.  Once the Yisrael gives it to the Kohen, then the Kohen is the Baalim and the Miskaper.  Everyone tells me that Reb Chaim holds that if the Yisrael doesn't give it to the Kohen at all, and brings it as a korban to the Beis Hamikdash, he will be obligated to pay for the Nesachim, because it is his Korban, but I didn't see that inside.

If so, the pshat in the passuk is simple.  The Bechor is the Korban of the Yisrael.  If he doesn't give it to the Kohen, and he brings it to the Beis Hamikdash, he is the baalim of the Korban and he gets the kapara of the korban.  He is, in fact, the Zovei'ach.  The passuk makes perfect sense.

The weakness of this pshat is that the passuk would be talking about an avaryan that was mevatel the asei of giving it to a Kohen.  On the other hand, it could be that the passuk used words that are shaveh le'chol nefesh under various circumstances. שבקיה לקרא דאיהו דחיק ומוקי אנפשיה.

Here's the Steipler I mentioned above.  It's very close to the Reb Chaim answer, but not exactly Reb Chaim; it also has elements of the Brisker Rov answer.  You can click on it to make it easier to read.

4.  THE BRISKER ROV PSHAT
Eli points out that there is a machlokes among the Rishonim and the Achronim as to the nature of the dinim of Bechor.  It might be that there are two very different dinim in bechor as far as where the Kohen's rights come from.  It could be that his rights are based on the animal being a Petter Rechem, but it could be that his rights are based on the Kedushas Korban Bechor.  These two dinim are independent.   But it is possible that the nature of the baalus of the Kohen, and the issurim to the Yisrael owner, would be different based on the two ways of understanding it.  Now, if  you will look in the Achronim, you will see that most of them talk about two dinim in the Kohen's rights to the Becehor, and whether the ownership stems from the Kedusha or the Kedusha stems from the ownership.  See Reb Dovid Povarsky's shiurim in Bava Kama on Takfo Kohen, where he brings the Mikdash David and Reb Shimon in Shaarei Yosher.  See also Reb Meir Simcha on the Rambam in 3 Temura 2.  But the Brisker Rov in the first piece in Bechoros in the Griz on the Rambam has another approach: his approach is that it's not either/or.  It is both.  There are two dinim in every bechor, and one is the baalus of the Kohen based on the actuality of Petter Rechem, and the other is the baalus of  the Kohen based on the Kedushas Korbon of the Bechor.  (When I say "baalus," I mean all the dinim of Kehuna on the animal, ownership and issur.)

With the Brisker Rov in mind, we can understand why the Torah seems to tell us contradictory dinim in Bechor.
First of all, we have our parsha, that says that the owner is makriv the korban, that it is his korban.

Then we have several pesukim in Devarim that say that the owner eats the Korban.
Devarim 12:6-7:

ו והבאתם שמה עלתיכם וזבחיכם ואת מעשרתיכם ואת תרומת ידכם ונדריכם, ונדבתיכם ובכרת בקרכם וצאנכם.  ז ואכלתם שם לפני ה' אלוקיכם ושמחתם בכל משלח ידכם אתם ובתיכם אשר ברכך ה' אלוקיך

Devarim 12:17-18:

לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך מעשר דגנך ותירשך ויצהרך ובכרת בקרך וצאנך וכל נדריך אשר תדר ונדבתיך ותרומת ידך.  יח כי אם לפני ה' אלוקיך תאכלנו במקום אשר יבחר ה' אלוקיך בו אתה ובנך ובתך ועבדך ואמתך והלוי אשר בשעריך

Devarim 14:22-23:

עשר תעשר את כל תבואת זרעך היצא השדה שנה שנה.  כג ואכלת לפני ה' אלוקיך במקום אשר יבחר לשכן שמו שם מעשר דגנך תירשך ויצהרך ובכרת בקרך וצאנך:  למען תלמד ליראה את ה' אלוקיך כל הימים

Devarim 15:19-22:

יט כל הבכור אשר יולד בבקרך ובצאנך הזכר תקדיש לה' אלוקיך  לא תעבד בבכר שורך ולא תגז בכור צאנך.  כ לפני ה' אלוקיך תאכלנו שנה בשנה  במקום אשר יבחר ה' אתה, וביתך.

But then we have Bamidbar 18:8-13, where it is absolutely clear that it is the Kohen and only the Kohen that can eat the Bechor:

ח וידבר ה' אל אהרן ואני הנה נתתי לך את משמרת תרומתי  לכל קדשי בני ישראל לך נתתים למשחה ולבניך לחק עולם.  ט זה יהיה לך מקדש הקדשים מן האש  כל קרבנם לכל מנחתם ולכל חטאתם ולכל אשמם אשר ישיבו לי קדש קדשים לך הוא ולבניך.  י בקדש הקדשים תאכלנו כל זכר יאכל אתו קדש יהיה לך.  יא וזה לך תרומת מתנם לכל תנופת בני ישראל לך נתתים ולבניך ולבנתיך אתך לחק עולם  כל טהור בביתך יאכל אתו.  יב כל חלב יצהר וכל חלב תירוש ודגן ראשיתם אשר יתנו לה' לך נתתים.  יג בכורי כל אשר בארצם אשר יביאו לה' לך יהיה  כל טהור בביתך יאכלנו. 

Not only does the Korban belong to the Kohen, but it is also assur for a non-kohen to eat it: The Rambam (10 Maaseh Korbanos 5) is mattir all members of the Kohen's household to eat it, , like Teruma and Chazeh v'Shok, and the Raavad (1 Nedarim 11) has a chiddushdikeh shitta that it is only muttar to male Kohanim.  See Kli Chemda כי תבא א׳ סק״ט)

The point is that it could be that the Din of Bechor has a din of Petter Rechem, in which it is like Teruma or Bikkurim.  On that basis, it is the property of the Kohen and it's his Korban and assur to the Yisrael.  But there is also the din of Korban Bechor.  The din of Korban Bechor is like Chazeh Ve'Shok, a din of Mishulchan Gavo'ah, and it depends on Hakrava, but it is essentially the Korban of the Yisrael.  It could be that Shemos and Devarim are talking about the Kedushas Korban Bechor, which is more like Maasar B'heima.  Bamidbar is telling us that there is another din, the din of Kedushas Petter Rechem, which is one of the Matnos Kehuna, which renders it like Teruma.  

I am writing over the (relevant parts of the) Brisker Rov just so that nobody should say that I don't understand or am misrepresenting what he says.  I want to make it clear- what we are saying here is not from the Rov, it is based on the Rov.  We are saying that the two dinim in the Kohen's rights have different dinim.  One is the din Petter Rechem which is absolute mamon kohen and issur to the Yisrael.  The other is Kedushas Korban Bechor that is the Yisrael's mamon but the Kohen has rights to the korban from Mishulchan Gavo'ah, like his rights to Chazeh Ve'Shok.

Among the 24 מתנות כהונה, ten are given anywhere in Eretz Yisrael and can be consumed anywhere (example- Teruma) ; four are given have to be kept in Yerushalayim (example- Bikurim); and ten are given in the Beis HaMikdash (example- Chazeh Ve'Shok, Kodshei Kodoshim.) (BK 110b)

What is the basis of the Kohen's right to the Bechor?  Is it based on its actuality of being a פטר רחם, like Reishis HaGez, or is it based on the Kedushas Korban of the Bechor, like Chazeh V'Shok?

The Brisker Rov brings the Gemara (Zevachim 9b) about Mosar ha’Pesach. This is a left over Korban Pesach.  A Mosar ha’Pesach is shechted with the intention that it should be a Shlamim, and this makes it a Shlamim.

The Gemara asks, what if one shechted the Mosar ha’Pesach as a Bechor?  What would the practical relevance of this status be?  למאי הילכתא דלא ליבעי נסכים אי נמי דליתביה לכהנים- that unlike a Shlamim, it would not need Nesachim; or, that you would have to give it to a Kohen.  (The Gemara brings a Drasha that eliminates this option.)

But you do see that had you been able to designate this non-bechor as a bechor, you would have to give it to a Kohen.  Evidently, the right of the Kohen is based on the animals Kedushas Korban Bechor.
In other words:
Petter Rechem, therefore Kedushas Bechor, therefore property of the Kohen.  If you were able to skip step one and give it kedushas Bechor, it would also belong to the Kohen.

There is another example of a quasi-bechor, and that is the Temura of a Bechor.  The Temura of a Bechor has kedusha, but cannot be brought as a Korban, because of a Gzeiras Hakasuv.  There is a machlokes between the Rambam (3 Temurah 2) and Tosfos (Zevachim 75b) concerning a temuras bechor.   The Rambam holds that the temurah of a bechor is given to Kohanim.  Tosfos holds that the owner does not have to give it to a Kohen because it is not actually a bechor.

The Rov asks on Tosfos, but from the din of mosar ha'pesach we saw that it is the Kedushas Korban of Bechor that generates the Kohen's rights, not the actuality of being a Petter Rechem!

He answers that there are two dinim, two causes, either of which creates create the Kohen's right to this animal.
 ·         Either the actuality of being a Petter Rechem, even if it does not have the Kedusha of a Korban, like Reishis HaGez.

Or

·         Kedushas Korban Bechor even if it is not actually a Petter Rechem, like Chazeh Ve'Shok.

Everyone will agree that a Bechor has to be given even if it is only a Korban Bechor and not a Petter Rechem, as we see by the Mosar ha'Pesach. BUT Tosfos holds that this is only where there is the real possibility that the animal will actually be brought as a Korban to the Beis HaMikdash. A Temuras Bechor cannot be brought, and so its Kedushas Korban will not generate any rights to the Kohen.  The Rambam holds that Kedushas Korban, even without the real possibility of Hakrava, is enough to create the Kohen's rights to the animal.  (This machlokes is based on how to read the Gemara in Bava Kama 12b-13a, regarding Bechor Bizman Hazeh.)

All I am adding is that now that we see there are two dinim in the Bechor, it could be that the Torah here is addressing only the Kedushas Korban aspect of Bechor.  It is possible that Kedushas Bechor, viewed in isolation, has entirely different dinim.  True, when you're makriv it it becomes the property of the Kohen, like Chazeh Ve'Shok.   But that is a din of Mishulchan Gavo'ah in the Korban.  Until the Shechita it is the owner's, and it could be that even afterwards, he could be invited by the Kohen to eat it.  On the other hand, the Kohen's ownership of Bechor that is an actual Petter Rechem creates a different set of rules- it is the property of the Kohen from day one, and it is assur for the Yisrael to eat it if it is brought as a Korban.

Our parsha, and the pesukim in Devarim, can be talking about the aspect of Kedushas Korban Bechor, and not the Kedushas Petter Rechem.  True, the latter usually is dominant and renders the former irrelevant.  But there are times when the exist independently, and they Torah is teaching us that their dinim differ.


NOTE:  Some people might have a hard time believing that the issur has anything to do with the Baalus of the Kohen- The Rov and many achronim said said that the baalus of the Kohen (based on Petter Rechem) creates an issur for the Yisrael to eat it if it is brought as a korban.  Why should that be?  Because whenever you have issurim for a zar and hetter for a Yisrael, it could be that the issur is because it is meyuchad for the Kohen, not because the Yisrael is not r'aui to eat it.  In order to protect the rights of the Kohen, it is assur for the Yisrael.  It is the yichud for the Kohen that creates the issur.

NOTE:  I think that Eli's pshat (Brisker Rov) and my first pshat (Reb Meir Simcha), although each could work independently, are not mutually exclusive.  Each each works better when combined with the other.  I think that my pshat would help us to understand how the evolution of the overlay, and why the Torah would use words that imply a halacha different than halacha l'maaseh. Before the Chet Ha'Eigel the Ba'alim actually brought it as a korban based exclusively on Kedushas Korban Bechor.  After the Chet Ha’Eigel new dinim were chal for the Kohen based on Petter Rechem.  But the first halacha still exists.

Less Kavana, please.

I once walked into the Beis Medrash in Staten Island with Reb Moshe, and as we passed by a bachur that was saying Le'olam before Pesukei De'Zimra, the bachur said Shma loudly and with an emphatic Daled.  Reb Moshe remarked that it would be better if he would have less kavana.  As we walked, we discussed his reason for saying so: that the proper time to fulfill the Mitzva of Krias Shma is during Birkos Krias Shma before Shmoneh Esrei.  If a person has kavana in Le'olam, he fulfills the Mitzva then, and is no longer fulfilling the mitzva when it should properly be done, during Birkos Krias Shma.  He said that some have the minhag not even to say the entire passuk of Krias Shma in L'Olam, but only "...ve'omrim Shema Yisrael period.  Atta hu...."

Reb Moshe's remark was based on the Gaon (and the Pri Megadim) in OC 46.  The Rama there says that you should say ברוך שם in Le'Olam if you think the Tzibur might not get to Shema in time-

וטוב לומר בשחרית אחר שמע ישראל וגו' ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד, כי לפעמים שוהין עם קריאת שמע לקרותה שלא בזמנה ויוצא בזה (טור

.  The Pri Megadim there, brought in the MB SK 31, says that a person should only do this if necessary.  If it's not necessary, he should have kavana to not be Yotzei the mitzva.

יכוין שלא לצאת מצות ק''ש כשאומרו בקרבנות לפני פסוקי דזמרא אא''כ ירא שהצבור יעברו זמן ק''ש, אבל כשלא יעברו מוטב לצאת ידי ק''ש עם הצבור שבצבור יקרא כל השלשה פרשיות ובברכותיה כמו שתקנו חז''ל לכתחילה 

The Biur Halacha there brings that the Gaon disagrees with the Rama, because he reads the Rama as saying that it's alright to be yotzei then even if there's no emergency (because the Rama said
וטוב לומר... כי לפעמים שוהין,
which means it's good to do it all the time because sometimes it comes in handy,) and the Gaon argues and holds that to do so is an avla, because Chazal wanted you to be yotzei davka with their Nusach.  The Biur Halacha says

עיין בביאור הגר"א שכתב ול"נ שאין נכון בזה לצאת בלא ברכות וגם לא יסמוך גאולה לתפלה. והוא סובר בזה כשיטת הרא"ה שהובא בב"י דטפי עדיף לצבורא למימר ברכת ק"ש אק"ש דאורייתא עי"ש. ולכאורה נראה דדבריו סובבים אדברי רמ"א שמשמע מיניה שהוא מסכים להב"י במסקנתו דמוכח מיניה שסובר דאפילו אם הצבור לא יעברו זמן ק"ש אפ"ה יאמר בשכמל"ו כדי שיצא בזה והגר"א סובר דבכה"ג אינו כדאי לצאת בלא ברכות אבל אם הוא רואה שהצבור יעברו זמן ק"ש יותר טוב שיכוין לצאת כדי שלא ישאר בלא ק"ש וכמ"ש הב"ח והמ"א ושארי אחרונים או אפשר שסובר הגר"א דאפילו בזה יותר טוב שיקרא ק"ש בזמנה בברכותיה ויסמוך גאולה לתפלה ויתפלל ביחידי ממה שיקרא בלא ברכות ולהתפלל אח"כ עם הצבור וצ"ע.

Reb Aizik Ausband wrote about this idea in the Kovetz Beis Ahron v'Yisrael Torah Journal (#46, תשנ"ג/1993).  He notes that Tzur Mishelo enunciates all the central ideas of Birkas Hamazon.  As such, he said, it is not proper to sing that Zemer during a meal, because if one would do so, he will have fulfilled the Mitzva of Birkas Hamazon, if we assume that a mitzva is fulfilled by an act done without kavana.  Because we do concern ourselves with the shitta that מצות אין צריכות כונה, (and certainly where the obligation to bentch is miderabanan, where the Radvaz (brought in Magen Avraham 60 and MB there sk 10, who says we don't hold like the Radvaz,) says that everyone agrees  אין צריכות כונה, this would be a problem.

מה שנדפס בתוך הזמירות לליל שבת הזמר צור משלו אכלנו, יש למנוע מפני שהוא כנגד הג׳ ברכות של ברה״מ והא ניחא למ״ד מצות צריכות כונה שפיר דלא יצא ברה״מ בזמר זה שאינו מכוון לשם ברה״מ אבל למ״ד מצוות אין צריכות כונה הרי יצא בזמר ברה״מ ותו איך יברך אח״כ ברה״מ, ולהלכה באו״ח סימן ס׳ ס״ד הביא ב׳ דיעות ומכריע המחבר שצריכות כונה אבל הרע״א הביא שם את הפמ״ג שפירש שזה מספק לחומרא וא״ב בנ״ד שהספק הוא לחומרא שלא יאמר הזמר הזה דשמא הלכה שא״צ כונה והו״ל ברכות לבטלה, הרי שיש לחוש לזה ושלא לזמר זמר זה ואין להקשות למה המחבר של הזמר חברו וקבעו בתוך הזמירות די״ל דהוא סבר כמ״ד צריכות כונה אבל לדידן לפי הפמ״ג שהוא ספק להלכה א״כ יש להחמיר שלא לזמרו ובאמת הגר״א כתב כן שלא לזמרו ובסידורו נשמט זה.

וכש״כ בימוח החורף שאין אוכלים בסעודה ג׳ כדי שביעה מפני שהוא סמוך לסעודת שהרית דאז ברה״מ דרבנן ובדרבנן קיי״ל שא״צ כונה בודאי יש לחוש שלא תהא ברה״מ ל בטלה ובפרט לאלו שאומרים רחם בחסדך ברוב התרגשות ודבקות בבקשת רחמים על הגאולה יותר ממה שאומרים אח״כ רחם בברה״מ, שהזמר להם יותר עיקר מברה״מ דצ״ע אם עבדי כדין.

(Rav Ausband's point that this is a problem only if you hold Mitzvos do not need kavana might not be helpful in the case of Krias Shma.  After you say מה טוב חלקנו ומה נעים גורלנו.... ערב ובוקר פעמים בכל יום, when you say Shma with kavana of Kabalas Ol Malchus Shamayim and Baruch Shem, one could argue that it's not just סתמא לשמה any more- that it crosses the line from implicit to explicit, and everyone will agree that you're yotzei, even more than the Mechaber's case in OC 475:4 and the MB in 60.)

In the next issue, there was a weak response to Rav Ausband's he'ara, and I think the writer knew it was not convincing.

In a following issue (#49), Rav Eliezer Weissfish of Yerushalayim had a very lengthy defense of Tzur Mishelo, in which he discusses the absence of Bris and Torah, and the requirement for using the format of a Bracha, and many other things.  Almost all of his svaros would only apply to men (Bris, Torah, and Re'tzei on Shabbos,) so he's not helping regarding women.  Unless in his house the women didn't sing zemiros. (Unbeknownst to him, his points mirror those of the Biyur Halacha in 271 regarding the Magen Avraham and Reb Akiva Eiger on Kiddush.)

Finally (#50), someone sent in a note saying that Telzer Rov's (Reb Leizer Gordon's) son in law, Reb Yitzchok Hirshowitz, used to say Tzur Mishelo, but he used the kinui "Hashem" instead of the Sheim Adnus during Tzur Mishelo.

בענין הערתו של הרב אייזיק אזבנד, ר״י טלז בקליוולנד, (בגליון ניסן-אייר ש״ז) שלא לומר בליל שבת את הזמר ״צור משלו״ היות שהוא מכוון כנגד שלוש הברכות של ברכת המזון, הנה שמעתי (כמדומה) מהרב יהודה ליבר הירשוביץ ז״ל שאביו הרב יצחק אייזיק אליעזר ז״ל (הי״ד) רבה של ווירבאלין (ליטא) וחתנו של הרב אליעזר גורדון מטלז ז״ל היה נוהג לומר זמר זה אבל בלי הוכרת שם שמים אלא בכינוי בלבד (היינו, שהיה אומר ״השם״.

It's interesting that in the Yosef Ometz, a compilation of the minhagim of Frankfurt written by Rav Yosef Zeligman Hahn (a contemporary and colleague of the Shelah Hakadosh) in the early 1700s, he says that their minhag was to sing it after Bentching, not before Bentching.  The reason he gives (#607) is that it's not appropriate to say שבענו והותרנו until all the food on the table has been cleared away.  Later in the Sefer  (#815) he remarks that the Zemer echoes Birkas Hamazon., but he does not say that this is the reason they didn't say it before Bentching.

Reb Chaim Volozhener's talmidim (Keser Rosh #94 and Shaarei Rachamim page 10 #50) say that in Reb Chaim's house they did not say Tzur Mishelo (consistent with Rav Ausband's remark that the Gaon didn't say it.)  The notes in the Keser Rosh  bring from the author of the Birkas Rosh, one of Reb Chaim's first talmidim, that the reason is because one would thereby be yotzei Birkas Hamazon, as Rav Ausband said two hundred and seventy years later.

I just saw on Chaim B's website that he brings

the Steipler (Orchos Rabeinu vol 1.) is reported to have made sure to eat a k'zayis of bread after singing Tzur Mishelo (so that his real bentching would be on a proper shiur achila) and also had in mind specifically that it is not a hefsek.

I have to say that I don't know what the Steipler was thinking.  As we saw earlier, where I brought the discussion in OC 46,  this is all based on the Gaon, who argues with the Rama there, and holds that when Chazal instituted a nusach, it's very important to fulfill the mitzvah with that nusach- even, perhaps, at the expense of Tefilla Be'Tzibbur, or losing smichas geula litefilla.  Thus, if you were yotzei Kerias Shema or Bentching without Chazal's nusach, it's an avla.  So eating more after singing doesn't help you.  Furthermore, and even according to the Rama, there would be a problem here, because if  you were yotzei Bentching, you would not be allowed to continue eating without a new Bracha.  I'm not 100% sure about that, though, because you're still chayav to bentch with the Nusach, but I'm not far from 100% either.

Rav Ausband said that if you were yotzei earlier, the Bentching would be a bracha levatala, and for that problem, the Steipler's minhag would make sense, but I think he was exaggerating.  Although the Rambam seems to hold that way by Krias Shema, nobody says that's the halacha by Bentching.  Just because you were yotzei the De'oraysa does not mean you can no longer say the Nusach as Chazal wrote it.

Reb Akiva Eiger (in רע"א, of course,) says that if, as the Magen Avraham paskens, b'makom seuda is not deoraysa, then you'll be yotzei Kiddush Friday night when you say ah Gutten Shabbos to your friend (כל שמזכיר שבת ואומר שבתא טבא ג"כ יוצא.)  Reb Akiva Eiger doesn't say that you shouldn't say Good Shabbos before Kiddush.  There are already too many people that don't say Good Shabbos a whole Friday, because maybe it's called kabbalas Shabbos, which I think is 100% untrue in our lexicon.  So now you can't say Good Shabbos Friday night either because you'll be yotzei kiddush before you sit down at the table?  I don't think so.  So why isn't it a problem if you were yotzei the din D'oraysa before?

The answer is that Chazal were kovei'a Vayechulu in Shmoneh Esrei anyway, so you were already yotzei the D'oraysa with a nusach of Chazal anyway, and there's nothing lost by saying Good Shabbos.  But by Tzur and Shma, being yotzei earlier means that you are not being yotzei with the nusach that Chazal wanted for the Mitzva.  (I have to admit that the Chasam Sofer in 271 does say that you should have kavana not to be yotzei Kiddush De'oraysa in Shmoneh Esrei, in order that you will be yotzei the D'oraysa with wine and bimkom seuda.  Another admission- the Biur Halacha in 273:6 dh Ukegon brings a Reb Akiva Eiger, which he says is right there, that since you're required miderabanan to have wine and mekom seuda, there's an anan sahadi that you don't want to be yotzei before that in davening.  This Reb Akiva Eiger, which I can't find, is farkert from the Gaon and the Rama we brought above.)

A similar idea is found in the Rosh in Arvei Pesachim regarding a person who only has maror, and has to use the maror for Karpas at the beginning of the Seder and again during the meal for Maror, but I don't have the patience to explain why the Rosh is an excellent tzushtell.


UPDATE August 2014:
Besides the nusach issue the Gaon has, there might be another problem in repeating Krias Shema after you were yotzei- Bal Tosif.
See here, (Divrei Yakov on Parshas Va'eschanan( where he brings mipi hashmua that the Chafetz Chaim held there is bal tosif if you say krias shema for the purpose of kiyum hamitzva after the zman, and that the Chazon Ish held there is no bal tosif.  See Igros OC II:60 where Reb Moshe says there probably is no bal tosif, and he says the same svara as the Chazon Ish.

Va'eira, Shemos 6:12. The Heart and the Head

Moshe Rabbeinu asked the Ribono shel Olam, what is the point of talking to Pharaoh?  If the Jews did not listen to me, certainly Pharaoh will not listen to me.
Rebbi Yishmael in the Medrash (Rabbah Breishis 92)tells us that this is one of the ten kal vachomers in Tanach.  These are:

בראשית מד:     הן כסף וגו' השיבנו אליך   ק"ו   ואיך נגנב

שמות ו:     הן בני ישראל לא שמעו אלי   וק"ו   ואיך ישמעני פרעה

 במדבר יב:     ויאמר ה' אל משה ואביה ירוק ירק בפניה    ק"ו   לשכינה י"ד יום

דברים לא:     הן בעודני חי עמכם היום ממרים הייתם    ק"ו   ואף כי אחרי מותי

ירמיהו יב:     כי את רגלים רצתה וילאוך    ק"ו   ואיך תתחרה את הסוסים

שם:     ובארץ שלום אתה בוטח    וק"ו   ואיך תעשה בגאון הירדן

שמואל א כג:     הנה אנחנו פה ביהודה יראים    וק"ו   ואף כי נלך קעילה

משלי יא:     הן צדיק בארץ ישולם    ק"ו   ואף כי רשע וחוטא

אסתר ט:     ויאמר המלך לאסתר המלכה בשושן הבירה וגו'    וק"ו   בשאר מדינות המלך מה עשו

יחזקאל טו:     הנה בהיותו תמים לא יעשה למלאכה    ק"ו   אף כי אש אכלתהו ויחר

 (Obviously there are many more, starting with Breisihis 4:24,כי שבעתים יקם קין ולמך שבעים ושבעה.  The mefarshim there offer numerous explanations about what distinguishes these ten, but מקום הניחו לך להתגדר/להתגדל.)

Reb Elya Lopian, in the Lev Eliahu, addresses the question that everyone asks.  This kal vachomer does not seem to work.  The reason the Bnei Yisroel didn’t listen was (6:9) “מקוצר רוח ומעבודה קשה", because they were exhausted mentally and physically from their demeaning servitude and endless hard labor.  If so, the kal vachomer is not valid, because these problems did not apply to Pharaoh.  He answers that the Bnai Yisroel did accept Moshe Rabbeinu's nevu'ah when he told them about the geula (4:31.)  It was only when things got worse that they lost their faith (6:9)  when they suffered.  This shows that they did accept it intellectually, but that it did not penetrate their hearts.  If so, Moshe’s kal vachomer was good; if this lack of heartfelt faith ended their trust, then Pharaoh, with his wicked heart, certainly would not accept it at all, despite what his intellect would tell him.  When it comes to belief, to conviction, the heart is stronger than the mind.

                Reb Elya brings down a wonderful vort from Reb Yitzhock Blazer: the distance between וידעת היום, and והשבת אל לבבך is far greater than the distance between is far greater than the distance between לא ידעת and ידעת.    My father zatzal, a  talmid of Slabodka in Litteh, used to say this about the passuk in Krias Shma.   והיו הדברים האלה אשר אנכי מצוך היום על לבבך.  The most important thing is that after you hear and understand something intellectually, you must keep it on top of your heart.  Every Jew has a moment that his heart softens, and at that moment, what he knows will penetrate his heart and then he will truly know it.

This brings to mind R Yisroel Salanter’s advice to the person who asked what to learn in the only fifteen minutes he had available, because the point there is that the kotzer ru’ach will be come like earmuffs and blinders, and you won’t see what you otherwise would.  Mussar is the antidote to kotzer ru’ach and avoda kasha.

My son Shlomo sheyichyeh used this in a drasha in January ‘04/Shvat ‘64.  He said
                In Brisk once, a wealthy exporter put all his money into a shipment that was loaded on a boat.  The boat, unfortunately, sank not far from the port, and the man’s family was afraid to tell him the terrible news.  They came to the Beis Halevi, and he told them he would take care of it.  When the man came to the Beis Halevi’s shiur, he opened to the Gemora (Brachos 54) חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה.  and repeated it many times, and he asked the man, What's the pshat in this Chazal?" The man asked, rebbi, I don't understand your kashe! The pshat is pashut— that a person has to know that no matter what happens to him, it is the retzon Hashem, and it is meant for his good, so he has to thank Hashem for it.  The Beis Halevi said, well, if you understand this, I have a little story to tell you.  When the man heard what happened, he fainted and didn’t recover for three days.  The Beis Halevi went to visit him, to be mevakeir choli hanefesh. The man asked him, Rebbi, I don't understand. I understand the Mishna Why did I faint? The Beis HaLevi answered him yes, it's true that you understood it fully.  But you understood it in your head, not in your heart.

He then quoted Rabbi Neuman, a Rebbi in Yeshiva of Staten Island, who said that the lesson of tefillin is that the Torah has to go from from your head, to your heart, to your hand.


Just knowing something is not at all the same as full emotional understanding. We have all experienced the difference: This is like when a person tells his best friend, or a father tells a son, close your eyes, lean back, and fall into my arms. Even if you absolutely trust the person behind you, it will be very hard to actually fall and depend on the person to catch you. Only after a few false starts can you convince your body to let go and fall into the other’s arms. It’s not enough that you know— your body has to be convinced.

Rav Eliyahu Dessler (Michtav Mei’Eliahu Vol. 5, on the avoda of Rosh Hashanna.) stresses this difference, which he categorizes as the difference between rational awareness and ‘dveikus’. He says that this journey is the avoda of Rosh Hashanna: if you properly say Malchios, Zichronos, and Shofros, you will come to devykus, which will make teshuva a foregone conclusion. If the dveykus does not lead to remorse and full teshuva for past sins, then your enthusiasm and kavana is just an ephemeral overlay, a delusion.

This applies just as well to negative or destructive beliefs or behaviors. In the Haftorah of Devorim the Navi talks about sins that are Kashanim and sins that are Katola. Both shanim and tola refer to red-dyed wool Despite their similar appearance to an observer, there is an very important difference between them. R’ Meir Simcha says that Shanim is wool that is only dyed on the surface, so teshuva can result in brilliant white like snow, whereas Tola is red through and through, and teshuva can only result in the less pristine white of Tzemer. This illustrates the difference between an act or behavior that is superficial and one that saturates the personality.

The Darash Moshe and the Ramban observe that the Meraglim in Shemos Shlach 13:3, were listed lefi gedulasam, in the order of their spiritual achievements. But strangely, we find that Yehoshua and Kaleiv are in middle of the pack. Despite the apparent superior tzidkus of the others over Yehoshua and Kalev, what mattered in the end, when faced with nisayon, was the depth of conviction, the emotional saturation, the dveikus— the hasheivosa el levavecha.

What really is the difference between yedi’ah of the mind and yedi’ah of the heart? One example: a woman may know absolutely that married women cannot go outdoors with her hair uncovered. But she might sit in mixed company and talk about private matters that concern only her and her husband. Or, strangely enough (and I’m not making this up), swim in a bathing suit at a mixed pool– with a snood covering her head to preserve her standards of modesty. People who never miss davenning in shul can let years go by without one Shmoneh Esrei in which they pour their hearts out to Hashem. What the heck are they doing there? The only possible explanation is that simply knowing something means that you know the thing and nothing more. Knowing it in your heart means that you understand and feel the underlying concept and you have made it a part of your emotional and intellectual essence. When a person has reached that level, then everything he does will subconsciously be checked for consistency with his essential belief.

And how can you tell who is a tzadik misafa v’lachutz and who is a tzadik in his pnimiyus? You can’t. Not only can’t you tell in other people, you can’t even tell in yourself. It’s like courage— you never know what you are until you are tested, as is well illustrated in Stephan Crane's The Red Badge of Courage. Not only can’t you tell, it is almost unknowable; the Torah (and Sefer Iyov) is full of stories of people who were tested, after which Hashem says “Atta yadati” that you are a real ba’al bitachon. Appearances mean little. Only after being put to the test can one know who he is.

When we put on our tefillin, let us remember this important idea, perfectly symbolized by the Shel Rosh on our head, the straps of the shel rosh that go down to our heart, the Shel Yad next to the heart, with the straps that go down to our hands: it is not enough to 'know'. Torah has has to go from your Head to your Heart to your Hands.