Be'haaloscha, Bamidbar 19:35. Bris Milah and Learning Torah

Bris Milah is an essential prerequisite for proper understanding of Torah.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Reb Akiva Eiger, in his Tshuvos (42) discusses the right of a grandfather to make the Bracha over a bris when the father is not there.  He says the following:

1. The Bracha of "Le'hachniso" is not only on the Mitzva of Milah itself, but an expression of gratitude for the other mitzvos that follow the Bris, such as...to teach him Torah and to find him a spouse, and the grandfather also has the mitzva to see to it that these things are done.
2. The Gemara in Nedarim says that the words "אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חוקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי", if not for my Bris, I would not have emplaced the laws of Heaven and Earth, seem to refer equally to Torah and to Bris Milah. 
3.  We find in the עוללות אפרים (written by the author of the Kli Yakar, but not very popular because it's not written with the clarity he developed for the Kli Yakar) that the external Milah is the cause for the spiritual Milah of the heart, which opens the heart and enables it to absorb and understand the wisdom of the Torah.  (and again, since the grandfather has a personal obligation to see to it that the child learn torah, this means that he has a personal obligation to ensure that he gets a bris milah, so he has the right to the bracha.)

הלבוש (סימן רס"ה)כתב דיש מתמיהים למה יברך האב להכניסו, הא המוהל הוא שלוחו, ושלוחו של אדם כמותו, וכיון שהמוהל מברך על המילה מה צורך לאב לברך להכניסו, הרי המילה היא בריתו של אברהם אבינו, ויש מפרשים דברכת להכניסו אינה על המילה רק האב משבח ומברך לד' שמיום ההוא והלאה מוטל עליו עוד מצות אחרות הנגררות אחר המילה,  והם שמצוה לפדותו אם הוא בכור וללמדו תורה ולהשיאו אשה, עין שם... מצינו במתניתין סוף פרק ג' דנדרים גדולה מילה שאלמלא היא לא ברא הקב"ה עולמו, שנאמר אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חוקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי. ואמרינן שם (דף ל"ב) גדולה תורה שאלמלא תורה לא נתקיימו שמים וארץ שנאמר אם לא בריתי, משמע דאם לא בריתי קאי אתרוויהו על מילה ועל התורה... ויותר נראה דבאמת מילה ותורה שייכים להדדי, וכמ"ש בעוללות אפרים (מאמר שצ"ב) שמילה חיצונית היא סיבה למילה פנימית מערלת לב, כשימול ערלת לבבו אז יהיו חדרי לבו פתוחים להבין ולהשכיל 

So I always wondered, are there any other proofs of the association of Bris Milah and Limud Hatorah?  Of course, there's Birkas Hamazon, where it says "על בריתך שחתמת בבשרנו ועל תורתך שלמדתנו", but that does not prove any causal relationship. But I do have several good, strong ra'ayos, as follows.

(Before the rayos, I want to point out that the Gemara Reb Akiva Eiger brings from Nedarim 32 that says that the world stands on Bris and Torah is mentioned in the Baal HaTurim in the the first word in the Torah, Bereishis.  He says that the outer letters are Bris, and the inner letters are Eish, and Eish is Torah.  So in that structure, the Bris is meigin on the Torah.  But this is not a proof of any kind, just a nice tzushtell.)

 1.  The Tanchuma in Mishpatim (5), which goes like this. 

ואלה המשפטים. זה שאמר הכתוב, מגיד דבריו ליעקב וגו', לא עשה כן וגו'. אונקלוס) הגר בן אחותו של אדריאנוס, היה מבקש להתגייר והיה מתירא מן אדריאנוס דודו. אמר לו, אני מבקש לעשות סחורה. אמר לו, שמא אתה חסר כסף וזהב, הרי אוצרותי לפניך. אמר לו, אני מבקש לעשות סחורה לצאת לחוץ לידע דעת הבריות, ואני מבקש לימלך בך היאך לעשות. אמר לו, כל פרקמטיא שאתה רואה שפלה ונתונה בארץ, לך עסוק בה, שסופה להתעלות ואת משתכר. בא לו לארץ ישראל ולמד תורה. לאחר זמן מצאוהו רבי אליעזר ורבי יהושע, ראוהו פניו משתנות. אמרו זה לזה, עקילס לומד תורה. כיון שבא אצלם, התחיל לשאול להם שאלות הרבה, והן משיבין אותו. עלה אצל אדריאנוס דודו. אמר לו, ולמה פניך משתנות. סבור אני שהפסידה פרקמטיא שלך או שמא הצר לך אדם. אמר לו, לאו. אמר לו, אתה קרוב לי ואדם מצר לי. אמר לו, ולמה פניך משתנות. אמר לו, שלמדתי תורה, ולא עוד אלא שמלתי את עצמי. אמר לו, ומי אמר לך כך. אמר לו, בך נמלכתי. אמר לו, אימתי. אמר לו, בשעה שאמרתי לך מבקש אני לעשות סחורה, ואמרת לי, כל פרקמטיא שאתה רואה שפלה ונתונה בארץ, לך ועסוק בה, שסופה להתעלות. חזרתי על כל האומות ולא ראיתי אומה שפלה נתונה בארץ כישראל, וסופה להתעלות. שכן אמר ישעיה, כה אמר ה' גואל ישראל קדושו, לבזה נפש למתעב גוי לעבד מושלים מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו למען ה' אשר נאמן קדוש ישראל ויבחרך. אמר ליה סקנדרוס שלו, עתידין אלו שאמרת, שיהו מלכים עומדים מפניהם, שנאמר, מלכים יראו וקמו. הכהו אנדריאנוס על לחיו, אמר ליה, יש נותנין רטיה אלא על גב המכה. עכשיו אם רואין גילורר אחד אין עומדין מלפניו, שהיית אומר שהמלכים רואין אותם ועומדין בפניהם. אמר ליה סקנדרוס, אם כן מה תעשה, טמנהו, הואיל ונתגייר הרגהו. אמר ליה, עקילס בן אחותי עד שהוא במעי אמו היה ראוי להתגייר. מה עשה סקנדרוס שלו. עלה לגג ונפל ומת, ורוח הקודש צווחת, כן יאבדו כל אויביך ה'. אמר ליה אנדריאנוס, הרי מת סקנדרוס, אין אתה אומר לי על מה עשית הדבר הזה. אמר ליה, שבקשתי ללמוד תורה. אמר לו, היה לך ללמוד תורה ולא לימול. אמר לו עקילס, נתת לאסטרטלירוס אנונה אלא אם כן נטל זינו שלו. כך, לעולם אם אין אדם נימול, אינו יכול ללמוד תורה, שנאמר, מגיד דבריו ליעקב (תהל' קמז יט), למי שהוא מל כיעקב. לא עשה כן לכל גוי, משום שהם ערלים. חקיו, זו תורה. 

Akilas' uncle, Hadrian, was shocked that he had been circumcised.  Akilas told him that he did so because he wanted to learn Torah.  His uncle said, you could have learned without making a bris. Akilas answered that it is impossible to learn Torah without having a Bris Milah.  (I believe the Gaon says that Akilas=Onkelos.)

2.  The connection to this week's parsha is that our parsha contains וַיְהִי בִּנְסֹעַ הָאָרֹן .  The Gemara in Shabbos 116 says that this little piece, separated as it is with the two upside-down nunns, is viewed as a separate book of the Torah.  We derive from this (OC 334:12 and Mishna Berura SK 36) that in certain cases of fire on Shabbos, one may save a sefer Torah if it has 85 letters that are intact, even if they are scattered in many words.  The source for the number 85 is that the smallest "book" of Torah, Vayhi Binso'ah, is 85 letters.  The gematria of the word Milah is, of course, 85.  This is another excellent flag that highlights the association of Bris Milah and Limud Hatorah.  The kedusha of Bris Milah is a Machshir that enables a child to become a Sefer Torah.   I'm sure I am not the first to note this association, but I am not aware of who else has said this, because I'm not a gematria man.  Minor point:  if you are a gematria person, then you can be associated with the idea of Metzitza b'peh.  Peh, פה, the locus of limud hatorah, connected with the bris milah.  Not my department, and as far as I'm concerned we can do away with Metzitza b'peh, but for those of you that like this sort of thing, there it is.  

3.  The Yerushalmi in Sotah about Elisha ben Avuya.  The Yerushalmi says that the great Talmidei Chachamim of Yerushalayim had gathered for Avuya's son's bris, and as they talked in learning, it appeared that a great fire burned around them.  Avuya was frightened and asked, have you come to burn down my house? They answered no, we were just talking Divrei Torah, and the words were happy as at the time they were given at Har Sinai, and so the fire of Mattan Torah appeared.  Nothing to be afraid of, it's just limud hatorah the way it should be.  Avuya was so amazed that he determined to dedicate his son to Torah scholarship.  This was, apparently, an inappropriate reason to learn Torah, and  this self interest expressed itself as a flaw in the child's learning, and since he was such a great and powerful intellect, what might otherwise have been a minor blemish became monstrous and resulted in Elisha ben Avuya becoming an Apikorus.  

The point of the Yerushalmi is that the time of the Bris Milah is the moment that the parameters of the child's potential growth in Torah, the potential of his trajectory, are set.  In the case of Acheir's great potential, this self-interest at the so very important moment of the Bris Milah הבאיש הביע את שמן הרוקח, and he became an apikorus. 

4.  The Targum Yonasan, as explained by Rav Schwab in his Sefer on Chumash.  The Targum Yonasan says that they used to say ישימך אלוקים כאפרים וכמנשה, Yesimcha, at a bris.  Rav Schwab explained that the word Milah is related to mahul, blended.  Bris Milah alludes to the idea that Ruchnius and Gashmiyus are not inherently and utterly incompatible. On the contrary, kedusha and chulin can work together in a synergistic, mutually beneficial relationship.  

The connection to Efraim and Menashe is that Efraim was able become a gadol batorah because he received monetary support from Menashe; the work that Menashe did with the kavana of supporting Efraim was as spiritual as Efraim's Torah.  One might associate this idea with something the Lubavitcher Rebbe constantly says from the Baal Hatnya: that the great chiddush of Mattan Torah was that previously, kedusha and gashsmiyus were incompatible and antagonistic.  With Mattan Torah, gashmiyus itself could become infused with kedusha through limud hatorah and kiyum mitzvos.  If so, we might say that the Bris Milah, the Bris that allows Mehila/mixing, is what enables our limud hatorah to affect our physical being.  To be a true talmid chacham, you have to be mahul- a man that combines the spiritual and the secular, you serve the Ribono shel Olam with the yetzer hatov and with what we call the yetzer hara.

Note, too, the Gemara (Psachim 68b) that 

א"ר אלעזר הכל מודים בעצרת דבעינן נמי לכם מ"ט יום שניתנה בו תורה הוא

and all the achronim ask, if for commemorations of gashmiusdikeh things like sukkos and mitzrayim Reb Eliezer holds you can do kulo lashem, kal vachomer the commemoration of mattan torah!  They answer that the Torah was given to mankind davka because we have the yetzer hara, because we're not malachim, and we can be mekadeish gashmiyus.  If so, the idea of Milah/mahul repeats the idea of Mattan Torah requiring davka that we not entirely divorce ourselves from gashmiyus, but that we find a way to make gashmiyus holy.

If you think about it for half a second, you'll realize that this "allusion" only might seem novel because it's so obvious that we don't even notice it any more.  It is the most obvious symbolism of the Bris Millah.  The location of the bris teaches precisely this idea, that what seems to be tumah and arayos can become kedusha and tahara.  

And of course, this is directly related to the excellent vort we said in the Chasam Sofer about the child needing to experience both Kiddush and Havdala before his bris.

Shavuos; The Recurrence of Mattan Torah

Two parts;  Part I discusses our minhag to avoid elective medical procedures Erev Shavuos, and explains that it is based on the fact that Shavu'os is not just a commemoration or a celebration of Mattan Torah, it is a recurrence of Mattan Torah, a re-experience that includes all the ruchniusdikeh events that surrounded the first Mattan Torah.  This pshat inspires a new answer to the Magen Avraham's question about the nusach of tefilla on Shavuos.  Part II addresses the question of lighting Yahrtzeit candles on Yomtov, which is particularly relevant when Yomtov falls on Motzei Shabbos.

I

In Hilchos Pesach, the Rama at the end of OC 468:9 brings from the Kol Bo/Rabbeinu Yerucham a minhag to not have a blood-letting procedure done the day before any yomtov.  The Magen Avraham explains that the Gemara (Shabbos 129b:  מעלי יומא טבא חולשא מעלי יומא דעצרתא סכנתא וגזרו רבנן אכולהו מעלי יומא טבא משום יומא טבא דעצרת דנפיק ביה זיקא ושמיה טבוח דאי לא קבלו ישראל תורה הוה טבח להו לבשרייהו ולדמייהו ) says that this is a "gzeira" of Chazal because when we were about to receive the Torah, a demon named Tavo'ach came forth, and if Klal Yisrael had not accepted the Torah, he would have slaughtered them all, he would have spilled their blood.  Since this threat took place Erev Shavuos, we avoid blood letting at that time.  In order to ensure compliance with the minhag of Erev Shavous, Chazal extended the issur to include all Arvei Yamim Tovim.

The Mishna Berura brings from the Chayei Adam and Pri Megadim that this only applies when it is an optional health maintenance procedure.  If, however, you're doing it because of any sort of real need, then it is muttar because Dashu bo Rabbim, which means that nobody paid attention to the danger and it became just like any normal life activity that we do despite some attendant risk.  'שומר פתאים ה.

Rav Waldenberg, in his Tzitz Eliezer (12:46) is much more strict on this matter,and prohibits all medical procedures that involve bleeding unless there is an exigent need:

למדנו מהאמור כי בערבי ימים טובים ובמיוחד בערב חג השבועות יש למנוע כל פעולה בגוף שגורמת לפתיחת ורידי הדם  או  לעקירת ונזילת דם ממקום  למקום והתפרצותם  חוצח או כל שינוי שהוא במהלכו הטבעי של הדם בגוף, כי יש חשש סכנה  לכך, כי באשר שיום זה איתרע מזלייהו  של ישראל וניתן  בו רשות  בזמנו — ולו על תנאי —לפגוע לרעה בבשר גופם ודמם לכן מיועד יום זה כאילו לתמיד לתת יד חפשי לשטן המשחית לפגוע בגוף האדם הישראלי

He says that Sefardim don't have to be machmir, but Ashkenazim must follow the lead of the Rama and take this minhag/halacha very seriously.

This halacha, I think, is, "a custom More honour'd in the breach than the observance", like the issur to go to work on Purim or erev Shabbos after zman mincha.  But Harav Shimon Kalman Goldstein pointed out something much more important than the actual Minhag in and of itself.  We are told that Yamim Tovim are not only a commemoration, but an actual re-experience.  The character and potential of a day recur annually, and just as the beginning of Chodesh Av is a time of sadness and danger, and Adar a time of happiness and opportunity, and Nissan a time of Geula, so too all the Yamim Tovim present to us the same awesome opportunities as occurred at the original event.  Shavuos is a day that is mesugal for Kabalas Hatorah and spiritual awakening.  But Shavuos is even more so than other Yamim Tovim, as the Netziv says in his Haamek Davar in Devarim 16:12, 

באשר אז זמן מתן תורתנו ומסוגל בזה היום שניתן בו בתחילה לדורות להתבונן בהם ולקבלם עליו להגות בהם כמש"כ הרשב"א בשו"ת ס' תי"ג דכל יום מימי הבריאה פועל יותר בדבר שנתחדש בו יותר משאר ימים.  

The events of other days were manifestations of ideas that existed prior to that day.  The Mattan Torah that took place on that day was a singular and unprecedented event, and so Mattan Torah was the דבר שנתחדש בו just like Shvisa was nischadeish on Shabbos and every Shabbos there is a chalos of Shvisa and kedusha and the Neshama Yeseira.  From the moment of Mattan Torah, the day was recast forever.  Shavuos is a re-experience of Kabalas Hatorah to the extent that even the events that surrounded that day, even the dialogue with the malachim about not eating Basar B'Chalav (see Toras Chaim in Bava Metzia 86 DH D'Kama and brought in the נוהג כצאן יוסף), even the threat by the demon Tavo'ach, all of it happens every year on Shavu'os.  It's not a tableau vivant like the Seder, it's a new Kabbalas HaTorah, including אמר רב אבדימי בר חמא בר חסא: מלמד שכפה הקדוש ברוך הוא עליהם את ההר כגיגית, ואמר להם: אם אתם מקבלים התורה - מוטב, ואם לאו - שם תהא קבורתכם  (Shabbos 88a.)

This is the lashon of the Toras Chaim:

איתא במדרש דמלאכי השרת אכלו בשר בחלב, והכי איתא בתהלים רבה (מדרש תהלים ח, ב) בשלשה מקומות נתווכחו המלאכים עם הקדוש ברוך הוא וכו' בשעה שבא לברא את האדם לפניו אמרו לו מה אנוש כי תזכרנו וכו', ובשעה שבא ליתן תורה לישראל אמרו לפניו וכו' ,(ובשעה שבא הקדש ברוך הוא להשרות שכינתו במשכן אמרו לפניו וכו' ), ובשעה שעשו את העגל שמחו מלאכי השרת אמרו עכשיו תחזור התורה אלינו, אמרו לפניו וכו', אמר להן הקדוש ברוך הוא כולהו זימנין קטיגורתין עליהון ואתון בשעת דאתיתו לגבי דאברהם מי לא קאכליתו בשר וחלב דכתיב (בראשית יח, ח) ויקח חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר אשר עשה וכו', ואילו תינוק שלהן כשהוא בא מבית רבו, ואמו נותנת לו פת ובשר וגבינה לאכול, והוא אומר לה היום למדני רבי לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו (שומת לד, כו), מיד הלכו בפחי נפש. ואפשר דמהאי טעמא נוהגין לאכול מאכלי חלב ביום מתן תורה ואחר כך אוכלין בשר, כדי שיראו המלאכים מה שאנחנו נזהרין יפה במצות בשר בחלב, לאכול חלב תחילה ואחר כך בשר על ידי קינוח והדחה ושאר אזהרות, ועל ידי כן אין להן מקום לקטרג עלינו ביום מתן תורה, דחיישינן שמא יקטרגו עתה, כמו שעשו בשעת מתן תורה, דמהאי טעמא אין מקיזין דם במעלי יומא סבא משום מעלי יומא טבא דעצרת (שבת קכט:) דחיישינן דלמא אכתי נפק ההוא זיקא דשמיה טבוח. הכי נמי חיישינן דאכתי יקטרגו עלינו, וכשרואין שאנחנו נזהרין במצוה זו שעברו עליה חוששין לקטרג, פן ישיב להן הקדוש ברוך הוא כבראשונה אתם אכלתם בשר בחלב והרי תינוק שלהם נזהר יותר מכם.

- I just saw something very interesting from Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, brought on Yeshiva World News, that dovetails perfectly, as follows:

In one of his shiurim, HaGaon HaRav Yitzchak Zilberstein explained that his father-in-law, Maran HaGaon Rav Yosef Sholom Elyashiv ZATZAL would on erev Shavuos visit the sick, remembering that we learn that prior to giving Bnei Yisrael the Torah on Shavuos, Hashem healed all the sick, including the blind, deaf and mute – all were healed.
Rav Elyashiv explained to a sick man that every year, on Shavuos, this power is renewed. This is a time when one may call upon Hashem and asked to be healed; even for such illnesses that we generally feel there is no cure.
It was asked at what time on yomtov may one ask for a refuah. Rav Elyashiv pondered for a moment and stated the time is when we read the Aseres HaDibros in the torah reading.

I'm not sure what he means by "the time we read the Aseres HaDibros."  He probably means immediately before.  But most importantly, as we have just seen, the concept is an extrapolation of the idea of the Kol Bo/Rabbeinu Yerusham.  Just as we have a minhag to avoid medical procedures erev yomtov because the malach is being mekatreig again, so, too, the segula of refuah that preceded mattan Torah recurs on this day.

It goes without saying that the way we accept the Torah at the time it is given has a tremendous effect on how we are zocheh to siyata dishmaya in learning.  Shavuos is a recurrence of Mattan Torah; therefore it is a recurrence of Kabalas HaTorah; it is therefore a time when we can be zocheh to a resurgence of siyata dishmaya in limud haTorah.

Another interesting idea; the Magen Avraham asks that according to how we pasken in Yoreh Dei'ah, Mattan Torah was actually on the seventh of Sivan, while we celebrate it on the sixth, so why do we say zman mattan toraseinu.  There are many, many answers to this question, such as the Chasam Sofer that says that the fifth was Na'aseh v'Nishma, the sixth was when it could have happened had Moshe Rabbeinu not added an additional day of preparation, and the seventh when it actually occurred.  But how about this for a teretz- since Shavuos is not simply a commemoration, it is a recurrence, it recurs when we are kovei'a the Yomtov, just like Moshe Rabbeinu was kovei'a the first time.  It's zman mattan Toraseinu not because it's an anniversary of an ancient event, it is zman mattan Toraseinu because we are kovei'a the date of the new Mattan Torah.

II

Yahrtzeit candles, or, נר נשמה.

The minhag is that those that say Yizkor light a yahrtzeit candle that burns over yomtov.  There are those that hold that in that we derive no personal benefit from this lighting,  it cannot fall under the rubric of Tzorech Hayom, and so it is assur to light such a candle on Yomtov itself.  Several people asked me whether this means that this year they would have to have a three day candle burning, since Yizkor is the second day of Yomtov and Yomtov follows Shabbos.  Coincidentally, I saw that the Tzitz Eliezer (6:10) is mattir lighting a yahrtzeit candle / נר נשמה at home on Yomtov, despite his correspondent's vigorous objections.
When I alluded to this problem in my shiur, they asked me what I say the halacha is.  I said that I refuse to discuss it.  They were upset, until Dr. David Grinblatt said that he remembers that Rav Yosef Ber, asked the same question in Boston, said that he refuses to discuss it.  The idea was that the people that are noheg to do it do it; it's less an issue of mutav yihyu then one of rational analysis saying one thing but the minhag Yisrael saying another.  It's hard to know when to take a stand and say the minhag is wrong and when to say that you must be missing something.
I have since learned that Rabbi Shmuel Fuerst of Chicago also assers lighting the yahrtzeit candle on Yomtov.
If you are noheig to light your cigarettes from a yahrtzeit candle, a habit with fascinating multiple-tiered symbolic resonance, then for sure it's muttar.  Or, less morbidly, the yomtov candles.




Postscript:

I came across a very nice piece on Shavuos/Tavo'ach from the Belzers in Antwerp, here:
It goes like this:

גליון "עלים לתרופה"
המו"ל: מכון "אור הצפון" דחסידי בעלזא - אנטווערפן, בלגיה
גליון תת"נ, מדור "עלי הדף"
מסכת שבת
דף קכט ע"ב

 

בענין "זיקא ושמיה טבוח" שיוצאת בערב חג העצרת

 

בין הימים שאין להקיז בהם דם נמנים גם ערבי ימים טובים, וכדאיתא בגמרא (קכט ע"ב): "מעלי יומא טבא חולשא (כלומר, הקזת דמים בערבי ימים טובים גורמת חולשה), מעלי יומא דעצרתא סכנתא (ואילו בערב שבועות - סכנה), וגזרו רבנן אכולהו מעלי יומא טבא משום יומא טבא דעצרת, דנפיק ביה זיקא ושמיה טבוח, דאי לא קבלו ישראל תורה הוה טבח להו לבשרייהו ולדמייהו" (וגזרו חכמים שלא להקיז דם בכל ערבי ימים טובים כדי שלא יבואו להקיז דם בערב חג השבועות, כי בו סכנה היא, משום שבו יוצאת רוח בשם 'טבוח', ואילו לא קבלו בני ישראל את התורה היה טובח את בשרם ודמם), ולכן סכנה היא להקיז דם בערב חג העצרת.

והקשו המפרשים, הלא בני ישראל כבר קבלו את התורה מאז ומקדם, ולמה אם כן ישנה סכנה בכל שנה ושנה בערב חג השבועות. ובספר 'עין אליהו' כתב לבאר, שהוא מעין אמרם ז"ל (מכות יא.) ש"קללת חכם אפילו על תנאי היא באה", ועל כן הגם שנתקיים התנאי, עדיין יוצאת אותה רוח בכל שנה ושנה, ויתר מכן, כי אף שבני ישראל כבר קבלו את התורה, יוצאת היא להזיק משום שמא אינם מקיימים חלילה את התורה, ומחמת זה הוי סכנה.

ומבואר באר היטב ב'מחצית השקל' (סי' תסח סקט"ו) בביאור דין זה: "ונודע, דבכל הזמנים שאירע לאבותינו ענין מה, בשיגיע זמן ההוא שוב מתעורר קצת מעין אותו דבר וענין ההוא", וביתר ארוכה בספה"ק 'מאור עינים' (פר' יתרו ד"ה במסכת שבת) בזה"ל: "אם לא קבלו ישראל את התורה היה נפיק זיקא דשמיה טבוח לפי שקבלו התורה נקרא טבוח ואי לא קבלו היה טובח ח"ו וכו', ונודע שכל מועדי ה' החוזרים חלילה בכל שנה נעשה התיקון בהם כמו בתחילת נתינת המועדים לישראל, כמו פסח הוא גם היום יציאת מצרים, ובשבועות הוא בחינת מתן תורה כנודע, ולכך בבוא יום טוב של עצרת צריך כל אחד להיות בגדר צדיק, בכדי שיהא צור ויסוד עולם לבל יתפשט הזיקא דשמיה טבוח". והיינו, כי שפיר מתעורר הענין של קבלת התורה בכל שנה ושנה, ובני ישראל מקבלים התורה מחדש, וגם הזיקה יוצאת בכל שנה ושנה מחדש על ענין קבלת התורה של אותה השנה.

והנה, המהרש"א מדייק בחידושי אגדות עמ"ס סנהדרין (מג: ד"ה כל הזובח) למה שמה נקראת בשם 'טבוח', ולא 'טובח', דלכאורה, הרי הרוח באה לטבוח את אלו שאינם מקבלים את התורה. ומבאר על פי מה שמצינו שהגמרא (שם) מכנה את הכובש את יצרו בשם "הזובח את יצרו", ובכן כתב: "ועל פי דרך זה יתיישב מה שאמרו פרק מפנין, מעלי יומא דעצרת נפיק ביה זיקא ושמיה טבוח כו', דלכאורה קשה דלא הוי ליה לקרותו 'טבוח' אלא 'טובח' - שבא לטבוח אחרים, אבל לפי מה שאמרו הכא שהכובש את יצרו ומנצחו הוא זובח יצרו, במתן תורה נמי דודאי 'ההוא זיקא' - שהוא השטן הוא יצר הרע הוא רוח מלאך המות שבא לטבוח את ישראל - אילו לא קבלו התורה, אבל כיון שקבלו התורה וכבשו את יצרם, הרי אדרבה זבחו ישראל את היצר הרע ושפיר מקרי טבוח".

ובספה"ק 'מאור עינים' (שם) כתב כעין דברי המהרש"א וביתרון דברים מופלאים, וז"ל: "להבין הענין גם לפי מה שפירשו המפרשים, דה'זיקא' הוא היצר הרע שהוא שטן הוא מלאך המות, ובקבלת התורה נעשו חירות ממלאך המות, שיתכן לפי זה שיקרא 'טובח' ולא 'טבוח'...", ויבואר בהקדם היסוד: "דנודע, כי כל העולם עם כל הנבראים צריכים לקבל החיוּת מהבורא ב"ה בכל עת ובכל רגע, כמו שכתוב 'ובטובו מחדש בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית', כי במעשה בראשית היה הבריאה על ידי חיות חדש שנאצל מהבורא ב"ה בכל הנבראים, וכמו כן גם בכל עת ובכל רגע צריכים שלא יופסק מהם החיות תמיד ויושפע עליהם בתמידות בהשתלשלות מלמעלה למטה מעילה לעלול, שאם יצוייר ח"ו העדר חיותו מן העולם אפילו רגע אחד היה העולם ומלואו בטל ממציאות כנודע".

והנה המשכת החיות אל הנבראים בכל יום תמיד הוא בכח "מה שהצדיקים פועלים - על ידי התורה, המורה להם דרך אשר ילכו בה, ואיך לדבק בו ית' על ידי התורה והמצוות שנתנו בסיני, כמו שאמרו רז"ל (שבת פח.) 'יום הששי' (בראשית א, לה), הידוע הוא ששי בסיון שהתנה הקודשא ב"ה עם מעשה בראשית, 'אם ישראל מקבלין את התורה מוטב ואם לאו אחזיר אתכם לתוהו ובוהו', כי ממילא על ידי שלא היה נתינת התורה שבה עושים הצדיקים שביל ומעבר השפע לנבראים ממילא היו חוזרים כל הנבראים לתהו ובהו... ואם לא היו ישראל מקבלים התורה ח"ו לא היה צינור כלל לעולם... ולא היה החיות יורד מאין סוף ב"ה ח"ו, ובהעדר החיות היה התפשטות המות ח"ו... ובנתינת התורה נפסק המות מן העולם על ידי החיות שיש לו צינורות על ידי עובדי ה' על ידי התורה".

וממשיך לפרש: "ולכך נקרא ה'זיקא' שהוא יצר הרע הוא מלאך המות נקרא 'טבוח' שהוא טבוח ונשחט ונחתך מן העולם, הכל לפי רוב מורידי החיות, אם יש הרבה צדיקים נחתך יותר לפי ריבוי הצדיקים, וכל זה על ידי התורה, ואם לא קבלו ישראל את התורה היה 'נפיק זיקא דשמיה טבוח', ולפי שקבלו התורה נקרא 'טבוח' ואי לא קבלו היה 'טובח' ח"ו.... ולכך בבוא יום טוב של עצרת צריך כל אחד להיות בגדר צדיק, בכדי שיהא צור ויסוד עולם לבל יתפשט הזיקא דשמיה 'טבוח' ושיקרא טבוח ולא טובח ח"ו כאמור. ולא כל אדם זוכה לזה שיהא בגדר צדיק כזה, והקזת דם הוא סכנה, והשטן מקטרג בשעת הסכנה ח"ו, ומה גם שזה העת שצריך להתחזק כנגדו מתחזק גם הוא, לכך הוא סכנתא להקיז דם".

Bamidbar 3:1-2. Parents are Parents, Whether by Birth or Through Adoption כאילו ילדו and other "כאילו"s

This was originally posted in 2010.  It is one of the collaborative pieces that I enjoy so much, including contributions from great Unknown, Micha, Chaim B., Nosson Gertner, and Eli..  I've added a paragraph and made some modifications. Yesterday, I re-posted it under its original title, but Reb Micha, in a few wise and poignant comments, explained to me why the original title was not what I wanted or needed to say. Because I'm deleting the more recent posting, I'm reproducing Micha's recent comments at the end of this post.  I also added a few words from R Asher Weiss.

The passuk begins by saying "These are the generations of Moshe and Aharon," and then lists only Aharon's children, Nadav and Avihu.  Rashi says that from here we learn that one who teaches another's child Torah "Ke'ilu/כאילו" it is as if he fathered him.

We find a similar expression in Sanhedrin 19b (from Michal bas Shaul) and Megilla 13a (from Basya bas Pharaoh) where it says

כל המגדל יתום ויתומה בתוך ביתו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו 

that one who raises an orphan in his  home "it is as if he fathered him."  The concept is the same, but Chazal derive the two ideas from different pesukim.

One has to wonder, what does "כאילו/as if" mean?  Is this homiletics or is it a statement of halacha?  Is it meant to be taken at face value?  Do Chazal really mean that if you raise an orphan, or teach a child Torah, that he is your child?

Reb Shlomo Kluger, in his first comment in Even HaEzer, says that this depends on a machlokes between the Taz and the Drisha in Yoreh Dei'ah 242 regarding the concept of מורא רבך כמורא שמיים.  The Drisha says that the Choph hadimyon, the "Ke'ilu," "as if," does not necessarily indicate real parity.  It just means that the one has certain aspects of the other.  The Taz, on the other hand, says that Ke'ilu must be understood to mean halachic parity. The Chochmas Shelomo says that the same machlokes will apply to Chazal's dictum המגדל יתום ויתומה בתוך ביתו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו.  According to the Drisha, one who raises an orphan would not thereby fulfill the mitzva of Pru Urvu, the mitzvah to have children.   But according to the Taz, one who raises an orphan fulfills the mitzvah of Pru Urvu.  (He says more there; it's worth reading.)

--Avrohom said that he finds it hard to understand that megadel yasom could fulfil pirya verivya, because that  mitzva is generally related to increasing the number of people in the world.  I responded that raising a child means that you're keeping him alive, and just as bringing people into the world is a mitzva, so too keeping them in the world is the same mitzva- as indicated in the Tanchuma I bring below regarding the relationship between Moshe Rabbeinu and Yisro.


--great unknown, in the first comment below, pointed out an interesting thing- that Reb Shlomo Kluger himself was an orphan raised by the Dubner Magid (which is a nice story, see here.  He did learn by the Dubner- see here- but he was a talmid, and although he was an orphan at that point, he was not the Dubner's foster child.  Apparently, his uncle took him in, or arranged for him to learn by various rabbeim/yeshivos.).  Chaim B notes that Rav Amiel in his Middos Le'cheker Halacha vol. III has a lengthy disquisition on the permutations of "ke'ilu" and K' in Chazal.  (Good luck reading it.  Don't expect the same lucidity as Drashos el Ami.  To me it reads like a hybrid of Reb Shimon Shkop's lomdus and Rav Kook's prose.)

The Taz cannot be taken too far.  Obviously, there is no din erva/prohibition of incest midoraysa with an adopted child.  Ugly and depraved, yes, but incest, no. Incest depends on a biological relationship, and a virtual child is not a biological child.  The din of ke'ilu only applies to the relationship between these two individuals, not to external ramifications of that relationship.  Also, I doubt that Reb Shlomo Kluger would say the Taz holds that one who teaches a child Torah is mekayeim Pru Urvu.  But who knows?  After all, the original Taz said his shittah regarding the obligation to honor and fear a teacher, which he says follows from the Chazal that one who teaches is like a father.

On the other hand, Reb Shlomo Kluger's pshat in the Taz would certainly apply the dinim of Arrur Makleh Aviv and Missas Beis Din by Makeh and Mekalel to an adoptive parent if not for Ein onshin min hadin.  But at least there would be an arrur for Makleh.

Teenagers in the 90s had a sarcastic expression, "as if." The phrase conveys the absurdity of something that another person has alleged. So it turns out that "as if" is tolui in the machlokes between the Drisha and the Taz.

Practical relevance of this issue:

• Many poskim say that there is no issur of yichud with an adopted child because their emotional relationship is that of a parent and a child (Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igros EH 4:64:2, but only so long as the adoptive parent is married; and Rav Eliezer Waldenburg in Tzitz Eliezer 6:40:21, but only if the adoption took place before a girl was 3 and a boy 9 years old.  The osrim are the Chazon Ish, the Steipler, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, and Rav Vosner.  Ask your CLOR!) 
• Reb Aharon Soloveichik once said that as a young rav, he was asked who should walk the Chassan to the Chupah- the natural or the adoptive parent.  He said that the adoptive parent should walk him down.  He said that he took a lot of criticism for his advice, but he was steadfast. 
• Similarly, there are poskim that say that when getting an aliyah, or writing a shtar like a kesuva, the adopted child may write "ben [adoptive father's name]".  (Others disagree: see Choshen Mishpat 42 in the Gaon #42.  Reb Moshe in EH I:99 says you should write the biological truth, and if we do not know who his father is, you should write "ben a person whose name is not known, and raised by [adoptive parent's name], although when you read it under the chuppah, you can make concessions to avoid embarrassing the person.  Ask your LOR!)
• This really expands the previous point, but deserves a paragraph of its own.  Micha, in a comment to the original post, pointed out that calling a child "Ploni ben adoptive father" gets complicated where one is e.g., a Kohen and the other is not, and poskim that generally allow "Ploni ben adoptive father" change their position in such cases.  I don't know why, though.  Unfortunately, there are plenty of people whose fathers were kohanim and who themselves are not kohanim, due to having been the product of a marriage prohibited to a kohen.  Besides the frum ones, I know a fellow named Christopher Cohen, a lawyer.  His mother is not Jewish.
• ➜  I was at a wedding where the biological father had converted to Judaism after his daughter, the kallah, was born.  This is a classic example of a problem in the kesuva.  You can't write that the kallah is his daughter, because al pi din, they're not related.  On the other hand, he raised her, so you have those poskim that allow writing the foster father's name.  I was not the mesader, baruch Hashem, but I got a lot of grief for not making a tumul about the problematic kesuva.  Why didn't I?  For two reasons.  First, because if I had, the chassan would have said מה לי ולצרה הזאת and gone home with his kallah without any kesuva.  Second, because although as I said most poskim hold not to use the foster father's name, an interesting argument can be made to allow it in this case, where he's the biological father and he raised her too!
• By the way, Rav Sherira Gaon says that Abbaya of the Gemara was not really named Abbaya, but Nachmeini, after his grandfather. His father had died before Abbaye was born, and his mother died at child-birth, and he was raised by his uncle Rabbah bar Nachmeini. Rabbah did not want to call his nephew Nachmeini, which was the name of his father; he therefore called him "Abbaya," meaning, "my father." Others say that Abbaya stands for Asher Becha Yerucham Yasom.  Rashi, though, says that Abbaya was his real name, and his uncle called him Nachmeini.  According to Rashi, then, it could be said that Rabbah held that the adoptive parent has certain naming rights.
• But who needs to speculate about Abbaya?  Moshe Rabbeinu was raised by Bisya bas Pharaoh (see link above to Megilla 13a,) and it was she that gave him the name by which we know him.  Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz says that the Torah identifies him by his Egyptian name davka to teach us about Hakaras Hatov.  True, in that case she didn't only adopt him, she saved him from death, while most adoptions are not matters of life or death.  But once you start splitting hairs in the sugya of Hakaras Hatov, you are going down a dangerous path.  Even when you help a person in need, the Tanchuma in Shemos by Moshe and Yisro says

 ״בשעה שאמר לי׳ הקב״ה למשה, ועתה לך אשלחך אל פרעה, אמר לי׳

משה, אדון העולם, איני יכול מפני שקבלני יתרו ופתח לי את פתח ביתו

ואני עמו כבן, ומי שהוא פותח פתח לחבירו נפשו הוא חייב לו . . . ולא

עוד, אלא כל הפותח לחבירו חייב בכבודו יותר מאביו ומאמו״

When Hashem told Moshe to go down to Pharoah, Moshe said "Master of the world, I can't, because Yisro received me and opened his house to me and I am like a son to him, and if a person opens his house to his fellow, he owes him his life....and furthermore, any person who opens his house to his fellow, he is obligated to honor him more than his own mother and father.
It seems to me that an adoptive parent is a perfect example of this Medrash--

פתח לי את פתח ביתו ואני עמו כבן....נפשו הוא חייב לו

He opened the door of his house to me, and I am like a son.....he owes him his life.

Come to think of it, it turns out that Moshe Rabbeinu was twice taken in and protected like a child- by Basya bas Pharaoh and by Yisro.  

**********************

Moving to another case where Chazal said "Ke'ilu," the Gemara in Menachos 110a says that one who studies the parsha of a korban "it is as if he sacrificed the korban."  Would the Taz say that if a person became obligated to bring a chatas for some inadvertent sin, and then he read and learned the parsha of korban chatas, and then the Beis Hamikdash was rebuilt, that he would not have to bring the Chatas?  And what if you were lazy, and while the Beis Hamikdash was standing you decided to stay home and read the parsha.  Are you pattur?  I would say that this, too, depends on the shittos of the Drisha and the Taz.

The Yad David in Menachos says this question is the subject of the machlokes between Reish Lakish and Rava there.  According to Reish Lakish, learning Torah accomplishes a similar atonement to that of bringing a Korban only during a time when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash and one cannot bring a real Korban. According to Rava, even when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing, learning Torah atones exactly as if one had brought a Korban.

The Gan Raveh in Parshas Tzav brings the Binyan Ariel who says that when Hashem told Moshe, "Tzav Es Aharon v'Es Banav Leimor Zos Toras ha'Olah" it means that the Kohanim should make sure that they teach the people the rule that whenever they learn the laws of the Korban, it is as if they have offered an Olah, even though telling this to the people will surely decrease the number of Korbanos brought to the Beis ha'Mikdash.  Despite the resulting monetary loss to the Kohanim (who receive the hides of the korban Olah and much of the flesh of other korbanos), the Kohanim were enjoined to let people know about this halacha.

See a nice discussion of the din amira for a korban in the first piece in the Har Tzvi. who addresses the Beis Yosef that says that amira is mechaper "ktzas," and Reb Yishmael ben Elisha in Shabbos 12b (I will bring a chattas shmeinah, mashma that amira wouldn't patter him.)  Also,  I once saw a svara (from Reb Refoel Hamburger, and a similar but slightly different slant from Reb Chaim Ozer's cousin from Omaha, Reb Tzvi Hirsch Grodzinsky in his sefer Likutei Tzvi, about whom Reb Aharon Soloveichick said that the Brisker Rov said that he was considered the bigger lamden of the two,)  that amira doesn't work where there are other aspects of the korban that cannot be fulfilled through amira, such as "Kohanim ochlim ubaalim miskaprim."  Your amira does not make a kohen's achila.  Kind of like the Beis Halevi on Kol Rom.  Also, great unknown pointed out in a private communication that it would not work for a nazir, because amira does duplicate or parallel the Matan Behonos.  Eli in the comments sends us a link to a beautiful piece from the Cheshek Shlomo that deals with this.

A slight digression:  I had this in my journal, but forgot about it until Chaim B reminded me.

The Magen Avraham in Siman 1 says that you should stand when you say the parshas korban, because avoda is be’amidah.  Reb Chaim Kanievsky brings a Yalkut Shimoni in Yirmiah that says that a min asked someone, how can you believe the nevi’im when the navi says that the Kohanim and Leviim will do avodah forever, but you can't deny the reality that the churban stopped the avodah, and he was answered that amiras parsha by Kohanim and Leviim is like hakrava.  The pirush there, which happens to be written by the Magen Avraham, indeed says that when kohanim and leviim say parshas korban it is as if they brought it, which is apparently different from what he himself says in Shulchan Aruch!
    The Chofetz Chaim in his hakdama to his son in law’s Avodas Hakorbonos brings the same medrash and is docheh the raiya that it only applies to kohanim, and says that it is mamash like hakrava no matter who says it.  The son in law brings the same medrash and skips the words kohanim and leviim!  How do you like that!
    But there are also problems with the Yalkut itself.  First of all, this can’t be accepted as our derech, because then only kohanim should be saying the parshas hakorban, which is something weird that nobody has ever said in print.
    Second, R’ Matisyahu Solomon brings from the Chazon Yechezkel that the pshat in “neshalmah parim sfaseinu” is that we bring to ourselves the zchus of the korbanos that were brought at the time of the Beis Hamikdosh.  R’ Solomon connects this to the din of “pokeid avon avos ahl banim...v’oseh chesed l’ohavai...” which teaches that zchus avos comes to descendants that are “ocheiz b’ma’asei avosam.”  Here too, our saying the parshoh of korbanos brings us the zchus of our ancestors’ korbanos.  If we take this mehalach at face value, it is not like the shittah brought by the Magen Avraham that you have to stand during amiras parshas korbanos, and also it is not like the Yalkut that says that the amiras haparsha is like hakrovoh only when a kohen says it.
    However, we can be meyasheiv all these kashes.  There are two dinim: the zchus of amiras haparsha- or the zchus avos we create by saying the parshah- can be either the zchus of the ma’aseh hakrava or the zchus of having a korban brought on your behalf, the rei’ach nicho’ach aspect of the korban.  If you say that the zchus avos is the zchus of their ma’aseh hakravah, that just as they were makriv, it is as if we were makriv, (and not the zchus of the korban,) so this only is legitimate and helpful if the person is a kohen whose avodah is kosher.  But there is also a din that saying the parshah brings the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach of the korban, i.e., that it is as if a korban was brought for us, then even a Yisroel will benefit.  And there is no reason to think that one din is more mistavra than the other, and both dinim are true, so a kohen’s amira is as if he was makriv, and a yisroel’s amirah is as if he brought a korban and it was nikrav on his behalf.  (This question might revolve around the Gemara in Nazir and Kiddushin about Shluchi de'Rachmana or Shluchi didan.)
    This is meyasheiv all three kashes: the kashe on the Chofetz Chaim’s son in law (because the Yalkut that limits it to kohanim is the response to the min that said that avodah is boteil, and the proper response is that through the amirah of kohanim the avodah is eternal), the kashe that nobody limits amiras korbonos to kohanim (because although kohanim may have the additional aspect of the zchus of avodah, everyone has the zchus of the kiyum hamitzvah of bringing the korban), and the kashe on the Chazon Yechezkel from the Magen Avraham (because R’ Abramsky is talking about the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach, not the zchus of the avodah).   

Another interesting ramification of this discussion: The mitzva of Birkas Kohanim, according to Reb Yaakov Emden, is only de'oraysa when recited after the hakrava of a korban tzibur.  Therefore, he says, the duchening we do today is derabanan.  The Mishna Berura argues, but doesn't address the pasuk that is mashma like RYE.  So Reb Yakov Karliner answers in his Mishkenos Yaakov OC 66 that this is why we say "'ve'se'erav alecha asiroseinu ke'olah u'chi'korban" before duchenning- because our duchening is based on the parity between tefilla and korbanos.  Only because ve'se'erav can we duchen.  (His brother, the Keren Ora, says the same teretz in Maseches Sota in the sugya of birkas kohanim.)

I know about the Baal Hatanya in #37, and I don't want to put it in here, because it is not my mesora.  So please don't send me comments about his pshat in the Gemara in Menachos, thank you.

Next ke'ilu:  Shomeia Ke'oneh.
Rashi  in Sukkah 38b says that one who is in the middle of Shmoneh Esrei when the tzibbur is saying Kaddish or Kedushah should stop and listen quietly, thus answering through Shomeia Ke'oneh. Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri in Tosfos Brachos 21b ask on Rashi that if shomeia is really ke'oneh, then it should have a din hefsek.  (They say that Rashi is wrong ahl pi svara, but "gadol haminhag," so go ahead and do like Rashi anyway.)  Here, too, we see a machlokes as to the extent of Ke'.  (There are many other ways to answer Tosfos' kashe without saying that Rashi holds like the Drisha, though.  Example: The Tzlach in Psachim 56a holds that a whisper is not a hefsek, like in Baruch Shem in Krias Shma.  So even if Rashi holds like the Taz, the ke'oneh would not be worse than a whisper.)


This is getting too long.  Unless you or I can think of a really interesting machlokes about another ke'ilu, that will be it.  Nathan- thanks for mentioning Ke'ilu hu yatza mimitzrayim, but it doesn't say "yotzei," it says "yatza."

But considering that Shavuos is around the corner, here's one good thing to end with.  Kiddushin 30a.

״אמר ריב״ל כל המלמד את בן בנו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קבלה מהר סיני שנאמר והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך וסמיך ליה יום אשר עמדת לפני ה׳ אלהיך בחורב

~~~~~~~~

The following are the comments from the deleted version of this post, when it was titled "A Foster Parent is Like a Natural Parent."

Micha BergerMay 21, 2014 at 5:24 AM

Language quibble: Foster parenting is a short-time job, filling in for the parents while they or the family get help and is reunited. Adoption is a way to graft a child permanently into the family tree. Different things entirely.

As for my comment: lemaaseh my adopted children as well as those my wife gave birth to are simply "ben Mikhah Shemuel". (Foster children of course were not.) And that includes both Jews by birth and ones converted upon adoption. I also queue the gabbai to say "ve'es ishto ... ve'es kol benei veisam" rather than "kol yotzei chalatzeha".

WRT the latter, one step in conversion of a qatan is that the beis din appoints someone responsible for the child's education. So there is a place to acknowledge the adoption Jewishly during the conversion process, by having beis din formally appoint the parents at the child's beris. (Which we did not do; last time we adopted a non-Jewish child was 25 years ago. I hadn't thought of it yet.)

Eliezer EisenbergMay 21, 2014 at 6:08 AM

I should have realized that. I wish you had corrected me four years ago about foster/adoptive. The reason I chose foster was that it is shorter, and the term adoptive is an odd and distracting form of grammar. I'm going to have to change it and probably re-post it instead of just correcting it..

I just re-read your old comment, and again found it poignant that your adopted child's non-Jewish birth mother attended the bar mitzva.

You have married children. Did your mesader kiddushin know what to do with the kesuva?

Micha BergerMay 21, 2014 at 8:16 AM

None of the children I adopted are married. It's not that hard of an inyan that given the time between being asked to be mesader qiddushin and the night of the actual wedding they couldn't come to a pesaq. It's not like the question is going to come up last minute.

Side-note, nothing to do with your discussion: A foster parents needs to remember they are a "foster parent". Some of my saddest periods were when I built of dreams of eventually adopting a child who was then returned to his parents' custody. (E.g. Mitchel Steinberg / Travis Smigiel. Who would have pictured that a child whose sibling was beaten to death by their father wouldn't have been legally adopted and still had a mother with custody?)

Parents through adoption are just that -- parents. Thinking of oneself as an "adoptive parent", that the relationship is any more about chessed than any other parenting, or that adoption is more relevant than whether or not the child entered the family by c-section, isn't fair to the child. A child needs parents, not benefactors. And so, the really unwieldy but more accurate title would be "Parents are Parents, Whether by Birth Or Through Adoption".

***************************************

From R Usher Weiss:

שאלה:

האם בן מאומץ חייב בכבוד הוריו המאמצים

תשובה:

למרות שאין עליו חיוב ומצווה מדין "כיבוד אב ואם" שהרי אינם הוריו האמתיים, מ"מ חייב הוא לכבדם משום שהם גידלו אותו.

מקורות:

בחינוך מצוה ל"ו כתב משרשי המצוות כיבוד אב ואס הוא שיכיר ויגמול חסד עם מי שעשה אתו טובה ולא יהיה נקל ומתנכר וכפוי טובה שזו מדה רעה ומאוסה בתכלית לפני אלוקים ואנשים וכו' ולפי"ז אף בנדון המאומץ כיון מאמציו הטיבו עמו באמוצו הרי שיש לו לכבדם כהוגן.

ובשדה חמד מערכת אבילות סי' קנ"ו מביא מהמדרש (שמות רבה ד') בשעה שאמר הקב"ה למשה לכה ואשלחך אל פרעה אמר רבש"ע איני יכול מפני שקבלני יתרו ופתח לי ביתו ואני עמו כבן ולא עוד אלא שכל הפותח לחבירו חייב בכבודו יותר מאביו ומאמו. ושם מביא עוד ראיה מהנביא אלישע שאחר שנלקח אליהו לא הלך לביתו לאביו ולאמו להחיותם כמו שהחיה את בן האכסניא שלו לדעת השדי חמד אין סתירה בין מדרש זה לבין הגמ' סוטה כי אמנם מצות כיבוד אב ואם איננה מצות עשה המוטל על המתגדל ואולם מדרך אנושית חייב לכבד את המגדל שכן הוא דרך העולם להכיר ולהוקיר בהערכה מי שקיבל ממנו טובה.

וכתב בשו"ת אגרות משה יו"ד ח"ב סי' ק"ל דבכלל ענין מצות כיבוד אב שלא יהיה כפוי טובה להוריו שהביאוהו לעולם הזה ולפיה מש"כ הר"מ שהגר נוהג באביו מקצת כבוד הוא כדי שלא ייחשב בעיני הבריות לכפוי טובה ומסתבר שענין זה שייך אף בבן מאומץ שלא יהיה כפוי טובה להם שמגדלים אותו ועי' בשו"ת שאילת יעקב ח"א פ"א שכתב שעיקר הכיבוד הוא משום שגידלוהו ולא מצד שילדותו עי"ש.

UPDATE:

I realized a simple thing, so simple that it's embarrassing to have missed it until now.  Why would I need to prove that adoption is as real and deep as biological relations? Isn't every marriage chosen and not a product of a biological process? If you can understand the power of the relationship between husband and wife, it should be no harder to understand the power of the relationship between adoptive parents and children. 

The Halacha of Shaving the Head.

In my community, several men have taken to shaving their heads.  I suppose they're partly bald, Keirachas or Gabeches, and they find it more pleasant to simply shave their whole head.

This has given rise to comments about the issur of Lo Sakifu, the issur of cutting the peyos harosh (Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:27.)  In fact, one beis medrash doesn't allow people with shaved heads to daven for the amud.

The purpose of this post is to list some of the issues, pro and con.  At this point, it's going to be extremely condensed.

There are three threshold questions.

1.  The issur of cutting the peyos is called hakafa, from לא תקיפו פאת ראשכם (Vayikra 19:27.)  The word "hakafa" can be translated "circling," implying that the issur might only apply when cutting the peyos leaves a circle or a ring of the hair remaining on the head, similar to the tonsure of Catholics, Buddhists, Moslems, and Hindus.  Does the issur of hakafa apply when you're not leaving any hair on the head at all, when you're doing הקפת כל הראש?

2.  Does the issur of cutting the peyos harosh have the same rules as the peyos hazakan, namely, that it's only assur with a razor?

3.  Assuming the issur applies even when not done with a razor, how long do you have to leave the hair?


Answers:
1.  We pasken that הקפת כל הראש שמה הקפה, that the issur is the same even if you cut all the hair on your head.  (YD 181:2)
(Live and learn.  Reading the Wikipedia article on Tonsure, I found that  Muhammad prohibited partial הקפה, but was mattir הקפת כל הראש.  This is what it says there:

Islam
Partial tonsure is forbidden in Islam. The Prophet Muhammad forbade shaving one's hair on some parts of the head while letting it grow on other parts, as in tonsure. However, shaving the head entirely is allowed. )

2.  The Mechaber's language is that the issur of peyos harosh is only with a razor (that's the Rambam and the Chinuch, but the Chinuch says that even the Rambam is only talking about Deoraysa, and would agree that even too close of a scissor cut is assur miderbanan.)

3.  The Rosh says it's an issur deoraysa even with a scissor if it's as close as a razor, and one should be concerned about their opinion.  This is what he says:

אינו חייב אלא בתער, ויש אוסרים במספריים כעין תער ויש לחוש לדבריהם

4.  The Rambam says that the shiur of hair that has to be left after cutting is the same as the shiur of pegima on a chalef, (as the Chasam Sofer says in OC 154) that when you run your nail over it you can tell there's something there.  Which means very, very tiny. (It has been reported that a groove of 1 pm, cut in a smooth surface, can be detected by moving the fingernail back and forth over it (Kesten,1956; Matthey, 1960))  This is also the shitta of Tosfos Nazir 40a.  The Prisha in 181 says the same thing, and also the Chochmas Adam 89:16.  Some people want to say that the Mishna Berura holds the same (Biur Halacha 151 D'H V'Afilu mesapeir Yisrael.) but it's a very very weak proof.  The Mishna Berura there is just saying how terrible it is that they don't even leave a mashe'hu, he's not saying that he approves of leaving a mashehu.  Rav Wosner brings these shittos in his Shevet HaLevi.

5.  The Minchas Yitzchak 4:113:5 says you need to leave enough so that it could be bent into a loop.
Oddly, the Darkei Teshuva in 181 SK 15 brings from the Ksav Sofer that the Chasam Sofer said that the minhag was to leave enough to fold over.  See the Chasam Sofer in his Teshuvos (OC 154).

6.  Rav Elisahiv is quoted as saying that we are noheg to leave enough to fold over, and that this is 6 mm, or .23 inches, corresponding to #2 on most hair clippers.  (Beard clippers use a different numbering system.)

7.  Rav Dovid Feinstein, as in the poster available below, says .2 inches, 5 mm.

Mar'ei Mekomos:

 חת"ס (או"ח סי' קנד), מלמד להועיל (יו"ד סי' סד), צור יעקב (ח"א סי' ק) דמבואר מדבריהם שיש צורך להשאיר עובי כדי שיכוף ראש השערה לעיקרה, והוא ע"פ דברי הרמב"ם (פ"ח מטומאת צרעת ה"ו). וכ"פ בשו"ת תורה לשמה (סי' שפט). ועי' בספר אוצר הידיעות (שטרן, ח"א פרק נה עמ' רו) ובספר לשכנו תדרשו שכתב דהוא כחצי ס"מ, שכן פחות מכך הוי השחתה.

אמנם מדברי שאר הראשונים (עי' רא"ש מכות פ"ג סי' ב, וחי' רבינו ישעיה ור"י קרקושה ורבינו פרץ בשם ריב"א במכות כ:) מבו' שדי בכך שלא ישוה את השערות קרוב לבשר ממש, אך כל שמשאיר שער הנראה לעין כל אדם (מס' 1 במכונה), נראה מדבריהם דשרי. וכ"מ שנקט לדינא החכמת אדם (כלל פט אות טז). ואמנם החת"ס ודעימיה כתבו להוכיח מדברי הרמב"ם שם דבעי' כדי שיכוף ראש השערה לעיקרה, כבר כתב בחי' הגרי"ז (נזיר מ:) דדין פרטי הוא בנזיר. וע"ע בזה בשער החיים (שם אות ט) שהאריך בזה

From this skeletal outline, it appears that the people who shave their head can present adequate evidence that they are not being over an issur. Obviously, most of us are machmir to leave far more than the Chasam Sofer's shiur.  But it's far from a public aveira, it's just a kula that you or I wouldn't approve of- unless they really shave it so close that it's not even a mashe'hu left, and even then it's just against the mechaber's יש לחוש.

As I said, this is much too brief.  There are numerous other issues, including the Rambam's shitta (see Maharam Shick Sefer Hamitzvos 252 and Darkei Teshuva 181:8) about having a non-Jewish barber cut the peyos without your helping him by moving your head (which is probably impossible anyway,) and a possible connection between shaving your head and azus metzach and what that says about the kashrus of your yichus and your yiras shamayim, and many other things.  The limud zechus would be that partial baldness is very embarrassing to them, or might be harmful for their job or for shidduchim if people look at them as too old or unattractive, in which case it might fall under the rubric of Tzaar Gadol or Hefsed Merubah, which might allow reliance on the Rambam.  Another semi-limud zechus is that they might be totally unaware of the problem.

UPDATE: after a long time of cowardly confrontation avoidance, I mildly said to one young man "You learned in yeshivos, and I assume that you asked a shailah about the issue of Hakafas Harosh."  He blushed a little, and said that he recently realized it might be a problem, and he has resolved to use a guard from now on.

Reading material:
Essential, and absolutely clear, from HaRav Binyomin Forst with the haskama of HaRav Dovid Feinstein.
with option for pdf for poster.  It has photographs of Yerei'ei Shamayim with peyos that cut their hair too short around their peyos, and were over an issur de'oraysa.

Chicago Community Kollel

Rav Bakshi Doron

Rav Yishak Rasabi

Is there any limud zechus for the people who shave their heads?  No.  But there is a limud of not-chovah.  What is the halacha if you tell a non Jew to shave your head?  It might be an issur deoraysa, but it might be an issur derabanan  (see Minchas Chinuch 251:3-4.)  If it is an issur derabanan, one might claim to rely on the slim possibility that the issur is only when shaven like a razor.

Bechukosai, Vayikra 27:2. Arachin: Neder or Nedava, Gavra or Cheftza.

The law of Erchin is that a person can obligate himself to give his "Erech" to Hekdesh.  An Erech is a specific sum of money that relates to to age and gender.  If he says "I will give my Erech," ערכי עלי, he creates an obligation in accordance with the following list.

AGE                   MALE                  FEMALE
1 Mo. - 5 Yrs.    5 Shekels              3 Shekels
5 - 20 Yrs.         20 Shekels            10 Shekels
20 - 60 Yrs.       50 Shekels            30 Shekels
Over 60 Yrs.      15 Shekels            10 Shekels

The Mishna towards the end of Beitza (36b) says that on Shabbos and Yomtov it is prohibited to make something hekdesh, or to verbally create an Erech obligation, or to be machrim (another form of hekdesh) land.

לא מקדישין, ולא מעריכין, ולא מחרימין.

The Gemara (37a) explains גזרה משום מקח וממכר, that these things fall under the prohibition of making transactions, making transfers of property, on Shabbos and Yomtov.  Rashi explains that verbal designation as hekdesh brings about a transfer of property, and so these things have the appearance of a business transaction.   דלמקח וממכר דמו שמוציא מרשותו לרשות הקדש 

The Shiltei Hagiborim brings from רבי ישעיה בן אליה די טראני, whom we call the ריא"ז, that this issur only applies where you specify the object that you are making hekdesh.  The כלבו and the Meiri say the same thing.

שאינו אסור אלא כשהוא דבר בעינו כגון שיאמר דבר זה יהא הקדש אבל אם אמר הרי עלי הקדש כך וכך מותר. 

So there's nothing wrong with promising, with obligating yourself, to give something to Tzedaka or to a Mosad of kedusha, like a shul or a yeshiva, on Shabbos.  This is brought l'halacha in OC 306 and 339.

On this basis, the Ran raises a question.  The Gemara in Shabbos 150a says  פוסקין צדקה לעניים בשבת, that we make appeals for the poor on Shabbos.  The Ran there, 64a in the Rif, asks that this should be assur just like our Mishna prohibits declarations of Hekdesh on Shabbos.  He brings from the Rach that in the case of Hekdesh and Cherem, there is a transfer of ownership because אמירתו לגבוה כמסירתו להדיוט, but that is not the case by Erechin.  Erechin is just a personal obligation that does not effect any current transfer of property. The Ran says that he is not happy with this explanation, because Tzedaka is no different than Eirchin.

תמהני אמאי שרי, דהתנן (ביצה לו) אין מקדישין. ומצאתי בשם רבינו חננאל ז"ל שלא אסרו אלא להקדיש כלי ידוע משום דמחזי כמקח וממכר, אבל לא אסרו לחייב אדם עצמו לגבוה בדבורו. ועדיין אין נוח לי דהא אין מעריכין לאו כלי ידוע הוא ואפיו הכי אסור

The Gevuras Ari in Yoma 66a, in the Miluim (D'H V'im hikdish), also takes as a a davar pashut that Erchin only creates an obligation.

The question is very simple.  You can promise money to Tzedaka on Shabbos, because it's just a promise- albeit binding- and not a transfer of property.  Eirchin is also just a promise.  So why is Erichin lumped together with the issur of hekdesh and cheirem, when it ought to be muttar like making a neder to give tzedaka.

One could say a baalibatische teretz that Chazal didn't want to distinguish among the various forms of Hekdesh, and if most are assur, all have to be assur.  I certainly wouldn't use the question as a raya to recast the whole parsha of Eirchin, to say that Eirchin has a hidden and unique lomdus.  But as you'll see, there's plenty support for saying exactly that.

The Beis Yosef (OC 306) answers that Erechin is different than a regular vow or personal obligation.  In the case of Erechin, it is like buying the man, once he has promised to give his Erech to Hekdesh.

ונ"ל דמעריך דמי שפיר למקח וממכר דהוי כקונה איש זה, מאחר שנודר ליתן ערכו להקדש

It's not at all clear what the Beis Yosef means.  Apparently, he means that through the din of Erechin, you create in the subject a status like that of a bechor, who is born requiring pidyon.  You are creating a din of פדיון הבן on the subject of the Erech vow.  (I found this comparison to Pidyon HaBen later in Rav Kook's Halacha Brura on Beitza.)

This is very hard to understand.  But we found that the Shiltei HaGiborim himself addresses the question, and what he answers sounds similar to the the Beis Yosef.

The Shiltei HaGiborim is in Avoda Zara 13.   He says

ומה שהקשה הר״ן על רבינו חננאל וכתב דאין נוחין לו דברי ר״ח, דאכתי איכא ערכי עלי, שאינו מקדיש כלי ידוע, אפ״ה אמרינן דאין מעריכין, אינו נראה לי קושיא, די״ל דגם האומר ערכי עלי, הוי מקדיש שפיר כלי ידוע, דהיינו גופו ועצמו שהוא מקדישו, אלא שפודהו אח״כ מיד ההקדש בדמי ערכו, ודמי למקח וממכר

Reb Yosef Engel talks about this in his Gevuras Shemonim, #49, and says

מבואר מהשלטי גבורים, דערכין הוא חלות מהות קדושה על הנערך, ונתינת דמי הערך הוא פדיון הקדושה. וא״כ מדיש בכח אדם להעריך גם את חבירו ולומר ערך פלוני עלי, על כרחך דאפשר לאדם להתפיס חלות קדושה גם בשל חבירו, כל שאין מפסיד לחבירו דבר. ועל כרחך דשייך למצוא גם מהות קדושה שאינה אוסרת בשום דבר. דאל״כ האומר ערכי עלי, יהיה אסור ליהנות ממנו, או שיהיה בו איזה דין אחר, והרי דינו שוה לדין לשאר אדם. וע״כ דהיא מין מהות קדושה דאינה אוסרת ומחייבת את נושאה בשום דבר, ורק דיש למהות קדושה זאת פדיון בדמים. וכך הדין, שהאומר ערכי עלי חל עליו קדושה זאת על עצמו, ומתחייב ג״כ בדיבורו לפדות הקדושה ע״י דמי הערך. ולכן גם באומר ערך פלוני עלי, חל שפיר מהות הקדושה על הפלוני, אחרי שאין הפלוני נאסר ומתחייב בשום דבר ע״י מהות הקדושה הזאת שעליו ואינו נפסל בשום דבר וכו׳, וזה פשוט ומוכרח לסברת השלטי גבורים

I also found that the Alshich in our parsha (27:2) says like the Shiltei Giborim:

דע לך כי ענין הנדר אי אפשר שיהיה לשום בחינה כיוהרא שהוא ותרן וכיוצא בזה, רק על בחינת הפלאה, שהוא לפרוש עצמו משטף דברים גופניים ולהתקדש לשמו יתברך. כי על כן אמור "ערכי עלי" למען תחול קדושה על עצמו, מעין כל דבר שהוקדש ונפדה, שלא יבצר מלחול בו קדושה מהכין לו זה הכנה להנהיג עצמו בקדושה, כאומר בלבו "איני אשר הייתי עד כה, כי עתה הוקדשתי לשמים ונתתי ערכי לה'". וההקש בזה כאומר "ערך בני או אחי" וכיוצא בו להכינו לקדשו לכהנו לה', וזהו "כי יפליא נדר" שהוא בחינת הפלאה ופרישות

There are achronim that say a similar mehalach, without bringing the Shiltei HaGiborim or the Ran.  These are the Avnei Miluim (EH 2:2) and the Chazon Yechezkel in the first piece in his hashmatos on Erechin.  See also Reb Chaim Ozer in Achiezer III:67 and the Steipler Avoda Zara 2.  The Brisker Rov in the stencils in Pesachim says something similar on the sugya.

Avnei Miluim;

ולענ״ד נראה,  דודאי בבן נח ליכא משום בל יחל ולא משום מוצא שפתיך תשמור. אלא דאמירה לגבוה הוא קנין גמור כמו מסירה להדיוט, ואם נדר להביא קרבן, ה״ל חוב גמור וגובין מנכסים משועבדים וכו׳, אבל לגבוה אית בה משום קנין, ואפילו בב״נ מחוייב חוב גמור וככתיבה בשטר וכו׳. ומ״ש המל״מ דהא דפליגי בפ״ק דערכין אם הנכרי מעריך, לאו לחייב הכותי וכו׳, אינו מבורר, דודאי אפילו לא העריך כלל והפריש ממונו לשמים, חלה קדושה, דלא גרע משאר קדשי הבית דנתפס בקדושה. ועיקר כמ״ש לחייב המעריך ומשום קנין,

I think that the reason these achronim don't bring the Shiltei HaGiborim/Alshich/Beis Yosef is because they are saying something slightly different.  Unlike regular nedarim which create only an obligation on the person to fulfil his neder, this neder creates a monetary shibud gamur, so it's like a chalos kinyan.  In any case, even this mehalach answers the Ran's kashe, because all forms of hekdesh create a chalos kinyan- like mekach and memkar, it's just that this chalos kinyan is not a transfer of a particular object, it is the creation of a shibud gamur of mamonus.

It is possible that this is just another application of אמירתו לגבוה כמסירתו להדיוט, and that the consequence here is a shibud mamon.  So, as I said, it would answer the Ran's kashe- but there are still two little bumps in the road:  we would need to say that this does not apply to nidrei tzedakah, that by tzedaka the chiyuv is purely from the parsha of nedarim, motza sefasecha tishmor, and not a real shibud of mamonus.  Also, according to this, the issur to be makdish/maarich/machrim on Shabbos should apply just as well to all nidrei hekdesh, even if  you don't identify an object.

I still don't understand the mechanics of the lomdus of the Shiltei HaGiborim/Alshich/Beis Yosef, .  That's why I titled the post "Neder or Nedava," referring to one of the possible interpretations.  But at least we have an answer to the Ran's question, and the answer is more mysterious than the question was.

(There is a machlokes between the Magen Avraham and the Taz in 306.  The Magen Avraham in sk11 says that the Kol Bo is mattir even the dedication of a specific object to a Shul or Tzedaka on Shabbos, because it doesn't leave his reshus.  The Magen Avraham holds that there is a special lomdus by Eirchin, as we said above, but how he's learning the Beis Yosef is megumgam to me.  The Taz sk2 assers donating a specific object to a mossad on Shabbos.  According to the Taz, there's no special lomdus by Eirchin, it's just that Chazal assered whenever you identify the object you're giving, and since by Eirchin you identify the person, it's enough to asser- close to what we called a baalibatische teretz in the beginning of the piece.  In any case, the Mishna Berura says that lechatchila we should be machmir like the Taz.)


VERY NICE ADDENDUM:
There is a machlokes Rambam and Raavad in 3 Eirachin 6 about a poor man that hears a rich man say "Eirech ploni alai" and says "me too."
Rambam:

עשיר שאמר ערכי עלי או ערך פלוני ושמע העני ואמר מה שאמר זה עלי הרי העני חייב בערך עשיר שהוא ערך שלם

Raavad:

 אמר אברהם זו כרבי וחכמים חולקין עליו ואומרים שאינו נותן אלא ערך עני

According to the Raavad, this is a machlokes Rebbi and the Chachamim, and he says we should pasken like the Chachamim that he gives the erech of an ani.  What is the svara to say he would have a din heseg yad where he said מה שאמר זה עלי.

Later, the Rambam says that if a person says not Erki, but Domi, the Rambam in 3:9 says

וכן האומר דמי עלי או דמי פלוני עלי אינו נדון בהשג יד שחייבי דמים הרי פירשו נדרן והרי הן כמי שאמר מנה עלי הקדש שהוא חייב ליתן מנה גמור.

and the Raavad says

א"א לא מן השם הוא זה אלא לפי שהערכים הם כעין קנס כשלשים של עבד חסה התורה עליו שידון בהשג יד אבל בדמים אין קנס וגזרת הכתוב הוא ואם מך הוא

What does the Raavad mean when he says שהערכים הם כעין קנס?

Reb Chatzkel Sarno said the pshat in the machlokes is whether the chiyuv eirech is basically a neder to give money according to what the Torah defines or putting yourself into a matzav of chiyuv of Eirchin.  The Rambam begins Eirchin with the words

הערכים הם נדר מכלל נדרי הקדש. שנאמר איש כי יפליא נדר בערכך נפשות לה

and the Raavad, as we saw, said it was like a knas.  

According to the Rambam, eruchin are a donation where the donor did not specify how much money he was going to give.  The Torah fixes the donation. Nevertheless the words that the donor say mean that he is obligating himself to make a monetary donation, and despite that, the din of heseg yad applies to decrease his obligation.

The Raavad however says: שהערכים הם כעין קנס – eruchin are like a fine. Reb Chazkal explains that according to the Raavad  when a person says erech ploni olai  this is not a monetary statement at all. It just means that he undertakes to do something for Hekdesh relating to that person. The Torah imposes a fixed monetary donation to the Beis Hamikdash in this case, and that obligation is subject to the din of heseg yad.

Reb Chatzkel's divrei Torah are here, in the Sefer HaYovel of HaPardes page 161.

The section that's relevant to out discussion:

ולהבין פלוגתתם וגם מ״ש הראב״ד ז״ל שהוא כעין קנס ולכאורה מה זה ענין לקנס הכא, נ״ל דפליגי בגדר דערכין, אם הערכין הוא נדר דמים ממש ובדק הבית אלא מכיון שלא פירש בכמה דמים התחייב עצמו העריכה התורה דין זה בערכים מיוחדים, או דדין ערכין דין מיוחד הוא שהוא מחייב עצמו בדין הערכין ואחרי שחייב עצמו בדין הערכין חייבה אותו התורה בדמים לבד״ה כפי שיעור הערכין, והרמב״ם יסבור בזה כצד הראשון דערכין הוא נדר דמים ממש וכ״כ להדיא בריש הל׳ ערכין ז״ל ״הערכים הם נדר מכיל נדרי הקדש״ ועיי״ש בכ״מ שכ׳ ת״ל ״כתב כן ליתן טעם למה כתב הלכות אלו בספר הפלאה״. ע״כ. ולענ״ד אין צורך לזה אלא שכתב כן להגדיר גדר דערכים שהוא מכלל נדרי הקדש ואינו דין מיוחד כל, ולפיכך לדידי׳ הי׳ אפשר לומר שיהי׳ דין השג יד גם בדמים כי הלא ערכין ג״כ מדין דמים הוא, והא דאין דין השג יד בדמים הוא רק משום דלא גרע מערך מפורש שאינו בחשג יד וחייבי דמים הלא פירשו נדרן כמ״ש הרמב״ם ז״ל. אבל הראב״ד יסבור כהצד השני :־ערכין אינו דין נדר דמים אלא שהוא דין מיוחד שהוא התחייב עצמו בדין הערכים והתורה חייבה אותו בדמים קצובים לפי שיעור הערך וזהו שכ׳ הראב״ד כעין קנס כלומד לא שהוא תתחייב עצמו בשיעור דמים אלה, אלא שהתורה חייבה להמעריך דמים קצובין כעין שהקציבה דמים בקנס.

With the Shiltei HaGiborim/Alshich/Beis Yosef that we brought, we can say a nice mehalach in the Raavad.  The Raavad holds that the din of Eirchin is that you are creating a chiyuv pidyon on you determined by the person you specified.  What is required for pidyon is not bichlal in your hands.  It is what the Torah listed, and it is modified by the din of Heseg Yad.  The Rambam, on the other hand, holds that the din of Eirchin is basically a din Neder, that you've obligated yourself to give the sum of money to Hekdesh that the Torah specified in the parsha of Eirchin.  But if you say I'm giving the Eirech the rich man promised, then you've identified a different sum of money.


Another possibility- see the Machlokes Ketzos and Nesivos, which is the same machlokes as the shepherds of Avraham and Lot.  Ketzos 278:15, and Nesivos 278:11.  It could be that according to the Ketzos, the chalos chiyuv of Arachin is a momonusdikeh chalos.

Bechukosai. The Tochecha and the Preciousness of Human Life

A version of this post originally appeared in 2011.  This has been updated with an addition at the end.

A dear friend, Harav Shmuel Yeshaya Keller (Rosh Mechina Telshe Chicago,) shared a nice thought from his father, Harav Chaim Dov Keller, on this week's parsha, and I'd like to share it with you.  The vort is his, the presentation mine.

We Jews understand intellectually and emotionally how very precious human life is.  I recently read a memoir written by a man with whom I am privileged to be very close, Avraham (Romi) Cohen, "The Youngest Partisan."  He describes his experience before, during and after WW II, during which he joined and fought with a group of non-Jewish partisans.  To this day, his courage and strength of character are preeminent.  He is a lion of a man, and it is wise to not stand in his way.  In his book, he describes the tortures he experienced and saw inflicted on others by the Nazis.  Once, his group caught a Nazi, and after questioning him, tied him to a tree facing forwards, with his arms behind him.  Romi was handed a knife and granted the honor of executing the prisoner; he was told not to kill the prisoner quickly.  Standing there, visions of what this man and his friends had done ran through his mind.  But he couldn't do it.  Or, more correctly, he certainly could have done it, but he refused to do it.  He handed the knife to his superior and said that he wanted to be 'mechabeid' him.  As he walked away, he heard as his officer began his work.

But not everyone is like that.  For many, even for Jews, there are brutalizing experiences that diminish our respect for human life.  Three times in the Torah, we are forewarned about this problem and cautioned to balance what we have seen with kvod habriyos.

After the great mabul, in Parshas Noach, when so many lives were lost, what would murder mean?  Nothing.  Is there any difference at all between 5,555,555 and 5,555,556?  Specifically there (Breishis 9:10) the Torah teaches us שופך דם האדם באדם דמו יישפך  כי בצלם אלוקים עשה את האדם , one who spills the blood of a man deserves the ultimate punishment, for man was created in Hashem's image.  The great flood was Hashem's will, and even if we were told the reasons it happened, we can never understand why it was necessary and just.  Our job is to remind ourselves, even under the worst circumstances, that human life is precious.

In Parshas Shoftim, the Torah teaches us the laws of war (Devarim 20:10) and siege against our enemies (20:19).  Immediately afterwards, we are taught the dinim of Egla Arufa, the calf that must be brought for atonement for the residents of a city when some unknown criminal murdered someone near their city- perhaps if the residents of the city had been more welcoming and supportive, had they made the visitor feel honored and respected, he would not have felt so impelled to go elsewhere that he chose this dangerous route that resulted in his death.  This is a stark contrast!  Yes, there are times of war and of siege, there are times when slaughter and starvation are necessary.  But the touchstone, the baseline, is that we need to atone even for not anticipating the feelings of an itinerant beggar.

In our parsha, we see the same thing.  The Tochecha speaks of the unspeakable, and horrifies all that hear it.  After the Tochecha, one might feel that life is just a great and dark abyss of futility, that tranquility and happiness are only a delusion, that human life is brutish and worthless and lasts just long enough to emphasize the delusion of hope.  So the Torah tells us the rules of Arachin.  Every human being is equally precious, no matter who, no matter when.  Never forget that your friend is worth exactly the same as you and as the Kohen Gadol and as the Melech Yisrael.  We are all created be'tzelem Elokim.

Reb Chaim B directs our attention to the Mei Hashiloach, from Rav Mordechai Leiner, the Ishbitzer Rov.  He suggests that Arachin focuses our attention on the redemption of pledges, and says the idea of redemption should be understood more generally.   The Parsha of Arachin following the Tochecha reminds us that there is always an opportunity to redeem onself.   Indeed, other than the introductory passuk of "Vayidaber Hashem el Moshe…" and the ending review passuk, there is an exact match between the thirty-three pesukim of Parshas Arachin and the thirty-three pesukim of the Tochecha.  Sometimes, Tochecha is the trauma that forces a person to realize that he must redeem himself through sincere Teshuva and Ma'asim Tovim.  Sometimes, the punishment itself is the means of attaining redemption.

I particularly like this vort because it is an anodyne for how I felt yesterday as I was being ma'avir sedra.  I noticed that the Eirech of a man between twenty and sixty is fifty (50) shekalim.  The eirech for a man past his sixtieth birthday is fifteen (15) shekalim.  It's not nogei'a to me for another year, but still....put that in your pipe and smoke it.  Which actually sounds like a very good idea.

UPDATE 5/13/14
I'm past my sixty first birthday, and I managed to survive the insult of my eirech dropping by seventy percent.

I saw two things over the last couple of days, and I am going to present them just as I saw them, without any comment, without any explanation of any reason I am putting them here.

From Harav Shternbuch Shlitah, at the end of Parshas Emor, in the story of the Megadeif, Vayikra 24:23.

ובני ישראל עשו כאשר צוה ה' את משה הורה בזה כי המצוה הזו תתחבב על בני ישראל ככל מצוות ה' ,ובאומות העולם שהורגים על חוקים שבדו מלבם , מלאכה בזויה היא וההורג בוש במלאכתו , אמנם בני ישראל מקיימים מצוות ה' בהריגה כמו שמקיימים מצוות תפילין ולא נחשבת להם כמעשה רציחה כלל   עיין ברמב"ן .

Before continuing, I want to point out that when Harav Shternbuch says  ולא נחשבת להם כמעשה רציחה כלל, he implies that if a Kohen would do this, it would not passel him under Reb Yochanan's din ( :ברכות לב) of  כל כהן שהרג את הנפש לא ישא את כפיו.  It is important to know that this implication should not be taken at face value, as we have discussed elsewhere.

and now back to my update,

להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל

בין הקודש ובין המשוקץ המתועב והמגואל

להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל להבדיל

(BBC News 5/9/14) Shekau has neither the charismatic streak nor the oratorical skills of his predecessor - but he has an intense ideological commitment and ruthlessness, say people who study the group.
"He is the leader of the more militant wing of the group as testified by his aping of Osama Bin Laden in his video appearances," says Abubakar Mu'azu from the University of Maiduguri.
Shekau issued a chilling message in one of those appearances - which provides a major insight into what his leadership of the group will bring.
"I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill - the way I enjoy killing chickens and rams," he said in the video clip released just after Boko Haram had carried out one of its deadliest attacks, in January 2012, killing more than 180 people in Kano, northern Nigeria's largest city.
Shekau is also the group's spiritual leader - and, judging by video footage, he seems equally comfortable delivering sermons to his followers.
"He has a photographic memory and is well-versed in theology," Mr Salkida said.
His followers nickname him "Darul Tawheed", which translates as a specialist in Tawheed. This is an orthodox doctrine of the uniqueness and oneness of Allah, which is the very cornerstone of Islam. 

HaRav Shternbuch mentioned that one should look at the Ramban here.  Here's the Ramban, and I don't know how he means to use the Ramban.

: ובני ישראל עשו כאשר ציווה ה' את משה - 

אף לסמיכה אף לדחייה אף לתלייה אף ללא תלין נבלתו על העץ, תורת כוהנים פרק כ י 

ור"א אמר: 

בפשוטו, כי עשו מאותו היום והלאה כמשפט הזה בחובל. ואינו נכון שיהיה כתוב על העתיד. 

ופשוטו, וירגמו אותו אבן כי עשו בני ישראל המצווה אשר ציווה ה' את משה, כי כן יכפול בכל השומרים מצוות השם, כמו שנאמר בפרשת הפסח (שמות יב כח), וכמו שאמר בפרשת הפקודים (במדבר א נד): ויעשו בני ישראל ככל אשר ציווה ה' את משה כן עשו, וכן במטות הנשיאים (שם יז כו): ויעש משה כאשר ציווה ה' אותו כן עשה. והנכון בעיני בכאן, מפני שפרט בתחילה הסקילה ואחר כן חזר ואמר ובני ישראל עשו, כי טעם הכתוב, לומר כי כאשר דבר משה אל בני ישראל הוציאו מיד את המקלל ורגמו אותו, ועשו כן כל בני ישראל לשמור ולעשות כאשר ציווה השם את משה, ולא לשנאת בן המצרי שנצה 

עם הישראלי אלא לבער הפגום מתוכם

If you ask me, I would say the Ramban is saying not like HaRav Shternbuch.  I would say that the Ramban is saying that killing someone is an ugly act that is only made not ugly if it is done to fulfill Hashem's will, and even then is is not at all like putting on Tefillin.

For example, like he says in Breishis 15:4.

 "כאשר תצא הגזירה על פי נביא יש בעושה אותה דינים, כי אם שמע אותם ורצה לעשות רצון בוראו כנגזר אין עליו חטא, אבל יש לו זכות בו.. אבל אם לא שמע המצוה והרג אותו לשנאה או לשלול אותו יש עליו העונש כי הוא לחטא נתכוון ועבירה היא לו