Shlach, Bamidbar 15:35. Kashering Chillul Shabbos

This was originally posted in 2011.  I am re-posting because of an important addition, number VI below.

Synopsis:
Doing Melacha on Shabbos is a capital aveira.  But doing melacha to save a life is not only allowed, it is a mitzva.  Two questions arise.  Why doesn't the rule of Ho'il allow all melacha on Shabbos since the fruit of the melacha might be used for a sick person?  Also, even assuming that Ho'il does not allow melacha on Shabbos, what if a person was intentionally mechallel Shabbos, but in fact the fruit of his melacha was needed for and used by a sick person?  Would this retroactively kasher/excuse his chillul Shabbos?

If you're looking for chizuk in hashkafa or mussar, this is not it, but you could go to here or here.

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Our parsha tells us of the M'kosheish, a man that openly and rebelliously was mechallel Shabbos, and that he was found guilty of this crime and executed.

Chillul Shabbos is a capital aveira. The punishment is not merely theoretical, it can actually be carried out where there was hasra'a and zadon. There are two fundamental questions about what might excuse a mechallel Shabbos be'meizid.

I
Question one: 

While it is permitted to cook on Yomtov for a Yomtov meal, it is prohibited to cook on Yomtov in preparation for a weekday meal.  The rule called "Ho'il" relaxes this prohibition, because even though he intends to use the food for the weekday meal, if unexpected guests were to come on Yomtov, he would serve what he cooked to his guests on Yomtov, so the cooking is viewed as if it were for Yomtov use..  Ho'il allows us to say that as long as guests could possibly come, the issur of Yomtov is removed.  We don't care if guests actually come or not: as long as they could come, and there is a potential that the cooking you are doing on Yomtov will be needed for Yomtov, you're off the hook.  The issur of cooking on Yomtov for a weekday only applies, then, if you cook right before the end of yomtov, when it is impossible for guests to come and eat.

Pikuach Nefesh is Docheh Shabbos.  If there were a sick person who needed whatever the Mekosheish was being mekosheish, it would be muttar- indeed a mitzvah- to do it.  So why don't we apply the rule of Ho'il?  As long as what the mechallel Shabbos is doing might possibly be necessary to save a choleh, he should be pattur.

Tosfos asks this question in two places.  
First, it's important to see the Gemara in Menachos 64a

דאיתמר שמע שטבע תינוק בים ופרש מצודה להעלות דגים והעלה דגים חייב להעלות דגים והעלה דגים ותינוק רבא אמר חייב ורבה אמר פטור ועד כאן רבה לא קא פטר אלא כיון דשמע אמרי'  נמי דעתיה אתינוק אבל לא שמע לא ואיכא דאמרי א"ל היינו פלוגתייהו דרבה ורבא דאיתמר (לא) שמע שטבע תינוק בים ופרש מצודה להעלות דגים והעלה דגים חייב להעלות דגים והעלה תינוק ודגים רבה אמר פטור ורבא אמר חייב רבה אמר פטור זיל בתר מעשיו ורבא אמר חייב זיל בתר מחשבתו 

A.  In Menachos 64a Tosfos DH Le'haalos he says

להעלות  דגים והעלה דגים ותינוק:  לא דמי לאופה מיו״ט לחול דבפרק אלו  עוברין דפטרינן מטעם הואיל ומקלעי ליה אורחין ונימא  הכא נמי הואיל ופטר ליה אתינוק פטור נמי אדגים דהתם הוא דאפייתו חזיא לצורך יו״ט אבל הכא צידת דגים לא חזיא בשבת

He seems to mean that ho'il only helps when there is one act and one result, but if the one act had two results, and one of the results is not excused by the ho'il, then he is chayav.

B.  In Pesachim 46b Tosfos says 

א"כ ביטלת כל מלאכת שבת הואיל וראוי לחולה שיש בו סכנה וי"ל  כיון דלא שכיח כלל לא אמרינן הואיל

Here, Tosfos simply says that ho'il won't work where the excuse-event is extremely unlikely.  This is similar to the Tosfos' (Gittin 33a) teretz on hasra'as safek because you might be sho'eil.

The two teirtuzim are completely different and have different ramifications le'halacha.

II

Question two:
Let's assume that Ho'il does not apply to Melacha on Shabbos.  Even so, there ought to be a way to kasher chillul Shabbos.
If a person was willfully mechallel Shabbos, and as it turned out, the fruit of his chillul Shabbos was actually needed to save someone's life, such that if he hadn't done the melacha, it would have been a mitzva to do it, is he pattur?  Does this circumstance, which the malefactor was not aware of but which did exist at the time of the chillul kasher his chillul Shabbos, or does pikuach nefesh require awareness of the hetter to be invoked?  Is unwitting pikuach nefesh docheh Shabbos?

PLEASE note that Questions one and two are different.  Question one is why doesn't ho'il patter chillul Shabbos: in other words, regardless of whether the fruit of the melacha was needed, the possibility that it might be needed is enough to allow bishul on Yomtov, and so why doesn't the possibility it might be needed for pikuach nefesh allow most melachos on Shabbos.  Question two is, assuming there's no din of Ho'il on Shabbos, what if in fact someone ran into the house of the mechallel Shabbos and said "Baruch Hashem you cooked soup, because Shmerel the Choleh is dying for chicken soup!"  Would this excuse the sheigitz that cooked the soup?

The discussion among the Achronim regarding Question two is as follows.

A.  Rav Yosef Dovid Zintsheim (in his Yad Dovid on Menachos, available from Machon Yerushalayim,) writes that this hangs on the Machlokes Rabba and Rava in Menachos 64a (that we brought down in Section I,) and that according to Rabba, if you end up using the cooked food for the sick person, the chillul Shabbos will be kashered.  In other words, it will lemafrei'a not be called chillul.

B.  Reb Meir Simcha (Ohr Sameiach 2 Shabbos 16) modifies this slightly, and says that Rabba in the Gemara in Menachos is only saying he's pattur from Skila, that there won't be missas beis din, but certainly the person needs kapara no less than the woman in "va'hashem yislach lah," in Nazir 23a, where the Gemara says that a person who thought the food was treif and ate it anyway, and it turned out it was kosher, this person needs kapara and even is chayav Makkas Mardus.

C.  Reb Meir Don Plotzki (Kli Chemda in Vayechi) says that Rabba in the Gemara in Menachos is only saying he does not/can not bring a Korban for a Shogeig, but even Rabba agrees that the malefactor is chayav Missas Beis Din, or at least Kareis. 

What a difference between Reb Meir Simcha and RMDP!

D.  Reb Elchonon in Kovetz Shiurim Pesachim 193, to Daf 46b, says that the machlokes whether you say Ho'il is whether you go after the act, which might be justified, or the kavana, which is to use it after yomtov. He says that according to Rav Chisda that you don't say ho'il, even if guests come you'll remain chayv. BUT he brings the Meiri there, who says that even according to Rav Chisda, who doesn't hold of Ho'il, if guests do show up he's pattur; the same would apply to Shabbos and Pikuach Nefesh.  (Don't tell me that there's a difference between cooking on Yomtov and pikuach nefesh on Shabbos.  The Gemara in Pesachim 47b makes it clear that the rationale of Ho'il applies to cases of Dechiya.)  In any case, Reb Elchonon disagrees with the Meiri.

III
Question two has an interesting permutation.  Borer, separating good from bad, is muttar only if you are going to eat/use the good now.  If you are putting it away for another time, e.g., you are being borer Friday night for use at Seuda Shlishis, that is pure Borer and is Chillul Shabbos.  Reb Yosef Chaim of Baghdad (Rav P'alim OC 1:12) discusses a case where the person was borer good from bad to eat later, but then he changed his  mind and ate it right away.  Pattur or Chayav?  Also, what if he was borer to eat right away, but then didn't.  Pattur or Chayav?  You can see that the issue is similar.

A.  Rav Yosef Chaim says that all that matters is what he was intending when he did the breira.  Unlike Yomtov, there is a din of M'leches Machsheves on Shabbos.  This rule can apply to say that if he did the melacha with the intent that is part of the definition of the melacha, then it is a melacha, and nothing that happens later will change that.  Furthermore, this case is not exactly like the Gemara in Menachos.  In Menachos, what he did was an act that was muttar, although he did not know it.  Here, the act is assur.  What he does later does not change the nature of the act retroactively.

B.  He says that if not for this answer, we would have a conundrum.  How can any borer be chayav when the rule of Ho'il would say that since he might eat it right away, it should be muttar whether he does or doesn't eat it now.  Tosfos in Pesachim will not help us, because this is obviously not uncommon.  We must say, therefore, that Ho'il is totally inapplicable to Shabbos, because the rule of M'leches Machsheves defines the melacha on the basis of intent, irrespective of what he could have planned and what might happen.

C.  I have a little trouble understanding what he is saying.  As I understand it, the cases where Boreir is muttar are based on Derech Achila.  Derech Achila requires intent at that moment.  If the intent was not as Derech Achila, nothing you do later will matter.  Conversely, if the intent was Derech Achila, it doesn't matter whether you ate or did not eat.  

IV
There was a Rov in Chicago many years ago by the name of Rabbi Yosef Kagan.   He was a grandson of the Chafetz Chaim, whose daughter married a man named Kagan, just like her own name.  He was a great talmid chacham, but was not the type to seek out people to talk to.  In 1961 he printed a little sefer called עיוני הלכה והגיונות, and one of the divrei Torah is on our sugya.  He also talks about how Meleches Machsheves plays out in the Gemara in Menachos.  He reads the following into the Binyan Shlomo: that even Rava who holds that one who caught fish and saved a drowning child is chayav, that is only when he intended to catch fish and he caught fish, and the child was not what he had in mind.  Only then does Rava hold that Meleches Machsheves makes him chayav.  But if he cooked something to eat on Shabbos, and it turned out to be needed by a choleh, everyone would agree that he is pattur.  To the omniscient view, his entire act was muttar.  Only where he also caught fish, or by korbanos, where the din of Hiddur requires awareness of Hiddur, does Rava argue.  He then uses Meleches Machsheves just like Rav Yosef Chaim, to eliminate Ho'il from Shabbos calculations.  He  reads this pshat into the Tosfos there DH L'haalos.

V
The Gemara in Pesachim 47b asks, if we use Ho'il, then why is a person who plows on Yomtov chayav?  Plowing would be muttar if he were doing it to turn over soil to use for Kisui HaDam, so even if he's doing it for a different reason, ho'il should be mattir- Ho'il if he were to shecht a bird he would need it for kisui, under which circumstances charisha would be muttar.

Tosfos brings that the Rashbam understands the Gemara to mean that Charisha for Kisui is a Melacha She'eina Tzricha LeGufa.  If he would use the dirt for Kisui, it would turn out that the Charisha was muttar because it was a Melacha She'eina Tzricha LeGufa.  The R'i argues on the Rashbam.  He says that if you say "Ho'il that I could have done it as an eina tzricha legufa it would be muttar, so it's muttar now too," then "ביטלת כל מלאכת שבת" once again.  So Tosfos says a different pshat.  But this leaves us to wonder, why indeed don't you say a hetter of Ho'il on all melachos Shabbos, Ho'il I could end up using the fruit of the melacha in a way that makes the melacha eina tzricha le'gufa?

Reb Meir Simcha in the Ohr Sameach (1 Yomtov 7, last paragraph) says an amazing yesod:
Ho'il works only when in either case it is a melacha, but in the ho'il case, it is a melacha that is muttar.  But kavana of eina tzricha le'gufa is not a melacha at all; what you did was a melacha, and ho'il cannot reclassify what you did as a non-melacha.

Perhaps we can say the same thing to explain why ho'il won't work to be mattir on the basis of using it for a choleh.  It could be that just like hana'a from a mitzva is not called hana'a, so too, melacha for a choleh is not in the hagdara of melacha at all.  Ho'il cannot take a melacha and make it into a non-melacha.  I know this is highly debatable, but if Rav Shach's Avi Ezri can be full of svaros like this, why can't I say them once in a while?

VI
Reb Akiva Eiger in Tshuvos 5, Chasam Sofer in Tshuvos 79.  If you've gotten this far, look them up yourself.


Addition June 2015
VII
I just realized that this question is directly related to something we had once written about- Reb Shlomo Zalman's warning about which doctor should do pikuach nefesh on Shabbos.  The tzushtell is good, but it causes so many problems that I think we have no choice but to accept the svara from Reb Meir Simcha above in V and II B.

This is what I had in the other piece, which is relevant to this discussion.Regarding פקוח נפש on Shabbos, Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach  zt”l's psak is quoted by HaRav Yehoshua Yeshaya Neuwirth zt”l as follows:  (SSK 32:130)

ושמעתי מהגרש"ז אוירבעך זצ"ל , דנראה דעדיף טפי לעשות המלאכה ע"י שומר מצוות שכוונתו למצווה, כי ע"י עבריין אשר כוונתו רק עבור בצע כסף, אע"ג דקעביד מצוה, מ"מ הו"ל כנתכוין לבשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר טלה, דמבואר בקידושין לב. תוד"ה דמחיל, דגם ע"ז יש משום "ולפני עור" וגם אפשר דבני"ד גרע טפי, כיון שבאמת יש כאן חילול שבת, ויתכן שהרופא נחשב כאינו מחלל שבת רק אם כוונתו להצלה ולא אם מכוון  לתשלום, וראה גם בספר בית הלוי עה"ת פרשת שמות. על הפסוק ״וירא אלוקים את בני ישראל״ל

Here is the Beis Halevi:

שמות, ד"ה וירא

ומזה יצא למי שהיא פרוץ באחת ממצות ה׳ , אע״נ דלפעמים נתרחש לו אונס שלא יכול לקיימה מ״מ לא מקרי אונס  וכמו בשמירת שבת ונדומה דלפעמים אנוס הוא לעשות מלאכה או עבור חולה ר״ל וכדומה מ״מ לא מקרי אונס רק לאותם שהיו שומרים אותו אם לא היה האונס, אבל המחלל שבת כשאינו אנוס, גם במלאכה שהוא אנוס מקרי מחלל, וכן הוא בכל האיסורים

As we (not the royal we; I refer to the numerous contributors to that particular piece,) discussed, it is clear that RSZ is saying that the hetter of Pikuach Nefesh requires that the motivating intent is to save a life.  Where the motive is self-interest, it appears that there is no hetter of pikuach nefesh even where a life is saved.  Obviously, this is a shocking chiddush, which we discussed there at length.  But as far as the question of the day, according to RSZ, you couldn't kasher chillul Shabbos.  The hetter of dechiyah only applies where the melacha was done with the intent of saving a life.  Why?  We have to say like Reb Meir Simcha, despite all the problems it causes.

Behaaloscha, Bamidbar 11:16. Shivim Ish. How Many Judges in Sanhedrin?

ויאמר ה' אל משה אספה לי שבעים איש מזקני ישראל אשר ידעת כי הם זקני העם ושטריו ולקחת אתם אל אהל מועד והתיצבו שם עמך וירדתי ודברתי עמך שם ואצלתי מן הרוח אשר עליך ושמתי עליהם ונשאו אתך במשא העם ולא תשא אתה לבדך 

The Rabanan in the Mishna in Sanhedrin 2a learn from our pesukim that Sanhedrin has 71 members- the seventy Moshe Rabbeinu was told to gather, plus Moshe himself. Avi Mori Zatzal asked, but Moshe Rabbeinu's judicial status was such that he, as an individual, was considered equal to the entire Sanhedrin, he had the judicial power of an entire Sanhedrin.   משה במקום שבעים וחד קאי (Sanhedrin 13b, 16a-b.)  So how do you learn from here that Sanhedrin must have seventy one members?  If Moshe was equal to an entire Sanhedrin, then that first Sanhedrin, which included Moshe, was the equivalent of 140 people, and a Sanhedrin without a Moshe should need 140 people! Also, he asked, how is it possible for Moshe to pasken alone? Only God Himself is called a “dan yechidi,” the One Who judges alone? Furthermore, there is a rule in capital cases that kulo chayov, pattur- that if all the members of the court find the defendant guilty, he is automatically declared innocent, because unanimity in a capital case is evidence of prejudice, a failure of serious legal dialogue, and also because "והצילו העדה" requires that the judges be capable of considering exculpatory factors until the moment of execution, and this mutually reinforcing court will be incapable of reconsidering their decision. So how could Moshe be dan by himself? There could not have been any give and take, any discussion, and so whatever decision he made would have been procedurally flawed!

My father said that the answer to both questions can be seen in the parsha of the Slav, the quail, that immediately precedes our passuk.

When the people complained that they had nothing to satisfy their desire for meat, Moshe said to Hashem, it is impossible to satisfy these people, "mei'ayin li bassar?" As Moshe said later, there isn’t enough meat in the world!  If I gave them all the fish in the sea, it wouldn’t be enough, where will I get it from, האנכי הריתי את כל העם הזה אם אנכי ילדתיהו כי תאמר אלי שאהו בחיקך כאשר ישא האמן את הינק?  Did I conceive this nation? Did I give birth to them? What did he mean to add with this last phrase? Even if he had “harisi” and “yeliditihu," what's impossible is impossible!

From Moshe’s words we see that "impossible" presenting an insurmountable barrier depends on your relationship with the person in need. When a child needs something, a father's reaction is that he will do whatever he can, no matter how difficult, no matter if what they need is "impossible", he will try to do the "impossible." As my father put it, "פאר א טאטע איז דאס ניט קיין תרץ." For a father, that is not an answer.  He used Basya bas Pharaoh as an example: when she saw the child in the water, she stretched out her hand, although her hand could not possibly have reached him. No matter! You do what you can, and you don't even weigh the possibility of success. So first, Moshe Rabbeinu said "what they want simply does not exist." The whole world is not enough to satisfy their desires and needs. Then he said, if they are asking for the impossible, how do they expect me to do it? Am I their father? 

So Hashem told him, "Until now, you were like a father to the people. When you judged them, you didn’t judge as a dayan, you judged as a father judges his children. A father doesn’t need hagadas eidus, he doesn’t need drisha ve'chakira, your whole-hearted and selfless empathy and boundless love for your people allowed you to judge them by yourself. But if you say that you are not their father, from now on you are only the gadol hador, and you can judge them as a dayan, as one of the seventy one.

With this we understand another thing. The instruction to Moshe to convene a Sanhedrin is placed in middle of the story of the People's complaint about not having meat to eat. There seems to be no reason for this apparently irrelevant interruption. Why does the Torah place the parsha of Sanhedrin here? The answer is that the way Moshe reacted and expressed himself in his response to the people's complaint was the reason he was told to gather a Sanhedrin and to join the Sanhedrin as one judge among the others. Until that point, he was dan not as a dayan but as a father. Moshe had gathered the Bnai Yisroel in Mitzrayim, he gave them courage and hope and identity, he brought them out, he split the Red Sea, he gave them the Torah. In National identity terms, we would call him the father of the nation. And more than that– he was a charismatic leader– the people see themselves as part of him, and he sees himself as part of them. Their individual existence is meaningless, as they exist only as reflections of each other; the state is a reflection of the personality of the leader. But when he said "they are asking for the impossible! Am I their father? Am I their mother?" he lost that status, and could only be dan as a dayan.

After I said this in a drasha, someone showed me that the Brisker Rov asks the kashe on the Gemara in Sanhedrin (if Moshe was equal to the other 70, then we should say that a Sanhedrin without Moshe should comprise 140 members, not only 71.) The Brisker Rov answers that we see that Moshe Rabbeinu's din changed from being a shakul as soon as Hashem told him to gather the 70 people. 

But– and this is very important– the Brisker Rov does not even hint at any explanation for this change. He simply states this as a fact: his analysis of the pesukim leaves no alternative but to say that Moshe Rabbeinu's status changed at precisely this point.  After stating this tremendous and perplexing chiddush, he does not even begin to discuss why this might be true.  Ovi Mori’s pshat improves the vort tremendously. The fact that people told him it is a Brisker vort is just because people have a yetzer hora to say “yeah, I saw that someone else says that already,” when in fact the other person just says a little nothing from the vort.


(The idea that a father, one who loves someone with all his soul, will do what he can even when solving the problem is impossible, is found in several places.  First, as my father said, from Bas Pharaoh.  I've heard this in the name of Reb Itzel Ponovezher as well.  In our parsha, we have the people who were tamei, and they came to Moshe and complained that they can't take it, they need to be able to be makriv the Korban Pesach- even though they knew very well that their taineh was futile.  Finally, we see that Iyov was punished for his silence at the Egyptian Wannsee Conference.  There was nothing he could have done.  Running away, like Yisro, would solve nothing.  But at least cry out! A man who suffers, screams, even though it doesn't help him a ki hu zeh.  Reb Chaim B showed me that this is said over in the name of the Sfas Emes- see his comment, and I saw it in the Lekach Tov quoted from "the gedolei Baalei Mussar.")


When I told this to HaRav Yitzchok Grodzinsky, a Rosh Kollel in Bnei Brak, the son of my father's Mashgiach in Slabodkeh-Lithuania, I remarked that what my father said was certainly not a pshat that a Brisker would say.  Harav Grodzinsky added that it was, in fact, davkeh a Slabodker mehalach, emblematic of the foundational mussar spirit of the Slabodkeh Yeshiva.

The original version of this post was written in 2008, during the year of aveilus for my father Zatzal.

Note:

Yehuda O, in the comments, said an interesting svara.  He said that even though Moshe Rabbeinu was shakul to the seventy of Sanhedrin, he wouldn't have a din Beis Din of three without two other people.  Another commenter directed us to the Shai LaTorah III:133, where he brings this in a shakla ve'taria from the Brisker Rov, his brother Reb Moshe, and his son Reb Dovid.  Yasher koach to both of you!

ויאמר ה' אל משה אספה לי שבﬠים איש מזקני ישראל אשר ידﬠת כי הם זקני הﬠם ושטריו ולקחת אתם אל אהל מוﬠר והתיצבו שם ﬠמך 

מרן הגרי׳׳ז זצ"ל הסתפק בהא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, אם דין זה נאמר רק עד שנאמרה הך פרשה ד"אספה לי שבﬠים איש", שבזה נתמנו ﬠ' זקנים לסנהדרין או דגם אחרי פרשה זו ׳׳משה במקום שבﬠים ואחד

והביא ראיה מדברי הרמב"ם בהלכות מלכים פ"א הל"ג וז"ל אין מﬠמידין מלך בתחילה אלא ﬠ"פ בית דין של ע' זקנים. וﬠל פי נביא כיהושﬠ שמינהו משה ובית דינו וכו', עכ"ל. ומדכתב הרמב׳׳ם "משה ובית דינו" מוכרח מזה דאחרי שהוקם סנהדרין גדולה, לא היה משה במקום ﬠ"א, וזהו שהיה צריך לבית דינו כדי למנות את יהושﬠ ﬠכ"ד

והנה מרן זצ"ל אמר בשם אחיו הגר"מ זצ"ל להסתפק, אם הא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, שייכא רק לבית דין של ﬠ"א, או דהיה לו גם דיך בית דין של שלשה. והביא ראיה מהא דאיתא בגמ' ראש השנה כ"ה ﬠ"ב "ואימא הכא נמי (דקידוש החודש יהא

ביחיד) אין לך מומחה לרבים בישראל יותר ממשה רבינו, וקאמר ליה הקב"ה עד דאיכא אהרן בהדך" יעוי"ש. הרי דלקידוש החודש דבﬠינן ג' לא מהני משה רבינו לבדו, ובﬠל כרחך דלא היה אלא במקום ﬠ"א, אבל לא במקום בית דין של ג'

ואין לומר דכשנאמרה פרשת קידוש החודש ﬠדיין לא היה משה במקום ﬠ"א דהנה כתב הרמב"ם בהלכות קידוש החודש פ"ה ה׳׳א "כל מה שאמרנו מקביﬠת ר"ח וכו, אין ,עושין אותו אלא סנהדרין וכו׳. שכך נאמר למשה ולאהרן החדש הזה לכם ראש חדשים שכך הוא פירוש הדבר ﬠדות זו תהיה מסורה לכם וכל הﬠומד אחריכם במקומבם׳׳ ﬠכ"ל. ומבואר מזה דמ"החודש הזה לכם" ילפינן דקידוש החודש מסור לסנהדרין, ובﬠ׳׳כ דכבר אז היה משה במקום ﬠ"א

והנה בזה דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, ודין בית דין של ג' לא היה לו נראה בטעמא דמילתא, דהוא משום דב"ד של ﬠ"א, הוי מﬠלות, ולכן שייך ﬠ"ז הא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א קאי. אולם דין בית דין של ג' הוא הלכה בהחפצא של הבית דין דבﬠינן שיהיה בשלשה דיינין, ולכן לא שייך ﬠ"ז הא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, דבﬠינן ג' דיינין בדוקא

ולפי"ז י"ל דנהי דבית דין של ﬠ"א הוי "מﬠלות", אבל הרי בﬠינן גם שיהיה בית דין", וא"כ אף דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, אבל בﬠינן שיהיו שנים ﬠמו, כדי שיהיו" שלושה ויחול ﬠ"ז תורת "בית דין" וצ"ﬠ בזה

ואם כנים הם הדברים, א"כ יש לדחות ראית מרן זצ"ל, ממש׳׳כ הרמב׳׳ם "משה ובית דינו ﬠמו", דמש"כ הרמב"ם "ובית דינו׳׳ הכונה לﬠוד שנים ﬠמו. אכן הדין דמשה במקום ﬠ"א לא פקﬠ באמת גם אח"כ

אולם מלשון הרמבײם לא משמﬠ כן, ד'בית דינו" לכאורה הוא סנהדרין וֹכמש"כ הרמב"ם אח"כ

הגרמ"ד הלוי סאלאװײציק שליטייא

To Whom Should You Go for a Bracha

We've talked in the past about how Chazal often use the term Chacham where we expect to see the term Tzadik or Chasid.  One of the interesting examples is the Gemara in Bava Basra 116a,

דרש ר' פנחס בר חמא כל שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו ילך אצל חכם ויבקש עליו רחמים שנא' (משלי טז) חמת מלך מלאכי מות ואיש חכם יכפרנה

This is also in Yalkut Shimoni משלי רמז תתקנד

 חמת מלך מלאכי מות. דרש רבי פנחס בר חמא מי שיש לו צער או חולה בתוך ביתו ילך אצל חכם ויבקש עליו רחמים, שנאמר חמת מלך מלאכי מות ואיש חכם יכפרנה

The Rama paskens like this as well: YD 335:10, from the Nimukei Yosef there in BB.

 י"א שמי שיש לו חולה בביתו, ילך אצל חכם שבעיר שיבקש עליו רחמים 

The Nimukei Yosef inside actually seems to be a little different from the Rama.

 ומנהג זה בצרפת שכל מי שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו מבקש פני הרב התופס ישיבה שיברך אותו

and the Prashas Drachim (13) says pshat in הרב התופס ישיבה that since the Rav hatofes yeshiva is responsible for the rabbim, the zechus of the rabbim strengthens his tefilla.  So the Nimukei Yosef clearly is reading the choice of the term Chacham to be davka, meaning a Rosh Yeshiva.  But the Rama evidently does not think that matters.

So, who are Chazal sending us to?  I would have thought that the first thing would be a Tzadik, and it would be even better if the Tzadik were a Kohen as well.  But here we find we are being sent to a Chacham.

On the other hand, when the Medrash Rus 6:2 expresses this idea, it advises us to go to a Zakein or a Tzadik.  Zakein is probably synonymous with Chacham (Kiddushin 32b, אין זקן אלא מי שקנה חכמה) but Tzadik is different.

ויאמר ברוכה את לה' בתי, היטבת חסדך וגו' ר' יוחנן וריש לקיש ורבנן - רבי יוחנן אמר: לעולם אל ימנע אדם עצמו מלילך אצל זקן לברכו. בועז היה בן שמונים שנה ולא נפקד, כיון שהתפללה עליו אותה צדקת מיד נפקד. שנאמר: ותאמר נעמי ברוך הוא לה'. ריש לקיש אמר: רות בת ארבעים שנה היתה ולא נפקדה, כיון שנשאת למחלון, וכיון שהתפלל עליה אותו צדיק נפקדה. שנאמר: ויאמר ברוכה את לה' בתי. ורבנן אמרין: שניהם לא נפקדו אלא מברכותיהן של צדיקים, שנאמר: ויאמרו כל העם אשר בשער והזקנים עדים יתן ה' את האשה הבאה אל ביתך כרחל וכלאה... 

See Brachos 34b, where this was put into action by going to Reb Chanina ben Dosa for a sick child.

ת"ר מעשה שחלה בנו של ר"ג שגר שני ת"ח אצל רבי חנינא בן דוסא לבקש עליו רחמים כיון שראה אותם עלה לעלייה ובקש עליו רחמים

Following that story, the Gemara says that if you're going to ask someone to daven for you, you should look for a "Eved," not a "Sar."

מעשה ברבי חנינא בן דוסא שהלך ללמוד תורה אצל ר' יוחנן בן זכאי וחלה בנו של ריב"ז אמר לו חנינא בני בקש עליו רחמים ויחיה הניח ראשו בין ברכיו ובקש עליו רחמים וחיה אמר רבי יוחנן בן זכאי אלמלי הטיח בן זכאי את ראשו בין ברכיו כל היום כולו לא היו משגיחים עליו אמרה לו אשתו וכי חנינא גדול ממך אמר לה לאו אלא הוא דומה כעבד לפני המלך ואני דומה כשר לפני המלך

See Taanis 8a.

 ואם לחש ולא נענה מאי תקנתיה ילך אצל חסיד שבדור וירבה עליו בתפילה, שנאמר [איוב לו] ויצו עליה במפגיע, ואין פגיעה אלא תפילה שנאמר ואתה אל תתפלל בעד העם הזה ואל תשא בעדם רנה ותפילה ואל תפגע בי

 לחש ולא נענה there means that he davened and wasn't answered.  That Gemara is talking about a time of drought, which explains why it says to go to the Chasid of the generation.  This is something that endangers the entire community, not just individuals.

Eli once sent me a Medrash Seichel Tov, (authored/compiled in 1139 by R. Menahem Ben Shlomo, Italy (?),) that says:

ותלך.  לבית מדרשו של עבר: לדרוש את ה׳. לבקש רחמים על העובר, ואע׳פ שאברהם קיים, הלכה אצל זקנים ללמדך שכל המקבל  פני זקן שבדור, כאילו מקבל פני שכינה

This Medrash has two interesting ideas.  It says that there is a unique benefit from going to a Zakein, here meant literally as an elderly person.  It also indicates that the purpose of going to the Zakein is not so he should daven for you, but so that you can daven for yourself, to enhance the tefilla of the supplicant, because being in the presence of the Zakein is like being before the Shechina.

This "rationalist" approach is not unique to the Medrash Seichel Tov.  The Meiri in Bava Basra says it even more emphatically:

 ומי שיש לו צער או חולה בתוך ביתו או אחד ממיני הצרות ילך אצל חכם וילמוד הימנו דרכי התפלות ויבקש רחמים

No shortcuts, no out-sourcing!  He says that the reason you go to a Chacham is so that you can watch him and learn from him how to daven.  You can learn "Darkei HaTefillos," and then, you should apply the lessons to your own davening.  Go home and daven yourself.

 This is not like the Nimukei Yosef/Rama, who changes the girsa from ויבקש עליו רחמים, which might mean that you daven in the presence of the Chacham, consistent with the Medrash Seichel Tov that seems to be saying that Rivka was doing the davening in the presence of Shem and Eiver, to שיבקש עליו רחמים, which clearly means that the Chacham is doing the davening.

Similarly, the Ramban in Yisro on the passuk (18:15) ויאמר משה לחותנו כי יבא אלי העם לדרש אלהים says 

 השיב משה לחותנו, צריכים הם שיעמדו עלי זמן גדול מן היום כי לדברים רבים באים לפני, כי יבא אלי העם לדרוש אלהים, להתפלל על חוליהם, ולהודיעם מה שיאבד להם, כי זה יקרא דרישת אלהים.

Which is how he learns that expression by Rivka-

 דגם מה דאיתא אצל רבקה ותלך לדרוש את ה׳ היינו תפילה

So although you have a few Rishonim that learn that going to a Chacham is to enable and empower your own tefillos, most Rishonim, and the Rama in Yoreh Dei'ah, say not like that.  They learn like the Gemara kipshuto, that you go to the Chacham and ask him to daven for you or for your friend.

But that does not mean they would disregard what the Meiri says.  I think all the Rishonim would agree that there is a great benefit for a person to daven himself while in the presence of the Chacham, and to take that inspiration home and daven like that in the future as well.

As far as the variations in who one should ask for a bracha, it is possible that you go to a tzadik for a bracha (Medrash Rus) and to a chacham to be mispallel for you (Bava Basra.)  But this does not explain the Gemara in Taanis, where it says ילך אצל חסיד שבדור וירבה עליו בתפילה.  It is also possible that these Maamarei Chazal indicate that Chacham, Zakein, Chasid and Tzadik are being used synonymously.  After all, despite the unparalleled respect accorded Talmidei Chachamim, it is just hard to believe that an impious scholar has Hashem's ear.  As we mentioned above from Kiddushin 32b, the Gemara equates the terms Zakein and Chacham, reading Zaken as an acronym of Zeh Kanah Chachma, and from the passuk in Mishlei (8:22) ה' קנני ראשית דרכו, with ראשית a reference to Bereishis.  But I have to say that I've known Chachamim that were far from Tzadikim, and I've known Tzadikim that were far from Chachamim.

Reb Moshe (Igros YD 4:51) says that Chacham relates to tzidkus, and that the idea of going to a Chacham applies in our generation no less than in the time of Tannaim and Amaraim.

דלכל חכם חש השי"ת לתפילתו יותר מלסתם אינשי, וגם הוא בחזקה שיקבל השי"ת תפילתו. אך שאיכא מדרגות בין החכמים ליותר עדיפות וברירות – מצד גודל איכות חכמתו ומעשיו וכמות המעשים. וממילא פשוט וברור שהחכם שמבקש מי שהוא מישראל ממנו שיתפלל עבורו, מחוייב מכ"ש דכל אדם להתפלל עבורו, דהא יותר אפשר שיקבל השי"ת תפילתו. ופשוט שאף שר' פנחס בר חמא אמר על מי שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו, ה"ה על כל צער אחר שלא תבוא, לענין פרנסה ולזכות לבנים וכדומה, דמאי שנא, דהרי הכל תלוי בהשי"ת

.........

יש לנו לומר דגם לכל הדורות אמר זה רב פנחס בן חמא, אף שידעו חכמי הגמ׳ חכמי הדורות מתמעטין. וממילא אף שאיני מחזיק עצמי אף מחכמי הזמן, מ״מ כיון שהחולה מחזיק אותי לחכם, ובדין הוא צריד להחזיק כן, הרי הולך למקום שרב פנחס בן חמא ציוה לילך. ובזכות אמונתו בדברי חז״ל יקבל השי׳׳ת גם תפלתי וברכתי. וזהו טעם נכון ומוכרח לדינא שכל שמחזיקין אותו לחכם ובשביל זה מבקשין אותו שיתפלל ויברך, שמחוייב להתפלל עבורו ולברכו.

So the answer to the question I asked in the title of this post, who do you go to when you need a bracha, is
1. Go to a Tzadik,
2. Go to a Chacham,
3. Go to a Rosh Yeshiva,
4. Go to a Zakein,
5. Make sure they are Avadim, not Sarim.
6. Ask them to daven for you,
7. Ask them to give you a bracha.
8. While you're there, you also should daven for yourself,
9. Observe how the Chacham davens and apply those lessons to your tefillos.

Only the Ribono shel Olam knows who fills the bill, but it seems to me that if you're in Israel, you could save a lot of time and combine one through five by going to HaRav Steinman Shlitah, and if you're in the US you can go to HaRav Dovid Feinstein Shlitah.

Another lesson is that despite how proudly Misnagdim denigrate those who ask Gedolim for Brachos, the fact is that Chazal make it crystal clear that this is appropriate and helpful.  This should not become a crutch that we use to relieve ourselves of our own chiyuv of tefilla, but it is absolutely proper to go to a gadol and ask for his tefilla and bracha.

It's interesting, though, that contrary to what everyone seems to assume, Kehuna is irrelevant.  It seems that the special din and koach Kohanim to give a Bracha is exclusively in Birkas Kohanim, not a general koach of bracha.  The special din of Birkas Kohanim might apply only in very specific circumstances, and it certainly only applies to the nusach of Koh Sevarchu.  See Shaar Tziun in 128, and also see Igros Moshe OC 5:20:23 and our discussion here.  If anyone knows of a Chazal that is mashma that there is a special advantage in the bracha or tefilla of a kohen outside of Duchening, please let me know.  If you're going to see Reb Chaim Kanievsky, ask him.

Note:
I saw the following Chasam Sofer, Drashos II 356.  I find it perplexing, and I don't want to discuss it at the moment.  He's talking about Chanah going to the Mishkan to daven to have children, and he explains why she didn't ask the great Kohanim of the time to daven for her.

 ומזה הטעם בעצמו נראה מה שלא באתה חנה לפני הכהנים אשר היו בימים ההמה לבקש רחמים בעדה כראוי לכל מי שיש לו צער בתוך ביתו שילך אצל ת״ח (ב"ב קט׳׳ז.], והטעם הוא זה כי היו הכהנים החשובים סגן הכהן ומשוח מלחמה חפני ופנחס, והם לא היו כדאים להיות שלוחא דציבורא. כי די להיותם שלוחא דרחמנא ולא שלוחא דידן כידוע — וממילא יש תי׳ מספיק שלא רצתה שיתפלל עלי עליה על בנים כיון דבהאי מלתא ריע מזלא דידי׳ שבניו לא הי׳ הגונים. אין מהראוי שיתפלל הוא בעדה, ואולי עי״ז יתרע מזלה ג״כ להיות לה בן שאינו הגון ח״ו — וזה שקאמר בתחלת הפרשה ושני בני עלי חפני ופנחס כהנים לה׳ דייקא, שלא היו ראוים אלא להיות כהני ה׳ שלוחא דרחמנא לא שלוחא דידן. והיותם בני עלי ממילא מובן שגם אביהם עלי לא הי׳ ראוי לישא תפלה ורנה בעד חנה בענין זה

Additional Note:
Here is my opinion about to whom to go for a bracha.  It depends on whether you are looking for רצון יראיו יעשה,  namely, the bracha of a צדיק גוזר והקב"ה מקיים, or you are looking for ואת שועתם ישמע, namely, tefillos of a beloved servant.  If you're looking for צדיק גוזר והקב"ה מקיים, then you go to a Sar, a Rosh Yeshiva, a Talmid Chacham.  If  you're looking for תפלה לעני כי יעטוף ולפני ה' ישפוך שיחו ה' שמעה תפילתי ושוועתי אליך תבוא, if you're looking for a שם את נפשו בכפו, then you are looking for an עבד, an entirely different kind of person.

Naso, Bamidbar. The Korbanos of the Nesiim

The Medrash and the Ramban are famous - Why does the Torah repeat, twelve times,  identical lists of korbanos that each Nassi brought?  Because although each Nassi brought a set of Korbanos that was physically identical with those of his peers, every item they brought meant something unique to each individual Nassi,each item symbolized different things to the different Nesiim.  The כבש בן שנתו that Reuven's Nassi brought was meant to express a thought that was very different than the metaphorical meaning of the  כבש בן שנתו that Shimon's Nassi brought.  Although they were physically identical, the underlying motivation and intent was different, and in Korbanos, the kavana is as important as the physical form of the items.  The similarity was only superficial.

This is well known.  But very few people realize the amazing lesson about ידיעה ובחירה that is implicit in this story.

It is obvious that the identical korbanos were the right thing to bring- that they were mechavein to Hashem's will.  So that means that Hashem intended for every one of them to bring precisely קערת כסף אחת שלשים ומאה משקלה מזרק אחד כסף שבעים שקל בשקל הקדש שניהם מלאים סלת בלולה בשמן למנחה כף אחת עשרה זהב מלאה קטרת פר אחד בן בקר איל אחד כבש אחד בן שנתו לעלה שעיר עזים אחד לחטאת כג ולזבח השלמים בקר שנים אילם חמשה עתודים חמשה כבשים בני שנה חמשה.  But their decisions about what to bring were totally independent.  That means that although their ultimate choice was predestined, each individual made his decision on the basis of a lifetime of personal experience and hard-earned wisdom and spiritual achievement that informed his choice about what was the best and most appropriate korban they could offer, both as individuals and in their capacity as nasi of their shevet.

You have these twelve separate individuals, scattered all over the Machaneh Yisrael, sitting in their tents and pondering what the best and most meaningful Korban they could bring would be, and these twelve people decided, for twelve different sets of reasons, to bring exactly the same korbanos.   Visualize Nachshon ben Aminadav sitting on the east side of the Machaneh Yisrael, carefully thinking about what he should bring, and seven miles to the west is Alisha ben Amihud, thinking about the same thing, and the light bulb goes on in both tents- and ten other- that they should bring "kaf achas....." Biologists would call this convergent evolution.  In Chazal, it's reminiscent of the story in Sukkah 53a where Shlomo HaMelech quickly sent his two scribes to Luz because he heard that the Malach HaMaves was after them, and ironically it turned out that the Malach HaMaves had been told that he could only take their lives at the gate of the city of Luz.  It was Shlomo's personal choice, but what he chose was predestined and inevitable.

The Satmarer Rov takes this approach, with a slightly different perspective.  See his Divrei Yoel on this parsha, starting on page 147, paragraphs ו) ויהי ביום  and  וביארנו הענין, and then page 151 beginning from  ומעתה.  He uses it to illustrate the classic yediah/bechira idea of foreknowledge not contradicting free will because the foreknowledge is not based on an understanding of the inexorable and inevitable consequence of the facts of the present, but rather a supernatural awareness of what the future holds; he sees it as meaning that each person has innate proclivities and experiences which encourage (ensure? predetermine?) certain behaviors.

It's interesting how easy it is to overlook this powerful example of yediah u'bechira. Ironically, some of our readers will come away from this thinking that they knew it all along.  That's what the Briskers want in their Divrei Torah.  Before you know the pshat, it was impossible to see.  Once you know it, it appears to be self-evident.

 אמר רבי בנימין הכל בחזקת סומין עד שהקדוש ברוך הוא מאיר את עיניהם

UPDATE:

Thanks to a comment, I realized that this concept is commonplace.  We ask for Siyata dishmaya in psak, לאסוקי שמעתתא אליבא דהלכתא.  This is seen in many places in Chazal, such as the famous example of Rava in Gittin 77b:

אמר ליה רב עיליש לרבא מה שקנתה אשה קנה בעלה איכסיף לסוף איגלי מילתא דארוסה הואי

And in Mishlei 16:10, קסם על שפתי מלך במשפט לא ימעל, the Gaon says 

מאן מלכי רבנן ששפתותיהם כמו קסם אף שיטעו לפי השאלה, מ"מ במשפט לא ימעל פיו כלומר בדין עצמו לא יטעו כי בסוף יתגלה שלא כן היה המעשה ופסקם אמת

and the Chazon Ish (Igros I:33)

השגחתו ית' הוא בכל דור ודור על היחידים ששתלן בכל דור להורות חוקיו ומשפטיו לישראל, וכשהן מעמיקין בהלכה, הן בשעה זו כמלאכים ורוח ממרום שורה עליהן, ועל פיהן נקבעו הלכות באישות החמורה, ובשבת ובשאר הלכות חמורות

The point is that there can be siyata dishmaya to reach a true psak halacha, even though the person goes through his own reasoning, and might even be misinformed as to the facts of the case. The connection to the Nesiim is that if you think of the choice of nedavos as halacha, the fact that they came to a particular conclusion is just an example of סייעתא דשמיא  לאסוקי שמעתא אליבא דהלכתא.

I don't understand the mechanics, but this seems to be the simple explanation of the Nesiim, as the Satmarer explains.

A Novel Proposal for Tefilla B'Tzibur on Yomtov Sheini in Israel

Despite my recently ruined left knee, which has severely constrained my mobility, and even that only with the assistance of a medieval brace and a cane (as a friend said, "Welcome to the golden years",) I was in Israel for Shavuos. Going to Israel under these circumstances was not a good idea, but the alternatives were worse. I came a few days before Yomtov and left the morning after.  Basically, my time there was spent going to my parents' and the Feinsteins' kevarim on Har Hamenuchos, spending fifteen minutes at the Kosel, and laboriously gimping from Kikar Shabbat to Manny's to buy the latest A'aleh B'samar. The rest of the time I was either at my son's house in Givat Zev or in shul.  The local kids constantly asked me "למה אתה צולע" while zooming by on their bikes.

An added disorientation of the trip was doing Yomtov Sheini in Israel.  While there are minyanim for outsiders for Pesach and Sukkos, there wasn't any for Shavuos in Givat Zev.  As a chiyuv to say kaddish for my mother, this was unpleasant, but at least I could daven while they were davening and say kaddish.

If I was saying the Shemoneh Esrei of Yomtov, and the tzibbur was saying that of a weekday, was my davening tefilla betzibur?  I would say yes.  The first and last three brachos are the same, and the main thing is standing before Hashem and davening.  What you're davening doesn't make any difference, as long as we're all saying Shemoneh Esrei.  I am told that this is indeed the opinion of Rav Usher Weiss.

On the other hand, other rabbis, namely Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, hold that this is not called tefilla betzibur.  With all due respect to Rabbi Usher Weiss, whose opinion is held in high regard by many people, and despite my high estimation of my own opinion, let's assume like Reb Moshe and Reb Shlomo Zalman.

So I was left saying Shemoneh Esrei without a minyan.  Sure, I had Barchu and Kedusha and Kaddish, but I did not have tefilla betzibbur.  This bothered me, because part of the kibbud Av of Aveilus is to daven betzibbur, not just to say kaddish.

So I came up with an idea.  It is clear in OC 268 that the weekday Shemoneh Esrei is a valid option for Shabbos and Yomtov, but the Anshei Knesses HaGedola gave us a different nusach to make davening less burdensome.  On that basis, the mechaber there paskens that if one forgot it was Shabbos/Yomtov, and began Attah Chonein instead of Attah Kidashta/Yismechu/Attach Echad/Attah vechartanu, he is obligated to finish Attach Chonein with a bracha, and only then return to the Shabbos/Yomtov Shemoneh Esrei.  This extends even to the point that if you mistakenly said Barech Aleinu on Shabbos, and said Tal uMattar in the summer, you would have to repeat it.  Strange, but true.

This is based on Brachos 21a:

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל היה עומד בתפילה ונזכר שהתפלל פוסק, ואפי' באמצע ברכה. איני והאמר רב נחמן כי הוינן בי רבה בר אבוה בען מיניה, הני בני בי רב דטעו ומדכרי דחול בשבת מהו שיגמרו, ואמר לן גומרין כל אותה ברכה. הכי השתא, התם גברא בר חיובא הוא ורבנן הוא דלא אטרחוהו משום כבוד שבת, אבל הכא הא צלי ליה

So I proposed to the local Rav, Rav Yaakov Horowitz, the Rebbe of D'Zikov in Givat Zev, and a big talmid chacham, that I begin my Shmoneh Esrei with the weekday brachos, and then, after Shema Koleinu, go to Attah Bechartanu of Yomtov.

By doing so, I would be saying the same thing as the others there, and I would have Tefilla BeTzibur.

(I only made this proposal regarding Maariv, Shachris, and Mincha, but not Mussaf, because Mussaf has nothing to do with the regular weekday Shemoneh Esrei, as the Rambam says (10 Tefilla 7)

מי שטעה והתפלל של חול בשבת לא יצא. ואם נזכר והוא בתוך התפלה גומר ברכה שהתחיל בה וחוזר ומתפלל של שבת. במה דברים אמורים בערבית או בשחרית או במנחה. אבל במוסף פוסק אפילו באמצע הברכה

and the Kesef Mishna there explains

 וסובר רבינו דכיון דבמוסף לא היה בדין לצלויי י"ח ....פוסק ואפילו באמצע ברכה)

Rav Horowitz said, and I quote, "זה חשבון טוב, אבל זה לא חשבון שלך."  "It is a good analysis, but it is not your analysis to make." In other words, the logic is good.  The halacha is correct.  But I should not be fiddling with the nusach Chazal instituted.

Out of respect of the Rav, I only did this in one of the Shmoneh Esreis of the day, in Shacharis, and even then I only added Atta Chonein and Hashiveinu.  I figured that Shavuos is the day of tefilla for Hatzlacha in Limud HaTorah (see Mahrsha RH 16a, and this article in Yeshurun,) so what better brachos are there than Daas and Torah?  Then I switched back to Attah Bechartanu and finished the nusach for Yomtov.  It was a "seven-plus-two" Shemoneh Esrei.

I kind of regret not doing this all the time.  I think it's an excellent idea.  I don't believe it would be called meshaneh mimatbei'ah, I don't believe it's like saying mezonos on an apple.  If it were, then the mechaber in 268 would not say that you are obligated to finish the bracha.  Also, it's Yomtov Sheinu in Israel, for goodness sakes!  I'm not suggesting that this be done regularly, I saying that under the circumstances, it's a legitimate application of Chazal's intent.  But Rav Horowitz definitely knows more than I do, he's a professional poseik and a yarei Shamyim, and I did, after all, ask him for a psak. Also, my personal interest may have colored my opinion (along the lines of "every man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client," or "A Rebbe who is his own Chassid has a fool for a Rebbe.)  I guess that listening to him was the right thing to do.

They bring down the Shelah (Maseches Shabbos #33) that says that if this mistake happens to a person, and he has to finish the weekday bracha, he should be nervous and upset the whole week.  Someone suggested that this shows that it's not a good thing.  I say, I'm no expert on the Shelah, but a raya it's not.  The Shelah is talking about forgetting that it's Yomtov, an indifference which shows disrespect, a zilzul of the chag.  I'm talking about intentionally adding to the tefilla with full awareness that it's yomtov and the intention to say the proper Shemoneh Esrei.


I have finally decided that this depends on a machlokes between the girsa and the shitta of the Sefer haManhig/Rashi in the Pardes/the Tanchuma, and the Ohr Zarua.

The Sefer haManhig (Shabbos 11) and the Abudraham (after Mincha of Shabbos) say that when the Gemara says pshat in לא אטרחוהו that it means that it's assur to ask for your need on Shabbos because you will come to be mitz'ta'eir.
Similarly, Sefer haPardes (p 315) says assur, and this is also found in the Shibalei HaLeket (128.)
The Tanchuma is in the beginning of Vayeira, where he talks about the problem of Meitzar, which contradicts oneg and menucha.

But I believe they had a different girsa in the Gemara, and I believe that our girsa is the basis of the Ohr Zarua (Krias Shma 95) who says clearly that even though there's an issur to be shoeil tzrachim on Shabbos, that does not apply when you're using the nusach of Shmoneh Esrei that was created by the Anshei KhG.  His words:

אי לאו משום לא אטרחיה משון כבוד שבת היה נכון להתפלל כל י"ח

Bechukosai. At my grandson's Bar Mitzva

Divrei Bracha at the Bar Mitzva of Avraham Jofen, 5/14/15

I am not the Chasan Haneshef,  or his father, or the zekan hamishpacha, so there is no need for me to speak.  Nonetheless, I think it is right that I do so, not as an individual, but as a representative of my parents, zichronam livracha.   אנן שליחותייהו קא עבדינן.

The Gemara (Brachos 11b) and the rishonim there talk about the issue of hefsek in Birkas HaTorah.  There are those that hold that if a person stops learning, he has to make a new bracha when he begins again, because it is a hefsek from the first bracha.  The Sefer Ha'Agur says that it is not a hefsek, because even when you are not actually learning, you have to consider what you can and cannot do according to the dinim of the Torah.  Even when you are in a place where it is assur to learn, you have to behave as the Torah prescribes.  As the Hafla'ah says, when you do business, it is not a hefsek, because you are learning Choshen Mishpat.  Every decision you make is examined in the light of the Torah, so that is not a hefsek in limud.

I would put it this way.  Torah is only a mitzvah when you learn al me'nas la'asos.  Al me'nas la'asos means that you don't learn superficially, you make the Torah a part of who you are.  On the contrary, if what you learn is just on the surface, the learning itself is bitul Torah.  If the Mitzva of limud hatorah requires that it should make you into a different person, do you think that carefully living the life of an ehrilcheh ben Torah is a hefsek in limud hatorah?  It's not a hefsek, it is a hemshech, it is a kiyum, of the mitzvah of limud hatorah.

My father Ztz'l had a lawyer,  William Rosenthal.  Bill was Jewish, but completely assimilated.  His only contact with Judaism was when he shook hands with my father.  Nonetheless, he and my father were good friends and respected each other.  After my father put a lawyer for a mortgage company through the wringer, the poor guy asked Bill which law school my father studied at, because he was amazed at my father's brilliant analysis of the contract.  Bill, who knew my father's background, told him that my father had studied at Slabodka U.

He once asked my father, "You and I are very ethical and honest men.  I adhere to the highest standards of behavior in business, and I wouldn't take a penny that wasn't mine.  You, too, are a man of the highest moral standards, but you behave that way because of your religious beliefs.  Is there really any difference between us?  

My father told him, on the spot, that there are three differences.  One is that for you, a dollar is a small matter, and a question involving a million dollars is a big matter. To me, there is no difference.  The principal, the law, is what matters, and the sum of money is irrelevant.  Another difference is that let's say you carefully think an issue through, and you decide the other side is right, and you are going to let them win.  The night before you tell them what you decided, you are going to toss and turn, thinking that maybe you really are right.  I, on the other hand, if I decide that I am right, and I am going to keep something I am entitled to, I won't be able to sleep at night out of a concern that maybe, God forbid, my view has been clouded by self interest.  The third difference is that while you and I are both successful people,, and we've both made a lot of money, you think that you made the money yourself, and it's 100% yours to do with as you please.  I believe that God decided that I should have the money, and every dollar was given to me so that I use it in the right way.

I thought that my father's answer showed his Ge'onus.  My son, Harav Mordechai, Rosh Kollel Hora'ah of Marlboro, suggested that the real significance of the story might be even greater.   My father answered as he did not because he was a genius, but because he really had these things in mind throughout his life.  For him, it was like being asked how he tied his shoelaces- this was an every-day part of his life.

In other words, I thought my father's immediate answer proved his Ge'onus. But in truth, it proves my father's Gadlus.

So Bill was right.  My father did learn how to do business at Slabodka U. Because he spent thirteen years yomam valailah learning how to do business at Slabodka U, he was able to give, on the spot, three excellent and lomdisheh chilukim about the difference between Bill Rosenthal's moral code and his own moral code.  Doing business like that  is not a hefsek in the mitzva of limud hatorah.  Farkert, it is the biggest kiyum and chizuk of limud hatorah and mussar.

This kind of life is a kiyum of the passuk אם בחקותי תלכו.  As Rashi explains,

אם בחקתי תלכו. יכול זה קיום המצות, כשהוא אומר ואת מצותי תשמרו, הרי קיום המצות אמור, הא מה אני מקים אם בחקתי תלכו, שתהיו עמלים בתורה:

ואת מצותי תשמרו. הוו עמלים בתורה על מנת לשמור ולקים, כמו שנאמר (דברים ה א) ולמדתם אתם ושמרתם לעשותם:

 If a person is a true ameil batorah, he eats like a Ben Torah, he drinks like a Ben Torah, he dresses like a Ben Torah, he does business like a Ben Torah, he mows the lawn like a Ben Torah, he even sleeps like a Ben Torah.   Ameilus BaTorah should make you into a person whose every action says "I am a Ben Torah."

It is this mesora which we bequeath to the Bar Mitzvah.  Yehi ratzon that Hashem be mekayeim on you the passuk in Yeshaya (59:21)

רוחי אשר עליך ודברי אשר שמתי בפיך לא ימושו מפיך ומפי זרעך ומפי זרע זרעך אמר ה' מעתה ועד עולם

_____________________

I recently realized that my father's distinction between a secular humanist and one who follows the mitzvos of the Torah is a restatement of Tosfos Kiddushin 31a about the advantage of Metzuveh ve'Oseh.  

גדול המצווה ועושה - נראה דהיינו טעמא דמי שמצווה ועושה עדיף לפי שדואג ומצטער יותר פן יעבור

_____________________

What follows is obviously inappropriate for a bar mitzvah, but it highlights the point that we made here.  
Brachos 62a:

תניא: אמר רבי עקיבא: פעם אחת נכנסתי אחר רבי יהושע לבית הכסא  ולמדתי ממנו שלשה דברים:
למדתי שאין נפנין מזרח ומערב אלא צפון ודרום
ולמדתי שאין נפרעין מעומד אלא מיושב
ולמדתי שאין מקנחין בימין אלא בשמאל
אמר ליה בן עזאי: עד כאן העזת פניך ברבך
אמר ליה: תורה היא וללמוד אני צריך
תניא: בן עזאי אומר: פעם אחת נכנסתי אחר רבי עקיבא לבית הכסא, ולמדתי ממנו שלשה דברים
למדתי שאין נפנין מזרח ומערב אלא צפון ודרום, ולמדתי שאין נפרעין מעומד אלא מיושב, ולמדתי שאין מקנחין בימין אלא בשמאל; אמר לו ר' יהודה: עד כאן העזת פניך ברבך
אמר לו: תורה היא וללמוד אני צריך.
רב כהנא על, גנא תותיה פורייה דרב, שמעיה דשח ושחק ועשה צרכיו
אמר ליה: דמי פומיה דאבא כדלא שריף תבשילא
אמר ליה: כהנא, הכא את! פוק, דלאו אורח ארעא
אמר לו: תורה היא וללמוד אני צריך.

Shavuos. A good pshat in the Gemara in Avoda Zara

Avodah Zarah 2b.  The Gemara begins with a prophetic description of the reaction of the nations when Klal Yisrael is rewarded for keeping the Torah.  They argue that had they been "chosen" at Har Sinai, they would have faithfully kept the mitzvos.  Hashem responds that He offered the Torah to all the nations before it was given to Klal Yisrael, and it was their choice to decline.

אומרים לפניו רבש"ע כלום נתת לנו ולא קיבלנוה ומי מצי למימר הכי והכתי' ויאמר ה' מסיני בא וזרח משעיר למו וכתיב אלוה מתימן יבוא וגו' מאי בעי בשעיר ומאי בעי בפארן א"ר יוחנן מלמד שהחזירה הקב"ה על כל אומה ולשון ולא קבלוה עד שבא אצל ישראל וקבלוה אלא הכי אמרי כלום קיבלנוה ולא קיימנוה ועל דא תברתהון אמאי לא קבלתוה אלא כך אומרים לפניו רבש"ע כלום כפית עלינו הר כגיגית ולא קבלנוה כמו שעשית לישראל דכתיב ויתיצבו בתחתית ההר ואמר רב דימי בר חמא מלמד שכפה הקב"ה הר כגיגית על ישראל ואמר להם אם אתם מקבלין את התורה מוטב ואם לאו שם תהא קבורתכם מיד אומר להם הקב"ה הראשונות ישמיעונו שנא' וראשונות ישמיענו שבע מצות שקיבלתם היכן קיימתם ומנלן דלא קיימום דתני רב יוסף עמד וימודד ארץ ראה ויתר גוים מאי ראה ראה ז' מצות שקבלו עליהן בני נח ולא קיימום כיון שלא קיימום עמד והתירן להן איתגורי איתגור א"כ מצינו חוטא נשכר אמר מר בריה דרבינא לומרלומר שאף על פי שמקיימין אותן אין מקבלין עליהם שכר ולא והתניא היה רבי מאיר אומר מנין שאפילו עובד כוכבים ועוסק בתורה שהוא ככהן גדול תלמוד לומר אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם כהנים לוים וישראלים לא נאמר אלא האדם הא למדת שאפילו עובד כוכבים ועוסק בתורה הרי הוא ככהן גדול אלא לומר לך שאין מקבלין עליהם שכר כמצווה ועושה אלא כמי שאינו מצווה ועושה דאמר ר' חנינא גדול המצווה ועושה יותר משאינו מצווה ועושה 

The Mishneh leMelech in Prashas Drachim asks what he calls a Pliyah nisgava.

כלום כפית עלינו הר כגיגית ולא קבלנוה כמו שעשית לישראל כו', מיד אומר להם הקב"ה שבע מצות שקבלתם היכן קיימתם כו', אשר הפליאה נשגבה אם כן מתחלה מאי קסבר למה בא אליהם ליתן להם התורה, אמנם דע כי לתת בכפיה אין זה נתינה אבל הכפיה אשר כפה את ישראל לא היה אונס, כמ"ש הרמב"ם ז"ל  ((ב' גירושין כ', הובאו דבריו בתוס' יו"ט פרק ט' משנה ח' דגיטין) בטעם גט המעושה בישראל כשר, כי הוא אנוס מדעתו הרעה, ואחר כי לעשות כל המצות הוא רוצה, רק יצרו תוקפו שלא לגרש, וכיון שהוכה עד שתשש יצרו, ואמר רוצה אני כבר גרש לרצונו , עכ״ל . וא״כ הדבר בהיפך, מה שהיה מהצורך לכופו זה היה אונס כמאמר יצרו אנסו, אבל תכלית נפש הישראלי ורצונו להתדבק מאד במצות רק היה לו הזדמנות אונס היצר, וזה אונס, עיכ לישראל כפה ההר כגיגית לדחות אונס היצר, ובא אונס כפיית ההר ודחה אונס היצר, ונשאר בנפשם הרצון הטבעיי מחפץ הלב והנפש, לא כן ישמעאל ושעיר המה מיאנו לא באונס, רק בעבור (תהלים נ״מ) זורו רשעים מרחם, א״כ מה זו טענה כלום כפית עלינו ההר, הלא שבע מצות שקבלתם היכן קיימתם , ואם כן רחוקים אתם בעצם ומה יועיל הכפיה,. והענין נכבד לנבון רוח

He's saying that they were already not doing even the sheva mitzvos before Mattan Torah.  But the Ribono shel Olam gave them a second chance, and offered the Torah to them.  They declined.  Later, Le'asid lavo, they are going to complain, "Yes, we declined.  But You should have forced us to accept it with Kafa aleihem, like you did for the Jews! If You had threatened to kill us on the spot if we didn't accept, we would have been wonderfully motivated!"  To that, Hashem responds that Kabalas HaTorah is only shayach with ratzon, with nichusa, and they are not even in the parsha of the Rambam's Kefiyah.  That idea that Kefiyah results in ratzon only applies to Klal Yisrael.

It's great, but he assumes that the Rambam's din applied even before Mattan Torah, which I would not have thought to be the case.  Also, it does not shtim with the Gemara in Shabbos 88a. 

ויתיצבו בתחתית ההר, אמר רב אבדימי בר חמא בר חסא: מלמד שכפה הקדוש ברוך הוא עליהם את ההר כגיגית, ואמר להם: אם אתם מקבלים התורה-מוטב, ואם לאו – שם תהא קבורתכם. אמר רב אחא בר יעקב: מכאן מודעא רבה לאורייתא. מלמד שהתנה הקב"ה עם מעשה בראשית ואמר להם אם ישראל מקבלים התורה אתם מתקיימין ואם לאו אני מחזיר אתכם לתוהו ובוהו". אמר רבא: אף על פי כן, הדור קבלוה בימי אחשורוש. דכתיב (אסתר ט) קיימו וקבלו היהודים, קיימו מה שקיבלו כבר

According to the Prashas Drachim, it wouldn't be a moda'ah.

Both of my tainos are easy to answer simply.  Which reminds us of what H L Mencken said, "For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong."

I stumbled upon one person that asks on the Rambam from the Gemara in Shabbos, the Maharash Danon brought in the Ohel Yosef there in hilchos Gittin.  He says that "the Chachmei Kushta" (Istanbul=Constantinople=Kushta) answer as I did.  He disagrees, (ironically, based on something the Prashas Drachim says elsewhere, when he could have brought this Prashas Drachim that clearly contradicts it,) and says another teretz, but I don't understand it.

ושמעתי מקשים מפה קדוש מהר"ש דאנון נר"ו שא"כ היכי קאמר בפר"ע מלמד שכפה עליהם ההר כגגית א"ר מכאן מודעא רבה לאורייתא שלפי דברי הרמב"ם אין כאן מודעא שאע"פ שמתחילה היה ע"י אונס מ"מ בשעת הקבלה גמרו וקבלו מלב ומנפש ואמר לי שחכמי קושט' יע"ה ניח' להו לתרץ שקוד' קבל' לא היו אז ישר' וק' לי דקודם קבלת התורה כבר קבלו עליהם כמה מצות כגון שבת ופרה ודינים במרה הופקדו וכ"כ בעל עשרה מאמרות בחיקור דין ח"ג פי"ג דישר' שפרשו קודם מ"ת ללכת בדרכי ישראל היה להם דין ישר' ע"כ וכ"ש למ"ד דאבות העולם יצאו מכלל בני נח אפי' להקל כמו שהאריך למעניתם הר"ב פרשת דרכים ז"ל בד"א יע"ש והכא נמי דכתיב קודם מתן תורה בשירת הים ויאמינו בה' ובמשה עבדו שודאי היו נוהגים ללכת בדרכי ישראל. אם כן הדרא קושיא לדוכתיה אודעא זו מה עושה ובדברי הרמב"ם הנ"ל הוא היה אומר מהר"ש דאנון הנ"ל מ"ש מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה רוצה לומר מתוך שכופין לאדם לעשות מצוה והוא עושה שלא לשמה מתחילה אבל בגמר המצוה גמר ועושה אותה לשמה ודוק