Ki Seitzei: Irony

Chazal tell us that an object that kills a man must be buried. It should be buried near its victim, but the essential point is that the item must be buried. 

For example, Sanhedrin 45b

אחת אבן שנסקל בה ואחת עץ שנתלה עליו ואחד סייף שנהרג בו ואחד סודר שנחנק בו כולן נקברין עמו 

(Regarding individuals executed by the Sanhedrin.) "All - the boulder with which he was stoned, the gallows on which he was hanged, the sword with which he was killed, the strip of cloth with which he was choked - all of them are to be buried with him."
Rashi

כולם נקברים עמו - מקבור תקברנו יתירא נפקא לן לקמן בפירקא (דף מו:):

(It's not as clear on 46b, so I brought it from 45b.


Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, in the Teshuvos in back of his sefer on Bamidbar, talks about a person who purchased a gun that had been used to kill a Jew, and the question was whether it must be buried.  He says that the halacha we are discussing here would apply only to the bullet, but not to the gun, and therefore the gun does not have to be buried.

(I haven't gone through the sugya recently, but I don't understand why, if this is true, the Gemara would say that the gallows require kevura, since it was not the instrument of his death.  The court never executes anyone on the gallows.  Only after the person was executed by other means was his body hanged for a moment.  Evidently, it's enough that the gallows was part of his death sentence, even if not used to cause his death; if the gallows has to be buried, how much more so should a gun be buried!)

But that is not the focus of this post.  What I found interesting was the contrast between Rav Zilberstein's psak and something I saw on Quora.  Quora is a website where people pose questions, others propose answers, and the answers are ranked by popular vote- what they call up-votes.

The question posed was

Which individual gun been used to claim the most human lives? What is its story?

The most "up-voted" answer, with seventy two thousand views, was offered by one Samuel Lim.

Oh boy, Ive been waiting for this one. I have a weapon with a not so illustrious history of service. The one-and-only...

Number 19074 Model 10 Browning FN

Images courtesy of: Browning FN Model 1910: The first shots of WWI

I can't even begin to do you justice by describing the kill count of this little peashooter, but suffice it to say that it is responsible for EVERY MILITARY CASUALTY OF THE 20th CENTURY PAST 1914.
Yup. A bit sensationalist of me? No, this was the firearm that Gavrilo Princip used to gun down the Austrian Archduke, starting the chain of events that culminated not only in the Great War, but also the Second World War. Who knows how the 20th century would have played out if this gun had jammed? We will never know.

So on the one hand you have Harav Zilberstein, saying that the din that the instrument of a man's death must be buried is limited to the bullet, and does not apply to the gun. On the other hand, you have Mr. Lim's observation that the weapon responsible for more deaths than any other weapon was this pistol. It's sort of ironic, in that the lamdan focuses on the naked physical fact, while Mr. Lim sees a deeper truth. How do you like that illustration of the difference between people-logic and Halacha-logic.


I am not, chalila, criticizing R Zilberstein's psak. We define "cause" contextually. In Bava Kamma, this point is hammered in countless times in the sugyos of Gramma and Garmin and the difference between liability in a court here on Earth and liability in a Heavenly court. Another example- when the daughters of Yisro told their father that Ish Mitzri, an Egyptian man, saved us from the other shepherds, it has been said that this was true. Moshe was not an Egyptian, but he was on the run from the Egyptian police for having killed the Egyptian man who attacked a Jew, so ultimately, it was the Egyptian that set in motion the chain of events that brought Moshe to Yisro.  But perhaps Mr. Lim's response should help us to realize that even if the din of  קבור תקברנו technically does not apply to a gun, the horrors it set in motion make it so repugnant as to be unworthy of continued existence.

If this were to be on a Parsha, it belongs in Ki Seitzei, Devarim 21:23, on  כי קבר תקברנו.

Here's the relevant part of Rav Zilberstein's teshuva.

תשובה קנ"ז

נאמר בקול מבשר ח"א סי' ﬠ"ח שחבל תליה שהנאצים ימש"ו תלו עליו יהודים קדושים הי"ד, אסור בהנאה וחייב קבורה ןזאת ﬠפ"י השאילת יﬠב"ץ ח"ב סימן קנ"ח שכתב לענין השאלה שהביא בלה"פ ליו"ד סי" ח' שאיש אחד קנה סייף מאת התליין הממונה להרוג מחויבי מיתה וﬠשה ממנו סכין של שחיטה. וכתב היּﬠב"ץ שיש לחוש בזה משום איסורי הנאה שכך בהרוגי בי"ד שנו חכמים סייף שנהרג בו נקבר ﬠמן ביחוד אם דן בו ישראל ואﬠ"ג דשלא כדין הרגו פשיטא דיש לחוש. ﬠ"כ.

.....

ובע"ז ס"ב: כתב רשי'י בד"'ה כולם נקברין ﬠמו דהע והאבן והסייף והסודר אסורים בהנאה וזאת כוונת היﬠב"ץ. ואף שהלכה זו נאמרה בהרוגי בי"ד מ"מ כיון שמפורש בסנהדרין מ"ו: ולא זו בלבד אמרו אלא כל המלין מתו ﬠובר בלא תעשה ובגמ' שם דריש ליה מרבוי דלאו דוקא בהרוגי בי"ד אלא גם כל שאר מתים יש בהם מ"ע ול"ת דלא תלין יﬠוי"ש

........

ובנוגע לאקדח, לא הוא הורג כי אם הכדור שיש בו אבק שריפה והברזל הוא ההורג והאקדח רק מצית את האבק, ודופק עליו, ומפﬠילו, אבל הוא ﬠצמו אינו משמש כלי מות, ולכן אין חיוב לקוברו

There's also a line attributed to Reb Yehuda HaChasid to this effect-

סכין או חרב שנהרג בו יהודי אסור ליהנות ממנו כי סכנה גדולה הוא לכל בני ביתו ולכל אשר יהנו ממנו, אך יקברוהו עם הנהרג.

And finally, it is important to know that although Rashi says this is a drasha, the Rambam (15 Sanhedrin 9) says that this halacha of burying the gallows is only to prevent his memory from being shamed.  It is a chesed for the man that was killed, not a drasha from a passuk.  If so, the rule only applies where keeping the object might result in disgrace for the person who was killed with it. Obviously, the Yaavetz held like Rashi.

Pinchas. Relying on Miracles when Miracles Occur Reliably

Parshas Pinchas is a parsha of miracles. The Gemara in Brachos 56b says that one who sees Pinchas in a dream, wonders will be wrought for him.

הרואה פינחס בחלום פלא נעשה לו

Rashi- because numerous miracles occurred when Pinchas attacked Zimri.

פלא נעשה לו. כמו שנעשה לפינחס כדאמרינן בסנהדרין (דף פב.)

The miracles are enumerated there in Sanhedrin. 


The Gemara in Brachos goes on to say that if one sees the written name Huna, or Yochanan, in a dream, miracles will happen to him, and Rashi says it is because of the presence of the letter nun.

הרואה הונא בחלום נס נעשה לו חנינא חנניא יוחנן נסי נסים נעשו לו

Rashi-

נס נעשה לו. נו"ן כנגד נו"ן וכגון שראה השם כתוב: חנינא. נוני"ן הרבה נסים רבים

We have a rule called of Ein Somchin, which means one cannot rely on miracles- אין סומכין על הנס. As the Gemara in Shabbos 32a explains, Even with the best intentions, one cannot assume a miracle will happen. Also, if it does, it is not necessarily a good thing, because experiencing a miracle often means it was paid for by a withdrawal from mitzva reward account.  

ר' ינאי לטעמיה דאמר לעולם אל יעמוד אדם במקום סכנה לומר שעושין לו נס שמא אין עושין לו נס ואם עושין לו נס מנכין לו מזכיותיו

So here is the question. What if a miracle occurs regularly in a particular place. Can one rely on it? For example: we have a rule that one may not interrupt Shemoneh Esrei even if a snake wraps itself around one's leg, but if a scorpion approaches, one may run away.  A snake is unlikely to bother you if it is not threatened, and the seriousness of standing in prayer before Hashem outweighs the risk of a painful injury, but a.scorpion is a nasty and aggressive creature that is very likely to sting. 

But what if you were in Yerushalayim at a time that, as the Mishna in Avos 5:5 says, neither snake nor scorpion ever injured anyone. What if a scorpion crawls onto your foot during Shemone Esrei.  Can you run away from it, because we don't rely on miracles, אין סומכין על הנס, or do we say that  in Yerushalayim, where scorpions were miraculously rendered harmless, you just continue to daven?

עשרה נסים נעשו לאבותינו בבית המקדש:

לא הפילה אשה מריח בשר הקדש,

ולא הסריח בשר הקדשיז מעולם,

ולא נראה זבוב בבית המטבחים,

ולא ארע קרי לכהן גדול ביום הכפורים,

ולא כבו גשמים אש של עצי המערכה,

ולא נצחה הרוח את עמוד העשן,

ולא נמצא פסול בעמר ובשתי הלחם ובלחם הפנים,

עומדים צפופים ומשתחוים רוחים,

ולא הזיק נחש ועקרב בירושלים מעולם,

ולא אמר אדם לחברו צר לי המקום שאלין בירושלים.

I suppose the initial response to this question would be that a reliable and predictable miracle is not a miracle at all. I do not believe that is correct. My definition of a miracle is something that is not caused by the laws of nature. True, we don't know all the laws of nature, but if something only occurs in one place, or only to one person, or only when people behave in a certain way, then it's not generated by teva, by the laws of nature. If it's above teva, then it's a miracle. It will soon become clear that this is this definition is the one accepted in Chazal, so let us put aside our initial response.

It turns out that this is a machlokes Abaya and Rava, possibly the Bavli and Yerushalmi.

In Pesachim 64b, the Gemara says that we want the sacrificial service of the Korban Pesach done in three separate shifts. Do you lock the doors between groups to ensure it's not finished in two shifts, or do you rely on the fact that the doors always locked themselves?  Abaya says, you rely on the doors to handle the problem miraculously. Rava says, you can't rely on miracles.

 נכנסה כת ראשונה וכו': איתמר אביי אמר ננעלו תנן רבא אמר נועלין תנן מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו למסמך אניסא אביי אמר ננעלו תנן כמה דעיילו מעלו וסמכינן אניסא רבא אמר נועלין תנן ולא סמכינן אניסא 

Additionally, we find the Gemara in Shekalim 17b says that there were marble tables in the Mikdash upon which limbs of the koranos were placed temporarily, or the Lechem for the Shulchan in the Beis HaMikdash was placed until it was brought in to the golden table. Why marble? Because placing it on silver might cause it to spoil- even though neither the limbs (see MIshna Avos above) nor the bread ever spoiled. The Gemara asks, not only did the bread never spoil, but it miraculously remained steaming hot and fresh for eight days! The Gemara answers - we don't rely on miracles.

Also, the Yerushalmi in Yoma 1:4 asks, why did they keep the Kohen Gadol a little hungry before Yom Kippur and awake all night if it never ever happened that a Kohen Gadol was unexpectedly disqualified (as mentioned in the Mishna in Avos above?)  Why worry about something that never happened! The Yerushalmi answers that the invariable purity was a miracle, and, as the Korban HaEidah explains, you can't rely on miracles.

The point is that Rava in the Bavli, the Yerushalmi in Shekalm and Yoma, all say that even if a miracle is as constant as the rising of the sun, we are not allowed to rely on it.  Even where it is a constant and unvarying reality that a certain miracle will take place- and, it seems, neither svara of שמא אין עושין לו נס ואם עושין לו נס מנכין לו מזכיותיו would apply- still they hold that אין סומכין על הנס.  We, humans, are obligated to behave in a manner that assumes that the laws of nature will pertain, even though we know that they will not. Abaya holds that you can rely on the miracle in such cases.


UPDATE:
When I first posted this, the connection to the Parsha was trivial, but I put it here because I couldn't find anywhere else to put it, and it's interesting, especially in that it opens a window into the lomdus of ein somchin.  But then.....
Wow, it's good to have talmidei chachamim reading this. Harav Yehuda Oppenheimer (Mazel tov on the upcoming bar mitzvah!) reminded us of the Gemara (BB119a) about the Bnos Tzelafchad- in this week's parsha- who miraculously bore children even though they delayed marriage until they were past forty years old.  The Rashbam says that they relied on a miracle happening for them because they knew they were tzidkaniyos (as we find by Reb Chanina ben Dosa.)

צדקניות הן - שלא נישאו אלא להגון להן. תני: רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אפילו קטנה שבהן לא נשאת פחותה מארבעים שנה. איני? והא אמר רב חסדא: ניסת פחותה מבת עשרים יולדת עד ששים, בת עשרים יולדת עד ארבעים, בת ארבעים שוב אינה יולדת. אלא מתוך שצדקניות הן נעשה להן נס כיוכבד דכתיב (שמות ב, א) "וילך איש מבית לוי ויקח את בת לוי"

Rashbam-

לא נישאת פחותה מארבעים - שהיו מצפות להגון להן:

שוב אינה יולדת - ואם נתעכבו עד ארבעים שנה לא היה אדם נושא אותן והן נמי לא היה להן להתעכב עד ארבעים שנה מאחר שלא ילדו עוד:

ומשני מתוך שצדקניות היו - בטוחות בצדקתן שיעשה להם נס כיוכבד ולכך נתעכבו עד ארבעים שנה בשביל להנשא להגון כיוכבד שילדה אחר ארבעים ומיהו נישואיה איכא למימר דהיו קודם ארבעים:

So, as Rav Oppenheimer points out, we see that if there is good reason to expect a miracle, there's nothing wrong with relying on it.  As I said, this opens up a whole sugya of what the lomdus is of אין סומכין על הנס.

His words:

I have the following chakira. You've proven that according to the Yerushlami(s) and Rava in the Bavli (like whom the Rambam paskens), one may not rely on a nes even though it's been happening consistently for a long time. So: Is that because of A) the metzius. (You don't know for sure that it will occur again this time since sof kol sof it's a nes) or B) a din. (Even if it will happen again you are still over on the Issur of relying on a nes "lo senasu es Hashem"). The nafka minah would be how to understand the Rishonim who say that big Tzaddikm who are certain in their Zechuyos may rely on a nes such as Rabi Chanina ben Dosa, Bnos Tzlafchad, Avrohom Avinu, etc. If it's a metziyus then you can say that tzaddikim have a bigger guarantee than merely the fact that this nes has been happenning for so long. But if it's a din then it's tzarich iyun. 

 On the topic of people who did rely on nissim, see Taanis 21a on Nachum Ish Gamzu, who told his talmidim to keep his bed in the house because his presence would miraculously prevent it from collapsing- כל זמן שאני בבית אין הבית נופל. The Maharsha asks from ein somchin and answers that the problem of ein somchin is the possibility of a small hidden sin, and Nachum Ish Gamzu knew that he was a tzadik gamur- אבל נחום היה מחשיב עצמו לצדיק גמור.  The Gevuras Ari and Yad Dovid say that even a tzadik gamur can only rely on nissim in cases of Sheiv al Taaseh, which explains the Bnos Tzelafchad but not Reb Chanina ben Dosa.

And since we've gotten this far, here's the Sdei Chemed in Cheilek 7 under the Klal of Ein Somchin (page 464a)

כדי להציל רבים שלא יהיו ניזוקין מותר להכניס עצמו לסמוך על הנס וכעובדא דר' חנינא בן דוסא בברכות דף ל"ג ע"א דסומך על הנס והלך לחורו של ערוד 
וכן בשב ואל תעשה מותר לסמוך על הנס והיינו דבנות צלפחד סמכו על הנס ולא נשאו עד שהיו בנות ארבעים דשוב אינן יולדות כדאמרינן בבבא בתרא סוף ד' קי"ט מה שאין כן לעשות מעשה לילך במקום הנס אסור 
וכתב שבספר יוסף אברהם פרשת פינחס ד' ק אין אצלי חלק זה האריך בזה 
ולכאורה יש להוכיח דלעמוד בשב ואל תעשה שפיר דמי מעובדא דנחום איש גם זו בתענית דף כ"א ע"א פעם אחת היתה מטתו מונחת בבית רעוע בקשו תלמידיו לפנות מטתו ואחר כך לפנות את הכלים אמר להם בני פינו את הכלים ואחר כך מטתי שמובטח לכם כל זמן שאני בבית אין הבית נופל פינו את הכלים ואחר כך מטתו ונפל הבית והיינו בשב ואל תעשה 
ויש לדחות דשאני התם שהיה סמוך וכעין זה אמרו בזהר הקדוש ריש פרשת וישלח דף קס"ו סוף ע"ת על פסוק וישלח יעקב מלאכים ובההיא דנקדימון בן גוריון בתענית ד' י"ט ע"ב שהבטיח להאדון על הגשמים לפי שהיה בטוח בזכות השנים עשר שבטים וכמו שכתב הגאון מוהרש"א שם שוב ראית שהרב יד דוד שם כתב בההיא דנחום משום שכבר היה שם ועמד בשב ואל תעשה  

Bilaam and Aesthetics

It's an admittedly subjective evaluation.  Ironically, of all the poetry in the Torah - Parshas Vayechi, Beshalach, Haazinu, Vezos HaBracha - the one that strikes me with the most power, the most beauty, is the poetry of Bilaam. Reading, hearing the words, evokes an unmatched pleasure. I don't know whether it is the sound, the meter, or the meaning, but it is extraordinary.

Many people have responded that Bilaam was not the author of these lines, he was nothing more than a conduit for the words of Hashem.  Unlike other nevi'im, the words he enunciated were stripped of all personal influence. When other neviim said Shira, it stemmed from their holy enthusiasm and passion, but Bilaam's shira was not a refinement of his words, it was totally extrinsic. One might say that the shira of other neviim, even that of Moshe Rabbeinu, was yeish mi'yeish, but the "shira of Bilaam" was yeish mei'ayin.

I respond to them that this is clearly not the case, as shown in Rashi.  Rashi brings Reb Yochanan from Sanhedrin 105b, that מברכתו של אותו רשע אתה למד מה היה בלבו - from Bilaam's words, we can see what curses he was trying to enunciate, but his words were forced to come out as brachos. Clearly, the words we see were influenced by and filtered through the instrument called Bilaam.

For a long time, I worried that perhaps my feeling arose from some kind of spiritual kinship, a harmony between Bilaam and me.  Hoping that this is not the case, I have, for years, wondered why Bilaam words are uniquely beautiful.

This year, Dr. Meir Zahtz pointed out to me that there is another case that is remarkably similar. I was relieved beyond words- it's not just me and Bilaam, Chazal say the same thing about Nevuchadnetzar.  Sanhedrin 92b:

 תנו רבנן בשעה שהפיל נבוכדנצר הרשע את חנניה מישאל ועזריה לכבשן האש אמר לו הקב"ה ליחזקאל לך והחייה מתים בבקעת דורא כיון שהחייה אותן באו עצמות וטפחו לו לאותו רשע על פניו אמר מה טיבן של אלו אמרו לו חבריהן של אלו מחיה מתים בבקעת דורא פתח ואמר (דניאל ג, לג) אתוהי כמה רברבין ותמהוהי כמה תקיפין מלכותיה מלכות עלם ושלטניה עם דר ודר וגו' א"ר יצחק יוצק זהב רותח לתוך פיו של אותו רשע שאילמלא (לא) בא מלאך וסטרו על פיו ביקש לגנות כל שירות ותושבחות שאמר דוד בספר תהלים

Rashi-

פתח ואמר - להקב"ה אתוהי כמה רברבין פסוק הוא (דניאל נ):

יוצק זהב רותח - משום דקא מיירי בשבחו דנבוכדנצר נקיט נמי לישנא מעליא ולשון קללה:

סטרו - הכהו מאחורי ידו:

לגנות - שהיה מסדר שבחות נאות יותר מדוד ואילו אמרן הקב"ה היה נוטה אחריהן יותר מאחרי השירות שעשה דוד:

When Nevuchadnetzar saw Shadrach, Mishak, and Abednego saved from the furnace, and he saw Yechezkel's resurrection of the dry bones in the Valley of Dura, he was moved to sing praise to Hashem.  An angel immediately silenced him with a backhanded slap across the face.  Had he not been silenced, his songs of praise would have shamed all the songs of David in Tehillim.

These were murderous and wicked men.  They were directly responsible for horrible suffering and innumerable deaths, and they were unspeakably depraved. Why were their songs so beautiful?

I think that Freud (Jenseits des Lustprinzips, 1920,) might have intuited a truth when he asserted that the artistic creation of beauty is an expression of the Id, it is at best a sublimation of a visceral drive for the satisfaction of animalistic desire. Beyond that, he adds, it can be a mechanism of self-consolation for the occasional frustration of those desires, for the times one could not satisfy his lust.

Of course, beauty can be created by Tzadikim, but I think that the discipline and re-direction of those impulses takes off the edge. Shlomo HaMelech and the Kalir and ibn Gabirol and Reb Yehuda HaLevi were truly lovesick for the Ribono shel Olam, and that love flows through their words, but it's not the same.  Bilaam and Nebuchadnezzar, their visceral, carnal,  even bestial lust was never denied, it was ferociously inflamed in every possible way. When they said Shira, it was the paragon of Shira.  There's a reason that Wagner's so good. There's a reason why Schubert's trill is so mesmerizing. And there's a reason why they played the merry Rosamunde (the polka, not Schubert,) and the sentimental Blue Danube at Majdanek and Auschwitz during death marches and slaughter.


Please note: I didn't say this teretz because I saw Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle." I said it myself, and then realized that Freud says something very similar. Why, then, do I mention (as my wife describes him,) that discredited sheigitz? Only because both my question and certainly my answer are easy to dismiss, and I wanted to demonstrate that I'm not just talking out of my hat.

Also: A certain individual, by nature somewhat disposed to negation, suggested that I shouldn't be bringing proof that Balaam was an incomparable lyricist from, and I quote, "A PARSHA WHERE A !#%$% DONKEY TALKS, FOR CRYING OUT LOUD!!!!!!" My response is, "Thank you for your elegantly stated and well tempered criticism, but please note that the Gemara in Sanhedrin cited by Dr. Zahtz supports my position."

Also: Rabbi Dr. NJS of Maaleh Adumim tells me the following:

10 days ago in my shiur [ we're a week ahead] i suggested that perhaps the meaning of משה כתב את ספרו וכו is what bekhor shor and rashbam meant when they say that moshe CHOSE THE WORDING of the torah not that it was literally dictated letter by letter

After picking myself up off of the floor, I was reminded of how the Malbim, in his introduction to Yirmiahu, castigates the Abarbanel for saying that the beginning of Yirmiahu was written in a different style and with less clarity than the end because it was written when the Navi was young and inexperienced. Man, what would the Malbim say about the Bechor Shor and the Rashbam!  Probably that they are forgeries.

But אחרי ככלות הכל, the fact remains that we have several places in Chazal that indicate that Bilaam's personality and intent do come out in his words, and it is on that I base this post.


UPDATE, JULY 2017.

When I said this over Friday night, one of our guests said an excellent pshat in the unparalleled shira of Nebuchadnezzar and of Bilaam. 

The pshat is that it was davka because these people were such horrible resha'im, and they suddenly recognized the Gadlus and Tzidkus and Hashgacha Pratis of the Ribono shel Olam that their Shira was so extraordinary, something along the lines of (Brachos 34b) דא"ר אבהו מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדין צדיקים גמורים אינם עומדין, like the difference between someone that has been working outside all day and a person suddenly waking up to bright sunshine.

This is from Reb Howie Borenstein's Rebbitzen, Mrs. Shari Borenstein. I don't know if there's a din of besheim omro here, and some people won't take it seriously because the person who said it doesn't have a long beard, but as long as you saw the vort before you found out who said it, it can't hurt to tell you whose it is. 



UPDATE, JUNE 2018

Speaking of Shari Borenstein: My wife and I finally cleared up something we've "discussed" for forty years. My wife says that the pronunciation of Shari and Sherry, of berry, Barry, and bury, of merry and Marry and Mary, are totally different. When she pronounces the difference, I simply can not even hear any difference. We found out, thanks to linguistic sites on the web, that in England the difference is pronounced, as it is in the Northeast of the US, but as  you go south and west, they words merge. More interesting, the common denominator is that the vowels at issue precede the letter R, and apparently, differences in pronunciation of the R lie at the root of the distinct dialects. I spoke to Shari, who is from Baltimore, and she said that there's some difference between them, but it's mild, unlike Malkie, who said they're completely different, and me, who finally can hear the difference but pronounces them all the same. And now you know. 

Anniversary of the Maaseh Merkava

ויהי בשלשים שנה, ברביעי בחמשה לחדש, ואני בתוך-הגולה, על-נהר-כבר; נפתחו, השמים, ואראה, מראות אלהים. בחמשה לחדש

Today is the anniversary of Yechezkel's vision, and it is a good time to repeat something Reb Moshe said about the meaning of what he saw.

One of the things Yechezkel saw was the Ofanim.

וּמַעֲשֵׂיהֶם כַּאֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה הָאוֹפַן בְּתוֹךְ הָאוֹפָן.

Reb Moshe said that although we do not understand the Maaseh Merkava, the image of אופן בתוך האופן is one of a gear. When we look at the things that take place in this world, we are perplexed by the apparent movement against what we are taught is Hashem's will, against justice and yashrus. But that is the nature of a gear- the direct result of an action is movement in the opposite direction; counterclockwise rotation is converted to clockwise rotation. Sometimes, what appears to be a very small movement is multiplied and generates tremendous change, far greater than was initially apparent. And what appears to be endless and pointless rotation produces forward movement.

(A coincidence involving Hashkafa and gears that change the direction of force- Reb Yisrael Salanter had a son, Lipmann Lipkin, b. 1846, d. of smallpox in 1876. Too bad they didn't have effective inoculations then. He received his Ph.D in Mathematics from Jena University, his dissertation titled "Ueber die Räumlichen Strophoiden." He first became known in the mathematical world through his mechanical device for the change of rotational into linear motion, this mechanism having been invented by him while he was still a pupil at the technical high school. He described his invention in the journal of the Russian Academy ("Mélanges Mathématiques de l'Académie Impériale à St. Petersbourg," 1870), under the title "Ueber eine Gelenkgeradeführung von L. Lipkin." The Russian mathematician Chebyshev had tried to show that an exact solution was impossible; and his views were accepted until Lipkin's discovery proved the contrary. This invention has been described in numerous text-books, such as Collignon's "Traité de Mécanique, Cinématique" (Paris, 1873), where it is called "Lipkin's Parallelogram."

A model of Lipkin's invention was exhibited at the exposition at Vienna in 1873, and was later secured from the inventor by the Museum of the Institute of Engineers of Ways of Communication, St. Petersburg.

And here it is.

Shlach. Tzitzis for Women

Last week, at our Kiddush, a friend recounted an interesting experience. He had been on one of his long walks in the forest preserve, and he saw two women on the path. They were dressed in tzniyusdikkeh old-fashioned-Orthodox garb. He was surprised to see that one of them was not only wearing tzitzis, and not only were the strings worn outside her clothes, but that she also had techeiles in her tzitzis.
It was ironic, he said, because, in consideration of the heat and humidity, he himself had left both long pants and tzitzis at home.

His story led perfectly in to our Torah discussion at the Kiddush, because Parshas Shelach ends with the parshah of Tzitzis.  Coincidentally, the local Kollel had printed a discussion by a dear friend and colleague on that very topic. I am reproducing the article here 

After the article, I bring sources, some of which were cited in the article, with comments and interpretation.

Our discussion will follow the sources section.

Women and Tzitzis 

Rabbi Henoch Plotnik 

-Rabbi Plotnik, an alumnus of Chicago Community Kollel, is a Ra'm at Yeshivas Meor HaTorah and Mora d'Asra of Bais Tefila in Chicago. 

The Gemara in Menachos (43a) teaches us that women are exempt from the mitzvah of tzitzis due to its status as a time-dependent mitzvah (z'man grama). This mitzvah is time-bound since only an article of clothing worn by day is obli-gated in tzitzis, as derived from the pasuk "u're'isem oso" in this week's parshah. Additionally, the well-known words of the Targum Yonasan ben Uziel include women wearing tzitzis and tefillin under the prohibition of "lo yilbash," forbidding a woman from wearing men's clothing. As a general rule, even some-one who is exempt from a mitzvah can certainly perform it vol-untarily, provided that there are no other prohibitions involved. In fact, the halachah for Ashkenazim follows the opinion of the Rishonim (Rabbeinu Tam) that women are even allowed to make a brachah when performing a "z'man grama" despite the implication of the word "v'tzivanu" ("and He commanded us"). Those that follow Sephardic custom may not recite the brachah as per their tradition, following the opinion of the R"i.

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 17) paskens that women are indeed peturos from tzitzis; the Rema adds that as is the case for other z'man grama mitzvos, they have the option to put on tzitzis and make a brachah. It should be noted that the Rema is only discussing a feminine article of clothing; wearing distinctively mate attire would certainly violate "to yilbash" (R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l in Shulchan Shlomo 3:18). The Rema adds that a woman should not wear tzitzis because it is "michzi k'yuhara" - an activity perceived as haughty and arrogant. Traditionally, women have never worn tzitzis; breaking with that long-standing conduct of bnos Yisroel since time immemorial is viewed as yuhara, hardly a commendable virtue. Furthermore, the Rema comments that since the mitzvah of tzitzis is not a "chovas gavra" (meaning, even men are not technically obligated to seek out a four-cornered article to obligate themselves in tzitzis if they don't own one, unlike tefillin where the observance is imperative), women should not put themselves in a position where they would need to wear tzitzis. (However, the minhag haolam is for us [men] to go out of our way and acquire clothing that is obligated in tzitzis.) The Bi'ur Halachah (190) adds that since the Gemara makes no mention of women per-forming this mitzvah, they should always refrain from making a brachah even in the event that they do wear them. He makes the same point concerning mitzvas shofar. 

In 1976, when women's "equality" movements were sweeping across the country, Rav Moshe Feinstein wrote a teshuvah (O.C. 4, #49) addressing the issues that were coming to the fore, one of which was the subject of women wearing talleisim. After explaining how Hashem in His ultimate wisdom exempted wom-en from mitzvos aseh shehaz'man grama and that Chazal neither encouraged nor mandated their observance, Rav Moshe writes unequivocally that even if "times have changed," the Torah has not. Those waging war against its tenets and principles and demanding "equality" are guilty chas v'shalom of very serious prohibitions. Although women were certainly given license to voluntarily perform those mitzvos, their true motivation must be the desire to fulfill the mitzvah, and not to make political or aggressive statements. If undermining Hashem's Torah is the underlying reason for their actions, their position is akin to kefirah, believing that the Torah needs to be changed. A woman is no less capable of achieving kedushah than a man but for reasons known only to the Giver of the Torah, women were given different mitzvos to perform. Being chosen for an alter-native role in mitzvah performance should not be per-ceived as a slight to their honor. 

Interestingly, the Maharil (the basis for many of the customs mentioned by the Rema) was asked why he didn't protest against a certain woman who consistently wore a tallis katan. His response was that he was concerned that she may not heed his words "and better she should remain a shogeig and not a meizid." Clearly the Maharil held this practice was something that fundamentally needed to be rectified. In fact, in that same teshuvah (37, chadoshos) he refers to such women as "hedyotos," a term reserved for those who are actually simpletons and misguided despite their apparent good deeds. 

The Aruch Hashulchan as well writes concerning women and tzitzis, "We do not allow this, such is the custom, and it should not be changed." It would also seem that any contemporary woman who dons what is recognizable as a classic men's tallis would be in violation of "lo yilbash" as quoted above from R' Shlomo Zalman. 

As far as tefillin are concerned, the Rema strongly condemns the practice of women wearing them; as the com-mentaries explain, since tefillin require extra attention to "guf naki," they are best worn only by those who are absolutely obligated to do so. The Gemara does record that one woman, Michal bas Shaul, wore tefillin (Eruvin 96a). The Kaf Hachaim writes that she was a lone excep-tion, as she possessed the neshamah of a man as well as other unique considerations. The common perception that Rashi's daughers wore tefillin has no reliable source and therefore need not be investigated. (For an exhaustive treatment of this popular myth, see article by Dr. Ari Zivi-tovsky available through the OU and their website.) 

In conclusion, neither social upheaval nor modern influence should ever encourage or cause us to waiver from true Toras Imecha, our badge of pride and honor since matan Torah. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky zt"l explained that the reason minhagei Yisrael are termed Toras Imecha is because just as a mother instinctively senses what her child needs, Klal Yisrael has developed and maintained those customs we instinctively know we need in order to perpetuate the kedushah and sense of mission we are privileged to transmit. Observing what we have always done in the past, will guide us in how to proceed in the future. 


OC 17 2

נשים ועבדים פטורים מפני שהיא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא.

הגה: ומכל מקום אם רוצים לעטפו ולברך עליו הרשות בידו כמו בשאר מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא (תוספות והרא"ש והר"ן פרק ב' דראש השנה ופרק קמא דקדושין) אך מחזי כיוהרא ולכן אין להן ללבוש ציצית הואיל ואינו חובת גברא (אגור סימן כ"ז) פירוש אינו חייב לקנות לו טלית כדי שיתחייב בציצית ולקמן בסימן י"ט אמר כשיש לו טלית מארבע כנפות (ולבשו).

The Agur quoting the Maharil as brought by the Rama

 ונשאל מהר״י מולן והשיב דנשים הלובשות ציצית שטות הוא ומחזי כיוהרא. ואחת היתה בשכונתינו שהיתר. לובשת 

ציצית

The Maharil in our version of the Maharil

 אמהרי"ל במקום שיש איש יודע לתקן ציציות אל תתקנם האשה ואמר דלא נהירא בעיניו מה שיש נשים מכניסות עצמן לחיוב ציצית ושאלו לו מפני מה אינו מוחה ביד הרבנית (מ' ברונ"א) בעירו שהינחה בכל עת טלית קטן והשיב שמא אינה מקשבת לי ועל כה"ג אמר מוטב יהו שוגגין ואל יהו מזידין 

Taz

(ג) הואיל ואינו חובת גברא — בזה מתורץ למה מברכות הנשים על לולב, דהוא גם כן מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא. ותירץ, שאני הכא שאינו חובת גברא, שאפילו איש אין עליו חיוב דאורייתא לקנות טלית בת ד' כנפים, אלא אם מתעטף חייב לעשות ציצית; מה שאין כן לולב, דגבי איש הוא חובת גברא שהוא חובת הגוף:

Mishna Berura 

(ה) ואינו חובת גברא — בזה מתרץ למה מברכות הנשים על לולב דהוא ג"כ מ"ע שהזמ"ג ותירץ שאני התם שאינו חובת גברא שאפילו איש אין עליו חיוב דאורייתא לקנות טלית בת ד' כנפות אלא אם מתעטף חייב לעשות בו ציצית משא"כ לולב דגבי איש הוא חובת גברא שהוא חובת הגוף. ודע דאנן פסקינן גבי ציצית חובת גברא ולאו ח"ג ותרוייהו לקולא חובת גברא לקולא למעוטי חובת מנא שכל זמן שאינו לובש הטלית אע"פ שיש לו ד' כנפות פטורה מציצית לאו חובת גברא שאינו חייב לקנות לו טלית כדי שיתחייב בציצית רק אם יש לו טלית מד' כנפות ולובשו אז חייב בציצית עיין סי' י"ט:

Kaf HaChaim

(ה) שם בהגה: אך מחזי כיוהרא ולכן אין להן ללבוש ציצית וכו' — ועוד יש חשש איסור משום לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה. לבוש סעיף ב'. ובדברי האר"י ז"ל בשכר הכוונות שהבאנו לשונו לעיל סימן ט"ז אות ב' מפורש שאין הנשים שייכות במצוה זו, יעויין שם. וכן כתב בן איש חי פרשת לך לך אות י"ג. ועיין לקמן סימן לח אות ט:

(ו) שם בהגה: הואיל ואינו חובת גברא — פירוש, שאינו חייב ליקח לעצמו טלית, כמו שכתוב ריש סימן כ"ד. מגן אברהם ס"ק ב. וכן כתב הט"ז ס"ק ג. מאמר מרדכי אות א'. ומה שכתב בשולחן ערוך סימן יט סעיף א: ציצית חובת גברא הוא, בא לאפוקי ממאן דאמר כלי קופסא חייבין בציצית, כמו שכתב הט"ז שם ס"ק א. אבל לא בא לומר ליקח לעצמו טלית שאינו חייב, כמו שכתוב סימן כד. ומה שקרא אותו חובת גברא, לפי שאם בא ללבוש בגד בת ד' כנפות חייב להטיל בה ציצית, כמבואר בסימן י"ט טור ובית יוסף:

ומזה נתבאר לנו דציצית חובת גברא, ולא חובת גברא, ותרווייהו לקולא. חובת גברא לקולא, למעוטי כלי קופסא, שכל זמן שאינו לובש הטלית, אף על פי שיש לו ד' כנפות פטורה מן הציצית, וכמו שכתוב בסימן י"ט. ולא חובת גברא, שאינו חייב לקנות לו טלית כדי שיתחייב בציצית, רק אם יש לו טלית בת ד' כנפות ורוצה ללובשו חייב להטיל בו ציצית, וכמו שכתוב בסימן כ"ד טור ושולחן ערוך. ועיין מה שנכתוב שם על סימן כד סעיף א בסייעתא דשמיא:

Aruch HaShulchan

....גם בציצית לכאורה יכולות להתעטף ולברך.

ג

אבל באמת לא שמענו זה. ואין מניחין אותן ללבוש טלית, וכל שכן לברך. ואינו דומה לשופר וסוכה ולולב דהוי פעם אחת בשנה והמצוה כרגע, אבל ציצית מצוותה כל השנה ולא נאה לנשים. ועוד: דכל המצות הם חובה לאנשים, ולכן יכולות גם הן לעשות כן. אבל ציצית אינו חובה כמו שכתבתי בסימן י"ט, ואיך נניח לנשים לעשותה? וזהו כוונת רבינו הרמ"א שכתב: ומכל מקום אם רוצות... אך מיחזי כיוהרא. ולכן אין להן ללבוש ציצית, הואיל ואינו חובת גברא. עד כאן לשונו, כלומר: דמיחזי כיוהרא כיון שהיא תמידית, וגם כיון שאינו לחובה לאיש אלא כשיש לו בגד של ארבע כנפות. ולכן אין מניחים לנהוג מצוה זו. וכן המנהג ואין לשנות.

ד

It is worth emphasizing one thing the Aruch HaShulchan says: that Tzitzis is different than other Zman Grammas in that it is constant. He says that this constancy is a good reason for women to not wear them.  What does he mean by this? He means that if a woman takes a lulav or hears shofar, she is a woman that is doing mitzvos like a man.  If a woman were to wear tzitzis every day, the halachic distinction between men and women, the firm standard of the ptur of zman gramma, would be attenuated. Speculatively, I would suggest that this is what the Targum Yonasan (Devarim 22:5) means when he says on Lo Yilbash לא יהיה גוליין דציצית ותפילין דאינון תיקוני גבר על איתתא. It's hard to understand why a simple daled kanfos would be a beged ish.  Maybe this is what he means.

Igros Moshe

 אגרות משה או"ח ח"ד סי' מט בעניין פטור נשים ממצוות עשה שהזמ"ג

איברא דאיכא רשות לכל אשה לקיים אף המצות שלא חייבתן תורה ויש להם מצוה ושכר על קיום מצות אלו וגם לשיטת התוס׳ רשאות גם לברך על המצות וכמנהגנו שמקיימות מצות שופר ולולב וגם מברכות שא״כ  גם על ציצית שייך לאשה שתרצה ללבוש בגד שיהיה בצורה אחרת מבגדי אנשים אבל יהיה בד׳ כנפות ולהטיל בו ציצית ולקיים מצוה זו. ורק להניח תפילין כתבו התוס' עירובין דף צ״ו ע״א ד״ה מיכל דצריך למחות בידן משום דתפילין צריך זריזות מרובה בגוף נקי ובהיסח הדעת שמטעם זו אף אנשים שמחוייבין בתפילין נמנעין מלהניחם כל היום אלא רק זמן המועט דתפלה בשחרית, וכן איפסק ברמ״א או״ח סימן ל״ח סעי׳ גי, ובתרגום יונתן על קרא דלא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה איתא לא יהי גוליין דציצית ותפילין דהינון תיקוני גבר על איתא לא סבירא להו לתוס׳ זה, ופשוט שהתוס׳ סברי שאינו מתרגום יונתן. אבל פשוט שהוא רק בחשקה נפשה לקיים מצות אף כשלא נצטותה, אבל מכיון שאינו לכוונה זו אלא מצד תורעמותה על השי״ת ועל תורתו אין זה מעשה מצוה כלל אלא אדרבה מעשה איסור שהאיסור דכפירה שחושבת דשייך שיהיה איזה חלוף בדיני התורה היא עושית גם במעשה שחמיר.

To Reb Moshe's teshuva, I would like to add a reference to the Meiri in Sotah 22b:, who says that tzitzis are sometimes used in the service of hypocritical dissimulation, to which he applies the passuk "ויציצו כל פועלי און"

In light of the Aruch HaShulchan's reason for opposing women wearing tzitzis, you recognize the special attraction tzitzis has for women that want to break down the mitzva distinction between men and women.

Yalkut Yosef from R Yitzchak Yosef on the Kitzur

ו נשים פטורות ממצות ציצית, ככל מצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא. ואף על פי שבשופר וסוכה ולולב אם רצו הנשים לקיימן רשאיות, ובלבד שלא תברכנה על המצוה, [למנהג הספרדים ועדות המזרח], ואין בזה משום כל הפטור מן הדבר ועושהו נקרא הדיוט, מכל מקום במצות ציצית אין להן לחייב את עצמן ולהתעטף בציצית, אפילו בלי ברכה, דמיחזי כיוהרא. ויש אומרים שיש בזה גם חשש משום לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, ואף על פי שהעיקר לדינא שאין בזה האיסור הנז' מכל מקום ראוי למונען מזה, ובפרט בזמן הזה כאשר הרפורמים מנהיגים כן בקהילותיהם. [ילקו''י שם עמוד שכג. ושאר''י ח''א עמוד רס]. 

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As an aside, it is important to mention that there are women that are obligated to wear tzitzis. We have written about this before.   Most of the people who read this are not members of that group.  Additionally, I am told that among some Chasidisheh groups, the Rebbe's wife puts on tzitzis and tefillin. This is probably a myth, but I don't care if it's true or not. I'm discussing Torah from Sinai.

I am unaware of even one poseik that mentions the idea of women wearing tzitzis with approval.  On the contrary- it is absolutely clear that the poskim disapproved of women wearing tzitzis. That, however, might be a cultural artifact, and therefore mutable if necessary. Therefore, while remaining aware of the historical and cultural opposition of all recorded poskim, we will limit our discussion to strictly halachic issues. 

...

1.  Let me share my biggest problem with this sugya.  I think that unlike other zman gramas, and even according to Rebbeinu Tam, a woman's bracha on Tzitzis is a bracha levatala. The mitzva of tzitzis is a two step process. If the beged is chayav, you put tzitzis in. If the person is chayav, you get a mitzva for wearing it. But if the beged is not chayav in the first place, it does not become a cheftza shel mitzva. Only a man's ownership of a beged creates the chiyuv to put in tzitzis before wearing that beged. I think that since a woman is not chayeves, her beged is not chayav, and she cannot create the cheftza of tzitzis by putting strings into a beged that is not chayav.

This has nothing to do with Rabbeinu Tam/Ri as brought in OC 14 whether women can put tzitzis into a beged. I'm talking about their beged being in the parsha of tztizis at all. Nobody is mattir tzitzis that were put into a beged before it was owned by a Jew, because it is not in the parsha of a beged of chiyuv (and later it would be min he'asui.) I say the same is true by a beged owned by a woman. As far as I can tell, the only beged that would be kosher would be one that is either owned by a man at the time of putting it together, or owned by a man who intends to sell it to a man. 

Therefore, the only beged that a woman could make a bracha on would be a beged into which tzitzis were placed while it was owned by a man.

It is possible that this is what the Maharil meant.  Although the Rama does not identify this as a problem, I believe that is because he is talking about Tzitzis that a women purchased or was given by a man who owned it when it was made and made it for a man.  But if it was made while the beged belonged to a women, it is passuuuul and it's a bracha l'vatala.

2.  We are machmir lechatchila like the Maharam that בני ישראל ועשו להם ציצית is darshened to mean that women cannot put the tzitzis into the beged, and that only a man can do so. According to the Maharam, a woman making a bracha on a woman-made beged would be making a bracha levatala. Also, people should know that if they're relying on Rabbeinu Tam's opinion in making a bracha on tzitzis, their Rabbeinu Tam would not allow them to make a bracha on tzitzis fashioned by a woman, on the basis of כל שישנו בקשירה ישנו בכתיבה (Gittin 45b.) To do so would be a bracha levatala.They would have to use tzitzis made by a man. Women making a bracha on tzitzis are using Rabbeinu Tam when it suits them and disregarding him when it does not.  

In any case, according to the Maharam and Rabbeinu Tam, the only tzitzis a woman could make a bracha on are where the tzitzis were inserted into the beged by a man.

As I said at the end of #1, I do agree that if a woman would walk into Eichlers and buy a pair of Tzitzis, that she could make a bracha on them.  

Someone (R'D'NJS of M'A) said the following:  

there is no halachic construct to say  that one can not be motzi oneself his / her own mitzva
even if you say women are peturot from tzitzit and therefor their beged [1] or tieing [2] is invalid, it is invalid for men but not for herselfi think that is axiomatic . [ and dont start with havdala and megilla please ] 
I responded to him that while in my heart I know he's right, I am too much of a technician to allow my mind to accept it.  Furthermore, I have to say that his teretz is somewhat demeaning to the concept of Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh.

However: we have to think about the Gemara in Hasfina about Rav Chanina ben Dosa's wife.  This is something Rabbeinu Tam has to deal with, too, but I don't recall if anyone discusses it. The Gemara in BB 74b says

דדביתהו דר"ח בן דוסא דעתידה דשדיא תכלתא בה לצדיקי לעלמא דאתי  

3. It's peculiar that a woman would wear Tzitzis out, when the inevitable result is to draw attention to one's clothing. I think this is what most surprised my friend in the forest preserve. Considering that in Chazal tzitzis are thought of as a means of reinforcing modesty, it's somewhat strange to use them in a fashion that has the opposite effect. On the other hand, the term "modesty" is malleable enough to support whatever thesis one wishes. Even so, my wife, whose insight into women's motivations is more reliable than mine, vehemently stated that any woman that wears her tzitzis out wants to be looked at- for her, the mitzva of tzitzis is וראיתם אותה, not for וראיתם אותו. Poor tzitzis..... .

Behaaloscha, Bamidbar 8:7. Shaving the Leviim

Here is what Rav Sternbuch says on Rashi in our passuk.  I understand the lesson he is teaching.  He's saying we should all be Novardokers- שלא יתפעלו מבזיונות.  I'm just surprised at the Drush-license he takes with the din of Metzora, and I do not see how he can seriously offer this as an interpretation of Reb Moshe haDarshan.

והעבירו תער על כל בשרם (ח , ז)

פירש רש"י מצאתי בדברי רבי משה הדרשן לפי שנתנו כפרה על הבכורות שעבדו ע"ז והיא קרויה זבחי מתים והמצורע קרוי מת הזקיקם תגלחת כמצורעים.

קשה בדברי רש"י שלדעתו הבכורות שעבדו ע "ז הם שצריכים תגלחת ולא הלויים, וכן לא מצינו כלל שעובדי ע"ז מתגלחים. 

ונראה מטעמי מצות גילוח אצל מצורע הוא , דכיון שדיבר לשון הרע בקשה תורה להרחיקו מבני אדם אל מחוץ למחנה ויתגלח, שיהא משונה משאר בני אדם עד שיהיו דוחים אותו מפני מראהו , ומעתה שנתרחק מבני אדם ירגיל עצמו לרסן דיבוריו ולא יכשל בלשון הרע .

ונראה שטעם זה גם הוא אצל בני לוי שיגלחו שערות ראשם ויראו שונים ונבדלים מיתר בני העם להיות קודש לעבודת ה' , והיינו שלא יתפעלו מבזיונות אלא ידעו שהם צבא ה' , ולעם נראים כמצורעים , וכן בני תורה בימינו כשבט לוי נבדלים מן העם , והתבדלות זו - כתגלחת הלויים , היינו לחזק בלומדי התורה עובדת היותם שונים ונתבעים לשחות נגד הזרם השקפות תעתועים , ונגד זרם ההנהגות החמרניות, ולהם קובע דעת תורה לבד, אף שאחרים מסתכלים עליהם בבוז כמצורעים , ואשרי חלקם שזכו להתקרב לאלקינו ית"ש , וזהו הטעם ששבט לוי גילחו כמצורע שיהיו מוכנים גם לכך .

Only twice in the Torah we find that one has to shave his entire body - a Metzora during his re-entry to society, and the Leviim during their initial inauguration. What is the connection?

Bechoros did avoda zara, 

Avoda Zara ≈ meisim, 

Meisim ≈ Metzora, 

Metzora is shaved, 
Leviim ≈ Bechoros, 

Therefore, the Leviim had to be shaved.  

Rav Moshe haDarshan's drush is interesting.   It would be nice if you could, but you can't make a shaliach for penance. For vidui, maybe. For Tshuvas HaMishkal or redemptive affliction - nope.  So we need to understand what Rav Moshe haDarshan has in mind.  But what does Rav Sternbuch mean?  Since when does a metzora do taglachas in order to distance him from people?  The Metzora doesn't shave his hair during his expulsion.  On the contrary, he has to let his hair grow long for the term of his expulsion - his hair has to be paru'ah.  Only after he has completed the first stages of his Tahara process and he is allowed to come home, only then does he shave his hair. At that point, he is being integrated, not isolated. How can you say that taglachas metzora is intended to reinforce his isolation? 

Maybe he means that davka when he is allowed to rejoin society, his penitential lesson of isolation has to be reinforced. The first step is isolation through expulsion.  The second step is isolation while being surrounded by others who enjoy the benefits of each other's company.  If that is what he means it needs editing. Instead of saying

  בקשה תורה להרחיקו מבני אדם אל מחוץ למחנה ויתגלח, שיהא משונה משאר בני אדם עד שיהיו דוחים אותו מפני מראהו 

he should have said 

אחרי שהותר לבוא בקהל הצריכו תורה לגלח כדי שיהא משונה עד שיהיו דוחים אותו מפני מראהו  ומעתה שנתרחק מבני אדם ירגיל עצמו לרסן דיבוריו ולא יכשל בלשון הרע

In any case, it doesn't really matter what Rav Sternbuch meant to say. I think this is a decent pshat in Reb Moshe haDarshan.