Monday, November 2, 2015

Chayei Sarah, Bereishis 23:2. Issues of Contributory Negligence, Hesped, Pikuach Nefesh, and Chillul Shabbos in Suicide

This post has been re-written several times in the last five years, with the help of readers and friends. The original version was titled "No Hesped for Smokers."  Nothing we've written , is intended to be a smug deprecation of bad life-choices that other people make.  I smoked for more than thirty years, and although I stopped years ago, I certainly haven't done teshuva. 


23:2.  ולבכותה  Avraham mourned Sara, but the letter Kof in "ve'livkosa" is written small in the Sefer Torah.  The Baal Haturim quotes a Braisa in Maseches Smachos that states that a person that causes his own death is not to be eulogized.  This is not to say that there is no obligation of mourning; the Baal Haturim paskens that there is an obligation to mourn, but there are no eulogies, as taught in the Braisa in Smachos 2:1, as follows:


המאבד את עצמו בדעת - אין מתעסקין עמו בכל דבר. רבי ישמעאל אומר: קורין עליו 'הוי נשלחה, הוי נשלה'. אמר לו רבי עקיבא: הנח לו בסתמו. אל תברכהו ואל תקללהו. 
אין קורעין ואין חולצין ואין מספידין עליו, אבל עומדין עליו בשורה, ואומרין עליו ברכת אבלים, מפני שהוא כבוד לחיים. כללו של דבר: כל שהוא לכבוד החיים, הרבים מתעסקין בו; וכל שאינו לכבוד החיים, אין הרבים מתעסקין בו. 
איזהו מאבד את עצמו בדעת? לא שעלה לראש האילן ונפל ומת, ולא לראש הגג ונפל ומת, אלא זה שאמר: 'הריני עולה לראש האילן או לראש הגג, ואפיל עצמי ואמות', וראוהו שעלה לראש האילן, ונפל ומת, או לראש הגג, ונפל ומת - הרי זה בחזקת המאבד את עצמו בדעת. וכל המאבד את עצמו בדעת, אין מתעסקין בו בכל דבר. 
מצאוהו חנוק ותלוי באילן, הרוג ומושלך על גבי הסייף - הרי הוא בחזקת מאבד עצמו שלא לדעת. וכל המאבד עצמו שלא לדעת, אין מונעין הימנו כל דבר. 
ומעשה בבנו של גורגיוס שברח מבית הספר, והראה לו אביו באזנו, ונתיירא מאביו, והלך ואיבד עצמו בבור. ושאלו לרבי טרפון, ואמר: אין מונעין הימנו כל דבר. 

The Baal HaTurim then quotes the Gemara (Bava Kamma 93a and Rosh Hashannah 16b) that a person who asks Hashem to judge someone else is closely scrutinized under Middas Hadin and might die as a result.  That Gemara derives this from Sara's death here in our parsha:


אמר רב חנן המוסר דין על חבירו הוא נענש תחילה שנאמר (בראשית טז) ותאמר שרי אל אברם חמסי עליך וכתיב (בראשית כג) ויבא אברהם לספוד לשרה ולבכותה

Sarah invoked Hashems' judgment upon Avraham Avinu, and this invocation of Middas Hadin resulted in her own death.  


Combining the Gemara that Sara "precipitated" her own death with the Braisa in Smachos that one who ends his own life is not eulogized, the Baal Haturim says that this is why Avraham did not say a hesped for her.  Now, Sara did not commit suicide.  But, he says, what she did contributed to her death, and that is reason enough to not eulogize.  In the words of the Baal Haturim:


 ולבכתה. כ''ף קטנה שלא בכה אלא מעט לפי שזקנה היתה א''נ שהיתה כמו גורמת מיתתה שמסרה דין ועל כן נענשה היא תחלה והמאבד עצמו לדעת אין מספידין אותו

This is most likely intended as drush, and not as a source of halacha.  But the concept would seem to apply to anyone whose behavior contributed to their death even if the death was not the desired or intended result.  If so, if someone knowingly engages in unnecessary risky behavior (that is not דרך כל הארץ), such as one who is very obese due to overeating or inactivity, or a person that smokes excessively, or people who do freediving, BASE jumping, and pole vaulting (you wouldn't believe how dangerous pole vaulting is) -  may the Good Lord preserve them all, but if רחמנא ליצלן, the Good Lord does not preserve them, one might cite the Baal Haturim as proof that one should not eulogize them.  I'm pretty sure that nobody is going to change his behavior for fear of not getting a nice hesped, and acute depressive disorder might remove some of the halachic stigma of suicide (Aruch Hashulchan YD 345:5- 
כללו של דבר במאבד עצמו לדעת׳ תלינן בכל איזה תלייה כל שהוא׳ כגון לתלות ביראה או בצער, או שיצא מדעתו, או שסבור היה שזה מצוה לבלי להכשל בעברות אחרות וכיוצא באלו הדברים מפני שזהו דבר רחוק שאדם יעשה נבלה כזו בדעת  צלולה), 
but if you want an excuse to not go the hespeidim, now you have one.

Coincidentally, I recently got a phone call from a young person seeking counsel.  The caller's friend's parent recently died of a heart attack.  Unfortunately, the niftar, feeling abdominal and chest discomfort, sought the counsel of a holistic healer, who told him some nonsense along the lines of gluten or artificial food coloring.  Eventually, the person realized the pain was just getting worse and worse, and finally went to the hospital, but was too late, and the person died in the emergency room of a heart attack.  The friend said that perhaps the parent would still be alive had he/she gone to a physician instead of a mountebank.  I told the young person to tell the friend that a person dies when fated to die, and not to blame the parent. Unfortunately, this is just something to tell the aveil to comfort them, but it's not true.  Going to a herbal healer for chest pain is akin to closing your eyes and walking across Ocean Parkway, and that decision definitely contributed to the tragic outcome.  Of course, in life, one is often convinced of irrational things, as we know that Rav Shmuel Kaminetsky is an anti-vaxxer, and everyone knows that he is a learned and highly intelligent man.  So it is really not fair to say that it was the parent's foolishness.  It was just a bad decision.  But a bad decision it was, and it certainly contributed to the ultimate outcome.


Again, I want to stress that the Baal Haturim probably did not mean this lehalacha.  And even if he did, the halacha is not like him.  The Rama in 345:2 brings (from מהרי"ו סימן קי"ד) that unless it was inescapably clear that death would follow, a foolhardy risk taker is not called a suicide for these purposes:

מי שגנב וגזל ועל ידי זה נהרג בדין מלכות מתאבלים עליו אם אין בו סכנה מפני אימת המלכות ולא מקרי מאבד לדעת
The Shach explains that one should not think that his knowing taking of a risk means that he has a din of a suicide, because he believed that he would get away with it.  So it is clear that unless the person who engages in my list above knows that he is likely to die and is indifferent to that death, he would not be categorized as a suicide for matters of Aveilus.

The Baal Haturim  himself was very machmir on this concept.  We see this in the Baal Haturim in Brieshis 9:5, where he says that the passuk ואך את דמכם לנפשתיכם אדרש, the source of the issur of suicide, means that it is even assur to curse yourself.  He says כמו שאסור להרוג עצמו כך אסור לקלל עצמו והוא ואך את דמכם לנפשותיכם ואך את הדבר שאפילו הדבור אדרוש.  So you see how far he takes this issur, and why he would say that even the indirect and indefinite effect of Sarah's words might fall under this issur.


Let's think about this concept.  Why is there a din that one does not eulogize a suicide?

1.  Is it because of the gravity of the sin, the affront to the will of the Ribono shel Olam, in which case there are other sins for which a person would be similarly punished by silent funeral?
2.  Or is it specific to suicide; If the person chose to die, he doesn't deserve to be mourned or honored by being spoken well of at the time of that death.

The reason I ask is because if it is because of the gravity of the sin, I find it hard to equate outright suicide with recklessness.  I can't imagine that any sort of negligence or recklessness would be viewed with the same severity as specific intent to end one's life.   If it is because of choosing to die, it's still hard to equate our case with outright suicide, but at least it is under the same rubric.


I mentioned that suicide is an extremely serious sin.  That means that besides the basic issur, it has some aggravating factor that increases the severity of the sin.  How do we know this?  One of the expressions that is well known but that has no known source in Chazal is  המאבד עצמו לדעת אין לו חלק לעולם הבא

that a suicide has no share in the world to come.

The earliest appearance of this phrase in in the Maharit (Kesuvos 103a, by the story of the launderer,) and the Shevet Mussar, who do not provide any source.  The Lechem Shamayim in Sanhedrin 87 brings it from a Tosefta in Menachos, but it does not appear in any Tosefta that we have.  It is important to realize that even if we never find a source for it, these alone are enough to legitimize the words, although other rishonim might argue with him.


For example, the Rambam in Teshuva, in his list of people who lose their share in Olam Haba, does not mention a suicide.  One might argue that he is included in שופכי דמים, murderers, but it appears that the Rambam does not mean a person who murdered one time.  He means murderers, people who murdered serially, which won't apply to a suicide.  Also, the Rambam in I Eivel 11, when he talks about not eulogizing this person, does not say anything about ein lo cheilek.    And in II Rotzeiach he just says that this person is מיתתו בידי שמים, he is subject to heavenly punishment.


Some bring the story in Gittin 57b of the children on the boat who asked, If we drown ourselves, will we have olam haba, and they were told that since they did it to save themselves from a life of depravity and horror they will have a share in Olam haba.  From there, they say, we can deduce that if not for the legitimate motive, they would indeed lose their Olam Haba.


Others note that among all that died for Kiddush Hashem, among them some that willingly put themselves to death, (חנינא בן תרדיון ור׳ עקיבא האי כובס ובקלנצטירו ור׳ אלעזר בן דורדיא) the Gemara always ends with the words that a Bas Kol came that they were מזומני׳לחיי עולם הבא.  The implication is that absent the special circumstances, they would not be מזומני׳ לחיי עולם הבא.


There's a often quoted and generally derided teshuva in the Besamim Rosh that notes that among those that don't have a share in Olam Haba, in the Mishna in Sanhedrin, Achitophel is mentioned.  The sin that lost him his Olam Haba is his rebellion against the reign of David Hamelech.  But the fact that he hanged himself is not mentioned, implying that such a sin would not be sufficient reason for losing Olam Haba.  He answers that only one who commits suicide because of some rebellion against God's will loses his Olam Haba, but a person who suffers from unbearable anguish is not considered so sinful.  As I said, ninety percent of the current poskim hold that this teshuva is a forgery and a fraud.


So, getting back to our discussion of the Baal Haturim, would his words apply to people whose behavior contributes to their early demise?


Please note that our passuk says לספד, to eulogize her.  If, as the Tur says, she had a din of one who caused their own death, he shouldn't have eulogized her at all!


It appears that he did, but in a lesser fashion.  Why would he have?  It ought to be all or none.  Being partially maspid, I think, would be neither one nor the other.


A possible answer is that the din hesped for a tzadik gamur is different than the din hesped for a tzadik not-gamur.  If so, the answer to this question is that to say that moser din is like shortening your own life is only true for a tzadik gamur.  It is only a criticism of a person as great as Sarah Imeinu.  So Avraham was not maspid her as befits a tzadik gamur.  But he was maspid her as befits a tzadik not-gamur.   The Baal Haturim's use of the Tosefta is a chidush, but he might mean that since K'chut hasa'ara, she needed this absence of kavod for kapara.


Another possibility is that as the Braisa in Smachos says, while one does not eulogize the niftar, one does those things that bring honor to the bereaved.  If eulogizing Sarah would inspire teshuva in the listeners, then it would certainly be muttar to do so.


The Pischei Teshuva in 345:1 brings from the Chasam Sofer that where not being maspid for a suicide would be a disgrace for the family, it is muttar to be maspid- not for the dead person, but to prevent the family's disgrace.  Although the Gemara in Sanhedrin 46b presents as alternative options that the hesped is honor of the dead or that it is honor of the living, that would only be true in the abstract.  There are, as the Pischei Teshuva says, cases where the hesped is definitely necessary for the honor of the living.


But I think that the most logical answer is that what Sarah Imeinu did, and le'havdil a lifestyle that increases the likelihood of death, are not halachicly comparable to suicide, even according to the Baal Haturim.  Every area of Halacha stands alone, and in each we have to determine the definition that distinguishes contributing from causing.  That standard of that distinction is not the same in Nezikin (civil liability) and in Bechoros (causing a mum) and in Meleches Shabbos (asiyah assurah, gramah mutteres, but maybe only by kibbui) and Kodshim (causing the korban to become nosar) and in what is called meabeid atzmo ladaas.   Some of you might might enjoy going through the various iterations.


In other words, the same way that in murder there's meizid, and shogeg karov l'meizid, and shogeg, and each has its specific punishment, the same is true in suicide.  There's out-and-out suicide, for which there is no hesped at all, and there's manslaughterish suicide, for which the hesped should be diminished.  That is Rav Sternbuch's approach, as I reproduce in the photographs below.


Reb Chaim Brown, in a comment, says that he saw a similar answer in a contemporary sefer.  He correctly says that I probably wouldn't like it.  He is right.  I said it was logical.  I didn't say I liked it.  To me it seems that if you're maspid, you're maspid, and if there is a reason to not be maspid, then you say nothing at all.  This in between business does not appeal to me at all.  You can make a peshara between Rashi and the Rambam with your mezuza.  It doesn't work with hespeidim.


Rav Sternbuch brings an amazing story that he heard from Reb Isser Zalman about the Chafetz Chaim.  Considering the chain of transmission, it's a story that you can believe.


The story is that when the Chafetz Chaim's son in law, Rav Levinson, passed away, the Chafetz Chaim was seen softly debating with himself.  He said to himself, maybe he is like one who committed suicide?  He then decided that this was not the case.  With the Baal Haturim in mind, his thoughts are understandable.  Although the Chafetz Chaim said about Rav Hirsh Levinson that his zechusim held up half of the world, perhaps his austerities contributed to his death, and so he should not eulogize him fully, as the Baal Haturim indicates.  He then decided that this was not the case, perhaps that the austerities did not really contribute to his death.


I just heard from a Yungermahn in the local Kollel that he heard the following.  Rav Yitzchok Perman, a Ram in Philadelphia, said that when Reb Yaakov Kaminetzky was Rov in Tzituvyan, he warned someone not to fast on Yom Kippur. The man fasted and died.  Reb Yakov refused to be maspid, because he held he was a me'abeid atzmo. Obviously there could be other factors there as well, such as making a statement about listening to the psak of a Rov and to ensure that others would not do the same in the future. But the stated reason was me'abeid atzmo.



So, bottom line: May one eulogize a morbidly obese, smoking, pole vaulting free-diver who prayed that Hashem punish a fellow Jew?  Boy, what a hesped that would be.  As to what the halacha is, now you have all the information you need to decide on your own.



Here's Rav Sternbuch on the Baal HaTurim.



(ויבא אברהם לספד לשרה ולבכתה (כג ב 

פירש בעל הטורים לבכתה כף קטנה שלא בכה אלא מעט שהיתה כמו גורמת מיתתה שמסרה דין ועל כן נענשה היא תחילה והמאבד עצמו לדעת אין מספידין אותו. והדבר תמוה שהמאבד עצמו לדעת אין לו הלק לעולם הבא ואטו חשש אברהם אבינו ח"ו על שרה שהיתה צדקנית ובעלת רוח הקדש שדינה כמאבד עצמו לדעת ואין לו חלק לעולם הבא ולכן גם לא הספידה הרבה 

ונראה ששניים קרויים מאבדים עצמם לדעת יש מאבד עצמו לדעת ששולח יד בנפשו ובזה הוא רוצח עצמו ודינו שאין לו חלק לעולם הבא ויש מאבד עצמו לדעת שאשם במיתתו והיינו כהמוסר דין על חבירו וכמו שפירש רש"י בר"ה ב"ז שהמוסר דין על חברו בודקים בשמים מעשיו אם הוא ראוי לכך שחבירו ייענש על ידו וכן היה בשרה שמסרה דין לשמים ואמרה לאברהם (ט'ז ה) ישפט ה' ביני ובינך וגרמה שיבדקו וידקדקו במעשיה עד שחייבוה מיתה והלחה מחודשת כאן שלא הספידה הרבה כיון שהיא עצמה גרמה מיתתה 

ושמעתי מהגאון רבי איסר זלמן מלצר זצ"ל דבעת שנפטר חתנו של הקדוש בעל חפץ חיים זצ"ל ה"ה הצדיק רבי הירש לוינזון זצ"ל שמעו התפץ חיים מתלחש ואומר שאולי דינו כמאבד עצמו לדעת' ואחרי הרהורים שמעו אותו מחליט שאין דינו כמאבד עצמו לדעת וגם כאן יש לתמוה היאך אפשר אפילו להרהר על גאון וקדוש צדיק יסוד עולם עד שחמיו הח"ח התבטא שחצי העולם קיים בזכותו כאילו איבד עצמו לדעת וח"ו אין לו חלק לעולם הבא ועפ"י פירוש בעל הטורים הדברים נפלאים שהח"ח חשש שסיגופיו גרמו למיתתו וכיון שהוא אשם במיתתו אין להספידו הרבה וכמו שרה אמנו ובגרמה מיתתה ואברהם לא הספידה הרבוד אבל לאחר הרהורים החליט שאין דינו כן ואולי טעמו שמצא שאין סיגופיו הסיבה לפטירתו 



Along the same lines: 
The Minchas Chinuch (in his sefer Kometz Hamincha, found at the end of the Chinuch, #237) says that there is no mitzva obligation of Lo saamod to save a person that knowingly put himself into that position of danger. 
The Minsker Gadol adds (Tshuvos Ohr Gadol 1 with a pretty good support from a Shvus Yaakov and Rashi Sanhedrin 74b by machteres that implies that if he was a mortal threat when a wall fell on him, there's no mitzva to dig him out even now that he's not a threat any more) that there would be no hetter to be mechalleil Shabbos to save him.
The Seichel Hapashut (not a sefer, just common sense) says that this cannot be oversimplified.  There are cases where endangering yourself is a good thing, and in such cases, the MC and the Minsker Gadol's rule cannot possibly apply.  You run across the street, you're endangering yourself.  You are a steel worker in a sky scraper, you're endangering yourself.  Those cases are not comparable to a thrill seeking free-diver.  And I'm not convinced they would even apply to a drunkard that falls asleep in the snow.


Here is the Kometz Hamincha:

נראה לכאורה, דאם אחד מאבד עצמו לדעת ויכול אחד להצילו, אפשר דאינו מוזהר על הלאו, לא מיבעיא דעל העשה והשבותו לרבות אבידת גופו ודאי אינו מצווה, כי העשה דהשבת אבידה אינה נוהגת בממון באבידה מדעת כמבואר בשו"ע חו"מ סי' [רס"א ס"ד], אלא אף על הלאו הזה אינו מוזהר, דמקשה הש"ס בסנהדרין שם למה לי הלאו על טובע בנהר הא מוהשבותו לו נפקא ליה לרבות אבידת גופו, הא יכול לומר דנפקא מינה במאבד עצמו לדעת דאינו מצווה על אבידת גופו, כמו דאינו מצווה על אבידת ממונו מדעת, א"כ על כן כתבה התורה הלאו הזה, אלא על כרחך דגם בלאו הזה אינו מוזהר ומצווה, כן נראה לי ברור


Having brought the great chiddush of the Minchas Chinuch, here is Reb Moshe's very convincing psak against him (Igros YD II 174.)

לא דמי כלל לאבדת ממון מדעת, שלהשליך לחוץ במקום הפקר שיאבד ממנו הוא דבר שרשאי אדם לעשות כן בשל עצמו ואין מחוייבין למנעו מרצונו ולהשיב, ואף אם ישליך למקום אבוד מן העולם שיש איסור בל תשחית, הרי עכ"פ לא שייך לחייב בשביל זה להשיב לו דוקא אלא היה שייך לחייב ליקח ממקום האבוד ולהניחו אף במקום הפקר, וזה הא לא חייבה תורה לאדם להציל דברים מהשחתה דהתורה אסרה רק להשחית בידים ולא להציל מהשחתה כשאין לחייבו מצד הפסד הבעלים, אבל לאבד נפש הא אינו רשאי אף נפש עצמו ולכן ודאי לא שייך שבשביל מה שהפקיר נפשו שאין לו הרשות לזה יפטרו אחרים מלהצילו, ואף בממון אם היה מציאות כה"ג שהיה עליו איסור להפקיר נמי היו מחוייבין להחזיר לו, 

Reb Moshe begins his disagreement with the words
 פשוט במחילת כבוד גאונים אלו אשר הוא טעות גמור,
 and he ends it by saying 
ואמרו לי שכן מפורש בספרו של הגאון מהרי'ל דיסקין ובספר חלקת יואב בפשיטות דמחויבין להציל גם בחלול שבת גם את מי שאיבד עצמו לדעת והוא ברור לדינא.



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I am erasing the earlier version, but I want to put the comments in here.  Some came by email, and most of them were incorporated, but I wanted the ones that were here to remain here verbatim.


Chaim B. October 23, 2013 at 11:39 AM
I don't understand - ain yisrurim b'lo cheit v'ain misah b'lo avon. Since at the end of the day everyone (or at least every tzadik) dies only because of his/her sins, for which he/she alone is responsible, every death can be categorized as suicide through aveira.
In terms of the question, I would suggest a Brisker-ish answer: there are 2 dinim in hesped - 1) honor for the dead; 2) benefit for the living mourners (Sanhedrin 45). Perhaps Sarah's being m'orer din caused a diminishment in terms of the honor she deserved through hesped, but in terms of second din Avraham felt he still should say something.


Barzilai/Eliezer Eisenberg October 23, 2013 at 1:12 PM
First point- you'll have to be mechaleik between direct and indirect. Second point you're mechavein to great unk in the older post.


Anonymous October 24, 2013 at 1:26 PM
Don't understand why undermining our Mother Sarah, when she was on a higher spiritual level than Avraham Avinu; and we surely don't come to the soles of her feet. Her actions, after all, were just human.


Barzilai/Eliezer EisenbergOctober 24, 2013 at 2:32 PM
Very good point. It's important that we stress that this is not a condemnation, or even a criticism. It is more in the way of the criticism of Moshe Rabbeinu at Mei Meriva, where he struck the rock instead of speaking to it- a act that was only considered wrong in the context of Moshe Rabbeinu's angelic perfection. By the standard of absolute middas hadin as applied to a man who spoke to Hashem constantly, it was the wrong thing to do. Which leads into my suggested explanation- that of course Sarah was entitled to hesped, because what she did was, as you said, entirely right by normal human standards. Only by the heightened standards of the great Sarah was her act deemed imperfect. The slightest imperfection on a background of flawless perfection, the faintest gray mark on a glowing white cloth, appears terrible.


Chaim B. October 24, 2013 at 8:46 PM
I saw the Imrei Shamai quotes the Ba'al haTurim and deals with your issue by saying that Sarah was only indirect causation of m'abed atzmo; the din of no hesped only applies when you directly do it. (It's like a gerama vs. ma'aseh.) I don't think you will be satisfied with that, but I wanted to pass on the mareh makom anyway.


Barzilai/Eliezer Eisenberg October 24, 2013 at 9:00 PM
Thanks. I'll check it out .

Barzilai/Eliezer Eisenberg October 25, 2013 at 10:01 AM
I was just in the Kollel looking for the Imrei Shammai (they don't have it.) When I said over the idea that the same way there are madreigos in retzicha there are madreigos in me'abeid atzmo, I realized that it is very pashut, and really should end the discussion.
But while I was there, a yungermahn told me that he heard from Rav Yitzchok Perman of Philadelphia that when Reb Yaakov Kaminetzky was Rov in Tzituvyan, he warned someone not to fast on Yom Kippur. He fasted and died, and Reb Yakov refused to be maspid, because he held he was a me'abeid atzmo. Obviously there could be other factors there as well, such as making a statement about listening to the psak of a Rov and to ensure that others would not do the same in the future. But the stated reason was me'abeid atzmo.

Thursday, October 29, 2015

Veyeira, Beresishis 19:27. Kevias Makom for Tefilla: A Personal שער השמים

We've written about the importance of being kovei'a makom for tefilla, and its connection to fighting battles, in Parshas Mishpatim.

We only bring it up here because of the passuk here in Vayeira
  וישכם אברהם בבקר אל המקום אשר עמד שם את פני ה
from which the Gemara (Brachos 6b) derives that
כל הקובע מקום לתפילתו אלהי אברהם בעזרו, וכשמת  אומרים לו: אי עניו, אי חסיד, מתלמידיו של אברהם אבינו 
and later (7b) that
 כל הקובע מקום לתפילתו אויביו נופלים תחתיו.

We did discuss this at length in Mishpatim.  We are only adding the he'ara ketana that this makor actually deals with a tefilla that seems not to have accomplished what Avraham Avinu wanted, it was an unanswered prayer.  One might think that the ma'aleh of makom kavu'a only applies where the tefilla was effective.  Wait and see if your tefilla is answered, and if it was, that'll be your "lucky" spot for tefilla.  Butt if you davenned and weren't answered, you should davka never daven there any more.  But that is not true.  In this case, it turned out that the tefilla did not save Sedom.  And even so, Chazal tell us from our passuk that the place is miskadesh to the extent that it becomes the best place for tefilla.

So the lesson, to me, is that we aren't kovei'a makom like Bilam, who thought that a particular place has special power that will enhance the tefilla.  It seems that we learn from this that the benefit of kviyus makom has to do with the act of tefilla that connected the mispallel with the Ribono shel Olam.  The fact that the answer was "no" is irrelevant.  That place becomes, for you, something of a Shaar HaShamayim.

(If you look at the post in Mishpatim, you will see that I bring this idea, in a slightly different form, at the very end of the post, from the Satmarer Rebbe.  And from my brother.)

One more reminder- even though Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona in Brachos 3b say that the Makom of Keviyus makom for tefilla means a room, no matter where in the room, and they also say that the entire shul is a makom tefilla so it doesn't matter where you daven in the shul, we do not pasken like either nekuda.  Keviyus Makom for Tefilla means that you should daven in one shul, and within that shul, you should daven in a specific spot.
Tur OC 90-
ויקבע מקום לתפילתו שלא ישנהו אם לא לצורך גדול דאמר רב הונא כל הקובע מקום לתפילתו אלהי אברהם בעזרו. ואין די לו במה שיקבע לו בית הכנסת להתפלל בה תדיר אלא גם בבית הכנסת שקובע בה צריך שיהיה מקומו קבוע וידוע, ולא ישב היום כאן ולמחר במקום אחר, דהכי איתמר בירושלמי אמר ר' תנחום בר חייא צריך אדם לייחד לו מקום בבית הכנסת שנאמר "ויהי דוד בא עד הראש אשר ישתחוה שם", "השתחוה" לא נאמר, אלא "ישתחוה" משמע שהיה תדיר משתחוה שם

 If you find a visitor sitting there, tell him to go away.  There has to be a limit on what we learn from Avraham Avinu.
Alternatively, find a vacant seat where the guest will be left alone, and then suggest to him that he sit there.

Sources for my way of reading it:
The Tzlach in Brachos 6b:
שכיון שהתפלל שם המקום קנה קדושה,וכשמתפלל שם שוב, קדושת המקום מסייעת לו שתתקבל תפלתו.

The Meromei Sadeh there:
אל המקום אשר עמד שם בכל יום להתפלל. ושם היה מקום קדוש לראות ממנו מה שלא היה נראה בחוש הראות

However, some rishonim say that it is a behavioral thing, that when you're kovei'ah makom, you'll have more kavana there.  Like the Meiri-
ראוי לאדם לקבוע מקום לתפלתו שכל שהמקום מיוחד לו לתפלה כונתו מצויה ביותר
and the Rashba in Aggados-
 כיון שהמתפלל צריך לכוון דעותיו ולדעת לפני מי הוא עומד ולעמוד ביראה וכו'והמקום המוכן לתפילה מוסיף יראה במקומות המוכנים לעבודת השי"ת

Thursday, October 22, 2015

Lech Lecha. Seeking a Mohel or Sandek Who is a Tzadik

I've realized that this is much too long and shmues-y, so here's the short version.
1.  It is beneficial to have a tzadik write your sifrei kodesh and tefillin.

2.  The same is true for the Bris Milah.  You should try to find a mohel and a sandek who are gedolim in Torah and Chesed.

3.  This hiddur may also apply to anything that requires that it be done or made lishma. It might even be true by all chafeitzim that are used for mitzvos.

4.  I have a list of five reasons that there would be a ma'aleh to seek out a tzadik to do certain mitzvos for you.  I can't compress them, you'll have to look at the list.

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The other day, someone told me a story about the Satmarer Rov.  A Chasid presented this question; given a choice between a pair of  unusually beautiful and mehudar Tefillin that were written by a respected Sofer, or a pair of less beautiful Tefillin that were written by a Sofer who was known to be a great Tzadik, which is better?  I don't remember the Rov's mordant response, which was actually the point of the story, but the bottom line was that the psak was to take the one that was written by the great Tzadik, even though the ksav is less mehudar.

As one who knows me might expect, my initial reaction was to say the opposite.  I thought that as long as the Tefillin are written with the kavanos and dikdukim that are necessary, it makes absolutely no difference in the chashivus of the Tefillin whether they were written by the local kli kodesh or Rav Chaim Kanievsky.  Since when does greater kavana and tzidkus of the sofer make it more mehudar?  Yes, the ma'aseh mitzva was greater, but that doesn't mean that the cheftza shel mitzva is any better.  This is not a shidduch, where zechus avos and familial traits and middos matter.  To the extent you would prefer the shoes made by Chanoch (חנוך תופר מנעלים היה ועל כל תפירה ותפירה היה מיחד יחודים) or dinner that was cooked by a tzadik, over one made by a regular ehrliche yid, to that extent would you prefer his Tefillin.  

My initial reaction was wrong.  

The Aruch HaShulchan in OC 32:42 and the Mishna Berura 32 sk 103 talk about how difficult it is to properly write kisvei hakodesh- the sheimos need special kavana, kesidran, and many many other things that only the greatest sofrim can do.  Ok, so now I understand that the greater Sofer, or at least the more scholarly sofer, can make tefillin that are more mehudar.  Once we know that certain kavana is essential, and that there are kavanos that add even more, then even though the other one is kosher, it is understandable that there can be greater hiddur with greater kavana.

Harav Mordechai Tendler, I'm told, has in his Masores Moshe a story of a similar question asked to Reb Moshe. Reb Moshe answered that it is impossible for a human being to judge who is a greater Tzadik.  If the apparently lesser one had overcome terrible nisyonos, and the other just did what came naturally, then the truth is the opposite of what you think; האדם יראה לענים וה' יראה ללבב, and in the world of truth, עליונים למטה ותחתונים למעלה.  So as long as you know that both are 100% kosher, it's best to go with the one that has the nicer ksav.

But Reb Moshe was just saying that we cannot know who is the greater tzadik.  If, however, we did know, then the Tzadik's tefillin would be the better choice.

In addition, there is the Gemara in Shabbos 133b about Zeh Keili.  
התנאה לפניו במצוות, עשֵה לפניו סוכה נאה ולולב נאה ושופר נאה, ציצית נאה, ספר תורה נאה וכתוב בו לשמו בדיו נאה, בקולמוס נאה, בלבלר אומן וכורכו בשיראין נאין


The question is, what does כתוב בו לשמו mean?  Lishma is not just hiddur, it is me'akeiv.  Because of this question, R' Yaakov Karliner, the baal Mishkenos Yaakov, in his sefer Kehilas Yakov, in Pesachim 64, wants to say that the whole halacha that the Sheimos in a Sefer Torah have to be written lishma is because of the din of hiddur mitzva, just that in this case, hiddur is me'akeiv, a tremendous chiddush.  But other achronim, for example, Rav Gifter, say pashut, that you see from this Gemara that besides the regular din of lishma that is me'akeiv in a sefer, there is another din of writing it "lishma," l'sheim Hashem, and this makes it into a more mehudardikkeh sefer.

So you have a strong proof that writing it with deeper kavana makes it into a sefer that is more mehudar, in line with the Aruch HaShulchan and Mishna Berura..


I'm not sure this is true by other mitzvos that have a din of Lishma, such as Matza and Tzitzis. There, it''s a simple yes or no, and greater kavana doesn't matter.  Here, it's not just a din of lishma.  The kavana creates the kedusha of the sheimos and the sefer, the kavana is a part of the cheftza shel Mitzva.

Note: please see Update I, where I bring the Netziv.


*

The reason I"m writing about this in Parshas Lech Lecha is because of the mitzva of Millah in our parsha.  Does it matter if the Mohel and the Sandek are tzadikim? 


(In case you think Sandeka'us is trivial, please see the Darkei Moshe in 265:11, who brings from the Maharil that the Sandek has kedima for the aliyah that morning-
דיפה כח הסנדק מהמוהל לקרות בתורה קודם המוהל, דהסנדק המחזיק הילד על ברכיו הוי כאילו בנה מזבח והעלה עליו קטורת.  The Tshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 119 explains that the Sandek has two maalos- he helps in the act of milah, and he becomes a mizbei'ach for that moment.  See also the Toras Chaim I have in Update II.)

Bishlema by Sefer Torah, we saw that the manner of writing makes a difference in the quality of the sefer.  


Bishlema by korbanos, we find that people would seek out a tzadik for the performance of the avoda of their korban.

 Sefer Chasidim 761:
אם יש בעיר שנים צדיק ושאינו צדיק הגון ושאינו הגון שיודעים לתקוע בשופר יתנו להגון לתקוע ובלבד שלא יהיה מחלוקת בדבר ויראי שמים לא היו מוסרים קרבנותיהם אלא לכהנים צדיקים
But that could be because the other is doing it on your behalf, so you want the act of doing the mitzva, the maaseh mizvah, to be more mehudar, and doing it with greater kavana makes it a better ma'aseh mitzvah.  

But by Milah, all you care about is the result.  Who says that having a tzadik do the milah makes the result any more chashuv?  As I said above, does it matter who tied your tzitzis, as long as it was done le'sheim mitzvas tzitzis?  Are tzitzis that were made by a tzadik any better than tzitzis that were made by a regular trustworthy person?  On the other hand, it could be that by Milah also, the ma'aseh is being done as a shlichus, so you would apply what the Sefer Chasidim says.  Although there are those that learn that the Rosh holds there is no shelichus by milah, the Tur in 265 says from the Baal HaItur that the father should stand net to the Mohel and state that he wants him to do his shelichus, as we find by korbanos.  In fact, it is possible that the din of standing there that we find by Korbanos and Milah means it is more than just the regular din of shelichus, it could be that the ma'aseh becomes yours as well.


I don't have time to do this thoroughly, but here are the basics.  It should be enough.

1.  The Rama in YD 264:  ויש לאדם לחזור ולהדר אחר מוהל ובעל ברית היותר טוב וצדיק  from the Or Zarua.  (I bring the Or Zarua at the end.)


2. Reb Chaim Kanievsky in Derech Sicha page 64:

השפעת הסנדק על התינוק
 על גודל השפעת הסנדק על התינוק סיפר הרב שליט"א נכנס אלי אדם עם שני ילדיו האחד נראה הגון והשני נראה גוי גמור זה שנראה טוב אבא זצ"ל היה הסנדק שלו ואילו אצל השני אינו רוצה לומר מי היה הסנדק שלו.   החזו"א הקפיד שהסנדק יהיה הגון 

Along the same lines, from a different book.  This is actually a well known story, if that proves anything.  (I don't understand the story, because the father has the right to be mochel on behalf of the child, and there was no kinyan, just an invitation.  The Levush here says the following:
ואם נתן המוהל ובעל ברית לאחד, אסור לחזור בו. מיהו, אם חזר בו, הוי חזרה, ואין מועיל בזה אפילו ק"ק [קבלת קנין] שאינו אלא קניין דברים ודבר שאין בו ממש, ואין קניין חל עליו. מכל מקום, החוזר בו עובר משום "שארית ישראל לא יעשו עוולה ולא ידברו כזב". וזה הוי דבר כזב. ומותר לקרותו רשע. אבל אם נשבע לו או נדר תקיעת כף, כופין אותו שיקיים שבועתו ותקיעת כף.
And we all know the Ketzos and others in CM 382.  But that doesn't matter.  It's a well known story.)
הובא מעשה בספר בית ישראל באיש אחד שכיבד את הגאון בעל חזון אישי בסנדקאות ובליל שימורים שקודם המילה שאלוהו בני משפחתו את מי תכבד בסנדקאות והשיבם שכבר כיבד את החזון איש אך הם הרימו עליו קול צעקה הרי הדוד בא מאמריקה והוא רב וגם שולח לנו כסף מפעם לפעם ואם לא תכבדו בסנדקאות בודאי יעלב ולא יתמוך בנו יותר והלך אבי הבן לחזון איש וסח לו כל המעשה והשיבו החזון איש אלמלי היתה הסנדקאות טובה בשבילי יכול הייתי לוותר עכשיו שיש בסנדקאות טובה לרך הנימול אין אני רשאי לוותר על טובתו של הילד 


3.  Since we pasken like Reb Yosi in AZ 27a,  as the Taz and the Shach bring from the Beis Yosef, that kavanah is not me'akeiv by a bris- as long as a Yisrael shomer mitzvos does it, it's kosher, even if he was mis'aseik, that he did it only for medical or other reasons, it's kosher, if Lishma is not essential, what difference does it make if the mohel/sandek had great kavanos and were tzadikim?  It's even less important than kavana by Tzitzis.

4.  More than that.  It appears that even though Reb Yosi holds in general that Mitzvos tzrichos kavana, he doesn't care if a kusi does the bris l'sheim har Grizim (as the Keren Ora points out in his intro to Zevachim (end of column 2.)  That apparently means that forget about lishma, you don't even need kavana.  So who cares if a tzadik does it?


5.  Reb Boruch Ber Yevamos 2, second paragraph, where he talks about the difference between mitzvos where the act is the mitzva and mitzvos where the result is the mitzva.


6.  By Milah, it could be that it becomes your ma'aseh through shlichus, and the gadlus of the ma'aseh milah is misyacheis to you.  This really is a machlokes between the Shach in CM 382, who says that a father that gets a mohel loses the ma'aseh mitzvah, following in the path of the Rosh (Chulin 6:8,) and the Tevuas Shor that argues and says that in kol hatorah kulah, yeish shliach.  It is possible that this is what the Tur in YD 265 means to say from the Baal HaItur, that by a bris the father should davka stand there and tell the mohel to be his shaliach, because then the shlichus is poeil that the ma'aseh is the father's.

I have to point out, though, that this is a dochack.  Even if there is a din shlichus, and even if the ma'aseh is done by a tzadik, there is no way that his enhancement of the ma'aseh mitzva is misyacheis to you.  He did the mitzva well, he gets schar.  But the din shlichus is not going to make it that you did a ma'aseh mitzva with hiddur.

7.  If #6 is correct, then we have a problem with the Or Zarua.  Why does the Or Zarua tell us to get tzadikim for the bris because otherwise Eliahu HaNavi might not want to come, or because a tahor should do the mitzva with a tahor?  These reasons are specific to Bris Millah, and have nothing to do with the svara of finding a good shaliach?  Doesn't this show that the svara of shlichus is wrong?  No.  It only shows that the Or Zarua holds like the Shach, and not like the Tevuas Shor.



The sof dovor is that it is a beferiusheh Rama/Or Zarua that by Millah also, there is a ma'alah of getting a tzadik to be the mohel and the sandek.  The question remains, why is this the case.  It is not because Milah needs lishma, because it does not.  Is it because of Chavivus Hamitzva?  Kavod?  A metziyus of influence on the child, like Reb Chaim Kanievsky says?  

It is possible that we ought to make a basic distinction between Tashmishei Mitzva and a cheftzah that has kedusha.  Matza and Sukkah and Tzitzis are only Tashmishei Mitzva, and if they're kosher, nothing is added to them by making them with better kavana.  Kisvei Kodesh is kedusha, and to make a chalos kedusha, the kavana in creating it matters.  It is possible that Milah also falls into that category.


My guess is that there is less here than meets the eye, that this is not a din, and my Reb Boruch Ber and Keren Ora are irrelevant:  Who says everything has to have a lomdus?  We simply have a mesorah, as the Levush says, that the character and ruchniyus of the Sandek, and maybe the Mohel, have an effect on the child that is getting a bris.  


So to sum up, the reason we should look for a tzadik to be mohel and to be sandek might be one or all of the following.

1. When you get a mohel, and you stand there and tell him to do your shelichus, the shelichus becomes that the ma'aseh is yours, not just the chalos, because there's no real chalos here that can be misyacheis to the father.  If so, it could be that the greater the ma'aseh mitzvah, the greater the ma'aseh that is misyacheis to the father.  (I heard this svara from Harav Dovid Oppenheimer.) 

2.  Even when there's no din of shelichus, when you arrange to have a mitzva done, you want the ma'aseh mitzva to be done in the best way.  A tzadik's ma'aseh mitzva is more chashuv.  This might even apply to tevillas keilim.  Or maybe it only applies where there is some kind of requirement of lishma

3. A Bris Milah, the אות ברית, is a Davar She'bikedusha, just like a Sefer Torah, and a Davar She'bikedusha that is created by a tzadik is more mehudar.  This only applies to a Cheftza that has inherent kedusha, not to Tashmishei Mitzva, like Tzitzis, Sukkah, or Matza. (Proof- Eliezer's נקיטת חפץ when Avraham Avinu gave him the Shvu'ah.

 4. The ruchniyusdikkeh madreigah of the Mohel and the Sandek have an effect on the ruchniyus of the child.  The greater they are, the more beneficial the effect on the child. 

5.  As you will see from the following update, it is possible that the hiddur of being done with greater kavana even applies to tashmishei mitzva. 

These five svaros are disparate and have clearly different applications.  If you go with 2, then it will apply to tvilas keilim or building a maakah, unless you limit it to cases that have a din of lishma, like baking Matza Shemura.  If  you go with 1, it only applies where there is a din of shelichus, and that is certainly not true by keilim or a sukkah.  If you go with 3, it only applies to devarim shebikedusha like STAM and maybe milah.  5, of course, is universal.

UPDATE I:
An anonymous comment came in that made an excellent point, and I thank the writer, whoever he/she/it may be.  In something posted five years ago on this parsha, (Og and Ulterior Motives) we talked about what the name Og means, the upshot being that the Matza (Ugos Matzos) that Avraham Avinu was making highlighted the difference between a mitzva done with and without good kavana.  What makes it even stronger is that Reb Moshe, in the Darash in Bo (Shemos 12:17) says that the din of ושמרתם את המצות applies to every mitzva in the Torah.  
 ודאי עדיף טובא מה שצריך לעמול ולהתייגע  במעשה המצוה כהילפותא מקרא דושמרתם דמצות שלא סגי במה שנזדמן שאינו חמץ אלא צריך שיהיה בהשתדלות שלא תחמיץ.
Reb Moshe is not talking about lefum tzaara agra.  He is talking about the quality of the mitzvah.  So the answer is, yes.  It does make a difference who writes the St'am, and it makes a difference who the mohel and the sandek are, and it makes a difference who ties your tzitzis, and for all I know, it might make a difference who builds your sukkah and makes your matza. Kosher requires specific kavana in all these cases, and with that kavana it will be kosher.  But if they are done with chavivus and kavana and dveikus, then they are, somehow, a whole different cheftza shel Mitzva. 
IMPORTANT NOTE:
I found that the Netziv addresses this directly and clearly.  He says it's just common knowledge.
העמק דבר שמות  כח ג ד"ה ועשו בגדי אהרון לקדשו

ועשו את בגדי אהרן לקדשו. דאחר שנצטוה אהרן להתקדש נתן המקום לו בגדי קודש שיסייעו לו לדבר. וידוע דכ״ד שבקדושה לבד שטעון עשיה לשמה עפ״י דין עוד כל מה שמכינים יותר הפעולה לשם קדושה מועלת יותר לתכליתה כמש״כ לעיל י״ט ב׳ ובכ״מ מש״ה נצטוה משה שיזהיר להאומנים שהם בעצמם יראי ה׳ לעשות הבגדים באופן שיועילו יותר לקדשו. ובאשר הוא דבר שבלב ע״כ הקדים לומר להם אשר מלאתי את אהרן רוח חכמה והוא יבין וישכיל מכח הבגדים איך שהם פועלים על לבו. היאך נעשו. ומש״ה נצטוה בזה משה בעצמו שידבר אל כל חכמי לב. ולא בצלאל שזה הפרט אינו נוגע לחכמות המלאכה אלא לחכמת המוסר:



UPDATE II

Our local Rambam's baalabus (not a guzma) showed me the Rama in YD 265 that says that davka the Sandek should drink the wine at the bris.  Reb Akiva Eiger earlier in the siman brings the Toras Chaim from the last piece in the tenth perek in Sanhedrin who says this is because the Sandek, being the mitzbei'ach, should drink the wine, so the korban of Milah should have Nesachim.  In the context of our discussion, this underlines the unique character of Milah as being a kind of avodas hakrava (see, for example, Rabbeinu Bachay in Breishis 17:13,) and, as we saw in the Sefer Chasidim, you want the Kohen who does your avoda to be a special Yarei Shamayim.
 לפי שהמילה כקרבן יחשב, כדמשמע במדרש רבה ריש פ' וירא. ר׳ לוי פתה, ושור ואיל לשלמים לזבוח לפני ה; אמר מה אם זה שהקריב שור ואיל לשמי הריני נגלה עליו ומברכו, אברהם שמל עצמו לשמי על אחת כמה וכמה ולכך בשעה שמל אברהם יליד ביתו והעמיד גבעת ערלות והתליעו עלה ריחן לפני הקב״ה כעולה שהוא כליל לאישים כדאיתא במדרש רבה סוף פ׳ לך לך. ומהאי טעמא נראהדמה שמלין בב״ה בצפון לפי שהעולה שחיטתה בצפון.  והיינו דאמ' ליה באבר אחד שנעש׳ בך קרבן אתה מגרה בי אם אומר לי הקב"ה זבח עצמן לפני לשם קרבן אני זובח... וכיון שהילד הנימול נחשב כקרבן כך רגלי הסנדק שמלין עליהן חשוב כמזבח כמ״ש להדיא מהרי״ל ז״ל בהלכות מילה. 
ונראה דלכך נוהגין ליתן כוס יין של ברכה לשתות לסנדק ואין נותנין אותו לתינוק כדרך שנוהגין בכוס יין של קדוש, לפי שהעולה טעונה נסכים שהיו מנסכין יין על גבי המזבח בשעת ההקרבה וכיון שהילד דומה לקרבן עולה והסנדק דומה למזבח לכך נותנין כוס יין של ברכה בגרונו של סנדק דהוה ליה כמנסך יין על ע"ג המזבח. ומהאי נראה דדוקא הסנדק המחזיק את הולד בשעת המילה על ברכיו הוא יחזיקנו ג״כ בשעת ברכה וישתה מן הכוס של ״ן ודלא כאותן שנוטלין את הילד מן הסנדק לאחד שנימול ונותנין אותו לאדם אחד להחזיקו בשעת ברכה והוא שותה כוס של ברכה דאיהו לאו מזבח יחשב ומה לו לשתות כוס של ברכה זו



The Or Zarua inside
Hilchos Milah 107:
וצריך לחפש יהודי טוב לעשותו בעל ברית כדי שיבא אליהו ז״ל וישב על הקטידרא אצלו בשעת המילה כמו׳ש רב שרירא גאון ז״ל מנהג בישראל להעמיד קטידרא מכוסה במעיל אצל בעל ברית משום כבודו של אליהו ז״ל דמתקרי מלאך הברית כדתניא בברייתא דר׳ אליעזר (כנ״ל) בענין ויאמר קנא קנאתי וגו׳ א״ל הקב״ה לאליהו בשטים אתה מקנא על גילוי עריות שנא׳ פנחס בן אלעזר וגו׳ וכאן אתה מקנא על עסק הברית חייך אני אכרות ברית עמך ברית שלום וברית כהונה, ולא עוד אלא שאין ישראל עושין ברית מילה עד שאתה רואה בעיניך. ומיכן נהוג רבנן למעבד מושב כבוד למלאך הברית והוא אליהו זכור לטוב
 וצריך נמי לחפש אחר המוהל יהודי טוב כדאמרינן במדרש חזית המול ימול יבא טהור ויטפל עם הטהור



 ויש לאדם להדר ולחזור אחר מוהל ובעל ברית היותר טוב וצדיק, שיכוונו במילתו כוונה מובחרת ומעולה, ויגרום שגם הולד יהיה כמותם.

Saturday, October 17, 2015

Noach. History repeating itself.

Several years ago, I posted this:

 Rav Chaim Falagi's peirush on Tehillim, in 33:14:  מִמְּכוֹן שִׁבְתּוֹ הִשְׁגִּיחַ אֶל כָּליֹשְׁבֵי הָאָרֶץ. notes that the first letters of the first three words are משה, and the last three letters of those words are נוח, or, if you prefer,  ונח.  He says that Moshe was a gilgul of Noach's neshama.  The Arizal says the same thing.  They both note that Noach and Moshe were saved by being placed in a Teiva, which was floated upon the medium that brought death to the others of their generation- Noach the waters of the Mabul, which killed everyone of his generation, and Moshe the waters of the Nile, into which his cohort of male children had been thrown to drown.  This neshama, Noach's, was given the opportunity to do its mitzva a second time, this time doing it properly.  Although Noach was a great Tzadik and beloved by Hashem, he was criticized for not doing enough to influence and save the people of his time.  Moshe rectified this failure, because when Klal Yisrael did the sin of the Eigel, and Hashem told him that the people deserved destruction, and that Moshe would be the only survivor who would begin a new race, Moshe did not accept this terrible gzeira.  Moshe said that he cannot exist without the people he was responsible for.  He said, Hashem, forgive the people, and if not, מחני נא, erase me from your book of life.  The words מחני נא are an anagram for מנח אני.  Hashem, this is my second chance.  This time, I cannot live if my people die.  If they die, I will die with them.  (This idea is brought in many places: for example, it is in the Yalkut Reuveni in the beginning of Tetzaveh quoting the מגלה עמוקות, and in the Chasam Sofer's Drush for zayin Adar in 91) 


This year, when we discussed this at the Kiddush, I pointed out that while the story of Noach was the beginning of a story that culminated with Moshe Rabbeinu's saving the Jewish people, the story of Noach also echoes the experience of Adam in Gan Eden.

I am just pointing out parallels, not interpreting them.

1. When Noach came out of the Teivah, he was given dominion over the animals, even more than Adam HaRishon was.

2. Chazal see criticism in the words (9:20)   ויחל נח איש האדמה ויטע כרם :  Rashi- ויחל: עשה עצמו חולין, שהיה לו לעסוק תחלה בנטיעה אחרת:  As a result of his chillul,   וישת מן היין וישכר ויתגל בתוך אהלה , he drank and was exposed.  I see here a connection, an echo, of the story of Adam HaRishon.  Noach ate from an eitz, which happens to have been the grape (which the Zohar  in Noach 307 associates with the Eitz HaDaas from Gan Eden,) and as a result, his nakedness was exposed. (The Malbim in 9:20-21 touches on this and distinguishes between Adam covering his nakedness and Noach's exposure.)

3. I speculated that while Adam and Chava were tantalized by the possibility of becoming greater through a more intimate access to knowledge, perhaps Noach sought a connection to ruchniyus through something beyond knowledge, the type of trance state that Neviim experienced.  If so, both the chet of Adam HaRishon seeking knowledge, and the chet of Noach seeking something that required an abandonment of knowledge, were tainted by the immediate exposure of the animalistic component of the human state.  (I gratefully acknowledge Rabbi Dr. Resnick's comments and observations.)

This is not the sort of thing I usually write, and I only offer it as something to think about.  It might come in handy.

Thursday, October 8, 2015

Doing the DAF- Donor Advised Funds and Hilchos Tzedakah

When a person makes a profit, he will want to to give Maaser Kesafim, and to reduce his tax liability through charitable donation.  He does not necessarily want to disburse the entire amount immediately, preferring to distribute the charity over a long period.  For example, a person sells an asset he spent a lifetime developing.  This is a singular event. He intends to give maaser kesafim, so he'll give at least ten percent to tzedaka.  From a tax perspective, it makes sense for him to give the money away the same tax year as his profit, so he can deduct the charitable donation from his income and only pay on ninety percent.  (Actually, it would be better for him to give a percentage of appreciated asset to tzedaka, which will enable him to deduct the appreciated value from his income. This will reduce his tax liability even more.)  But he wants to distribute it over time. How do you give it all away immediately, and still give it away over a long period?  By creating a Donor Advised Fund (hereinafter DAF.)

A DAF is a convenient giving vehicle that has mostly replaced family foundations. The donor makes an irrevocable contribution to an account within the fund, getting an immediate tax deduction.  At that point, he names the account (e.g., The Eisenberg Foundation for Clever Online Torah, hereinafter EFCOT) and becomes the account advisor.  
The advisor and his named successors may make subsequent additions/donations to the fund.  As Advisor, there are two things he can do: He can choose among multiple investment pools where the funds might grow over time. Most importantly, he can "recommend" grants to charities he selects.

It is important to emphasize that from the legal perspective, the donor gives up all ownership and legal control over the money in the fund.  (If the fund goes bankrupt, all the money deposited with them is lost and gone forever.)  In this peculiar but perfectly valid arrangement, the sponsoring organization, the manager of the DAF, is not legally obligated to follow the wishes of the donor.   Still, the reality is that the funds or assets will be invested and distributed exactly as advised by the donor.  

Approval of grant recommendations is essentially automatic, as long as the fund's rules and IRS regulations are satisfied.  Generally, all that is required is that the recipient be a 501 (c) charity in good standing.  (There may be exclusions that prevent the advisor from naming charities where the adviser or a close relative would benefit from the gift- obviously, grants made from DAF’s must be made for charitable purposes and not for the benefit of the donor or donor advisor or to pay a grandchild's tuition.)  The Adviser instructs the manager to send a check in the amount of X to "Kollel Hora'ah of Marlboro" and the manager of the DAF will send out the check.

What if the fund would refuse to follow donor advice and would give the money to a different charity?  As far as I know, this has never happened. My guess is that the donor would have an action for fraud, but not for conversion.

DAFs are available at Vanguard, Fidelity, and other large investment houses.  There are some Jewish DAFs as well, with slightly higher carrying costs.


As I said, one big advantage of a DAF is that a person might sell a large asset that he has spent a lifetime building, and set aside a percentage, such as maaser, for tzedaka.  But he might not want to distribute the maaser all at once, but rather over a period of several years- or decades.  This will enable the donor to give his entire maaser to the DAF, and distribute it to charitable organizations over time. Another benefit is the option of anonymous philanthropy.


There are several halachic ramifications that arise.


1. If he promises the money to tzedaka, he will have a bal te'acheir problem, because giving the money, or the asset, to the DAF, is not giving tzedaka al pi halacha.  The IRS, of course, views the charitable contribution as having taken place when you fund the DAF.  But it is likely that funding a Fidelity DAF is not called giving tzedaka.  If you haven't given the tzedaka, then you haven't fulfilled your neder, and you'll be over on the issur de'oraysa of Bal Te'acher.


2.  So, of course, one should not promise the money to tzedaka.  Just fund the DAF and give when you want.  The problem is that in that case, you're not really giving maaser, are you?  Maaser ought to be given within a certain time.  For example, the Noda Biyehuda in YD II 198 says that it must be given annually.  So how can I keep it on ice for ten years?


3.  Maybe the DAF administrators can be viewed as the Gabbai, odd as that may seem, and the Gabbai can give when he wants.  But first of all, you would have to give it to what we would consider Tzedaka, not The Vanguard Donor Advised Fund definitely does not fall into that category.  And even if you gave it to a Jewish administered DAF, the fact remains that you have the tovas hana'ah, and the administrator cannot give it away without your approval, so is he really a gabbai?  I lean toward the idea that the DAF administrators do have the din of gabbaim, but this can be argued either way.


4.  A DAF can be invested, like any account.  It is possible that you can designate tzedaka, and then invest on behalf of the nitzrachim, and still call it maaser right now.  I'm not sure what the result as far as Bal Te'acheir will be if you designate tzedaka and invest it on behalf of tzedaka but don't give it to them for years.



In sum, there are two major questions.
1. Is this person creating a problem of the issur deoraysa of Bal Te'Acheir by setting aside tzedaka and not giving it quickly enough.
2. Does a person who funds a DAF fulfill a mitzvah of Tzedaka?  Is he doing a mitzva of Tzedaka at the initial funding, or is the mitzva only when he disburses the funds ten years from now.
3. If he is not doing a mitzvah of tzedakah now, is he fulfilling the din of Maaser Kesafim now?

Answers:
1. Yes, but this can be easily avoided if you know what to do.
2. Probably not.
3. Remarkably, yes.


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The Bal Te'Acheir problem:
 It says in YD 257
 הרי עלי סלע לצדקה או הרי הסלע זו צדקה, חייב ליתנה לעניים מיד. ואם איחר עובר בבל תאחר שהרי בידו ליתן מיד,
 ועניים מצויים הם. ואם אין שם עניים, מפריש ומניח עד שימצא עניים. ודוקא במפריש צדקה סתם, אבל כל אדם יכול להפריש מעות לצדקה שיהיו מונחים אצלו ליתנם מעט על יד על יד, כמו שיראה לו 
which indicates that if you give with a tnai that you can distribute it when you want, you're not over bal te'acheir at all.  As the Tur says, this is a machlokes between the Rosh and the Rambam, but he and the Mechaber pasken like the Rosh.
 הצדקה היא כמו הנדר לעבור עליה משום בל תאחר, לפיכך האומר הרי עלי סלע לצדקה, או סלע זו לצדקה, חייב ליתנו מיד לעניים ועובר משום בל תאחר אם לא יתנו מיד, שהרי עניים מצויים לו בכל שעה, וכתב א׳׳א הרא׳׳ש ז׳׳ל, דוקא דמפריש צדקה סתם אבל כל אדם יכול להפריש מעות לצדקה שיהיו מונחים אצלו ליתנם מעט על יד על יד כמו שיראה לו, והרמב״ם כתב, אם אין עניים יפריש וכו', ואם התנה אין צריך להפריש וכו', נראה מדבריו שאין תנאי מועיל אלא כשאין עניים, ולא נהירא
The bottom line is that you can give money to tzedaka and avoid the whole Bal Te'Acheir problem by making a tnai that you will give it out when and to whom you want.  The Bach disagrees with the Beis Yosef and the Tur's psak against the Rambam, but I don't think that matters.  We will go with the Tur and the Mechaber.





~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The Tzedakah and Maaser Kesafim problem- is he fulfilling either of these dinim with a DAF?

Is it called giving Tzedaka or Maaser when there's a hafrasha now and the nesina is in ten years?  It is obvious that the only purpose of Tzedaka is so that nitzrachim receive what they need.  If so, the designation of assets as Tzedaka is by no means a fulfillment of any mitzvah.  If and when you deliver it, then you fulfill a mitzvah, but not before that.  So what good is it that you have a hafrasha and you put it in to a DAF?  You have done exactly nothing until the nitzrachim receive it.  If from a Mitzvas Tzedaka perspective you've done nothing, then you haven't fulfilled the din of Maaser.  All you've done was obligate yourself to give money in the future.  Ten years from now, when you give it away, at that point you've fulfilled the din of Maaser, but we saw that Maaser is an annual requirement. Until that point, you've done nothing but promise to do something in the future.


I'm putting it in here in Hebrew so that someone might find it in a search.
השאלה
אם האדם מקיים מצוות מעשר כספים ע"י הפרשה בלי נתינה מיידית 


I believe that we've resolved this question as well.  As you will see, it appears that hafrasha/designation does immediately fulfill the din of Maaser Kesafim.


1.  Reb Moshe in the Dibros in Gittin p. 117-8 says that Rav Saadiah Gaon as brought in the Tur is mashma that the hafrasha is a not mitzva on its own.  Either you're chayav to give, or don't bother with hafrasha.   Therefore, a person that only earns enough for his basic needs is simply not chayav in the mitzva of tzedaka.  The Rama there seems to say that there are two dinim in Tzedaka, hafrasha and nesina.   Therefore, a person that only earns enough for his basic needs has to be mafrish tzedaka and then, based on the din of kedima, he takes it for himself.

Reb Moshe says a nafka minah would be where a person is noheig to give Maaser Kesafim, but now he earns only what he himself needs.  According to the Rama, he will have to be mafrish maaser, and he'll take it for himself; the idea is that the minhag of Maaser is to be meyacheid it for Tzedaka, and then you apply the dinim of tzedaka to the money.  So fine.  Be meyacheid, and by doing so you've fulfilled the minhag of MK, and then take it for yourself.  According to RSG, since his minhag to give maaser was only when he was chayav to give tzedaka.  Now that he's not chayav to give tzedaka, he has no reason to be mafrish or be meyacheid anything.
It is clear as day that according to Reb Moshe, our question will depend on the difference between RSG and the Rama.
According to RSG that the mitzva of tzedaka is the nesina alone, then hafrasha really does nothing.  According to the Rama that just like leket, there is a din of hafrasha besides the din of nesina of tzedaka, then in our case, the hafrasha is all that is needed to fulfill the minhag of Maaser Kesafim.  Once I was mafrish and it's in the parsha of Tzedaka, I follow the dinim of Tzedaka.  One of the dinim is that, according to the Rosh/Tur, I can be masneh to give it over a long period.

Reb Moshe's diyuk in the almost invisible difference between the language of RSG ( חייב אדם להקדים פרנסתו לכל אדם ואינו חייב לתת צדקה עד שיהיה לו פרנסתו)and the Rama (פרנסת עצמו קודמת לכל אדם ואינו חייב לתת צדקה עד שיהיה לו פרנסתו) seems like a very slim reed to support this tremendous difference in the din of Tzedaka.  Reb Moshe himself says later in the piecee that this diyuk is tzarich iyun le'dinah, because the idea that there's a mitzva of hafrasha alone, based on an asmachta to matanos from produce, is far fetched.  But in the end he says that he believes that the diyuk in the Rama is valid, and if Reb Moshe says so, you can take that to the bank with you.


2.  Rav Wozner, in vol 5:131, on YD 247, brings that there are those who hold that Maaser kesafim obligates hafrasha even where there is no recipient- you're chayav to do the hafrasha even when there's no nesina.  He argues.  It appears that he holds that hafrasha alone is nothing as far as the idea of Maaser Kesafim.  On the other hand, it appears that the shittah he is arguing with, the Rishon LeTzion from the Pri Toar (brought more clearly in his vol 4:124) holds that the hafrasha is a kiyum of MK; if so, maybe the DAF will work.

Here's the Pri Toar:
מצות עשה ליתן צדקה — מצוה זו יש בה כמה פרטים הא׳ — דאפילו מבלי תובעים אותו מצוה על האדם להפריש מממונו צדקה ולחפש עני לתתה לו, וההפרשה היא אחת מעשרה וראי׳ ממה דאיתא בספרי וכתבוהו תוס׳ תענית ע׳ ע״א וז״ל תעשר וכו׳ אין לי אלא תבואת זרעך מנין לרבות רבית ופרקמטי׳ ושאר רווחים ת״ל את כל וכו׳ — הרי דדמיא למעשר ומזה אתה למד דהויא כמעשר דהגם דאין לו תובע לא יפטר מלעשר אלא יעשר ויניח עד שימצא לוי לתתו לו ויש בזה מצות עשה, אבל אין בה לאו אלא דוקא אם בא העני ושאל אי נמי שיודע שיש עני נצרך והוא מעלים עין ולזה כ׳ הרמכ״ם פ״ז ממתנת עניים וז״ל כל הראה עני מבקש ומעלים עין ממנו עובר בלאו הרי דלא עבר בלאו אלא בכה״ג 
Rav Wozner says that there is no mitzva when there are no aniyim, there is no din of hafrasha that is separate from nesinah.  Either you give it to the ani, or you've done nothing.
According to this, Rav Wozner would not view our hafrasha as a fulfillment of any sort of mitzva of tzedaka.  The Pri Toar would.
However, if you'll read the teshuva, it appears that Rav Wozner agrees that as far as the din/minhag of Maaser Kesafim, it could be that there is a new mitzva of hafrasha.  His words-
אלא כנ״ל דמה״ת ודאי לא חייב רק בקיימי עניים, או בעניים תובעים, או לתת לגבאים שיש להם עניים מקבלים, אבל בלא הא ליכא דין הפרשה מה״ת וצדקה אם לא ממדת חסידות או מתקנת רז״ל כמש״כ בפוסקים בדיני מעשר כספים
So even Rav Wozner would agree that you fulfill the din of Maaser Kesafim with the immediate hafrasha.



We are assuming that my funding of a DAF is called a hafrasha, and the administrators have the status of gabbaim, since ultimately we know for a fact that they will give the money to the tzedaka I advise/designate.




I discussed this issue with Harav Shmuel Fuerst, and he stated clearly that creating a DAF with the intention of giving the money to tzedaka over time does fulfill the din of Maaser Kesafim.  I asked him about the hafrasha/nesina issue, and he said that based on the Rosh/Tur we mentioned, it is a kiyum of the din of Maaser Kesafim.



So it appears that everything is fine.  I had a very hard time understanding how you can fulfill anything that has to do with Tzedaka with a hafrasha.  Who cares that you're mafrish?  א"ר אלעזר אין צדקה משתלמת אלא לפי חסד שבה שנאמר זרעו לכם לצדקה וקצרו לפי חסד


The answer has to be that, as Rav Wozner says clearly and Reb Moshe discusses as well, that ein hachi nami, Tzedaka per se is only meaningful when it gets to the ani, and a hafrasha has nothing to do with the mitzvah of tzedaka.  But Maaser Kesafim is akin to matanos, and matanos have a din hafrasha besides the din of nesina.  


For the moment, I'm going to link to some relevant articles.  I'll winnow them out later.


Here is the biggest Jewish DAF.  While administrative costs are higher, at least it's going to a Jewish fund. https://www.jcfny.org/

Re that fund, see
http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/jewish-communal-fund-sees-11-percent-increase-in-grants-totaling-297-million/2015/08/07/
On the other hand, see
http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/opinions/expose-jewish-communal-fund-seeks-to-cover-up-their-7-figure-funding-of-israel-boycott/2015/08/27/
and
http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/03/12/why-is-the-jewish-communal-fund-allowing-grants-to-nif/#

One must remember that they were not acting on their own initiative, merely doing what the fund donor advised.  Still, it weakens the claim to be an organization that exists for the betterment of Judaism and the Jews.


Generally-

http://jewishlinknj.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7768:ez-daf-enhanced-tzedakah-with-donor-advised-funds&catid=160:business-spotlight&Itemid=572


The following is a general discussion of the idea that in Matanos there might be two dinim, hafrasha and nesina.


Here's the Ramban in Sefer HaMitzvos regarding the separation of hafrasha and nesina into two mitzvos.  From the Ramban, you will see that the Rambam holds not like this.  And in any case, again, this makes more sense by matanos than by stam tzedaka.


והראייה עוד שהיא מצוה חיובם לברך על הפרשתם כמו ששנינו (תרומו' פ"א מ"ו) חמשה לא יתרומו ואם תרמו תרומתן תרומה האלם השכור הערום ובעל קרי. והיינו מפני שאינן יכולין לברך. ומפורש בתוספתא באחרון שלברכות (הי"ט) ההולך להפריש תרומה ומעשרות אומר אקב"ו להפריש תרומה ומעשרות מאימתי מברך עליהם משעה שמפרישן. ואילו היה המצוה עלינו הנתינה לכהן מפסוק ראשית דגנך תירושך ויצהרך תתן לו בלבד לא היו גוזרין עלינו לברך בשעת הפרשה מן הכלל המסור לנו מהם כל מצוה שעשייתה אינו גמר מלאכתה כגון תפלין אין צריך לברך כמו שנתבאר (בחמשי) [ברביעי] שלמנחות (מב ב)  וכיון שאמרו לנו לברך בשעת הפרשה אקב"ו להפריש תרומה או להפריש מעשר למדנו שבהפרשה מצוה. ועוד שהרי הכהנים עצמם מפרישים תרומה ומעשרות ומברכין גם כן עליהם כמו שדרשו [הובא פ"א ממעשר סה"ג] מפסוק כן תרימו אלו לויים גם אתם אלו כהנים. ואילו לא היה במצוה אלא הנתינה בלבד היו הם פטורים מזה. ועוד שהרי בחלה טמאה מברך בהפרשתה ואינה ניתנת לכהן אלא משליכה באור כמו שמוזכר בגמר בכורות (כז א) ואם כן ראוי שנמנה שתי מצות בתרומה הפרשתה מפסוק תרימו תרומה לי"י ונתינה לכהן מפסוק תתן לו... ויעלו בידנו במנין הפרשת החלה והתרומה והמעשרות הראשון ושל העני ונתינתן הם מצות משלימות לנו החשבון:

And the Chazon Ish in Maasros 7:24, that if you think that hafrasha by Truma is only a hafrasha when he intends to give it to the Kohen, but if he intends to be mafrish and pour it out, what good is the hafrasha?  He says you would be wrong.  It's a hafrasha nonetheless.

 והדין מבואר גם בגמ' שבת י"ז ב' דאמר משום תרומה ביד ישראל ופריך אם איתא דרוצה לקפח את הכהנים היה מפריש חטה אחת ואם איתא דלא מיתקן הכרי הו"ל למפרך הא קאכיל טבלים ואפרושי נמי לא לפרוש ובמכות י"ז א' אמר טעמא דר"א שא"צ לקרוא שם למ"ע דכיון דממונא הוא מפריש לי' ואינו נותן אלמא שהכרי מתוקן ובבכורות ל' א' פי' תו' החשוד על המעשרות היינו לאכלן חוץ לירושלים אבל אינו חשוד על הפרשה ופירשו כן הא דאמר חושש משום מעשר ואם איתא דמפריש מע"ש ע"מ לאכלן בבית אין הכרי מתוקן א"כ אין כאן מ"ש כלל אלא טבל ולמה חושש משום מעשר הרי יש כאן משום טבל ויכול לתקן דמאי ואין כאן משום מעשר ובב"ק קט"ו ב' לימא מהפקירא קזכינא כו' וראה שהן משתברות וכו' ומאי ראיה דילמא שאני תרומה דהמפריש ע"מ לשופכו אינו תרומה דעיקרה הנאת כהן אלא בודאי המפריש ע"מ לשפוך לארץ הוי תרומה ואפי' שפכן אח"כ 


And here is something I wrote ten years ago about Challah:

.......machlokes the Magen Avraham and Reb Akiva Eiger and Rashi (and maybe the Rambam) against the Taz and the Gaon (and maybe the Ramban).  The  Magen Avraham  in OC 8:2 asks why the mishna in Challa allows the bracha on hafrashas challa while seated, when in general brachos should be said while standing.  He answers that this mitzva is only a mattir, like Shechita, so it is not like other mitzvos.  The Gaon there disagrees, as follows: ודברי מג"א שחלה אינה מצוה, דבריו אין להם שחר, והלא אסור לעשות עיסתו קבין כדי להפקיע חיוב חלה כאמור ביו"ד סי' שכ"ד סי"ד ואמרי' בפ"ג דפסחים [מח,ב,] מאי דעתך לחומרא חומרא דאתי לידי קולא, דמפקע ליה מחלה   The Taz in YD 1:17 says clearly that there is a mitzva to be mafrish even if you have no intention of eating the rest and don't need a mattir.  Reb Akiva Eiger there mentions the Magen Avraham and holds like him, against the Taz:  לא מצאתי זה, דבפשוטו הוא רק כשרוצה לאכלו אסור עד שיפריש תרומה, ובמג"א ריש סי' ח' כתב כן לענין חלה ע"ש, וה"נ בתרומה.  Reb Aharon and the Chavatzeles Hasharon (Carlebach) point out that the passuk in Shlach, Bamidbar 15:19, and a similar passuk by Teruma in Devarim 14:22, use the word "B'achlechem," which seems to support the Magen Avraham.  Also, see Rashi in Gittin 47b: ד"ה מדאורייתא: דביכורים מצוה דרמיא עליה היא ולא טבלי לאסור פירות באכילה וכו'. ולא דמי למעשר וכו' דמעשר טביל ואסר ליה באכילה, ולא מצוה דרמיא עליה היא, אלא אם כן אוכלן או מוכרן דקא משתרשי ליה, clearly like the Magen Avraham.

Obviously, our case is different, because he does intend to give it eventually.  My only question was whether he's mekayeim the mitzva of tzedaka with the hafrasha, or only later when he actually gives it to the nitzrachim.

Just for shleimus, here's a conversation I and another commentator had on Reb Chaim B's blog regarding the question that chita achas poteres, but there's a din of kdei nesina:


pellehDin9:05 AM
As at Shlach 15:20, Rashi is saying pshat in the concept of titain/titnu - k'dei nesina. Although chitta achas poteres es ha'kri, it is not mekayem the d'oraysa of k'dei nesina. 
However, k'dei nesina implies a certain minimal amount, similar to the minimum amount to give each oni from ma'asar oni. This minimal amount would satisfy the obligation regardless if it was given from 100 pounds of challah or grain, or from 100 tons. Continues Rashi that the Chachamim said pshat in k'dei nesina that it is proportional to the amount being tithed.
This is not a takana or gzeira: this is nosnu shiur. K'dei nesina means a minimal amount or a proportional amount, whichever is greater. One who gives the minimal amount when it is less than one in sixty is not mekayem k'dei nesina. Perhaps more than by the melochos asuros on Chal Hamo'ed, this shiur is de'oraysa for k'dei nesina, because it is not a value judgement by the Chachamim but rather the pshat in the words.
However, the halacha of chitta achas poteres es hakri remains regarding tevel, because that is a din in torimu, not titnu.

Eliezer Eisenberg10:35 AMFor pellehDin to say that there are two dinim deoraysa in matanos, hafrasha which has no shiur and nesina that has a shiur, is a blithe assertion of an unprecedented proposition of such novelty that it requires a good deal more support than "how do I know so, because I think so."Fortunately, the Noda beYehuda in Tinyana YD 201 says exactly what he says.

Eliezer Eisenberg10:45 AMI just want to add that the Noda beYehuda himself says "ויש לי לומר בזה דבר חדש לא קדמני בזה שום מפרש או פוסק," and indeed the Aruch haShulchan (Trumos 60:4-5) disagrees. He says you can't say you're not yotzei nesina midorasa, Instead, you're yotzei, but the Torah calls it a chet, like min ha'ra'ah.

pellehDin11:25 AMAccording to both, however, k'dai nesina is separate from hafrasha. The parameters of which Rashi is clearly elucidating.

pellehDin11:33 AM
And BTW, the fact that one is yotzai harama min haTorah even min ha'ra'ah seems to be the makor for chazal establishing three shiurim for nesina by teruma.



I realize that this is booooring if you're not in the parsha or in the sugya, but if anyone has any experience or expertise with this matter, I would appreciate your thoughts.

Sunday, October 4, 2015

Walking out of the Sukkah

Several current Israeli gedolei haposkim have said that if you make kiddush in the Sukkah, and walk out to wash netilas yadayim for hamotzi, you've lost your Kiddush Bemakom Seudah and you have to make kiddush again, unless you yourself drank a reviis.

My father was not noheig like that, I am not noheig like that, and the Feinsteins are not noheig like that.  Nobody I know is noheig like that. One might argue that this was just an oversight, and makom heinichu etc.  But Reb Yossele Slutzker, a great poseik and a talmid of Reb Chaim Volozhiner, addressed the question and said that exactly this case happened once when he was in Reb Chaim Volozhiner's sukkah, and everyone yelled at him to make kiddush again, as the Magen Avraham (273 SK 5 DH Tzarich) says is necessary.  Reb Chaim said it's not a problem, because כיון שהניח מקצת חבירים שנתחברו יחד כדי לצאת בקידוש זה וחזר לחביריו, it is like the halacha in in OC 178 that shinui makom does not create a new chiyuv bracha when you left chaveirim in the first place.  This is in teshuva 7.

ואגב דקיימינן בהאי ענינא דקידוש במקום סעודה אמרתי לכתוב כאן מה ששמעתי מפ"ק אדמו"ר הגאןן המפורסם החסיד מהור"ר חיים זצןק"ל בעל נפש החיים בהיותינו יחד הוציא אןותנו בקידוש ליל א' של יו"ט ואחר הקידוש יצא אחד לחוץ ןחזר מיד ואוושו עליו שצריך לחזור ולקדש כמו דכתב המ"א בסימן רע"ג סק"ה ד"ה צריך כו' דאם יצא ממקומו בנתיים צריך לקדש שנית ואמר מורנו שאין צריך כיןן שהניח מקצת חבריס שנתחברו יחד כדי לצאת בקידוש זה וחזר לחביריו הו"ל כההיא דסימן קע"ח דבהניח מקצת חבריס אין צריך לחזןור ןלברך בשינוי מקוס ואע"ג שדבריו ז"ל אין צריך חיזןוק יש לצרף מה שראיתי בחידושי הריטב"א במסכת סוכה דף מ"ה ד"ה ורבה כו' דז"ל מיהו כי אמרינן דמברך על הסוכה כל זמן שנכנס בה היינו כשיוצא מתחלה יציאה גמורה לעשות ענינו ושלא לחזור לאלתר דהוי כחליצה דתפילין אבל לא יצא מתחלה אלא לדבר עס חבירו אן להביא דבר לסוכה לצורך שעתו לא הויא יציאה כלל לחייבו בברכה כשחוזר וכיוצא בזה לענין ברכת נהנין כשעמד בתוך הסעודה על דעת לחזור לאלתר שאינן טעןון ברכה לאחריו ולא לפנין ולקבעי הדר ואע"פ שלא הניח שס זקן אן חולה וכדפרישנא בדוכתא עכ"ל הריטב"א וצ"ע שלא הביאו דעתו כלל וכפי העולה בזכרוני ראיתי פ"א בכנה"ג דחולק על גוף הדין של המ"א ואין הספר ת"י לעיין בן ועיין בח"ש מה דכתבנן בדברי המג"א סימן קפ"ד סק"ג 


Josh and Avi put their finger on something that I was wonderring about, which is that the teshuva implies that if everyone was out of the sukkah, they would indeed have to repeat the kiddush.  I agree, it does seem that way.  The only reason I'm not 100% sure is because Reb Yossele in that teshuva says that while Reb Chaim doesn't need validation, he did find a Ritva in Sukkah 45, as follows.
מ"ה ד"ה ורבה כו' דז"ל מיהו כי אמרינן דמברך על הסוכה כל זמן שנכנס בה היינו כשיוצא מתחלה יציאה גמורה לעשות ענינו ושלא לחזור לאלתר דהוי כחליצה דתפילין אבל לא יצא מתחלה אלא לדבר עם חבירו או להביא דבר לסוכה לצורך שעתו לא הויא יציאה כלל לחייבו בברכה כשחוזר וכיוצא בזה לענין ברכת נהנין כשעמד בתוך הסעודה על דעת לחזור לאלתר שאינן טעון ברכה לאחריו ולא לפניו ולקבעי' הדר ואע"פ שלא הניח שם זקן אן חולה וכדפרישנא בדוכתא עכ"ל הריטב"א וצ"ע שלא הבאו דעתו כלל
Clearly, he disagrees with the essential din of the Magen Avraham.  In any case, I am not confident that he intended to pasken like that.  I believe he only wanted to say what Reb Chaim said, and I agree that Reb Chaim's statement does support the idea that if everyone goes out, at least if they all go out at once, they have to make kiddush again.
In one sense, this is a big chiddush, because hesech hadaas is more chamur by kiddush than it is by brachos, as the Biur Halacha says in 178.  On the other hand, assuming that heini'ach means it's not a hefesk, in other words, if the circumstances are clear that you absolutely intend to return and only walked out for a momentary need, then it's not a hefsek,, then your requirement to return and eat there because you made kiddush there (and that the kiddush would become a bracha levatala if it was batteil) creates the biggest possible keviyus.


In teshuva 22, he says a tremendous chiddush, a fascinating chumra, that coincidentally was also said by my oldest son, Reb Mordechai.  He says that even though you're not chayav to eat peiros in the sukkah, but if you're in middle of a meal and walk into the house, you can not eat peiros.  Your achila doesn't need a new bracha because it's part of the keviyus seuda- so it's a keviyus, and it cannot be outside of the sukkah. It's a pretty strong svara.

The sefer is not on hebrewbooks, but it is available in Otzar Hahochma, if you have a subscription.
שו"ת רבינו יוסף מסלוצק.  He writes beautifully, and he was the Rebbi muvhak of Reb Michaleh Trestiner, Reb Moshe's uncle, who made Reb Moshe's father's shidduch (but with a tnai, that Reb Dovid Feinstein drop his Kaidaner Chasidus, spend some years in Volozhin, and adopt minhagei haGra.  Funny thing is that even after Reb Dovid did this, he was the dayan, and then the Rov, of the Kaidaner kehillah in his town.)

Avi, in the comments, tells us that this is also said in modern sefarim, from Rav Feinhandler, and lhbchlch Rav Nissin Karelitz and Rav Ch Kanievsky.  I would add that this depends, of course, on whether you would make a bracha on the peiros or drink.  In other words, if it's at desert time and you're in the house taking an apple, it is likely that you ought to make a bracha on the apple itself because it's not lelafeis es hapas.  Even if you don't make a bracha, or if you would remove the safek by eating it with bread, there is enough reason to say that it's not part of the keviyus of the meal, and so it would be muttar to eat outside of the sukkah.  Although you might see this as a safek bittul asei, I would say that since you're away from your meal, and it's not really lelafeis, there is no safek at all.